*Image above: Khalid Qaraf and his son Nurdin shortly before his conscription into the Russian army

By Paul Goble

Moscow has launched a major conscription effort in the North Caucasus to recruit more soldiers there in the hopes of refilling the rapidly depleting ranks of its invasion force in Ukraine to avoid declaring a general mobilization or involving more ethnic Russians in the fighting. This represents a major change in Kremlin policy, not only because it focuses on the North Caucasus, a region that has largely escaped Putin’s disproportionate use of non-Russians since he launched his expanded war against Ukraine, but also because Moscow is using the military itself to carry out this impressment campaign rather than rely upon local officials to enforce this drive. That combination is now at risk because of the death of Nurdin Qaraf, a Circassian repatriant who died after being forced to serve in the Russian army—a development whose impact has been exacerbated by the threatening behavior of Russian security services against his family.

As a result, Moscow may be forced to double down or quit—either sending more Russian troops to the North Caucasus at the expense of pulling some units out of Ukraine, or scaling back this campaign entirely. Otherwise, what might have appeared in the Kremlin to be a natural extension of existing policies could spark a violent explosion in the North Caucasus and lead to the undermining of Russian influence across the Middle East, where millions of Circassians live and are extremely well-organized, particularly in Türkiye.

Since Putin launched his expanded war against Ukraine in February 2022, the Kremlin leader has disproportionately used troops drawn from poorer ethnic Russian regions and non-Russian republics. That has been widely reported, but what is much less well-known, although it has definitely been documented, is that this policy has adversely affected the North Caucasus, which in fact has sent far fewer troops to Ukraine and suffered far fewer deaths there than most have assumed.

Moscow’s Manpower Dilemma in the North Caucasus

Multiple factors explain this trend. First, Russian commanders long have been opposed to using North Caucasians as troops, worried that providing them with military training could give the North Caucasians the skills needed to one-day challenge Moscow. Indeed, from the end of Soviet times to 2014, the Russian government refused to draft North Caucasians; and it has continued to have fewer of them in the military than their share in the prime military-service age cohorts would suggest. Second, more than in any other non-Russian section of the Russian Federation, the North Caucasus has been the site of anti-war demonstrations since the beginning of the expanded conflict four years ago, an indication that people there harbor opposition to Putin’s war and reject serving in it. And third, there are today growing indications that even the most Kremlin-loyal leaders in the region, including Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov, do not want to see their young men fighting in what they increasingly view as “Russia’s war.”

*Image: Kadyrov units serving in the Russian Army

But now, as Putin’s war in Ukraine grinds into its fifth year and Russian forces are suffering ever greater losses, the Kremlin appears to have concluded that it has little choice but to find new ways to raise more men for its army. Going after North Caucasians who had escaped such service more frequently per capita than other non-Russians in the past is an obvious choice, and the one the Kremlin has made. But clearly aware of the problems such a recruitment campaign would face, Moscow decided to use its own military forces rather than rely upon the normal military recruitment system, which often lies in the hands of local people, to ensure that its campaign would be more effective.

To that end, earlier this year, Moscow began sending more predominantly ethnic Russian troops into the North Caucasus from which it had pulled units earlier to fight in Ukraine. In addition, Russian authorities appear to have focused their efforts on groups like the Circassians, a nation Moscow has worked to divide and which it would like to keep from uniting, given that there are currently 700,000 ethnic Circassians across the North Caucasus and more than seven million abroad, many of whom are interested in returning. Those two choices, using the Russian military and focusing particularly on the Circassians, have combined to generate severe difficulties that may jeopardize the entire Russian effort.

This assessment arises from a single incident—one largely overlooked in Moscow and the West, yet is drawing significant attention from Circassians both in their North Caucasus homeland and abroad. Earlier this year, Nurdin Qaraf, a Circassian who had returned to the North Caucasus from Syria, was compelled to join the Russian military. His family did not know of his fate and thought he was living with friends or relatives in Moscow. But when his father attempted to find his son after not hearing from him for more than six months and even appealed to Russian officials for assistance, the family was finally told that Nurdin had been killed. The officials provided no details or access to the body and at the same time warned his father Khalid that if he did not stop his efforts to learn about his deceased son, he would suffer the same fate. In addition, Russian propagandists launched a campaign to claim that Nurdin had fought proudly for his recovered country just as have many other Circassian repatriants.

Not surprisingly, neither Nurdin’s family nor Circassians more generally accept the Russian version of events. Instead, they believe, Moscow’s new effort to recruit Circassian returnees into the Russian army has three main goals. First, it seeks to reduce the number of Circassians in the North Caucasus both by having some of them killed in the war and by discouraging others from trying to come. Second, it helps Moscow with its war by providing the Russian army with cannon fodder. And third, and this may be especially important in Moscow’s calculations now, it is intended to sow discord between the Circassians and the Ukrainians who have increasingly shown greater interest in the fate of the Circassians and support for the effort of that nation to gain international recognition of the Russian genocide against their nation.

Outlook

The Qaraf case will greatly compound Moscow's problems among Circassians, not just in the North Caucasus but also in its vast overseas diaspora, where ever more people are paying attention to the recent development. However, the impact of this tragedy is not limited to these two groups. Instead, it is affecting other nations in the North Caucasus, like the Chechens, who can easily see that what the Russian government is imposing on the Circassians is a prelude to what it is likely to inflict on them. As a consequence, both Circassians and other non-Russians in the North Caucasus are becoming radicalized in their opposition to Moscow, something that could spark new violence there and jeopardize Russian control.

To avoid such outcomes, Moscow will likely deploy more military units into the North Caucasus to maintain stability there, something it is loath to do given the scarcity of Russian manpower to fight in Ukraine, or it will altogether have to scrap this project. Putin may prefer the former course to the latter, but either option is fraught with difficulties for the autocratic leader given that both highlight the weakness of the center brought on by the war in Ukraine, something cooler heads in the Russian capital might have recognized in advance but that Putin failed clearly to foresee.

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by George Vișan

In the early hours of June 5, 2026, a Ukrainian Sargan-3000 USV was discovered inside the Romanian Black Sea port of Constanța. The USV became entangled in a protection barrier on Pier 78 (Dana 78) in close proximity to facilities operated by the National Agency for Saving Human Life at Sea (ARSOVM), Romania’s maritime search and rescue service. The Ukrainian USV was likely part of a swarm of four sea drones en route to attack the Russian naval base at Novorossiysk from their home base in Odesa. The Ukrainian sea drone likely lost course as a result of Russian Electronic Warfare (EW) countermeasures, which disabled the USV. Following the Constanța drone incident, it should be noted that the Ukrainians hit Novorossiysk again using a similar Sargan-3000 USV after the June 5 incident, failing in their first attempt to sink a Russian patrol boat but later succeeding on July 14.

Romanian authorities attempted to disarm the Ukrainian drone in Constanța’s harbor after quickly establishing contact with their Ukrainian counterparts. However, around 10:30 am the drone exploded inside the harbor. Fortunately, the Ukrainian authorities warned their Romanian counterparts in time that the USV would self-destruct, and the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team tasked with the drone’s neutralization had enough time to evacuate. The subsequent explosion destroyed an ARSVOM facility and lightly damaged the pier, and as a result, no one was injured.

*Image above: Ukrainian drone explosion at Port of Constanța on June 5

The Importance of Constanța

Despite the positive outcome, the incident was extremely serious. The Port of Constanța is Romania’s biggest Black Sea port and handles, on a regular basis, oil and energy-related products, as well as chemical fertilizers, including a major oil terminal. One of Romania’s recently announced new naval priorities is to extend its military port facilities at Constanța by creating a new naval base to replace the outdated facility located deep inside the harbor. These plans are linked with Romania’s ongoing process of modernizing its naval forces and securing its maritime interests in the Black Sea. Efforts to create a new naval base are a welcome long-term development that would increase the capabilities of the Romanian Naval Forces. However, steps should be taken immediately to improve harbor security in the Port of Constanța due to the harbor’s vulnerability to the threat of unmanned systems.

Constanța is also the main operating base for the Forțele Navale Române (Romanian Naval Forces). Vessels with weapons systems on board are frequently moored at the main naval pier as ships regularly enter and leave the port. The risk of a large explosion remains high. The recent incident with the Ukrainian Sargan USV demonstrates the vulnerability of ports and harbors to unmanned systems. Both Ukraine and Russia have used unmanned naval systems to regularly infiltrate and strike targets within ports and naval bases up and down the Black Sea coast.

The Lack of Anti-USV Defenses

What is particularly concerning about the protection of the port of Constanța is that, at the time of the June 5 incident, it lacked an adequate system for detecting USVs. However, it did have an operational system for detecting and jamming UAVs, but it proved ineffective against USVs. Romania’s coastal surveillance system, SCOMAR, is not designed to detect sea drones. Its mission is optimized for law enforcement, to detect smugglers or vessels that fish illegally in Romanian waters. The system cannot detect surface targets smaller than 6 meters in length, and given their low profile and hulls built mostly of composites, USVs are practically invisible. SCOMAR is operated by the Ministry of the Interior and not by the Ministry of Defense.

A further consequence of the June 5 incident is that it revealed a complex - if not convoluted - decision-making process among different Romanian governmental agencies and ministries that deal with Constanța’s port security. For example, following the incident, the Romanian Ministry of Defense issued a statement claiming that the navy cannot protect maritime infrastructure during peacetime and that no legislation is in place that would authorize the military to intervene to resolve similar incidents or deal with potential grey zone activities.

Naval Basing Options & Constraints

Romanian Naval Forces are small and mostly obsolete despite past and current efforts to bring them into the 21^st century. Currently, the Romanian Navy is divided between the ports of Constanța and Mangalia, which have dedicated military port facilities, while the nascent naval air arm is based at Tuzla, a small locality situated between the two ports.

The 53^rd Frigate Flotilla and the 146^th Mine Warfare Squadron are homeported in Constanța, along with a number of auxiliaries (tugs, logistics ships, diver support ships and school ships). The 150^th Missile Squadron and the 50^th Corvette Squadron are homeported in the military harbor in Mangalia. Its ability to host large surface combatants is hampered by a road bridge that connects it to the rest of southern Dobruja and to the border crossing with Bulgaria. Mangalia is particularly important because it has a naval shipyard at Șantierul Naval 2 Mai that is used for maintenance and repair.

The Romanian Navy has always shared the port of Constanța with the merchant marine and the civilian operator of the port. However, the need to create a separate naval base from the civilian infrastructure was not considered a high priority. Historically, the navy has always been the smallest branch of the Romanian armed forces and is usually treated as an afterthought when it comes to funding. Usually, military vessels have been assigned to Pier O (Dana Zero) of the Port of Constanța. As the port was developed by the government and owned by the state, this situation never posed a problem.

In 1937, an attempt was made by the government to build a separate naval base for the navy and another commercial port on Lake Tașaul, which lies a few kilometers north of Constanța. The project did not progress beyond the groundbreaking ceremony due to a shortage of funding and the start of the Second World War. During World War II, the Royal Romanian Navy used the port of Constanța as its main base, and the Soviet Air Force and Soviet Navy repeatedly bombed the port, seeking to destroy both civilian and military shipping, in an effort to make the port’s infrastructure unusable. After the war, the project to build a separate naval base was abandoned and instead, in 1975, a refinery and oil terminal were built at the mouth of Lake Tașaul.

During the communist era, Romania’s small Black Sea fleet primarily used the ports of Constanța and Mangalia. As the state owned both the ports and the shipyards, the need for dedicated facilities for the maintenance of military vessels was not required. The Romanian Navy would simply use the civilian shipyard facilities for complex maintenance operations. Additionally, shipyards in both ports constructed new surface combatants for the Romanian Navy as commissioned by the communist regime.

The fall of communism changed all that. While the ports remain government-owned, the shipyards have been privatized. For maintenance operations that cannot be handled by the Navy’s logistics bases, a complex procurement process should be conducted, with a single shipyard ultimately selected to perform the work

Inaction on the New Naval Base

In 2025, the Romanian Ministry of Defense announced plans to expand the military port of Constanța. These plans include the development of a new military pier near the southern sea wall of the port. Selected for its accessibility and proximity to the strategically vital Danube-Black Sea Canal, this location offers significant operational advantages. The base’s connectivity streamlines logistical support, enabling seamless joint operations with the Romanian Land Forces alongside interagency cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and the Lower Danube Authority. Moreover, the new military pier will facilitate docking operations for Romanian navy ships as well as allied vessels that plan to visit the port. It will also host new infrastructure to help improve naval operations for deployments to not just the Black Sea, but also the Danube as well.

Despite being announced in 2025, no additional information has been published about the project, and so far no acquisition procedure has been launched to begin development of the new naval base. If completed, the extension of the military facilities at the Port of Constanța would greatly assist in the modernization and development of the Romanian Naval Forces and enhance its ability to project power to protect the offshore Neptun gas field. The new base would move some units of the Romanian Navy from their current location deep inside the harbor to a central point near the entrance, significantly enhancing its response time to sea-borne threats emanating from the Black Sea.

In light of these developments, two important pieces are missing from the government plans announcing this project. As the project has initially been presented, it does not have repair facilities, dry docks and/or floating docks needed to perform maintenance operations on the ships of the fleet. Such infrastructure would obviate the need to procure maintenance services from civilian shipyards, with the exception of complex maintenance procedures.

*Image above: Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV)

The second key issue concerns port security. The port of Constanța is extremely vulnerable to sea drone attacks, not only USVs, as evidenced by the June 5 explosion. If a Ukrainian USV were jammed or hacked by Russian Electronic Warfare (EW) countermeasures, then it could easily end up in Romania’s biggest port. Any well-planned sea drone attack involving a swarm of USVs could do extensive damage to port facilities and the military vessels moored inside it. The port is even more vulnerable to Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) than to USVs, as UUVs can infiltrate undetected if a port lacks adequate defenses and subsurface sensors. The difference between a USV and a UUV is that a UUV operates entirely beneath the water's surface (like a submarine or submersible), while a USV navigates on top of the surface, similar to a jet ski.

The port’s vulnerability to underwater unmanned vehicles (UUVs) is even higher than that posed by USVs, because UUV’s would have the specific ability to infiltrate without being detected in any port that is not protected and lacks adequate sensors to deal with unmanned systems.

Countering the USV Threat

To prevent a similar breach from occurring again, a network of early-warning sensors should be installed. Following the drone incident, an interim solution was considered for early warning against further potential USV infiltration incidents. Two Ocean Aero Triton autonomous underwater and surface vehicles (AUSV) were acquired and are now being used by the Coast Guard for surveillance missions outside the Port of Constanța.

Romanian authorities have yet to offer any public solutions to how to counter the threat posed by USVs. On August 28, 2025, Russian sea drones launched a surprise attack inside the Danube sinking the Ukrainian intelligence ship Simferopol. Moscow will in all likelihood continue to search for ways to infiltrate Romanian port facilities due to its previous success. What Romania urgently needs, before implementing any plans of expanding its military port facilities in Constanța is the creation and deployment of a sensor network to detect unmanned systems.

Acoustic sensors, FLIR sensors, LIDAR, and radar should be deployed in proximity to the ports of Constanța, Mangalia, and at the Danube River distributaries (mouths). This sensor network should be under the command of the Romanian Naval Forces and complement the existing Integrated Maritime Surveillance System (SCOMAR). Destruction of the unmanned systems once detected should be achieved using drone interceptors, air assets (helicopters, Unmanned Aircraft System, or UAS), air defense systems and surface combatants. Without adequate means to protect maritime infrastructure, Romania risks losing access to the sea as well as its navy.

Outlook

Efforts to develop military facilities in the Port of Constanța will greatly contribute to the development and modernization of the Romanian navy. However, securing the current port facilities should be prioritized and strongly reinforced in the near term as a result of the emerging threat posed by USVs. The threat matrix in the Black Sea has evolved exponentially over the past 18 months as the array of sophisticated threats grows due to the widening use of sea drones in naval warfare. Losing access to the sea and to the global markets can be achieved not only through blockade but also by destroying port infrastructure and Romania’s efforts to create a new naval base in the Port of Constanța will need to keep this factor in mind.

About the Author:

George Vișan is an expert on Romania and Black Sea Security and works as an expert on issues of peace and war for the Romanian Diplomatic Institute. He holds both undergraduate and postgraduate degrees in Political Science and International Relations from the University of Bucharest, and has published extensively on Romanian security and defense policy. From February 2022 to February 2024, he served as an advisor to the State Secretary for Strategic Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE). His opinions and research in this article are his own and do not reflect the official positions of the Romanian Diplomatic Institute nor the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania.

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Hi everyone!

As Russia prepares for the upcoming State Duma (parliament) elections from September 18–20, 2026, tremendous speculation exists as to whether Moscow will initiate a nationwide military mobilization to mount one final effort to defeat Ukraine in the fifth year of Putin’s war, while Russia moves closer to exhausting its manpower base.

In our new special report, “Russia’s Force-Generation Strategy After the Duma Elections,” Senior Fellow Roger N. McDermott evaluates the trajectory of Moscow’s military recruitment pipeline, the viability of a post-election call-up, and the long-term outlook for Russian force generation as Moscow struggles to find enough military personnel to offset its battlefield losses, now estimated to be 1.4 million, killed, wounded and missing through June 2026.

Key Takeaways & Findings

• Post-Election Mobilization Dynamics: While an immediate post-election announcement in September is politically sensitive, a post-ballot decision implemented during October or late autumn is far more credible. However, Moscow is more likely to intensify its current model of “mobilization by other means”—combining targeted compulsory measures, financial incentives, regional targets, and administrative pressure—rather than declaring an open nationwide draft of 300,000–500,000 men.

• Force-Generation System Under Strain: Russian volunteer recruitment saw a sharp drop in Q1 2026 (70,500–71,200 new contracts, or ~800/day) before recovering slightly to ~1,000/day (see graph below). While the system has not failed, its efficiency is rapidly declining. Municipalities, employers, bailiffs, and prison officials are constantly pressured to sustain manpower intake to replace battlefield losses rather than building substantial net force growth.

• Military Impact vs. Immediate Effect: A potential public target of 300,000–500,000 personnel should be understood as a phased program spanning several months aimed at rotational relief, filling rear-area roles, and building operational depth for 2027. Bottlenecks in training capacity, equipment, junior leadership, and Ukrainian interdiction risks prevent such a force from rapidly converting into immediate combat power before winter.

• Evaluating the Evidence: While digital registry reforms, administrative updates, and local decrees confirm that the Russian state has significantly enhanced its technical capacity for a call-up, there is currently no evidence confirming that President Vladimir Putin has authorized a final mobilization plan, quota, or official execution date.

It is critically important to understand the real mechanics of Russia’s force generation in terms of assessing the long-term sustainability of Moscow’s ongoing military operations and operational dynamics going into 2027, which will likely be a decisive year in the war. Please download the full report: 👉 here.

Sincerely,

Glen E. Howard

President, The Saratoga Foundation

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By Alexander Melikishvili

Speaking at the XXII Forum of Interregional Cooperation in Omsk on July 25, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev for the first time suggested to his Russian counterpart that the war in Ukraine be frozen. He characterized the war as an “interstate conflict” and emphasized that its nature was “not entirely clear to many, including us.” Tokayev also categorically rejected the idea of Kazakhstan as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine. The Kazakh leader’s choice of venue could not have been better, as Russia has such a close level of cooperation at the regional level only with select countries in its “near abroad,” including Armenia, Belarus, and Uzbekistan.

The timing of Tokayev’s remarks reflects the urgency that Kazakhstan feels due to the adverse impact the war has on the operations of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) at Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. Kazakhstan is vitally dependent on the uninterrupted operations of the CPC’s Yuzhnaya Ozereyevka terminal near Novorossiysk because roughly two thirds of its oil exports reach global energy markets (mainly Europe) through that chokepoint.

On July 17, a news report, citing the CPC’s Telegram channel, noted that the ExxonMobil-chartered tanker Nordic Zenith (sailing under the Liberian flag) was attacked by two drones en route to the CPC terminal, where it was scheduled to load Kazakh oil. The drones caused a fire aboard the vessel, leading to the partial evacuation of the crew, but the vessel remained afloat. On July 19–20, more tankers came under Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) attacks, according to two press releases issued by the CPC. On July 19, the Liberian-flagged ASIA and Marshall Islands-flagged NISSOS IOS were attacked by UAVs while they were loading from the CPC’s single point moorings (SPMs) 1 and 2. On July 20, the Cameroon-flagged tanker NELSA was attacked by UAVs as it was loading at SPM-1. None of these attacks resulted in any sunk vessels, oil spills, or damage to the CPC’s assets, including SPM-1 and SPM-2. Interestingly, neither the CPC press releases nor the press statement released by Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 19 mention Ukraine by name.

Kazakhstan’s Black Sea Nightmare

The attacks prompted the CPC to temporarily suspend its operations. However, because Kazakhstan is so dependent on Novorossiysk for its oil exports, any disruptions at the CPC terminal imply that oil production at its three main oil fields—Kashagan, Karachaganak, and Tengiz—must be reduced. On July 23, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy announced that a “controlled adjustment” of production levels had been introduced without specifying its scale. Nonetheless, two anonymous industry sources told Reuters that, as of July 22, the extraction of oil and gas condensate in Kazakhstan had contracted to 1.63 million barrels a day (compared to the daily average of 2.07 million since the start of the month). Per these accounts, daily oil production at the Tengiz field had to be lowered to 406,000 barrels on July 22, instead of 925,000.

On July 27, Reuters reported that CPC interruptions resulted in oil production being halved in Kazakhstan. Chevron owns a 15% stake in the CPC and a 50% stake in the Tengizchevroil international consortium that is developing the Tengiz field, which explains why Chevron raised its concerns with the Trump administration, as reported by The Wall Street Journal on July 24.

Kazakhstan can certainly withstand short-term CPC interruptions, even if they stretch into weeks or months, because it has ample foreign currency and gold reserves, which, as of the end of June, stood at $127.31 billion, according to the National Bank of Kazakhstan. Commenting on the CPC interruptions on July 24, the Chairman of the National Bank, Timur Suleymenov, stated that Kazakhstan’s central bank was ready to stabilize the exchange rate, if necessary. It appears that the crisis has been averted, as Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy reported on July 27 that the offshore loading of tankers had resumed at the CPC’s SPM-1 and SPM-2. In particular, the Liberian-flagged tanker SEA MAJESTY and the Greek-flagged tanker Milos were receiving Kazakh oil (belonging to Tengizchevroil) without any interruptions. While Kazakhstan and US energy majors can breathe a sigh of relief, their critical dependence on the CPC remains unchanged.

No short- or even medium-term solutions exist to fix this problem, as Kazakhstan sends about 60 million tons of oil for export via the CPC on an annual basis. Given the existing pipeline topography in the region, namely that the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) and/or Atasu–Alashankou pipelines (to China) are limited in their export capabilities, it is simply not possible to reroute this much oil via these energy outlets. BTC capacity is 1.2 million barrels per day (bpd), while the CPC pipeline is 1 million bpd, and any effort to reroute additional oil from this overland pipeline to Azerbaijan via the Caspian is virtually impossible.

These logistical bottlenecks are further exacerbated by the surprising announcement of the Russian Ministry of Defense on July 22, according to which Russia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), extending 200 nautical miles from the coast, has been declared unsafe for commercial navigation due to attacks by Ukrainian UAVs and seaborne USVs (unmanned surface vehicles). Although this announcement is advisory and does not prohibit vessels from entering Russia’s EEZ in the Black Sea, it will definitely increase insurance premiums, making maritime transportation of all cargo, including oil, more expensive. It reflects the continuously deteriorating maritime security situation in the northern part of the Black Sea, where, according to the Ukrainian military, 124 vessels linked to Russia were attacked between July 8 and July 20, including 89 tankers, as quoted by Bloomberg on July 23.

Meanwhile, Russia is also not sitting idly by. It is regularly attacking vessels carrying cargo to and from Ukraine. On July 21, for example, it attacked a Liberian-flagged LPG tanker en route to the Ukrainian port of Reni, wounding three crew members, Agence France-Presse reports. On July 19, in the gravest maritime attack to date, Russia launched three Kh-59/Kh-69 cruise missiles against the Guinea-Bissau-flagged (and Turkish-owned) bulk carrier GOLDEN LEO (carrying grain) in close proximity to the port of Odesa, killing ten sailors, including four Indian nationals, and prompting the Indian government to summon the Russian Chargé d’Affaires, Mr Vladimir Ladanov, on July 21.

Outlook

Following the formal warning that Ukrainian authorities reportedly received from the Trump administration late last week not to attack CPC assets and non-Russian tankers in the Black Sea due to concerns expressed by the CEO of Chevron, Mike Wirth, it is very likely that Ukraine will comply. Officials in Ukraine are eager to capitalize on the US commitments made after the NATO summit in Ankara on July 7–8, including the license to manufacture interceptor missiles for Patriot air defense systems that are vital for shooting down Russian missiles. Thus, Kyiv would not want to jeopardize this positive momentum in its at times tumultuous relations with Washington.

Kazakhstan greatly matters to the United States because it accounts for 2% of global oil production. Knocking Kazakhstan’s oil exports offline by destroying the CPC terminal (all three SPMs) would increase oil prices, which is something that the White House is keen to avoid, especially ahead of the contentious midterm elections in the United States in November. It is almost certain that the CPC and Novorossiysk are a priority issue to be discussed by Trump and Zelensky when they met in Washington earlier today.

As for Kazakhstan’s options, there is a trans-Caspian pipeline project that would leave Russia out, connecting Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan across the Caspian seabed, but here the biggest impediments will be Russia and Iran. The Caspian littoral states abide by the 2018 Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, which contains clauses that both Russia and Iran interpret as allowing them to veto any trans-Caspian projects under the pretext of environmental concerns.

Russia will do everything within its power to derail any pipeline project that would reduce Kazakhstan’s dependence on the CPC and Novorossiysk. This includes Kazakhstan’s oil pipeline to China, which has limited throughput capacity and would have to be significantly expanded, requiring considerable capital investment. More importantly, at present Russia uses the Atasu–Alashankou pipeline to export 10 million tons of oil annually to China via Kazakhstan. In fact, Kazakhstan and Russia signed an agreement only recently to increase this volume by 2.5 million tons.

Lastly, Kazakhstan’s predicament is the toxic legacy of Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan’s First President, who failed to see the wisdom of maintaining diverse oil export routes. Although Tokayev has consistently spoken of the need to diversify oil export routes since assuming the presidency in 2019, little has been done in practice apart from the modest volumes sent in transit via the Baku-Tbilisi Ceyhan pipeline.

About the Author:

Alex Melikishvili is a senior country risk analyst with more than a decade of experience working in the private sector (S&P Global, IHS Markit) with a focus on Eurasian security. Alex holds a master’s degree in International Affairs from the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

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by Andrew McGregor

In the latest phase of an insurgency that began in 2012, the ability of Mali’s military regime to fend off a rebel insurgency has been sorely tested by a rebel offensive that began in April with coordinated attacks across Mali’s 479,000 square miles (by comparison, Texas covers a total area of 268,596 square miles).

The offensive is being carried out by an unlikely partnership of two Tuareg-dominated groups – the Salafi-Jihadist Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa’l-Muslimin (JNIM, led by Iyad Ag Ghali) and the separatist Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA, led by Alghabass Ag Intalla). Though the latter seek the creation of Azawad, an independent state in northern Mali, Ag Ghali and his followers seek the transformation of Mali into an Islamic State based on Shari’a. For the purpose of operations, the two groups work closely together in northern Mali, while operations in the Central and Southern regions of Mali are often carried out by JNIM alone.

Mali’s military regime is defended by the Forces Armées Maliennes (FAMa, led by Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces Élisée Jean Dao) and their Russian partners, the Africa Corps, which succeeded the Russian Wagner Group in June 2025. The Wagner “withdrawal” (many Wagner personnel in Mali simply switched over to the new Africa Corps) was accompanied by a significant uptick in JNIM and FLA attacks, most notably in regions of Mali where the militant groups had not previously operated. There is significant friction between FAMa and the Russians, who tend to operate independently while helping themselves to FAMa arms and equipment. The Russian military presence has been accompanied by a sharp increase in human rights abuses and civilian casualties, though all parties to the conflict have demonstrated little respect for civilian life.

The coordinated attacks in April (which included strikes in the capital itself) shook the Malian regime and led to the loss of a number of population centers in the north, including Kidal, Aguelhoc and Tessalit in the Kidal region, Ber in the Timbuktu region, and Tessit in the Gao region. The loss of Kidal came as a shock to the Africa Corps, which had proclaimed its role in taking the rebel stronghold in November 2023 by raising a Russian flag over the city. The insurgents also succeeded in killing FAMa commander Sadio Camara during an attack on the Kati military base outside Bamako.

Rebel Offensive – July 2026

On July 4, the FLA and JNIM launched coordinated attacks in Aguelhoc (retaken by government forces after April), Anéfis, and Gao in the north, Sévaré in the central region (home to a large army base and an airport), and at the prison at Kéniéroba in the south (46 miles from Bamako), where many opposition figures are held (the latter attack failed to free any prisoners). The dispersed July attacks followed similar the pattern used in April. Airstrikes were carried out against JNIM/FLA fighters concentrated at Aguelhoc in the northeast, where the latest insurgency began with the slaughter of the Aguelhoc FAMa garrison by jihadists under the command of Iyad Ag Ghali in 2012.

Anéfis has a small population of 8,000 residents, but is strategically located and home to a base used by both FAMa and the Africa Corps. Most of Anéfis was taken by the rebels on July 4, but parts of the Malian/Russian garrison continued to fight, with the Russians defending their position with drones. Intense fighting followed at Anéfis on the 5^th and 6^th as rebel reinforcements poured in on 4x4 trucks. By July 7, FAMa drones and fighter jets began taking a toll on attackers. As fighting continued on the 8^th, a Malian/Russian relief column of 60 vehicles left Gao for Anéfis, with air cover provided by helicopters and surveillance drones.

The militants inflicted a devastating July 9 attack on the relief convoy. Military assistance was required from Niger and Burkina Faso to relieve the attack on the Russian/Malian column. Nonetheless, FAMa issued a proclamation that declared the situation had stabilized. Before switching to regional sweeps, FAMa claimed the elimination of 330 “terrorists” and the re-occupation of Anéfis. During a ceremony in Bamako celebrating the FAMa/AC “victory” in Anéfis, an Africa Corps speaker declared “Terrorism is a scourge created by Western countries to divide and dominate.”

The FAMa Strategy

FAMa commander Elisée Jean Dao led Mali’s National Guard (the“Brown Berets”) in the January 2013 Battle of Konna (the first significant reverse for Iyad Ag Ghali and the jihadist coalition) and the retaking of Gao from the Islamists. After advanced military training in France in 2015, Dao supported Colonel-Major Assimi Goïta’s post-coup junta in 2020. Dao served as ambassador to Gabon and China before becoming Mali’s Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces in May 2026. His appointment in May came at a time of continuing purges of senior FAMa officers suspected of ties to opposition figures and would-be mutineers.

General Dao insisted on July 11 that FAMa and its Russian partners had delivered a severe blow to the insurgents by allowing them to “concentrate their forces” in Anéfis before launching a coordinated counter-offensive that inflicted heavy losses. According to Dao, this strategy allowed government forces to target rebel military assets rarely caught out in the open, including armored vehicles and heavy weapons, as well as large numbers of the usual motorcycles and “technicals” that provide mobility for the insurgents. According to the general, one thousand rebels were “neutralized” at a cost of 30 soldiers killed and 60 wounded in the relief operation.

In the jubilation that followed FAMa’s expulsion of the insurgents from Anéfis, General Dao also spoke at length about the strategy that enabled the “victory.” The general began by describing the government’s April loss of the cities of Kidal and Tessalit as “a ruse” that brought the insurgents “within range.” Anéfis, in a “truly flat terrain,” was held as “a kind of bait” to draw out the enemy’s armored vehicles, anti-aircraft missiles, anti-tank guns and artillery for destruction, a method of bypassing the insurgents’ concealment skills: “Operation Anéfis was part of a comprehensive strategy for us that allowed us to gradually reduce the enemy’s capabilities, and well, they let themselves be caught, hoping to gain control…”

Financial incentives are another part of the regime’s strategy; a reward of 2 billion CFA francs ($3.5 million) was offered in June by Mali’s government for information leading to the “capture or neutralization” of JNIM leader Ag Ghali. Further rewards were offered for Ag Ghali’s Fulani deputy, Amadou Koufa, and Tuareg separatist leader Alghabass Ag Intalla.

*Image above: 50 Captured FAMa Soldiers After JNIM Convoy Attack

July 18 Ambush

Only days after General Dao proclaimed the success of the regime’s strategy, a FAMa convoy leaving Anéfis for Gao was ambushed near Tabankort by the jihadists and separatists on July 18, with over 50 soldiers and allies from pro-government militias killed and 24 taken prisoner. A convoy of Africa Corps personnel was reported to have left earlier for Gao; some reports claim no Russians were involved in the July 18 ambush, while others claim some Russians were with the FAMa convoy and among the known dead. Echoing the ruthless and demoralizing slaughter of bound FAMa prisoners at Aguelhoc by Ag Ghali’s Ansar al-Din movement in 2012, it appears that many of the prisoners taken in the latest ambush were massacred. Several armored vehicles were reported to have been taken intact, replacing earlier rebel losses.

The Role of Algeria

An Africa Corps statement claimed that that two leading Tuareg militants were eliminated during the fighting; FLA military leader Mbarek Ag Akli and JNIM military planner ‘Abd al-Rahman Zaza (Ag Akli was later seen alive on video discussing the battle). An unconfirmed local report alleged that Iyad Ag Ghali was seriously wounded in the battle and was transported with other wounded militants to an Algerian military hospital in the Saharan city of Tamanrasset. Malian authorities have frequently accused Algeria of harboring Tuareg militants over several decades, even though Algiers has a long record of acting as a mediator between Bamako and Tuareg rebel movements in northern Mali.

Mali’s relations with Algeria began to improve in July, a year after Algeria took down a Malian surveillance drone allegedly operating in its airspace. The sudden rapprochement is viewed as benefitting Algeria and Russia while further weakening French influence in the region and forestalling American efforts at a rapprochement with Mali. Russia favors the revival of the never fully implemented 2015 Algiers Accord as a means of restoring peace and security to the restless north after years of warfare and Russian military intervention has failed to provide a military solution.

Foreign Interference?

According to General Dao, the type of weapons FAMa is now encountering in the field are more suggestive of those held by a state rather than a rebel group, a situation the general believes is indicative of foreign support for the insurgents. Regime-friendly media in Mali attributes FAMa and Africa Corps difficulties to the entry of “battalions of mercenaries” into the conflict, including Algerians, Polisario fighters and Ukrainian instructors, all under the supervision of French legionnaires.

It was further claimed in the Malian press that the July 4 offensive was committed by “terrorists in the pay of Western powers” led by French president Emmanuel Macron “and some neighboring countries,” notably Algeria and Mauritania, who are alleged to be “awaiting the green light” from Paris before launching attacks against FAMa positions.

Ag Ghali, meanwhile, has called the cooperation of Mali’s ruling military council with “Russian proxies” traitorous, and has cited it as a reason to reject any negotiations with the state.

Outlook

The expansion of insurgent operations to Central and Southern Mali as well as the massive Northern province has forced FAMa to spread its forces across the nation rather than address the rebellion in the north alone, the traditional pattern. The joint insurgent strategy involves pulling Malian and Russian military resources in several directions at once, exposing convoys rushing to one hot-spot or another to ambushes in unfamiliar country.

Despite promoting a Salafist religious belief foreign to most Tuareg Muslims, Iyad Ag Ghali not only survives, but grows in power and influence every year. This is attributed to his strategic understanding of the Sahel conflict, one that has brought ideologically opposed Tuareg separatists under his leadership.

Does Ag Ghali seek the creation of a Chad-type situation, where a tiny desert minority (in Chad’s case, the Zaghawa) controls a large and diverse nation by force of arms and exclusion of other groups in the power structure? Given that the Tuareg are as divisive as the Zaghawa (both rebels and rulers in Chad hail from the same group), the main challenge to a Tuareg-led Islamist government in Mali would inevitably come primarily from rival armed Tuareg groups, including not only the separatists but also those (mostly from the vassal class) still loyal to Bamako. Unless Ag Ghali believes he can actually replace the existing government with that of an Islamic State, then it is likely that the growing number of attacks in the center and southern provinces and the blockade of fuel destined to Bamako are designed less to seize territory than to destabilize Mali’s military regime by exposing its weaknesses, internal rivalries and reliance upon an unpopular and erratic military partner, the Russian Africa Corps.

About the Author:

Dr. Andrew McGregor is director of Aberfoyle International Security, a Toronto-based consultancy specializing in the security issues of Africa and the Islamic world.

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By Vasif Huseynov

On July 16, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov arrived in Moscow for a two-day official visit, holding talks with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov on July 17. The two ministries used the occasion to sign a Plan of Consultations for 2026–2027 and to review the full range of bilateral relations — political dialogue, trade, transport, the Caspian, and the South Caucasus. On paper, this was a scheduled diplomatic reset. In substance, it marked the closing chapter of a year-and-a-half-long standoff in which the pace and conditions of reconciliation were largely set by Baku.

A few days earlier, at the fourth Shusha Global Media Forum on July 13, President Ilham Aliyev had already previewed this outcome. When asked about the state of ties with Moscow, Aliyev said: “Relations between our countries are developing very positively. You mentioned the difficulties. Yes, we all know about them. But what is important is that this period is now behind us. I would say that our relations have been fully normalized.”

That formulation, however, was not left to stand on its own. In Moscow four days later, Bayramov used almost the same identical language, telling Lavrov’s press conference that the two states had overcome their difficult period and fully normalized the entire spectrum of bilateral relations. Lavrov, for his part, stopped short of using the phrase himself, merely noting that Moscow had taken note of Aliyev’s statement and shared Baku’s understanding of the current situation — a small but telling asymmetry in how each side chose to characterize the same reconciliation.

A Crisis Moscow Could Not Simply Talk Its Way Out Of

To understand why the sequencing of Russia-Azerbaijan rapprochement matters, it is worth recalling how deep the rupture had been. On December 25, 2024, an Azerbaijan Airlines Embraer 190 flying from Baku to Grozny was struck by Russian air defenses as Ukrainian drones entered Russian airspace, then diverted across the Caspian and crashed near Aktau, Kazakhstan, killing 38 of the 67 people aboard. Moscow’s initial explanations — including theories about a bird strike or an onboard gas cylinder explosion — were dismissed by Aliyev at the time as absurd theories unbecoming of the response he expected from Moscow. Baku’s position was clear and sequential: acknowledgment of responsibility, an apology, accountability for those responsible, and compensation.

It took until October 9, 2025, when Putin met Aliyev in Dushanbe, for the Russian president to explicitly acknowledge that Russian air defense missiles had detonated near the aircraft, and to commit to compensation. Even then, it took another six months of technical negotiations before the two foreign ministries jointly confirmed, on April 15, 2026, that all outstanding issues — including the payment of compensation — had been resolved, with the crash attributed to an unintentional action of an air defense system in Russian airspace. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin, asked shortly afterward to confirm the settlement, said only that all issues linked to the tragedy’s aftermath had been resolved, declining to discuss specifics out of consideration for the victims’ families. No compensation figures were ever disclosed. But the sequence itself is instructive: full normalization did not proceed until Baku’s conditions had been met.

Baku’s Balanced, Multi-Vector Foreign Policy

What followed the Moscow talks reinforced the fact that reconciliation was never intended as a return to dependency. Days later, Aliyev traveled to Germany for an official visit, where he and Chancellor Friedrich Merz signed a joint declaration establishing a strategic partnership spanning energy, transport, green hydrogen, digital transformation, and industrial modernization. Aliyev used the occasion to highlight Azerbaijani gas flowing to ten EU member states and recent visits by European Council President António Costa and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to Baku. Restoring dialogue with Moscow and deepening ties with Berlin within the same week is a fairly clear illustration of what a genuinely multi-vector foreign policy looks like in practice: no single relationship is allowed to define the country’s options, and no single capital is treated as indispensable.

This is the frame through which the Russia file is best read — not as a standalone bilateral story, but as one strand in a foreign policy that has spent several years methodically diversifying. Azerbaijan has hosted senior European Union officials, expanded the Middle Corridor and Trans-Caspian energy links, deepened the Organization of Turkic States framework, forged closer ties with the United States, including a visit by the Vice President of the United States, and positioned itself as a facilitator during the U.S.-Iran war, all the while keeping its channel to Moscow open. Restoring ties with Russia does not reverse that trajectory so much as complete it, by resolving the one relationship that had been operating in crisis mode while every other vector continued to move forward.

Moscow’s Weakened Hand in the South Caucasus

Another development shaping Russian rapprochement with Azerbaijan is that in the past eighteen months since the crash Russia’s position in the South Caucasus has rapidly eroded, which went far beyond Moscow’s bilateral standing with Baku. The clearest marker came on August 8, 2025, when the United States brokered a peace framework between Armenia and Azerbaijan at the White House, under which Washington secured a long-term arrangement to develop the transit corridor through Armenia’s Syunik province linking mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave. Branded the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), the arrangement gave the United States a direct operational role in a corridor that, for decades, Russia had assumed it alone would help secure this axis.

Analysts have described the deal as effectively pushing Russia out of key processes in the South Caucasus, noting that Moscow’s traditional role as the region’s principal security guarantor was, for the first time, taken up by an outside power operating on Armenian soil. Simultaneously, this shift coincides with a broader overall decline in Russia’s standing in Armenia itself, where Yerevan has pursued its own diversification away from Moscow-centered security arrangements in favor of Western - and US-facilitated frameworks. In Azerbaijan, the retrenchment of Russian influence has been visible in a different way. In the weeks following the plane crash, Baku moved to close the Russian House in Baku, the local representative office of Rossotrudnichestvo, Russia’s state cultural and soft-power agency, after Azerbaijani authorities said the center had failed to register as a legal entity and had breached local law.

Around the same time, Azerbaijan also shut the Baku bureau of Sputnik, part of the Rossiya Segodnya media group, permitting the outlet only a single accredited correspondent going forward. As of this year, Rossotrudnichestvo’s own leadership was still describing the situation as unresolved: in February 2026, agency head Yevgeny Primakov said Moscow was seeking acceptable options to resume the Russian House’s operation in Baku as soon as possible, noting that the 1997 intergovernmental agreement on cultural centers technically remained in force. Neither institution has reopened yet.

*Map: The International North-South Corridor (INSTC) Versus the Persian Gulf

Moscow’s Strategic Urgency: The North-South Corridor

Against this backdrop, it is worth noting where the balance of need now sits on infrastructure Russia itself greatly depends upon. At his joint press conference with Bayramov, Lavrov was notably direct about why the North-South Transport Corridor’s western branch — running through Azerbaijan and Iran — has become urgent for Moscow specifically. With the Strait of Hormuz crisis dragging on and disrupting global transport routes, Lavrov said the corridor’s importance had grown accordingly. He noted that Iran had finally completed land allocation for the long-delayed Rasht-Astara railway link, the corridor’s last missing segment, and that railway officials from Russia, Azerbaijan, and Iran had already met to discuss the practical steps needed to begin construction, expressing confidence that progress was now within reach.

Read plainly, this is Russia describing a route it desperately needs, not one it is doing Azerbaijan a favor by using. With Western sanctions foreclosing most alternative paths to South and Southeast Asian markets, and a key maritime chokepoint in the Gulf now unreliable, the overland corridor through Azerbaijani and Iranian territory has become one of Moscow’s few dependable arteries southward. Azerbaijan’s own foreign minister noted that Baku has coordinated this project from its inception and is on schedule to raise freight volumes on its section to five million tons by 2028, a reminder that Azerbaijan is not merely a transit host but a central party whose cooperation the corridor’s Russian branch now desperately needs to preserve its relations with Iran.

Outlook

None of this suggests that Baku and Moscow have resolved every point of friction, or that the underlying grievances have fully receded. What the record shows instead is a reconciliation that was carefully calibrated and developed in stages as it restored political and diplomatic channels, while the institutions Russia once used to project cultural and media influence inside Azerbaijan remain closed. Moreover, Moscow’s broader position across the South Caucasus, particularly around the Zangezur corridor, has continued to recede even as bilateral ties with Baku improve. Azerbaijan’s return to dialogue with Russia has come without a return to the pre-2024 status quo, and largely on terms that Baku itself defined.

About the Author

Dr. Vasif Huseynov is the head of the Western Studies department at the Center for Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center) in Baku, Azerbaijan. He is a faculty member at Khazar University in Baku. Dr. Huseynov had previously worked for the Center for Strategic Studies (SAM) and the Public Administration Academy (DIA) in Baku.

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By Emil Avdaliani

Since the fall of the Assad dynasty in late 2024, the Russian military presence has remained a major mystery as to what Moscow’s future will be in Syria. Following Assad’s flight to Moscow on December 8, 2024, Russia has significantly scaled back its presence at its two principal facilities on Syria’s Mediterranean coast: the Tartus naval base and its strategic air base at Khmeimim, located in the Syrian province of Latakia. Russia’s future stay in Syria became even more uncertain after the new government in Damascus terminated the 49-year commercial port management concession granted to the Russian engineering construction business Stroytransgaz.

Russia has also pulled out from Qamishli Airport located in northeastern Syria and restricted its patrolling missions along the border with Israel. This reduced presence has coincided with Moscow’s ever-demanding war effort in Ukraine and the deterioration of Russia’s position in the Middle East following the weakening of its key regional partner – Iran. In fact, for the first time since 2013, Russia currently has no naval presence operating in the Mediterranean Sea.

Yet, over the past several months, Syria’s new leadership has not only maintained working ties with Moscow but even attempted to revive and expand the relationship. This has come as a surprise to many given that the interim government of Ahmed al-Sharaa, once in power, severed Syrian ties with Assad’s other allies such as Iran and Hezbollah. When it comes to Russia, however, the interim Syrian leader has twice visited Moscow: first on October 15, 2025, and then on January 28, earlier this year.

Preserving Russia’s Syrian Footprint: Khmeimim and Tartus

After these visits, the new Syrian government allowed Moscow to maintain a scaled-down military presence in its former Mediterranean bases. The Russian newspaper Kommersant has closely tracked Russian activity, reporting in April that Damascus intended to change the operation of Russian facilities to a non-military role by converting the Khmeimim airbase into a “training and humanitarian facility” for Syrian forces, noted one Syrian official. The move would effectively mean an end to the base’s military functions, and Moscow and Damascus would end up jointly operating the facility. Such a change in terminology would allow Russian sources to continue using Khmeimim airbase, which Kommersant noted is a vital staging area for Russian forces operating in Africa.

To this should be added more recent developments such as the reports in early July when Moscow announced it would get a commercial logistics hub up and running in one of two berths in Tartus. The revelation followed the June 6 announcement by the Russian-Syrian Business Council that Moscow would establish an assembly and distribution center for Russian goods in the strategic port.

In light of these recent developments, when it comes to relations with Russia, Damascus seems to have its own specific logic for how it interacts with Moscow. Firstly, it is about Syria’s economic situation. The Arab country owes around $1.2 billion in Assad-era debt to Russia. More importantly, Syria is in dire need of a large inflow of foreign investments to rebuild the country, and Damascus believes that Russia could be one of those investors. Russian expertise is also of critical importance when it comes to the operation of three large dams on the Euphrates River, which were either built or designed with Soviet assistance. Given the poor condition of these massive structures today, their rehabilitation is far more likely to occur with Russian help than with Turkish or European support.

Russian familiarity with Syria’s needs accumulated throughout decades of close cooperation, as evidenced by how Damascus handled the country’s currency printing issue. In 2025, Syrian authorities extended cooperation with the Russian company Goznak, which had long enjoyed a monopoly in the printing of Syrian currency.

Equally critical is the issue of oil and wheat, of which Russia is a leading exporter into Syria. If during the Syrian Civil War, Iran was Syria’s major oil supplier, the rupture in relations with Tehran left Russia as the primary exporter covering nearly half (46 000-60 000 barrels) of all Syrian oil demand. When it comes to wheat, Moscow’s influence is less decisive given Damascus’s arrangements with other countries. Nevertheless, Russia remains an important supplier of wheat to the Arab country.

The Russia Factor in Syrian Diplomacy

Another issue driving Syrian rapprochement with Moscow is Russian diplomatic power. Russia retains veto power in the United Nations’ Security Council, where it played a critical role in shielding former Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad during the early stages of the Syrian uprising and after his violent crackdown on Syrian opposition forces. For Damascus, it will be difficult to completely sever ties with Russia also because the latter was the biggest exporter of weaponry into the country before the downfall of Assad. Despite close ties with Türkiye and the United States, Damascus is unlikely to replace Russian technologies any time soon, which means that the Syrian armed forces will need continued access to Russian weaponry, spare parts as well as technical services.

Equally significant, a wider geopolitical calculus is driving Russo-Syrian rapprochement that factors into the equation for Damascus. A weak Syria that emerged since the civil war broke out in 2011 was a boon to Israel, which has throughout its history opposed the emergence not only of coalitions of Arab states, but also that of a single strong player in its immediate neighborhood. No wonder then that Israel has engaged in an intermittent aerial campaign against military targets in Syria once a new government was formed following the fall of the Assad regime.

A fractured Syria has been unable to counter Israel’s regional ambitions due to the lack of military capabilities and diplomatic support. It is in this context that Russia’s lingering presence in Syria serves as a mitigating factor, a tool to temper Israeli actions in the region, and one that Damascus likely values. Moscow is also perfectly well suited to serve as a mediator between Damascus and Tel-Aviv, which was particularly effective during the Assad regime.

Ties with Russia are also part of Syria’s effort to diversify its foreign partnerships portfolio well beyond its close relations with Türkiye and the improving ties with the United States and Europe. The rapprochement with Russia, however, does not mean that Syria would not try to keep the balance. Indeed, even on issues such as the war in Ukraine, Damascus has simultaneously forged good relations with Ukraine, developing security (primarily drone expertise) cooperation with Kyiv as exemplified by President Zelenskyy’s recent visit to Syria this past April.

Damascus’ approach can thus be characterized as a multi-vector foreign policy balancing Russia, Türkiye, the Gulf states, Europe and the United States. However, this places limits on what Russia can achieve in Syria. Moscow knows that it no longer enjoys the privileged position it once had with the Assad regime. Instead, it now has to compete alongside other external powers for influence within a more diversified Syrian foreign policy. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), for example, is especially pertinent given its seeming ambition to fully control the port of Tartus. Indeed, once Stroytransgaz left, Damascus signed a 30-year concession with DP World, worth an estimated $800 million.

Outlook

Moscow is keen on retaining a military presence in Syria given that the country geographically serves as a mid-point between Russia itself and the African continent where the notorious Wagner Group transformed itself into the Africa Corps. Experts should keep in mind that military facilities in Syria have become all the more important given the troubles the Africa Corps is experiencing in the Sahel region, especially in Mali where the Tuareg rebels led by the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) have been pressing on the capital Bamako. Moreover, the bases’ strategic value has further increased following the deterioration of Russia’s relations with Europe and NATO.

At the same time, major tensions remain in Russia-Syrian relations that should not be overlooked. The most significant unresolved issue remains the status of former President Bashar al-Assad. Syrian authorities continue to seek legal accountability for senior figures associated with the previous regime and have repeatedly expressed interest in Assad’s extradition to stand trial for his crimes. Moscow, however, continues to provide political asylum for the former Syrian leader and has shown no indication that it is prepared to reconsider this position. Another area of mutual concern involves the activities of former Assad-era political, military and intelligence figures now residing abroad. Syrian officials remain concerned that remnants of the previous regime could attempt to undermine domestic stability through external financing or political organization. Russian authorities have publicly emphasized that their territory will not serve as a platform for destabilization against the new Syrian government.

Though these differences remain politically sensitive, both governments have deliberately prevented them from dominating broader bilateral relations. Instead, discussions increasingly focus on future cooperation rather than lingering disputes. Syria is thus trying to reshape Russia’s presence in the country in a way that suits Damascus’ interests. It was within this effort that al-Sharaa first pressed against an extensive Russian military presence in the country but then has allowed a limited presence in exchange for greater concessions from Moscow.

The relationship today is neither an alliance nor a rivalry. Instead, it represents a careful partnership based on overlapping strategic interests, with both governments recognizing that cooperation remains more beneficial than confrontation. The elasticity of Russian-Syrian relations underscores Moscow’s broader capacity to adapt to changing political realities in the Middle East.

Although Russia suffered a major strategic setback with the collapse of the Assad regime, it has avoided complete marginalization by recalibrating its objectives and accepting a more limited but potentially more sustainable role in Syria as it struggles to retain its last major strategic foothold in the Middle East. Maintaining naval access to Tartus may matter less to Moscow now, but down the road, once the Ukraine war has ended and Türkiye has removed the constraints of the Montreux Convention, then the strategic importance of accessing Tartus will matter greatly when Russia tries to restore its great power status.

Author Bio

Emil Avdaliani is a Professor of International Relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of the Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at

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by Vusal Guliyev

On May 30, 2026, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan signaled a potentially significant turn in Türkiye–Japan defense relations when he told Nikkei Asia that Ankara sees considerable potential for cooperation with Tokyo in unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Fidan highlighted prospects for joint development and co-production, arguing that the two countries possess complementary technological strengths that could create mutually beneficial opportunities. His remarks came amid a broader intensification of defense contacts between Türkiye and Japan, including high-level ministerial exchanges, visits by Japanese officials to Turkish defense companies, and growing Japanese interest in combat-tested Turkish unmanned systems.

Before Hakan Fidan’s recent remarks, former Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu had previously signaled Ankara’s interest in strengthening defense cooperation with Tokyo, laying an important foundation for the closer Türkiye–Japan partnership that is now taking shape. Speaking at a press conference in Tokyo in September 2022, Çavuşoğlu stated that Türkiye saw significant potential for deepening ties with Japan and expressed hope that Turkish defense companies would eventually be able to export armed drones to the Japanese market. He also noted that several Asian countries, particularly Malaysia and Indonesia, had already demonstrated a strong interest in Türkiye’s defense industry

The growing momentum behind Türkiye–Japan defense cooperation was further demonstrated on May 6, 2026, when the two countries held the first-ever Japan–Türkiye Defense Industry Cooperation Day on the sidelines of the SAHA 2026 International Defence and Aerospace Exhibition in Istanbul. During the event, Japan’s Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) and Türkiye’s Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) signed a Letter of Intent aimed at establishing a working-level framework for deeper collaboration in defense equipment and technology. The gathering brought together approximately 40 Turkish and Japanese defense companies and drone manufacturers to explore opportunities for joint research, technology transfer, co-development, and industrial partnerships.

*Image above: Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani meeting with Turkish Defense Minister Yaşar Güler

Ministerial-level defense engagement received a significant boost in mid-August 2025 when Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani became the first Japanese defense minister to pay an official visit to Türkiye. During his meetings with Turkish Defense Minister Yaşar Güler in Ankara, the two sides agreed to deepen cooperation in defense industries and technology and launch consultations between senior defense officials. Nakatani also visited leading Turkish defense companies and facilities, including Baykar, Istanbul Naval Shipyard, and Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ).

Later, in January 2026, Turkish Defense Minister Yaşar Güler highlighted the growing potential of Türkiye–Japan defense-industrial cooperation, describing it as a partnership that could eventually reach a “strategic level.” In an interview with Japan’s Kyodo News, Güler emphasized that combining Japan’s advanced technological capabilities with Türkiye’s production capacity and operational experience could create significant opportunities for collaboration in defense technologies. He also pointed to Turkish unmanned systems, including the ANKA and Bayraktar platforms, as cost-effective and operationally proven solutions that could contribute to Japan’s efforts to modernize its defense ecosystem.

Tokyo’s growing interest in Turkish drone technologies is closely linked to its rapidly changing security environment. Japan is undergoing a rapid transformation from a traditionally pacifist economic power into a more assertive military and geopolitical actor amid intensifying strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. The strategic vision first advanced by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is now being further expanded under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi through increased defense spending, the acquisition of counterstrike capabilities, enhanced military diplomacy, and historic reforms to Japan’s arms export policy. Recent developments—including the expansion of defense cooperation with the Philippines and Australia, as well as agreements on combat drone cooperation with Ukraine—underscore Tokyo’s transition toward a more proactive and strategically assertive security posture.

As part of this transformation, Japan has invested heavily in emerging defense technologies, including artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, space capabilities, and unmanned platforms. However, despite possessing one of the world’s most advanced technological sectors, Japan’s domestic defense industry has faced challenges in developing cost-effective and combat-proven unmanned systems. At the same time, Tokyo is grappling with a shrinking population and persistent manpower shortages within the Self-Defense Forces, increasing the need for force-multiplying technologies that can reduce reliance on personnel-intensive operations.

In this context, Turkish unmanned aerial systems offer a potentially attractive solution. They combine relatively affordable production costs with extensive operational experience across multiple conflict zones, providing unmanned capabilities that have already demonstrated effectiveness under real battlefield conditions.

Türkiye’s Battle-Tested Drones

The international reputation of Turkish unmanned systems has been significantly enhanced by their performance in several recent conflicts. During the 2020 Second Karabakh War, Turkish-made drones operated by Azerbaijan played an important role in improving battlefield reconnaissance, target acquisition, and precision-strike capabilities. Their effectiveness contributed to Azerbaijan’s military successes and attracted considerable attention from military planners worldwide.

Similarly, during the initial stages of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Turkish drones gained international recognition for their ability to support intelligence gathering, surveillance missions, and strike operations against Russian military assets. These experiences have transformed Türkiye into one of the world’s leading drone exporters and elevated its status within the global defense industry. Turkish manufacturers have demonstrated an ability to rapidly innovate, adapt to battlefield lessons, and produce systems that offer an effective balance between capability and affordability

As Türkiye’s defense industry matures, Ankara is increasingly seeking partnerships that move beyond traditional export relationships. Ankara has strong incentives to deepen defense cooperation with Tokyo. Cooperation with Japan offers access to one of the world’s most sophisticated technological ecosystems, providing opportunities to integrate advanced Japanese expertise in areas such as sensors, artificial intelligence, robotics, semiconductors, advanced materials, and precision manufacturing. Such cooperation could help accelerate the development of next-generation unmanned systems while enhancing the competitiveness of both countries’ defense industries.

Several areas appear particularly promising for future collaboration. One potential avenue involves intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms designed for maritime operations. As an island nation with extensive maritime responsibilities, Japan requires persistent surveillance capabilities to monitor vast stretches of surrounding waters. Turkish expertise in unmanned aerial systems could complement Japanese sensor technologies and maritime surveillance infrastructure, creating more effective platforms for maritime domain awareness.

Artificial intelligence and autonomous systems offer another promising field for cooperation. The future of unmanned warfare is increasingly shaped not only by platform performance but also by software, machine learning, and autonomous decision-support systems. In April 2026, Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) established the Unmanned Defense Capability Promotion Office and the Unmanned Systems Office as part of a broader effort to integrate unmanned and AI-enabled technologies into military operations. Japan’s strengths in robotics and advanced computing could complement Türkiye’s experience in deploying unmanned systems under operational conditions, potentially leading to the development of more sophisticated autonomous platforms capable of operating in complex environments. On the other hand, expanded cooperation in unmanned defense systems could help Tokyo adapt its defense posture to the challenges posed by a shrinking population.

Beyond bilateral considerations, the emerging partnership carries broader regional implications. In East Asia and the Indo-Pacific, the potential integration of Turkish drone technologies into Japan’s defense architecture could contribute to Tokyo’s efforts to strengthen its Pacific defense. This objective is reflected in the establishment of the Pacific Defense Initiative Office by Japan’s Ministry of Defense in April 2026, a move that underscores Tokyo’s growing focus on strengthening its defense ecosystem through enhanced operational coordination, advanced military technologies, and more integrated deterrence strategies. Greater access to advanced drone capabilities would strengthen Japan’s ability to monitor and respond to emerging threats while reducing operational burdens on manned platforms.

For Türkiye, expanding defense cooperation with Japan would further demonstrate its transformation from a regional security actor into a globally connected defense-industrial power. Ankara has already established defense partnerships across the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa, and Europe. A deeper relationship with Japan would also extend Türkiye’s strategic reach into Indo-Pacific defense markets and reinforce its growing reputation as a supplier of advanced military technologies.

Outlook

While defense cooperation between the two countries has historically remained limited, changing geopolitical realities and evolving security priorities are creating new incentives for collaboration. The emerging drone partnership reflects a broader convergence between two technologically capable middle powers seeking to enhance their strategic autonomy, strengthen their defense-industrial bases, and respond to increasingly complex regional security challenges. The strategic rationale for closer Türkiye–Japan collaboration appears increasingly compelling. Both countries face evolving security environments that require innovative technological solutions, and both seek to strengthen their defense-industrial capabilities while reducing excessive dependence on external suppliers. The convergence of these interests provides a strong foundation for expanded cooperation in unmanned systems and related technologies.

In sum, Japan possesses advanced expertise in sensors, communications systems, materials, and electronics, whereas Türkiye offers extensive operational experience and internationally competitive unmanned platforms. If successfully institutionalized, cooperation in drone and counter-drone systems could become one of the most important pillars of a broader Türkiye–Japan strategic partnership and a noteworthy example of how middle powers are adapting to the changing dynamics of global security and technological competition.

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About the Author:

Vusal Guliyev is a frequent contributor to The Saratoga Foundation. He is the Indo-Pacific & Eurasian Affairs Analyst at the Baku-based Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center). Mr. Guliyev’s professional and academic experience spans leading research institutions, think tanks, and fellowship programs across Azerbaijan, Türkiye, China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States.

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By Sergey Sukhankin

In June 2026, Defense Minister Andrei Belousov stated that the Russian Armed Forces were integrating AI, robotics, and automated command systems into military management. The statement reflects a broader shift in Russia’s AI policy since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Whereas the original National Strategy for the Development of Artificial Intelligence framed AI primarily as an instrument of digital modernization and economic development, wartime priorities have increasingly repositioned it as a strategic enabler of military effectiveness, technological sovereignty, and state resilience. This evolution is reflected in the revised National Strategy for the Development of Artificial Intelligence until 2030, approved in February 2024, which places substantially greater emphasis on technological sovereignty, domestic software development, and reducing dependence on foreign digital infrastructure. Taken together, these developments suggest that AI has become an integral component of Russia’s wartime mobilization strategy, with civilian AI initiatives increasingly serving as a foundation for military innovation by strengthening the country’s data infrastructure, software ecosystem, and human capital.

This analysis proceeds as follows. First, it examines the institutional and legislative shifts that have altered the trajectory and centralized AI governance since February 2022. Second, it considers how civilian AI development across business, healthcare, education, and infrastructure has become increasingly tied to Russia’s broader sovereignty agenda. Third, it assesses the primary military applications of AI, specifically command-and-control, reconnaissance, drones, logistics, and battlefield management. Finally, it explores Russian writings on the role of AI in information-psychological operations, concluding with an analysis of what Russia’s post-2022 AI trajectory reveals about the relationship between technological sovereignty, military adaptation, and long-term confrontation with the West.

Institutional and Legislative Changes After February 2022

In the post-2022 period, implementation of Russia’s AI strategy has become increasingly centralized. For instance, the Government Sub-commission on the Development and Implementation of Artificial Intelligence has emerged as the principal coordinating body responsible for synchronizing AI policy across ministries, regional governments, state corporations, and research institutions. Unlike many Western AI governance frameworks, the Russian model prioritizes centralized coordination and state-led implementation.

This shift became particularly evident at the AI Journey conference in late 2025. Speaking at the event, President Vladimir Putin argued that Russia should move beyond isolated AI projects toward a comprehensive national implementation plan spanning ministries, industries, and regions. He maintained that AI should become integrated into “virtually every management and production process” by 2030 and presented it as essential for preserving Russia’s technological competitiveness under conditions of geopolitical confrontation. Putin also emphasized that dependence on foreign AI systems creates strategic vulnerabilities, reinforcing technological sovereignty as a central objective of AI policy. AI is thus increasingly framed not simply as an economic technology but as an instrument of national sovereignty and resilience.

As in other strategic sectors, AI development is expected to rely on strong state coordination and financial support. Discussing Russia’s “new digital leap“, Izvestiya argued that AI should become the technological foundation of the country’s next phase of economic development while emphasizing that success depends on coordinated government policy, investment in domestic infrastructure, and strategic state support. Similarly, experts interviewed by Rossiyskaya Gazeta argued that sustained AI development requires stronger mathematics education, expanded domestic supercomputing capacity, increased public investment in research, and support for domestic software ecosystems, drawing parallels with Soviet approaches to strategic technological development. Together, these institutional developments indicate that Moscow increasingly treats AI as a state-directed sovereignty project rather than a conventional modernization program.

Civilian AI: Trends and Changes

Although Russia’s AI strategy increasingly prioritizes national security, military modernization does not operate independently from civilian technological development. Rather, one of the defining characteristics of Russia’s post-2022 AI policy is the gradual erosion of boundaries between civilian and military innovation. Moscow increasingly treats healthcare, education, public administration, logistics, and industrial modernization as components of a broader AI ecosystem capable of supporting long-term strategic competition. Three civilian domains illustrate this trend. These areas matter not because they are military in a narrow sense, but because they build the data, personnel, software, and institutional infrastructure on which military AI adoption ultimately depends.

First, business and economic development. Following the introduction of Western sanctions, the Russian government increasingly identified AI as a mechanism for offsetting labor shortages, improving productivity, and supporting import substitution across strategic industries. The Yakov & Partners report, published in late 2025, estimated that AI could contribute between 7.9 and 12.8 trillion rubles annually to the Russian economy by 2030 while improving productivity across manufacturing, finance, transport, healthcare, and public administration—sectors facing acute labour shortages. The report also found that more than 70 percent of surveyed companies had already deployed generative AI in at least one business function, while nearly half had begun experimenting with AI agents, suggesting that AI adoption has moved beyond pilot projects into mainstream business operations. Similarly, Russian business media present an optimistic outlook. According to RBC, Russia’s AI market could reach approximately $2.1 billion in 2025 while maintaining annual growth rates approaching 45 percent. These projections should be treated cautiously, but they show the weight assigned to AI in Russian industrial policy despite sanctions and hardware constraints.

Second, healthcare has emerged as one of the fastest-growing civilian applications of AI. According to Vedomosti, Moscow’s digital healthcare platform has connected nearly 2,000 medical organizations across more than 70 regions, enabling AI systems to assist physicians in analysing medical images and improving diagnostic accuracy. Beyond healthcare itself, these applications expand Russia’s domestic AI ecosystem by generating large datasets, improving machine-learning models, and strengthening national computational infrastructure.

Third, education and human capital occupy a strategic position within Russia’s AI agenda. Rather than emphasizing digital literacy alone, Russian policy increasingly treats education as a prerequisite for technological sovereignty. The Yakov & Partners report identifies shortages of qualified specialists as a principal constraint on AI development and argues for closer cooperation between universities, state institutions, and technology companies. It recommends expanding mathematics, computer science, and engineering education while strengthening university-industry partnerships to sustain Russia’s AI ecosystem under conditions of international isolation.

Since 2022, given internal developmental trajectory, even nominally civilian AI sectors have moved closer to civil-military fusion. In Russia’s wartime setting, healthcare data, education, software ecosystems, robotics, cryptography, and drone technologies increasingly feed into the same sovereign AI infrastructure that the armed forces can draw upon.

Military AI: Areas of Application

While civilian AI provides the foundation of Russia’s sovereign AI ecosystem, the armed forces have increasingly become its principal destination. Official statements and military publications indicate that the war against Ukraine has reshaped Russian AI priorities – rather than pursuing fully autonomous weapons as an end in themselves, Moscow has concentrated on integrating AI into command-and-control systems, battlefield management, logistics, reconnaissance, and drone warfare. During a meeting of the Military-Industrial Commission in April 2025, President Vladimir Putin argued that “whoever begins using AI in military affairs faster will enjoy enormous – indeed colossal – advantages on the battlefield” and called for accelerating domestic software development for automated command systems alongside expanded production of unmanned aerial systems. This emphasis continued in June 2026, when Defence Minister Andrei Belousov stated that the Russian Armed Forces were actively integrating AI technologies, robotics, and automated command systems into military management, indicating that AI has moved beyond experimental projects to become part of Russia’s broader military modernization agenda.

The modernization of command systems has become the principal area of AI integration with lessons from the war in Ukraine underscoring the importance of rapid data processing, sensor fusion, and real-time situational awareness. Following Belousov’s inspection of tactical command modernization in July 2025, Moskovskii Komsomolets reported continuing efforts to integrate digital communications, automated battlefield management, and AI-assisted command support capable of combining information from drones, reconnaissance assets, electronic warfare units, and artillery into a common operational picture. Similarly, an article published by APNI argues that AI should strengthen tactical command by processing battlefield data, identifying operational patterns, supporting target prioritization, and improving coordination among different branches of the armed forces. One example of practical implementation of this approach is the AI platform Svod, reportedly designed to collect and synthesize operational information from multiple sources to provide commanders with integrated situational awareness rather than raw intelligence streams, illustrating Russia’s preference for decision-support systems over autonomous command architectures.

The war has also accelerated interest in AI-enabled navigation, computer vision, swarm coordination, and autonomous target recognition. According to Arsenal Otechestva defence magazine, future combat effectiveness will increasingly depend on integrating AI with robotics, precision-guided weapons, and unmanned systems capable of operating under conditions of electronic warfare, suggesting that AI will reshape not only individual weapons but also the organization of military operations.

Russian military writing after 2022 presents AI primarily as a decision-support technology rather than a substitute for commanders. Romashkina argues that AI’s main value lies in processing battlefield information, improving logistics, strengthening cyber defence, supporting reconnaissance, and assisting operational decision-making (Romashkina, N. P. “Iskusstvennyi intellekt v voennom dele: vozmozhnosti, ugrozy, perspektivy.” Voprosy kiberbezopasnosti, no. 6 (70) (2025): 158–165). A related study titled “Artificial Intelligence in Military Affairs: Essence, Problems of Development and Operation, Main Areas of Application” advocates a “human-in-command“ model in which AI helps construct digital representations of the battlefield, prioritize threats, model alternative courses of action, and prepare operational orders, while final authority remains with human commanders. Both studies argue that AI should function as a force multiplier embedded throughout command-and-control processes rather than as an autonomous decision-maker. Another analysis broadened this argument by treating AI as a strategic technology and introducing the concept of “cognitive weapons“: tools designed to degrade adversary AI systems through poisoned data, adversarial inputs, or attacks on software and hardware. This moves the discussion beyond AI-enabled weapons to AI itself as a contested battlespace. In other words, Russian military thinkers increasingly view AI systems not only as tools for enhancing combat effectiveness, but also as targets that can be deceived, degraded, or manipulated. Thus, the analysis postulates an idea that Russia must invest not only in military AI capabilities but also in protecting AI systems against manipulation, reinforcing the view that AI will increasingly shape military competition and international power relations.

The clearest articulation of this emerging Russian view appears in an article by Col. (ret.) V. Orlianskii and Col. (ret.) P. Dulniev in the Russian military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought), which links battlefield lessons from Ukraine directly to the need for AI-enabled command systems and a more flexible force structure. The authors argued that the experience of the war in Ukraine since 2022 demonstrates that Russia’s traditional, fixed organizational model is no longer adequate for high-intensity, technology-driven warfare. The principal lesson is that tactical units must become dynamically organized, capable of being reinforced in real time with drones, artillery, aviation, electronic warfare, and other assets according to rapidly changing battlefield conditions rather than relying on permanently assigned force structures. They contend that the speed of modern combat, the ubiquity of drones, and the transparency of the battlefield have shifted the decisive advantage toward forces able to process information faster, adapt organizational structures more rapidly, and coordinate multi-domain assets with minimal delay.

To achieve this transformation, the authors advocate integrating artificial intelligence into a unified automated command-and-control system spanning tactical, operational, and strategic levels. AI is presented not as a replacement for commanders but as a decision-support tool capable of processing massive volumes of reconnaissance data, identifying targets, modelling courses of action, allocating reinforcement assets, coordinating joint operations, and continuously updating decisions in near real time while leaving final authority with human commanders. They further argue that AI-enabled command systems should underpin a transition to “dynamic force organization,” improve reconnaissance, logistics, and electronic warfare, facilitate the employment of robotic and directed-energy systems, and ultimately reshape Russian military art. At the same time, the authors acknowledge that this vision faces major obstacles, including deficiencies in Russian computing power, microelectronics, software development, data quality, and AI expertise, warning that overcoming these technological shortcomings is essential if Russia is to avoid falling behind the United States and China in the next generation of warfare.^[1]

Information-Psychological Confrontation and AI

Military modernization represents only one dimension of Russia’s expanding AI strategy. AI has also become an increasingly important instrument supporting Moscow’s information operations abroad. While AI has not fundamentally transformed Russian influence activities, it has increased their speed and scale, even if its practical effectiveness remains uneven. A revealing example emerged during Hungary’s parliamentary campaign. According to The Moscow Times, Russian political strategists developed a disinformation campaign – which turned out to be a failure – intended to strengthen Prime Minister Viktor Orbán by portraying him as the defender of Hungarian sovereignty while simultaneously discrediting his political opponents. Subsequent investigations by Reuters found that coordinated Telegram networks amplified these narratives while increasingly relying upon AI-generated content and localized messaging. The pattern resembles earlier Russian influence operations such as the Doppelgänger campaign targeting European audiences – rather than replacing human operators, generative AI enables faster production of fake news articles, manipulated imagery, multilingual social media posts, and synthetic videos.

In this regard, Russian military thought is paying growing attention to AI’s role in gray-zone and sub-threshold operations. An article titled “Teoriya «Myatezhevoyny» E.E. Messnera kak instrument osmysleniya prirody sovremennykh voennykh konfliktov” (”E.E. Messner’s Theory of ‘Subversive Warfare’ as an Instrument for Understanding the Nature of Modern Military Conflicts) in a recent issue of Voyennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought) argues that Evgeny Messner’s concept of “global insurgent warfare” retains significant explanatory value for understanding 21st century conflicts. The authors contend that digital technologies, social media, and artificial intelligence have transformed myatezhevoyna into a “digital-ideological” form of confrontation, in which information, narratives, and collective consciousness become primary targets of strategic competition. They conclude that contemporary national security must protect not only territory and infrastructure but also the state’s cognitive and value space, reflecting the growing importance of non-military instruments in achieving strategic objectives.^[2]

Another article, “Doktrinal’nye transformatsii v sfere psikhologicheskikh operatsiy SShA i NATO s tochki zreniya vozmozhnykh posledstviy dlya bezopasnosti Rossii” (Doctrinal Transformations in the Sphere of US and NATO Psychological Operations from the Perspective of Potential Consequences for Russia’s Security) published in the same journal, argues that recent U.S. and NATO doctrinal changes in psychological operations (PSYOP) represent an expanding threat to Russian national security. The authors contend that Washington’s return to the concepts of PSYOPs, combined with increased funding and broader operational scope, signals an intensification of psychological pressure against Russian society and the Armed Forces. Particular attention is devoted to artificial intelligence, which is portrayed as a force multiplier capable of generating persuasive synthetic content in real time, enabling unprecedented penetration of Russia’s information space. The article also argues that AI-enabled micro-targeting, supported by big data analytics, substantially enhances the effectiveness of Western information campaigns by allowing tailored influence operations against vulnerable social groups. Overall, the authors present AI as a critical enabler of next-generation psychological warfare and gray zone competition rather than merely a technological innovation.^[3]

Taken together, these developments suggest that AI is becoming an increasingly important enabler of Russia’s information-psychological confrontation rather than a revolutionary new instrument of influence. While generative AI has expanded the speed, scale, and adaptability of disinformation campaigns, Russian military thought increasingly views AI in broader strategic terms – as a tool for shaping Western perceptions, protecting the state’s cognitive space, and countering perceived psychological operations organized by the West. This perspective complements Russia’s wider post-2022 AI strategy, in which technological sovereignty, military modernization, and information confrontation are treated as mutually reinforcing components of a single state-directed effort to strengthen national resilience under conditions of prolonged geopolitical competition.

Outlook

Russia’s post-2022 AI trajectory suggests that Moscow is not trying to win the global AI race on the terms set by Silicon Valley or China’s largest technology firms. Instead, it is building a sovereign, state-directed AI ecosystem shaped by wartime pressure, sanctions, and long-term confrontation with the West. The significance of this shift lies less in frontier-model competition than in the way Russia is integrating AI into command systems, logistics, battlefield management, drones, education, healthcare data, and information operations. This does not mean Russia has overcome its technological constraints. Access to advanced chips, computing power, and globally competitive commercial platforms remains limited. It does mean, however, that Russia may gain practical advantages from selective, state-coordinated AI adoption. This marks an important evolution from the pre-war logic of digital modernization – AI is no longer treated primarily as a tool for improving economic efficiency or public administration; it is increasingly understood as infrastructure for wartime governance, military adaptation, and strategic autonomy. The key implication is that Russian AI strategy is assuming the form of a resilience strategy – one designed to preserve military adaptability, state capacity, and informational reach under conditions of prolonged geopolitical confrontation. Judging by repeated statements from President Putin and Russia’s military-political leadership, this confrontation is viewed not as a temporary phase but as a long-term strategic condition likely to endure for the lifetime of the current political system.

^[1] Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought), No. 2 (February 2026), pp. 10 – 27).

^[2] Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought), No. 6 (June 2026), pp. 152–158).

^[3] Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought), No. 6 (June 2026), pp. 77 – 89).

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About the Author

Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at The Saratoga Foundation specializing in Russian military and security affairs, as well as Russo-Chinese relations. He is also an Advisor at Gulf State Analytics (Washington, D.C.) and Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defense and Security Network (Canada).

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By Paul Goble

Even though they do not have a republic of their own, the Circassians both in the North Caucasus and in the diaspora communities abroad have now taken the lead in defending one of the last vestiges of federalism and autonomy in Russia: the right of a federal subject to have a voice on any changes in their republic's borders. The Circassian effort, as impressive as it is, almost certainly will not prevent Moscow from eliminating provisions protecting the rights of the people of Kabardino-Balkaria to control their own borders; but it will simultaneously help mobilize the Circassian people in that federal subject and more generally and prompt other national movements to take up this cause, a development that Moscow fears more than the actions of any republic or region by itself.

Because of such fears about this move and others suggesting that the Circassian national movement is once again on the rise, Moscow has drawn an old arrow from its quiver and sought to undermine that movement by sowing confusion among the 700,000 Circassians who live within the current borders of the Russian Federation and the more than seven million who live abroad, particularly those who live in Turkey and the Middle East.

In early June, ten leading opposition figures in Kabardino-Balkaria, most from the dominant Kabardinian (Circassian) portion of the population, issued an appeal to the KBR parliament to reject a call by the republic procuracy to take out of the republic constitution all references to the right of the republic and its people to guarantee the territorial integrity of Kabardino-Balkaria after the Moscow-imposed KBR agreed to do just that. Moreover, the declaration specifies that “the decision adopted by the Parliament is deeply flawed and poses a danger to the future of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic as a constituent entity of the Russian Federation. We insist on preserving the constitutional guarantees of the republic’s statehood and territorial integrity.”

Further, it declared that: “while the President of the Russian Federation ensures the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation as a unified federal state, this does not preclude constituent entities from enshrining guarantees of their territorial integrity—as an integral part of the unified state—within their own constitutions.” And because that is the case, the ten continue, “removing the provisions establishing the principle of territorial integrity from the Constitution of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic is the most destructive aspect of the proposed amendments. If the provision regarding the inviolability of the republic’s territory is eliminated, the federal center would gain the legal authority to alter the republic’s borders unilaterally.”

“Such a turn of events could lead to the following consequences,” they point out, including the transfer of territories—inhabited for centuries by Kabardinians, Balkars, and other peoples—to neighboring constituent entities of the Russian Federation; the abolition or redrawing of historically established national districts under the guise of ‘the interests of the Federation;’ and the loss of the republic’s final constitutional safeguard against arbitrary changes to its territorial structure at the discretion of the federal center.” And they conclude with the following two points: On the one hand, they say, “we cannot allow the Basic Law of Kabardino-Balkaria to remain silent on the issue of the inviolability of the republic’s territory. This is not a matter of legal technicality, but a question of the republic’s very existence as a national-territorial community.” And on the other, they note, “the intention to remove the aforementioned provisions from the Constitution of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic (KBR) is not an isolated event but part of a systematic effort by the federal center aimed at dismantling the special status of the republics within the Russian Federation—a strategy observed over the past 25 years.”

They were quickly joined in this protest by the leaders of more than 40 Circassian organizations in Turkey, something that has transformed a small domestic problem into an international one and made the Circassians the leader of this resistance. In a sign of just how worried Moscow is about this, the original webpage that included these declarations has been taken down; but a discussion of the content of their appeals can be found here.

No non-Russian nation within the Russian Federation has more of its members living abroad than the Circassians, and none can so quickly mobilize their co-nationals abroad when Moscow violates their rights or the rights of other non-Russians within the current borders of the Russian Federation. Indeed, this foreign base of support gives the Circassians a far greater ability to defend themselves and advance not only their causes but those of other non-Russians, a major reason why the Circassian nation could very well be among the first to escape Moscow’s control as the disintegration of the Russian Federation continues. (For a discussion of that possibility, see this author’s argument at Window on Eurasia, Dec. 1, 2024.)

Outlook

Given what is at stake, it should come as no surprise that Moscow has responded to this development and other signs of growing Circassian activism by closing down websites that carry the Circassian message. It has also revived one of its tried-and-true tactics of sowing confusion in the midst of both by setting up new organizations and media outlets that seek to undermine Circassian unity.

Once again, the Russian security agencies have sought to promote the idea that Circassians and Abkhazians are one people—an idea without historical foundation that knowledgeable Circassians reject but that enough Circassians may find persuasive enough to undermine opponents of that idea and alienate other non-Russians from them. That conclusion is strongly supported by the fact that, in recent weeks, Moscow has once again enlisted many of the same people it used before the 2014 Sochi Olympiad to undermine Circassian opposition to staging the international competition on the site where Tsarist forces carried out a genocide of the Circassians. In doing so, it has compounded the insult on the 150th anniversary of that horrific event. (The author is indebted to the distinguished Circassian historian Adel Bashqawi for calling his attention to this repetition).

Moscow was not able to derail Circassian opposition to the Sochi Olympiad; and most observers would agree that Putin’s decision to hold the games on these blood lands backfired badly on the Kremlin. It also allowed the Circassians to gain influence not only among other non-Russians inside the current borders of the Russian Federation but also among governments and experts in the West. What is now happening in Kabardino-Balkaria may lack the same drama in the short term, but it could well be recorded as an important step toward the restoration of a Circassian republic in the North Caucasus and the emergence of other non-Russian states that will no longer be under Moscow's control.

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By Alexander Melikishvili

Ukraine’s “kinetic sanctions” (drone and missile strikes targeting Russia’s oil and gas sector, including oil refineries) finally forced the Kremlin to acknowledge that these relentless attacks are causing gasoline shortages at a time when domestic demand is peaking due to the summer vacation season. On June 28, President Putin for the first time publicly admitted that the Ukrainian attacks have resulted in “a certain shortage,” but called it “not critical.” In fact, the Russian leader is grossly understating the scale of the problem. According to the Russian investigative platform Mediazona, as of June 26th, some form of fuel rationing was in place in 56 out of 83* regions comprising the Russian Federation. Furthermore, brawls often break out in long lines at gas stations, undermining social stability to the extent that this has already prompted local authorities in at least one location (the Black Sea resort town of Anapa in Krasnodar Territory) to employ Cossack volunteers to maintain public order at the pumps.

*Russian fuel restrictions by region: Image source: Mediazona

In June alone, the Ukrainian military struck eleven refineries across Russia, according to Ukraine’s defense ministry. By early July, the Ukrainian General Staff was reporting that Ukraine had knocked out 42% of Russia’s refining, costing Moscow $13.5 billion in losses since August 2025. Earlier, the Associated Press had reported, quoting the Macro-Advisory consultancy, that these attacks had caused the destruction of about one-third of Russia’s refining capacity, a major milestone for Ukraine. Even Russian government statistics, which should be treated with extreme caution as they are most likely manipulated to create a more favorable picture, indicate that gasoline production has been reduced by 17% to 850,000 barrels a day.

In response to the escalating crisis, on June 1, the Russian government introduced the first-ever ban on the export of jet fuel, which is to remain in effect until November 30. This comes after a restriction on the export of petroleum that has been in place since April and is due to expire at the end of July. Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak also revealed that the authorities are considering a ban on the export of diesel fuel. The situation must be really dire if Russia, one of the world’s top energy exporters, is resorting to such measures.

A Friend in Need: Russia Turns to Belarus and Kazakhstan

To remedy the situation, Russia plans to import 400,000 tons of gasoline per month, according to an anonymous industry source, as reported by Reuters on July 1. However, considering that Russia’s daily consumption of petroleum in summer reaches 110,000 tons, this volume will not be sufficient. Moreover, as Alexander Kolyandr at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) points out, Ukrainian drone strikes have affected eight out of the ten largest refineries in Russia that currently produce about 85,000 tons of gasoline daily, leaving a shortfall of 25,000 tons per day. Consequently, Russia leaned on its long-time ally Belarus, leading to a threefold increase in Belarusian petroleum exports delivered to Russia by rail in the first half of June compared to May, reaching more than 70,000 tons. Belarus is opportunistically profiting handsomely from this arrangement as it has hiked the price of gasoline it sells to Russia. Since May, it has almost doubled to $1,646 per ton, as the Russian business daily Kommersant reports. However, given Russia’s daily consumption, Belarusian petroleum exports are simply not enough.

While Russia has turned to Kazakhstan for help, the degree of influence it wields over Astana is significantly different, which explains why the assistance it has been promised is less significant. Industry sources in Kazakhstan told Reuters that Kazakhstan agreed to supply 50,000 tons of gasoline (Ai-92 and Ai-95) to Russia in July and August as humanitarian assistance. They also noted that the Kazakh side was not enthusiastic about this because it would strain the already tight gasoline market in Kazakhstan while raising potential sanctions risks. It should be noted that, as of July 2, the Kazakh government officially denied receiving any requests for petroleum from Russia, according to Kazakhstan’s Minister of Energy Yerlan Akkenzhenov. Regardless of the veracity of the report by Reuters, which is likely credible, Kazakhstan is dogged by limited refining capacity.

To avoid shortages on the domestic market, Kazakh authorities banned the export of gasoline, diesel fuel, and other oil products, starting from November 2025. Since then, this ban has been extended twice, most recently in April, and it is due to expire in November. However, on 3 July, the energy ministry published a draft law that will extend the ban from November to May 2027.

Outlook

Given production and refining constraints in Kazakhstan and Belarus, they are unlikely to mitigate Russia’s deepening fuel crisis. Nonetheless, this presents Kazakhstan with a excellent opportunity to demonstrate its symbolic loyalty to Russia, even as it balances that relationship against its growing ties with the EU and the United States.

On both fronts, Kazakhstan can boast significant achievements, especially with regard to the European Union, as demonstrated by President Tokayev’s visit to Brussels in June that was preceded by the conclusion of $462 million worth of agreements to deepen connectivity between Kazakhstan and the EU via the Middle Corridor.

Kazakhstan’s constraints are systemic due to its considerably underdeveloped refining capacity. With only three main refineries (located in Pavlodar, Atyrau, and Shymkent), Kazakhstan’s aggregate refining capacity is only 18 million tons annually even though the country produces about 100 million tons of oil per year. The government unveiled ambitious plans for boosting refining capacity, but even the recently accelerated timeline envisions increasing it to 40 million tons only by 2033. This provides Tokayev with the perfect excuse to decline further requests from Russia without angering either the Kremlin or Ukraine.

Unable to shore up support in the “near abroad,” Russia is turning its attention further afield. Naturally, India, as the second-largest buyer of Russian crude in the world in May, emerges as the most reliable option. Reuters reported on 1 July that a shipment of 60,000 tons of gasoline was en route from India to Russia by sea, loaded on two tankers. The Indian energy minister Puri’s superficial denials notwithstanding, anonymous sources with direct knowledge of the relevant deals told Reuters that the said shipment originated with the Indian refiner Nayara Energy, which is 40%-owned by Rosneft. India gets Russian crude at a significant discount, but it’s likely that Russia receives gasoline from India at a premium price considering that, as the Indian authorities claim, Russia imports it via intermediaries.

Even if you add all of the above, including Kazakhstan’s likely one-off contribution and supplies from Belarus and India, the combined total falls short of meeting Russia’s summer peak in daily consumption. This, in turn, proves that Ukraine’s strategy of “kinetic sanctions” is effective as Russia is incapable of repairing damaged refineries quickly enough to offset the reduction in refining capacity caused by the Ukrainian strikes. Nor is the Russian government’s ambitious objective of importing 400,000 tons of gasoline per month enough to cover Russia’s daily demand. In addition, Ukraine also has the option of ramping up maritime attacks against tankers delivering gasoline to Russia as well as targeting the key Russian ports where the imported gasoline is unloaded. Apart from substantially increasing public anger in Russia, Ukrainian strikes against refineries also severely endanger Russia’s agricultural sector by derailing the crucial grain harvest season, as farmers complain that they have no fuel to run combines.

*Note: This total does not include Crimea and four other regions of Ukraine (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia) that Russia unlawfully declared annexed in September 2022.

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About the Author:

Alex Melikishvili is a senior country risk analyst with more than a decade of experience working in the private sector (S&P Global, IHS Markit) with a focus on Eurasian security. Alex holds a master’s degree in International Affairs from the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

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The Houthis are looking for a new enemy. The October 2025 Gaza ceasefire took away the cause that had carried them for two years, and the solidarity-with-Iran line they have tried in its place has gained little traction with a significant percentage of the population wary of Tehran. With the “defending Gaza” narrative minimized, the movement is reaching back for an older adversary — Saudi Arabia, which it fought from 2015 until the 2022 truce — and recasting it as the author of Yemen’s economic ruin. That search itself is a measure of the Houthis’ relative weakness: they are more fragile than they have been in years, underfunded, short of fuel and food, and losing their once-firm hold over some key northern tribes.

Their adversaries, namely the recognized Government of Yemen (GoY), are no stronger. GoY has, for once, made some headway — Saudi Arabia rolled back a UAE-backed offensive by the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in January, and a new GoY defense ministry has begun to weld its disparate forces into something closer to a single army. But the gains are shallow and growing shallower, undercut by the rivalry that jump-started the reforms. through local proxies, and the contest among them prevents GoY and what remains of the STC from consolidating. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates —with Israel backing Abu Dhabi, and Turkey and Qatar supporting Riyadh— pursue rival aims in Yemen.

While the Houthis have spent much of the last three years diversifying supply chains and sources of income away from Iran, the US-Israeli war with Iran has further reduced Iranian aid to the Houthis. Both the Houthis and the GoY are under pressure, and the outside powers that have, to varying degrees, propped them up are the main reason neither can finish off the other.

Searching for an Enemy

Behind the Houthis’ effort to look for an enemy lies increasing economic fragility. The World Food Program announced it was shutting down its operations across the Houthi-controlled north in late January, ending food assistance to a population in acute need. Fuel imports through the Red Sea ports of Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras Issa fell by roughly three-quarters in the first quarter of 2026, with no fuel entering at all in March. The United Nations estimates that more than 18 million Yemenis are facing acute food insecurity, while its humanitarian appeal for the year stood at around 14% funded by mid-2026.

Public-sector salaries across the north have gone unpaid for years, with only periodic payments for a small percentage of public-sector employees. Staple prices across Yemen keep increasing, with the increases most pronounced in Houthi-controlled areas, driven in part by reduced port capacity and the heavy taxes the Houthi authorities levy on what still gets in. The Houthis’ wartime slogans and messages of shared sacrifice ring hollow as members of the Houthi elite continue to construct lavish homes in Sana’a and elsewhere.

The Houthis are now trying to place the blame on Riyadh. They hold Saudi Arabia responsible for the unpaid salaries, so they demand that it release funds from Yemen’s oil and gas revenues and lift restrictions on the northern ports and Sanaa airport. Their media increasingly frames the wider economic crisis as a Saudi-American siege. In June, the movement’s General Mobilization Forces announced full combat readiness, and Abdul-Malik al-Houthi spoke of restoring “full sovereignty” and ending the blockade.

This is a return to a tested approach. The Houthis know from experience that their cross-border strikes on Saudi territory, including the 2022 strike on an Aramco oil depot in Jeddah, were what eventually brought Riyadh to the negotiating table. The threat to Saudi infrastructure remains their most reliable source of leverage. That leverage has only increased with the Iran war and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia now relies on its East-West pipeline and the port of Yanbu for oil exports, both of which are within easy range of the Houthis’ missiles and drones.

Mobilization and the Tribes

The mobilization behind the Houthis’ anti-Saudi rhetoric is real, but narrower than the slogans imply. Recruitment continues under the movement’s wartime narratives, and fighters have been moved up to the front lines facing GoY and the Saudi border. Houthi authority over the northern tribes has always been more of a bargain than pure loyalty: money and government positions for cooperation, and a credible threat of punishment for anyone who withholds it. Both halves of that bargain are weakening at once — the money because the Houthis’ revenues have collapsed and the threat because two years of war have exposed the limits of what the movement can enforce. Sheiks in the outlying districts who once had no reason to question the arrangement are reassessing it, and with a Saudi-backed government reasserting itself in the south, the Houthis are no longer the only conceivable authority.

That reassessment is already producing friction. Tribal figures in several areas have resisted Houthi demands, and the movement has answered with purges, death sentences, and tighter surveillance of its own ranks. The leadership knows where this can lead. Ali Abdullah Saleh ruled Yemen through patronage as well, and lost it once corruption, falling revenue, and the cost of his wars left him unable to keep paying. The Houthis are nearer to that point now than they have been in years.

The strain is no longer hypothetical. In late June, a tribal call to arms filled the Al-Rayyan area of eastern Al-Jawf with armed men for days on end, drawing delegations from Hadhramaut, Marib, and the Mahra, after the Houthis detained a tribal sheik who had taken up the cause of a woman who said a Houthi-linked arms dealer had seized her Sanaa home. What began as a quarrel over a single house hardened into an organized encampment that named a commander to coordinate any escalation, while the Houthis put their forces in the area on alert. Confrontations like this are usually bought off or mediated before they reach gunfire, and this one likely will be. However, many tribal leaders who were once at least nominally allied with the Houthis sense the group’s weakness and are increasingly reasserting their local authority.

The Bab al-Mandeb

The same fragility that constrains the Houthis on land governs their conduct at sea. They hold much of Yemen’s Red Sea coast and have the anti-ship missiles, drones, and mines to make the Bab al-Mandeb impassable, yet they have left it open. Since the Gaza ceasefire, they have kept to selective strikes; in early June, they hit Israel-linked vessels in the Gulf of Aden and renewed a ban on Israeli shipping, but general traffic has kept moving, and the strait has not been closed. Traffic through the strait has yet to recover to pre-2025 levels.

The Houthis’ restraint reflects both weakness and pragmatism. The Houthis’ ports — Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras Issa — are critical to their finances and north Yemen’s economy. They tax all imports and depend on those imports to feed the north and fund the movement. A wider maritime campaign, or an outright closure, would bring the one response they cannot absorb as easily as they did in previous campaigns: renewed Israeli and American strikes on Hodeidah, which have already damaged port infrastructure and tightened the flow of food and fuel into Houthi territory.

For now, the threat of closure is far more useful than actual closure, and the threat of closing the strait has been replaced by the more potent and direct threat of attacking Saudi Arabia’s oil handling infrastructure. The Houthis’ dire financial situation and the rising threat of social unrest due to rising food prices and shortages mean that they need the strait open to maintain their grip on power.

Captured by Its Patrons

The Houthis’ core constraint is now financial. Yemen’s recognized government (GoY) faces a core constraint: its persistent inability to reform itself or govern the territory it claims. GoY, now more than ever, is dependent on its chief patron, Saudi Arabia, for financial and military support. Saudi Arabia’s increasingly overt management and backing of GoY are critical, but they also subvert GoY’s already limited authority. GoY’s one real gain of the past year, retaking the south, was Saudi Arabia’s work more than its own.

In December 2025, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), backed by the United Arab Emirates, launched “Operation Promising Future,” seizing the oil-rich governorates of Hadramawt and al-Mahra along the Saudi border. Though fought by Yemenis, the offensive was in substance an Emirati one, carried out with Emirati arms and Emirati backing. It came less than three months before the United States and Israel went to war with Iran, and within weeks of Israel’s December 26 recognition of Somaliland across the Gulf of Aden. Together, the offensive and the recognition are best read as an effort by the UAE and Israel to secure positions along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden corridor before the confrontation with Iran began.

The effort failed. Riyadh treated a UAE-aligned force on its southern frontier as a direct threat, hit Emirati arms shipments at Mukalla on December 30, and backed a counteroffensive in January that retook the territory, dissolved the STC, and drove its leader, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, into exile in Abu Dhabi. The UAE withdrew its remaining forces. The episode nonetheless put Riyadh on notice. Saudi Arabia now treats the deepening UAE-Israel partnership as a driver of regional instability nearly on a par with Iran, and sees in it the makings of strategic encirclement along its flanks. Its answer has been to move closer to Turkey and Qatar while distancing itself from Emirati policy, and to take the southern file in hand itself, running it through a Supreme Military Committee under coalition command, a degree of direct control over Yemeni affairs the Saudis had avoided throughout the war.

Somaliland belongs to the same design. For Israel, recognition opened the way to a possible military and intelligence foothold in Somaliland, across the water from Yemen, from which to watch and strike the Houthis at a time when missile fire has all but closed the port of Eilat. A divided and contested Yemen serves that end, as does a southern authority open to the Abraham Accords, which the STC’s leadership had signaled it would join. For Riyadh, the UAE-backed offensive in south Yemen, paired with Israeli recognition of Somaliland, was an existential threat that required a maximal response.

The South

Whatever the maps now show, GoY’s hold on the south is shallow. The STC’s dissolution is disputed by members who reject it and continue to act in the group’s name, and the central demand of the southern movement, self-determination, is a direct threat to GoY and, now by extension, to Saudi Arabia and its regional allies. STC-aligned forces now operate as low-level insurgents against a government they were nominally part of until recently. GoY’s response has been forceful. Its troops fired on pro-STC demonstrators in Aden in February and in Mukalla in early April, killing several, and Human Rights Watch documented the use of excessive force and arbitrary detention in Aden. These actions undercut the already limited authority the government had only just begun to establish.

Yemen’s eastern governorates continue on their own particular trajectories. In Hadhramaut, the governorate that holds most of Yemen’s oil, the Saudi-backed Hadramawt Tribal Alliance (HTA) under Amr bin Habreesh continues to quietly press for autonomy and a larger share of the governorate’s oil revenue. The HTA answers to neither the government nor the southern separatists, and Saudi Arabia courts the alliance as a counterweight to both the GoY and the southern separatists.

Image Source: Yemen Monitor

A Hollow State

The hollowness shows most plainly in GoY’s failure to keep the lights on in Yemen’s wartime capital, Aden. A Saudi fuel grant in January gave Aden close to twenty hours of power a day, an improvement residents had not seen in years. The relief did not last. As summer temperatures rose, outages lasted up to 20 hours a day, with residents protesting in the streets and some sleeping outdoors to escape the heat. A further $150 million Saudi fuel package announced in late May produced no noticeable improvement. Repeated promises followed by repeated shortfalls have become the pattern, and residents have stopped expecting otherwise.

Corruption remains a core driver of the ongoing failures. The electricity sector has long been among the government’s largest budget lines and one of its most plundered, with vast sums spent in recent years for little to show for it. The waste drains the treasury and, worse, leaves the government without the means to deliver the services on which GoY’s legitimacy rests. In most of what touches ordinary life for Yemenis — power, water, salaries, healthcare, the courts — it is a government in form more than in substance, recognized abroad and kept solvent by Saudi transfers.

The exception is the army, the one institution the government has genuinely begun to reform, albeit unevenly. Since February, a new defense minister has consolidated most of the duplicated commands and payrolls he inherited, begun a unified personnel database and biometric payroll to purge ghost soldiers from its rolls, and restored a measure of coordination among forces that had spent a decade pulling apart. Yet the strongest formations still answer to their own patrons and senior commanders rather than to a single chain of command — the Saudi-funded National Shield to the council’s chairman, the southern brigades to the commanders who raised them — and the central authority now drawing them together and funding them is the Saudi-led Supreme Military Committee, not the president of Yemen. Command and control is slowly being unified, but into Riyadh’s hands rather than GoY’s. Even the government’s one act of state-building deepens its dependence on its core patron.

Outlook: What Comes Next?

Neither the Houthis nor the GoY are positioned for or strong enough to launch the kinds of offensives that could reshape Yemen’s political and military landscapes. The front lines have scarcely moved since the 2022 truce and are unlikely to move over near- or medium-term timeframes. All armed parties in Yemen now possess a range of UAVs for surveillance and attack. The diffusion of UAVs further locks in the frontlines, as surveillance is ubiquitous and massing troops carries greater risks.

Due to what it perceives as an existential threat from the UAE and Israel, Saudi Arabia is now more deeply involved in day-to-day affairs in Yemen than it ever has been. Saudi military and civilian advisers are now key decision-makers who, in many cases, are positioned ahead of GoY civilian and military officials. Saudi involvement is unlikely to diminish in the near term, but neither is it likely to force GoY to move toward more durable and effective governance. At the same time, the Saudis, who are acutely vulnerable to a Houthi attack on the East-West pipeline, will continue to placate the Houthis despite their increasing anti-Saudi rhetoric.

The Houthis and GoY show increasing fragility across multiple sectors, which means they remain balanced against one another. This balance means that Yemen faces what it has faced for much of the last decade, a slow, grinding economic decline that punishes the vast majority of Yemen’s 36 million inhabitants while elites on all sides benefit. At the same time, the continued diffusion of increasingly capable military technology and armaments means that a range of armed actors operating across Yemen will be further empowered. This, in turn, further imperils GoY authority and, increasingly, Houthi authority.

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About the Author:

Michael Horton is the co-founder of Red Sea Analytics International (RSAI) and a contributing author at Eurasia Outlook. He has two decades of experience as an analyst and researcher in Yemen and the Red Sea region. Michael has written policy briefs and conducted briefings and seminars for the US National Security Council, the British Foreign Ministry, the British Ministry of Defense, the US State Department, and senior members of the British Parliament and the US Congress. He has written extensively about the region for The Saratoga Foundation, Jane’s Intelligence Review, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Oxford Analytica, and The Economist,.

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The recent two-day visit to Azerbaijan by Turkmenistan President Serdar Berdimuhamedov from June 22-23 has been hailed as a major milestone in bilateral relations. Indeed, ten years ago, not only such a warm welcome, but even a visit by Turkmenistan’s head of state would have seemed highly unlikely. The two countries have come a long way from disputing ownership of a Caspian oil field to agreeing on its joint development and symbolically naming it Dostluk (“Friendship”) - a word that carries a similar meaning in both Azerbaijani and Turkmen.

The Turkmen president’s visit to Azerbaijan has again raised hopes that the long-discussed Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) project might finally gain new momentum. The recent endorsement of the Trans-Caspian corridor by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio during a meeting with Turkmen Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov on May 29 has once again renewed interest in the geopolitical significance of the Trans-Caspian undersea gas pipeline, once championed by U.S. officials in the 1990s. Successive U.S. administrations have supported the idea of a Trans-Caspian energy link as a means of strengthening the sovereignty and economic independence of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, diversifying export routes, and reducing excessive dependence on any single market.

From Azerbaijan’s perspective, strengthening Trans-Caspian connectivity and capitalizing on growing international interest in the Middle Corridor remain key strategic priorities. To Baku’s dismay, Ashgabat has not shared the same level of enthusiasm.

The China Factor in Turkmen Strategy

Several objective reasons explain Turkmenistan’s reluctance to embrace the project and its proclivity to maintain an eastward orientation in its gas exports. First, Turkmenistan is a natural gas exporter, and, unlike Azerbaijan, the overwhelming majority of its proven gas reserves are located in the eastern part of the country. Second, an extensive pipeline network connecting Turkmen gas fields to China is already in place, providing a reliable and established export route. This pipeline system consists of three parallel lines that run for 1,830 kilometers across Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan before entering China’s Xinjiang region. The combined design capacity of these three lines is 55 bcm per year (though some of this capacity is shared with smaller export volumes from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan).

This strategic direction was reinforced in April when China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed an agreement to develop the fourth phase of the giant Galkynysh gas field, which supplies much of Turkmenistan’s approximately 30 bcm annual gas exports to China. While both countries have periodically discussed the construction of a fourth branch of the Central Asia–China gas pipeline (Line D), the project has faced repeated delays and remains uncertain.

Given these realities, it is highly unlikely that Turkmenistan would invest in a westward export pipeline to transport gas from fields developed largely with Chinese financing and intended primarily for the Chinese market. As a result, Ashgabat’s economic and infrastructure incentives continue to favor an eastward rather than a westward alignment.

Baku’s Energy Diplomacy with Ashgabat

Despite the challenges ahead, Azerbaijan is pursuing a deliberate, long-term energy strategy to engage Turkmenistan by leveraging ongoing developments in the Turkmen offshore oil sector to build support for a western vector to complement its eastern strategy. One promising area where Azerbaijani-Turkmen cooperation could deepen is the exporting of oil and gas from relatively smaller fields in the Caspian Sea.

On June 20^th, Turkmenistan awarded exploration rights for Blocks 19 and 20 to Petronas. The Malaysian company already operates Block 1, which produces around 10 million cubic meters of gas per day. On its own, such production volumes are not sufficient to justify a dedicated export route. However, when combined with output from additional offshore developments, they could eventually create the scale necessary for commercially viable exports across the Caspian.

Azerbaijan is equally interested in expanding cooperation with Turkmenistan in the oil sector. In this context, one of the most symbolic outcomes of the visit was Azerbaijan’s decision to present Turkmenistan with an oil tanker. The vessel was named Dostlug—the Turkmen spelling of “friendship”—echoing the name of the offshore field that has become a powerful symbol of the rapprochement between the two countries.

Gifted by Azerbaijan to Turkmenistan, the “Dostlug” oil tanker was built at the Baku Shipyard and has an overall length of 141 meters, a width of 16.9 meters, and a draft of 4.54 meters. With a deadweight of 7,875 tons and a carrying capacity of 55,000 to 60,000 barrels, the Dostlug is a Volga-Don Max river-sea tanker specifically designed with a shallow draft to navigate the fluctuating water levels of the Caspian Sea and regional canal systems while maximizing its cargo load. Its construction not only demonstrates the development of Azerbaijan’s shipbuilding industry but also highlights Baku’s growing capacity to implement large-scale and technologically complex shipbuilding projects in its modernized shipyard.

From Baku’s perspective, increasing Turkmen oil exports through Azerbaijani infrastructure offers tangible economic benefits. Azerbaijan’s full operator-ship of the 833-kilometer (518-mile) long Baku–Supsa oil pipeline (145,000 bpd) further enhances the attractiveness of such cooperation, allowing Baku greater flexibility in marketing and transit arrangements.

Both President Ilham Aliyev and SOCAR President Rovshan Najaf have confirmed that Turkmen crude is already being transported through the 1,768 kilometer (1099-mile) long Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. According to SOCAR, approximately 230 million barrels of Turkmen oil were shipped via BTC between 2005 and 2022, averaging around 14 million barrels per year. While this is a significant volume, it remains modest compared to BTC’s current throughput capacity of approximately 400,000 barrels per day. This suggests that Azerbaijan’s transit infrastructure has ample room to accommodate additional volumes of Turkmen oil should Ashgabat choose to increase exports through the Caspian corridor.

Outlook

With the recent visit to Baku by the Turkmen President, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev continues to nurture aspirations for a potential Trans-Caspian pipeline project that could once again be backed by the United States. Secretary’s of State Marco Rubio’s recent statement and meeting with the Turkmen Foreign Minister symbolize a revived level of US interest in the project, and American interest in promoting the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) could bolster US aspirations for greater Caspian connectivity, even linking TRIPP and TCP with the Middle Corridor.

That said, the principal obstacle to the realization of the TCP gas pipeline remains Turkmenistan’s reluctance to make a strategic commitment to the project. Despite Turkmenistan’s recent rapprochement with Azerbaijan and a series of goodwill gestures from Baku, the Turkmen leadership has shown little inclination to take the decisive steps necessary to advance a Trans-Caspian energy corridor.

Instead, Ashgabat appears to be adhering to its long-standing approach: preserving multiple export options without fully committing to any specific westward project while maintaining its eastern connection with China. Projects such as the Trans-Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran (TAPI) gas pipeline, a project designed to export Turkmen natural gas out of the Caspian basin to energy-deficient markets in South Asia, a Trans-Caspian gas connection, or expanded gas exports to Türkiye via Iran serve less as concrete strategic priorities and more as bargaining chips in negotiations with China, Turkmenistan’s dominant gas customer.

From this perspective, the value of these alternative routes lies not necessarily in their implementation but in the leverage they provide. By keeping the possibility of diversification alive, Turkmenistan seeks to strengthen its negotiating position vis-à-vis Beijing while avoiding commitments that could alter the existing balance of its export relationships. As a result, discussions surrounding westward export routes continue to generate political interest, but tangible progress remains elusive.

This would explain Moscow’s muted response to the Turkmen president’s visit to Baku. At this stage, Moscow is likely to closely observe these developments rather than react strongly, particularly given the numerous political, commercial, and logistical obstacles that continue to hinder progress on the Trans-Caspian Pipeline. From Russia’s perspective, there is still a considerable gap between the positive symbolism surrounding Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan relations and any concrete steps toward the realization of a westward export corridor.

Author Bio:

Rauf Mammadov is a senior manager at Fuld & Company, specializing in energy issues. His research focuses on energy security, global energy industry trends, and energy relations between the Middle East, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus, with a particular emphasis on the post-Soviet countries of Eurasia.

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Hi everyone,

Something significant and unexpected is unfolding in the war in Ukraine: Russia’s critical land bridge linking the Russian-occupied land areas in southern Ukraine known as “Novorossiya” that runs to occupied Crimea along the R-280 highway is increasingly becoming a battlefield in its own right. Once considered a secure Russian logistical artery, the network of roads and rail lines running through occupied Ukrainian territory is now under sustained attack by explosive-laden drones.

Kyiv’s new mid-range drone campaign against Russian military transport routes is turning the Donetsk–Mariupol corridor and the R-280 “Novorossiya” highway into a ‘Mad Max’ death zone where Russian fuel trucks, supply vehicles, and logistical convoys are being hit daily - hundreds of kilometers from the front line. Ukrainian officials have described the campaign as a “logistics lockdown.” Russia’s southern military grouping and its forces in Crimea depend heavily on this overland network to receive daily shipments of food, fuel, ammunition, and reinforcements.

In our new report, The Vanishing Rear: How Ukraine’s Middle-Strike Revolution Is Rewriting Russian Disposition Doctrine on the R-280, Ukrainian security expert Hlib Parfonov addresses these developments as the grinding new reality along the R-280 is forcing a major reassessment within the Russian military over how to counter these attacks.

Key takeaway:

👉 By targeting the connective tissue of Russian logistics, Ukraine is exploiting a fundamental vulnerability of modern warfare: a military force may maintain strong defensive positions at the front while remaining exposed along the arteries that sustain it.

Facing this new reality, Moscow is reaching a stark conclusion about the modern battlefield: troops, equipment, and supply nodes once considered safe in rear areas are now vulnerable to precision strikes conducted by increasingly capable Ukrainian unmanned systems. The response has been a push toward radical dispersal, the abandonment of fixed rear-area assumptions, the deployment of mobile counter-drone teams and robotic surveillance systems, and a new counterintelligence posture designed to withstand persistent observation and attack.

Yet this adaptation reveals a deeper contradiction. Russia is attempting to solve a problem rooted in a traditional conception of the battlefield — protecting static formations and rear-area concentrations — while Ukraine’s drone campaign has shifted the contest onto the roads, logistics networks, and movement corridors that connect the battlefield. In effect, Russia is now confronting the very reconnaissance-strike complex that its own military theorists anticipated decades ago. The result is a transformation of warfare in which mobility, concealment, and logistics resilience may prove as decisive as firepower itself.

In his new report, Hlib argues that Russian military thought has reached a candid conclusion about the modern battlefield: troops in assembly areas hundreds of kilometers behind the front are no longer safe, and their losses may now exceed those of forces in direct contact. The corrective taking shape — radical dispersal, the abandonment of fixed area boundaries, robotic sentries, mobile counter-drone groups, and a counterintelligence regime imposed over the rear — amounts to the deepest revision of Soviet-rooted disposition doctrine in three generations. It is a response to a pressure Ukraine is actively generating: a deep-strike campaign reaching 300 kilometers into the Russian rear that has shifted from hunting air defense to strangling fuel and transport that could undermine Russia’s ability to remain in the occupied areas of “Novorossiya.”

According to Hlib, the deeper irony is that Russia is now rewriting its defensive manual for the reconnaissance-strike complex its own military theorists first prophesied — and that the doctrine answers a stationary problem, concealing a force at rest. At the same time, the threat has migrated to the R-280 highway, where dispersal cannot follow.

To read the report, please click 👉 here.

Enjoy!

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By Andrew McGregor

Since French troops and business interests were expelled from France’s former colonies in the Sahel after a series of Russian-inspired anti-colonial military coups, Paris has sought means of restoring its status as an influential player in Africa. One route has passed through Nairobi, where French president Emmanuel Macron joined a summit of African political and business leaders in mid-May amid deepening military ties with Kenya.

A second, more challenging path is represented by mutual efforts in recent months by both France and its former colony of Algeria to create a rapprochement after decades of hostility, efforts opposed by powerful political elements in both nations.

The Colonial Legacy

Algeria’s transition to independence was far from peaceful, with 132 years of French colonization coming to an end only after a bitter eight-year war (1954-1962) that finished with the death of hundreds of thousands of Algerians and the expulsion from the newly independent nation of French settlers (the pied-noirs) and Algerian collaborators with the colonial regime (the harkis). Algeria’s new regime perceived itself as a Marxist-influenced global center for anti-colonial ideology that had no place in its foreign relations for France, which had declared the integration of Algeria with mainland France as early as 1848.

Franco-Algerian relations, never good, were inflamed in July 2024 when France joined the US and Israel in recognizing Morocco’s sovereignty over the disputed former Spanish colony of Western Sahara, whose Polisario independence movement is supported by Algiers. After Algiers and Paris withdrew their respective ambassadors, Algeria’s National People’s Congress (the lower house of parliament) expressed its displeasure with France’s abandonment of its neutrality on the issue by passing a law in December 2024 decreeing French colonialism a “state crime,” with demands for an official apology and massive reparations.

In France, the education system has been instructed to emphasize the positive aspects of French colonialism, while Algerians frame attitudes to France through a lens of colonial repression, including massacres, summary executions, unwanted nuclear tests and the forced exile of dissidents from the homeland. These perceptions lay behind the Algerian legislation, which also called for the return of historical relics seized by French forces and the criminalization of “glorification” of French colonialism.

The French foreign ministry declared the legislation “manifestly hostile, both to the desire to resume Franco-Algerian dialogue and to calm, constructive work on issues of historical memory.” Conservative French senator Max Brisson rejected what he perceived as a narrowness of historical perception embodied in the Algerian legislation: “The Algerian regime may pronounce as many condemnations as it wishes - it will not erase history. That history has both its dark and its lighter chapters.” Macron made similar remarks in October 2016: “Yes, there was torture in Algeria, but there was also the emergence of a state, or wealth, of a middle class. This is the reality of colonialism. There are elements of civilization and elements of barbarism.”

By February 2017, Macron had changed his tone in remarks made in Algeria, asserting that French colonialism was “genuinely barbaric,” constituting “a part of our past that we have to confront.” With the possibility of a mutually beneficial rapprochement with France looming, Algeria’s upper house, the Council of the Nation, approved a revised version of the legislation in March, dropping the demands for an apology and reparations. According to French foreign minister Jean-Nöel Barrot, what matters most is creating conditions in which France can neutralize drug traffickers, expel Algerians living in France illegally and create new markets for France’s powerful agri-food industry. Barrot, however, did not aid the cause of rapprochement when he reaffirmed his support for Moroccan sovereignty over its “southern provinces” (the Western Sahara) in May of this year.

Mutual Suspicion

Macron’s willingness to engage in a reconciliation process has something less than broad support within France and may be seen by some as a willingness to increase immigration from Algeria. Others suspect Algerian president Abdelmajid Tebboune of trying to create an ultra-nationalist base amongst the five-million-plus French residents of Algerian descent that would enable him to influence French foreign policy. Some Algerian leaders have suggested the French government’s concern over migration issues is a craven attempt to gather domestic political support and appease the French right. Algerian authorities are also troubled by France’s role as a host for Algerian opposition figures as well as fugitives who have absconded with state funds and property obtained through administrative corruption.

A February visit to Algiers by French interior minister Laurent Nuñez led to the reactivation of a dormant framework for security coordination, including cooperation in intelligence matters and the delicate question of repatriating illegal migrants. Counterterrorism coordination was a special feature of the talks, with Algeria sharing a border with Niger and Mali, Sahelian nations that recently expelled French forces fighting Islamist extremists in favor of Russian troops acting under the direction of the Russian Defense Ministry. Two more French ministers have made visits to Algiers in recent months, and French ambassador Stéphane Romatet returned to Algiers in May.

French attitudes towards the rapprochement fall into two camps: the “pragmatists” who favor improved relations with Algeria (as represented by President Macron and his ministers) and the “power struggle” camp (represented by opposition leaders like Bruno Retailleau and Jordan Bardella), who have accused the Macron government of “incredible naiveté” in its dealings with Algeria. The growing rapprochement was described in the Algerian press as the “softening of relations between Algiers and Paris after a long period of freezing fueled by the racist and xenophobic discourse of a part of the French political class.”

Despite this “softening of relations,” Algiers has implemented new policies designed to eventually remove Algeria from the French cultural orbit. Algerian schools have reduced the time spent in class learning French in favor of English language instruction. Last year, for example, English replaced French in Algerian medical schools. The number of students learning French is in steady decline, as government-controlled agencies have switched to the use of Arabic and English in their documents. Le Monde notes that Air Algérie and Algérie Télécom have switched to the use of English and Arabic rather than French for tickets, billing, and receipts. Both are state-owned entities.

This development appears to be part of a gradual transition away from French in education and administration that has not yet been accompanied by any official decrees regarding a full-scale shift to English. The reasons for a gradual rather than abrupt and disruptive switch to English are described by an Algerian researcher as part of a deeper struggle over Algeria’s postcolonial identity, global integration, and the politics of language.

Conclusion

The leaders of both nations have come to the conclusion that a state of permanent estrangement benefits neither. The role of history in defining the quality of Franco-Algerian relations is so vital that Macron created a joint commission of French and Algerian historians to examine historical memory and commissioned a report by historian Benjamin Stora in 2021 to help guide attempts to build a new relationship, a recognition that the course of the present and future cannot be determined without acknowledgement of the burden imposed by history.

It is difficult for both Paris and Algiers to allow their foreign policies to stray very far from public sentiment, which tends to be deeply entrenched in an historical interpretation of the desirability of improved relations. The Algerian regime has benefited in the past from strict adherence to an anti-colonial ideology while blaming Algerian misfortunes on an allegedly hostile France. This may explain the antagonistic approach to improving relations taken by the government-controlled Algerian press, even as diplomatic initiatives for improvement are underway. Elements of French media have also promoted an aggressive suspicion of Algerian motives, suggesting that an Algerian presence in France is tied to toleration of crime and disorder. For both Algeria and France, nothing can be achieved in terms of the sought-after mutually beneficial rapprochement without reference to a contentious past.

About the Author:

Dr. Andrew McGregor is director of Aberfoyle International Security, a Toronto-based consultancy specializing in the security issues of Africa and the Islamic world.

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By Alexander Melikishvili

The US-Israeli war against Iran has had several second-order effects on Ukraine since it commenced on February 28. Most importantly, it has applied upward pressure on oil prices in global energy markets, benefiting Russia’s hydrocarbon-dependent economy. According to the Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, the increase in oil price could result in an additional $2.73 billion in revenues for the state budget. This will, in turn, provide the Putin regime with more financial resources to continue to wage war against Ukraine.

President Zelensky acknowledges this in his open letter to Putin, in which he cites “intelligence reports” indicating that the Russian leader is “considering plans to continue the war into 2027 and 2028.” Russia’s position is further strengthened by the political anxieties in the Trump administration over continued increases in the price of oil. This fear resulted in the US Department of the Treasury’s repeated issuance of 30-day waivers from sanctions on Russian oil starting from March (the latest one dates back to 18 May and is due to expire on 17 June).

The US-led war of choice with Iran also spurred Ukraine to intensify its bombing campaign targeting Russia’s oil and gas sector to deny the Kremlin the windfall profits from soaring oil prices. The Ukrainian military has been relentless in its deep strikes against oil refineries across Russia, forcing Deputy Prime Minister Novak to grudgingly admit the drop in oil production on the sidelines of the St Petersburg International Economic Forum on June 4. In March, Reuters estimated that due to Ukrainian drone strikes on Russia’s strategically important oil export terminals on the Baltic (Ust-Luga and Primorsk) and Black (Novorossiysk) Seas, and the disruption of oil flow via the Druzhba pipeline caused by a Russian drone attack, Russia’s oil export capacity was reduced by 40%.

Ukraine’s “kinetic sanctions” have not been limited to Russian oil refineries, as maritime attacks against the Kremlin’s so-called “shadow fleet” indicate. Vessels carrying Russian oil in contravention of international sanctions have been regularly targeted by Ukraine not only in the Black Sea but as far away as the southern Mediterranean. For example, the tanker Qendil was struck off the coast of Libya in December 2025.

Russia Again Aims for Winter

Owing to the combination of extremely cold weather (coldest in the last 15 years) and persistent Russian strikes against Ukraine’s critical energy infrastructure, this past winter was the hardest for Ukraine since the war began in February 2022. Unable to achieve a major breakthrough along the frontline, which, according to General Oleksandr Syrskyi, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, stretches over 1,200 km, Russia is increasingly resorting to massive volleys of drones and missiles launched against Ukrainian electrical supply and production facilities. For example, the June 2 attack included 73 missiles and 656 drones, causing power outages in Kyiv and across six regions (Kyiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Sumy, and Cherkasy).

Moscow’s overarching objective is to degrade Ukraine’s national power grid by destroying the high-power transmission lines and substations that connect its electrical-generation facilities, which are mainly concentrated in the south and west of the country, to industrial demand in the east. As early as January, President Zelensky acknowledged that, because of the Russian attacks, Ukraine’s electrical-generation capacity could cover only 60% of the country’s needs.

*Image above: Naftogaz Facility Struck by Russian missiles in Chernihiv

Russian strategy is ruthlessly methodical, and it is multi-pronged, as it also entails the destruction of Ukraine’s oil and gas infrastructure. In January–April alone, the facilities of Ukraine’s national oil and gas champion, Naftogaz, were struck 96 times, according to its CEO, Serhii Koretskyi. This forced Ukraine to import 2.21 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas in January–April, which is 2.1 times as much as during the same period in 2025, according to data from the Ukrainian oil and gas consultancy ExPro. Considering that the Iran war increased gas prices in Europe to USD 500–600 per 1,000 cubic meters (compared to below $400 before the war), the debt-laden Naftogaz would need $1.3–1.5 billion to purchase the planned 2–2.5 bcm before the start of the heating season (31 October–31 March), based on Ekonomichna Pravda’s estimates.

The Ukrainian government’s baseline scenario for 2026–2027 envisions having 14.6 bcm in underground storage facilities by the start of the heating season. As of May 25, Ukraine had 10.7 bcm in storage, including 4–5 bcm that must remain in the system for technical maintenance, according to S&P Global Energy CERA. Although Ukraine boasts a network of twelve underground storage facilities (mainly concentrated in the western regions) with a total storage capacity on the order of 31 bcm, the largest in Europe, they have come under repeated attacks. In January, the Bilche-Volytsko-Uherske underground gas storage facility in Stryi district of Lviv region, the largest in Ukraine, was attacked by what the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s Parliamentary Support Team for Ukraine described as “a missile of the ‘Oreshnik’ type with separate warheads.”

Outlook

The impending disbursement of the two-year EUR 90 billion EU loan (approximately $104 billion), slated for mid-June, provides welcome relief to the Ukrainian government as it ramps up preparations for winter. President Zelensky stated that at least EUR 30 billion ($34 billion) from this loan will be spent on direct budgetary support, which presumably also implies funds allocated for urgent repairs to critical energy infrastructure. However, Ukraine will be racing against time, as Russian attacks targeting the oil and gas sector, the electricity grid, electricity generation, and heat production will probably escalate to previously unseen levels as the heating season approaches.

With Russian combat operations effectively stalled due to the 10–15 km-wide drone-patrolled “kill zone” on both sides of the frontline, Putin’s options are limited. They could include another mobilization in the autumn, as suggested by the Russian MP Gurulev, but that would be deeply unpopular with the Russian public, which is already seething with anger from noticeably increased Ukrainian attacks deep inside Russia. Instead, chipping away at Ukraine’s critical energy infrastructure with massive drone and missile volleys presents a more palatable choice, one that is virtually guaranteed to yield tangible results both in terms of incapacitating Ukraine’s defense industry and exacerbating war fatigue among the population without incurring losses on the battlefield.

In such a context, the provision of interceptor missiles (particularly PAC-3s for Patriot batteries) for Ukraine’s air defenses via the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), a US-NATO procurement mechanism, becomes absolutely critical. But here again, the harmful impact of the Iran war is felt strongly as the US balances its priorities with Israel and Gulf allies in mind, stoking European concerns. In the absence of adequate American commitments, it will fall on Europe to make difficult trade-offs that will have to entail drawing down stocks of munitions in some countries.

Speaking at the European Parliament in January, NATO Secretary General Rutte urged member states that “are sitting on large piles of interceptors” to transfer them to Ukraine. Without robust air defense to protect the ongoing repairs to energy infrastructure, Ukraine is destined to face another grueling winter that could strain the war-ravaged country to the breaking point.

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About the Author:

Alex Melikishvili is a senior country risk analyst with more than a decade of experience working in the private sector (S&P Global, IHS Markit) with a focus on Eurasian security. Alex holds a master’s degree in International Affairs from the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

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The ongoing US-Iran war and its fallout are driving Middle Eastern countries, particularly the Gulf states, to reconsider the traditional US-backed security architecture and opt for swifter diversification of defense partnerships in order to tackle security challenges caused by the three-month-old Gulf War III. The Gulf states’ decision is a rational choice, as the recent Iranian missile attacks targeting military and energy targets demonstrated the limitations of the US-led support and local air defense systems during Iranian drone and missile attacks on the Arab Gulf states.

While currently the United States is engaged in peace talks with Iran to end hostilities and restore maritime movement in the Hormuz Strait, wealthy Gulf states are searching for new security partners to mitigate potential future risks of war, and Türkiye is moving quickly to fill that vacuum. Moreover, as a result of this shifting strategic environment, a new axis is seemingly taking shape that includes Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan amid the war that will likely further alter the geopolitical landscape, alongside the existing long-term Türkiye-Qatar axis.

Indeed, such a stance reflects Türkiye’s ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) vision of “an alliance of Muslim countries to minimize dependence on countries outside the region.” On the other hand, the new axis is poised to counter the US, Israel, India, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), thereby emphasizing the decades-long estrangement between the two blocs. Ostensibly, there are several significant motivating factors behind the emergence of this axis, such as shared concerns regarding Israel’s expanding power in the Middle East, ongoing instability in the Red Sea, and renewed attempts by Iran and its proxies to regain influence in the immediate neighborhood by escalating violence.

Amid deepening discontent with the war and the US-Israel alliance that has altered the regional balance of power, Gulf countries are increasingly turning toward Turkish-made defense products, namely drones and smart-guided missiles, to thwart Iranian drone and missile attacks. Despite robust air defense systems, which remain effective against ballistic missiles, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia are facing ammunition shortages at a time of growing threats. Since the very beginning of the war, Iran has succeeded in striking no less than 12 US and allied radar and SATCOM terminals deployed in the Gulf states. According to satellite imagery, four AN/TPY-2 radars have been hit in al Sader and al Ruwais in the UAE, Muwaffaq Salti Airbase in Jordan, and Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia.

Turkish Defense Industry Fills the Gap

In contrast to the Gulf states, which face acute ammunition shortages despite possessing advanced air defense systems, Türkiye is on the verge of becoming one of the Middle East’s foremost military powers. Ankara is forging a modern-day industrial equivalent to Germany’s legendary Krupp defense industrial giant (or even multiple Krupps) capable of mass domestic defense production and global export.

With this goal in mind, Ankara is increasingly positioning itself as a leading supplier in the global defense sector. Ankara has spent the last decade cultivating an integrated domestic defense ecosystem in an effort to bypass Western embargoes and secure total strategic autonomy. During this time it has moved into the ranks of the Middle East’s top missile exporters. This transformation is anchored by a massive network of nearly 4,000 localized small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) scattered across the country, creating a resilient, insulated supply chain that resembles the vast industrial depth once developed by Krupp’s in the historic Ruhr Valley.

Drawing upon lessons learned from recent conflicts worldwide, most notably the war in Ukraine, Türkiye has leveraged battlefield data to shape its defense innovation strategy, prompting ROKETSAN to develop cost-effective first-person-view (FPV) and AI-enabled kamikaze drones. In addition, the most significant achievement of the Turkish defense industry is the recent unveiling of Yildirimhan (the Turkish word for Lightning), an indigenous Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), on May 7 at the SAHA 2026 Defense and Aerospace Exhibition. With a planned 6,000-kilometer range, a maximum speed of Mach 25, and a 3,000 kg payload capacity, in theory, the missile launched from Türkiye could use its newly created ICBM to strike targets anywhere across Europe, Africa, and Asia.

*Image above: Türkiye’s first ICBM prototype, the Yildirimhan

The unveiling of Türkiye's first ICBM prototype, the Yildirimhan, marks a massive strategic shift for the Middle East. While Ankara’s ICBM is currently a concept mock-up rather than an active, fielded weapon, its development carries profound geopolitical, technical, and military implications for the Middle East. It also directly signals Türkiye’s emergence as a major regional power that its neighbors will take with great seriousness and further motivates the Arab Gulf states to pursue closer security ties with Ankara in the aftermath of the ongoing US-Iran confrontation.

Given such cutting-edge military technology, the Gulf states’ desire for a deeper partnership with Türkiye should come as no surprise. As such, on May 7, Kuwait’s Defense Minister, Sheikh Abdullah Ali Abdullah Al-Sabah, signed an intergovernmental protocol of intent for military-technical cooperation with the Turkish Defense Industry Administration. Alongside Kuwait, both Qatar and Saudi Arabia have expressed particular interest in ASELSAN’s Korkut 100/25 anti-aircraft artillery system, designed to counter small and ultra-small UAVs using 25 mm programmable high-explosive fragmentation rounds. Moreover, Qatar became the first importer of the newly developed Tolga Shorad short-range air defense system.

Undoubtedly, Türkiye’s strong commitment to achieving defense autonomy, significant production power, and proximity to the Gulf make Ankara a vital actor in the new geopolitical axis unfolding in the Gulf. As a rising regional power, Türkiye has successfully found a balance between soft and hard power, leaning mostly into mediation diplomacy and supporting several regional states due to its pragmatic vision.

Hence, while Middle Eastern states are eager to deepen defense partnerships with Türkiye through increased military imports and by reinforcing anti-Iranian narratives, some Western observers contend that Ankara’s expanding military footprint, driven by the rapid development of ballistic, cruise, and potentially hypersonic missiles, raises questions about whether Türkiye is acting as a stabilizing NATO ally or could evolve into a revisionist power.

Despite periodic criticism of Türkiye, the Trump administration has maintained a largely conciliatory stance toward the ruling AKP and forged stronger ties that have only deepened after the US military withdrawal from Syria. Meanwhile, critical delivery backlogs of U.S. Patriot and THAAD missile systems to the Gulf—combined with Europe’s scramble to rearm amid mounting geopolitical uncertainty—have enabled Ankara to position itself as a stable, reliable alternative supplier to the Gulf states. Moreover, Türkiye’s rising status will further cement its role in the new emerging order following the NATO summit in Ankara from July 7-8, which the President of the United States and other world leaders plan to attend.

Outlook

Türkiye’s recent advances in defense production and its growing alliances with Gulf states amid severe security challenges come at a pivotal moment for the global arms trade. The repercussions from the prolonged and violent drone and missile wars in Ukraine and Iran have drastically depleted global stockpiles of advanced weapon systems. During the recent conflict with Iran, the United States and its Gulf allies relied heavily on sophisticated Patriot and THAAD interceptors to counter inexpensive Iranian drones, yet concerns over limited inventories compelled the monarchies to seek alternative suppliers and partners. In this context, Türkiye appears to be well-positioned to outmaneuver established global arms producers, viewing the current crisis as a strategic opening for its arms industry and future exports to the Gulf.

Türkiye’s deepening ties with the Gulf monarchies mark a pivotal juncture in the Middle East’s security architecture. With Washington’s long-standing influence increasingly exposed, Ankara has gained fresh momentum as a strategic power broker in the region. The emerging geopolitical axis—anchored by Türkiye and reinforced by Gulf demand—signals a recalibration of regional alliances that will carry ripple effects that extend well beyond the Middle East into the wider global order that emerges in the aftermath of the ongoing US-Iran confrontation.

About the Author:

Fuad Shahbazov is a political scientist and analyst focused on regional security in Eurasia and the Middle East. He holds a master’s degree in Political Science from Vytautas Magnus University, a professional master’s degree in Terrorism and Countering Religious Radicalization from the University of Bergamo, and a master’s degree in Defense and Diplomacy from Durham University.

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By Paul Goble

Moscow continues to try to make the Circassian issue disappear, not only by seeking to limit participation in Circassian events but also by seeking to reduce the amount of academic attention the Circassians receive. But any short-term successes it has had in either are increasingly being overwhelmed by failures of its own making and by the growing activism of Circassians alike, both in the North Caucasus homeland and in the diaspora. Indeed, it is now the case that just like at the end of Soviet times, Moscow is fighting the Circassians in ways like the case of the foolish man who tries to extinguish a grease fire with water alone, a tactic that invariably fails when the center is unwilling or unable to douse the flames with a sufficiently large amount of water to put them out – and which as a result ends by spreading that which it hopes to extinguish.

Two developments this month alone highlight this new reality. On the one hand, officials in the North Caucasus sought to have it both ways as far as demonstrations on the anniversary of the 1864 genocide, giving official permission to some of them but then sending out the siloviki (Russian security services) in advance to warn people against taking part, an approach that ensured more participation and caused even more attention to the event than Moscow could ever have wanted. And on the other hand, a North Caucasian historian, to be sure speaking on condition of anonymity, noted that Moscow had driven the discussion of Russia’s 101-year-long war against the North Caucasus and the genocide of the Circassians that came at its end out of academic discourse in the Russian Federation, a trend that has also had an impact on Western attention to this issue. But even as it did that, a Moscow internet portal celebrated that the Russian-based Yandex search engine has now created an online translator of Circassian into Russian, something that will make the study of Circassian issues, including the war and genocide, much easier and likely more frequently discussed - at least outside of the Russian Federation.

The Continuing Importance of the May 21 Anniversary

May 21 marks the anniversary of the day in 1864 when Russian imperial forces expelled the Circassians from their North Caucasian homeland at the end of 101 years of resistance to Russian rule in an act of genocide. Commemorating this event plays a pivotal role in keeping the national movement alive, both among the 700,000 Circassians remaining in the North Caucasus and the seven million-strong diaspora. During the period of relative freedom in the first decades after the collapse of the USSR, Circassian activists in the North Caucasus, often with the open support of officials in the republics where they lived, organized various public measures to commemorate the anniversary. These efforts brought them into closer alignment with Circassian communities abroad, who had never ceased to commemorate this memorial day.

Those links became especially disturbing to the Putin regime at the time of the Sochi Olympiad in 2014, an event that the Kremlin clumsily organized precisely on the territory from which its genocide of the Circassians took place. (On that process, see the 50 weekly articles preceding the Sochi Olympics in Window on Eurasia (Window on Eurasia, Feb. 7, 2014.) And since that time, Moscow has taken ever more steps to limit Circassian activism both inside Russia and outside (Saratoga Foundation, Dec. 12, 2025, and Saratoga Foundation, Dec. 12, 2024).

Over the last decade, since then, Moscow has generally sought to restrict or even ban any commemorations of May 21 in the North Caucasus and has arrested some who took part in the hopes that would intimidate them and others. But instead, these bans and arrests have had just the opposite effect, attracting international attention to Russian repression and convincing many Circassians that they needed to adopt even tougher policies in response lest their national movement be crushed. This year, Moscow tried a new approach, giving permission for small meetings to make it appear more tolerant and then not arresting those who took part so as not to give the Circassians martyrs and further energize their activities. That led to a decline in attention to the measure in international media as compared to earlier years when bans and arrests made better journalistic copy, but Moscow combined these moves with another that is simultaneously more disturbing and counterproductive as far as Russian leaders are concerned.

Russian Intimidation Efforts Backfire

In the days and weeks before May 21 this year, Russian officials and their agents in place in the North Caucasus dispatched police and security officials to warn Circassians and members of their families against participating, implicitly suggesting that those who did so or supported those who did would suffer serious consequences. That Russian effort did not have the effect Moscow hoped for. While a few Circassians may have been intimidated, many more nonetheless did take part – and what is more important, they told sympathetic outlets about what Moscow was now doing, further angering and energizing Circassians and ensuring that their national movement will continue to grow rather than disappear as Moscow had wanted.

A second and related development in Moscow’s campaign, one so far overshadowed by Russia’s pressuring the Georgian government to reduce the status of the Circassian Cultural Center in Tbilisi, is yet another example of how Moscow’s campaign against the Circassians continues to backfire. That concerns the Russian government’s efforts to reduce scholarly discussion of Russia’s war against the Circassians, an effort historians in the region say has had success in Russian institutions and has echoed in Western scholarship as well over the last decade.

One of these historians, speaking on condition of anonymity, is blunt about this process. “In recent years,” he says, “the 19th-century Caucasian War has faded from the active agenda; all the discussions that resonated so loudly in the 1990s and 2000s have died down. Abroad, meanwhile, the study of the Caucasian War has, as a rule, never received much attention. Speaking of recent years, the only foreign work I can recall is Vladimir Hamed-Troyansky’s book: Empire of Refugees: North Caucasian Muslims and the Late Ottoman State, published by Stanford University Press in 2024.“

The decline in Western attention, he and other scholars in the North Caucasus suggest, is that the decline in Russian attention to this issue has meant fewer people in the West can do research on this topic because they know Russian but not Circassian or other North Caucasian languages.

That trend, of course, is exactly the one Moscow hopes for because declining attention to the Circassians and their national movement would seem to promise the Kremlin a real victory. After all, if Western scholars are not focusing on this, Western governments will not be as likely to either. There are some exceptions, most notably Lithuania and Ukraine, but Moscow’s hopes and intentions are clear.

Outlook

Unfortunately for the Kremlin but fortunately for the Circassians and all who care about the rights of minorities in the Russian Federation, Moscow is undermining its own goals in this regard by taking a step that quite likely will lead to more scholarship in the West about the Circassians, something that will help them maintain and grow their national movement in the face of Russian pressure. Even at the very time as the Russian authorities were unsuccessfully seeking to block Circassian commemorations of May 21, Moscow announced that Yandex, the Russian news portal, had added an online feature that would enable its visitors to translate Circassian into Russian.

This notable development should make it easier for Western scholars who know Russian but not Circassian to research the Russian advance into the North Caucasus in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Circassian resistance then, and the revival of the Circassian national movement now. At the very least, this shows a lack of coordination within the Russian government, a strategic vulnerability that Circassians and their friends are likely to exploit. Consequently, this combination of Russian actions, instead of making the Circassian issue disappear, seems set to make it even more important in the future.

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By Alexander Melikishvili

President Putin chose the press briefing on 9 May, the day Russia celebrates the end of World War II, to deliver a veiled threat to Armenia over its stepped-up efforts to pursue closer ties with the EU. He reminded the press pool that the war in Ukraine started with the latter’s attempt to do the same. He then added, “Therefore, they [Armenia] should not take it to the extreme.” Putin’s comments also included a suggestion to hold a referendum in Armenia, the outcome of which could potentially lay the groundwork for “a gentle, intelligent and mutually beneficial divorce.” Putin proposed discussing this topic at the upcoming Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) summit, which will be held in Astana, Kazakhstan, from May 28 to 29.

Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan was quick to respond. At an impromptu huddle with the media on May 11, in the Erebuni district of Yerevan, he defiantly disagreed with the divorce metaphor and stated that he saw no need to hold a referendum on relations with the EU, while issuing assurances that his government had no intention of harming Russian interests. Pashinyan expressed “great respect” for the EEU but announced that he would be skipping the summit due to being preoccupied with campaigning ahead of Armenia’s crucial parliamentary election on June 7. Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan will be representing Armenia in Astana.

If Putin’s remarks were relatively measured, other representatives of the Russian government were more explicit. Their ire was caused by the presence of Ukrainian President Zelensky at the 8th summit of the European Political Community (EPC), which, for the first time, was held in Yerevan on May 4. Maria Zakharova, the spokeswoman for the Russian foreign ministry known for her vitriolic tirades, declared at a press briefing on May 7 that the Ukrainian leader’s visit “showed the citizens of Armenia what kind of future the EU has prepared for them.” Mikhail Kalugin, the senior Russian diplomat overseeing relations with the CIS states, pointed out that “integration requires systemic work that is hardly compatible with an approach according to which membership in the EEU is viewed as a temporary measure for the period of search or the process of accession to an alternative association. To put it simply, sitting on two chairs won’t work.”

*Image above is a Russian AI-generated image mocking Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan, flanked by Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, and Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan in a Mount Rushmore-like sculpture taken from the YouTube channel (@notowa1) of the Armenian popular movement “No to Western Azerbaijan” that opposes Armenia-Azerbaijan-Türkiye rapprochement.

Russia Launches Disinformation Campaign in Earnest

Ahead of the general elections, Pashinyan is significantly hobbled by his principled position regarding the normalization of relations with both Azerbaijan and Turkey, which is very unpopular among a sizable segment of the Armenian electorate, especially Karabakh refugees. In addition, Pashinyan’s campaign against alleged corruption in the Armenian Apostolic Church, including calls for the resignation of Catholicos Karekin II, has made him the target of criticism from religious conservatives and the pro-Russian opposition. According to the public opinion poll results released in April, although Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party garnered the biggest share of supporters (33.6%), leaving far behind Narek Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia (11.4%) and ex-President Robert Kocharyan’s Armenia Alliance (4.2%), respondents who refused to answer or did not know whom they would vote for accounted for 23.3% and 13.7%, respectively, indicating that many voters are still undecided.

Against this backdrop, Russia unleashed an online disinformation campaign targeting Pashinyan due to his pro-Western policies, which is replete with AI-generated videos and images. According to the Russian investigative outlet The Insider, the Matryoshka bot network commenced its operations in October 2025, or eight months before the elections, which underscores the importance the Kremlin attaches to Armenia. In comparison, Matryoshka’s disinformation campaigns in the United States (presidential elections) and Moldova (parliamentary) began three and a half and five and a half months before the election dates in 2024 and 2025, respectively. In terms of content, it is a toxic mix of familiar Kremlin tropes and outright lies, including accusations that Pashinyan is planning to drag Armenia into conflict with Russia, that he is selling out Armenia’s national interests for the sake of normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, and that his pursuit of closer relations with the EU threatens “traditional values” in Armenia.

Russian election interference is further confirmed by the Swedish investigative organization Blankspot, which alleges that it has obtained a confidential document entitled Programme for Work in the ‘Anti-Pashinyan’ Direction for 2026. Blankspot claims that the document was obtained from “a person operating within the Russian intelligence services” after he or she “was hacked by a third party before March 2026.” It identifies the main objective as the “minimization of electoral results of the ‘Civil Contract’ and political forces allied with it.” This is to be accomplished through a number of means, including framing the elections as a referendum on confidence in Pashinyan personally.

Outlook

Russia does not lack levers of influence over Armenia, economic or otherwise. Suffice it to mention that Russia owns Armenia’s critical infrastructure, including its railway grid and gas distribution network. Armenia is vitally dependent on the gas it receives from Russia via Georgia at a steep discount, which Putin reminded Pashinyan of at their rather uneasy meeting in Moscow on April 1st. However, so far, it appears that the Kremlin’s strategy is limited to “soft” measures, including arbitrary trade restrictions such as the prohibition on selling imported Armenian mineral water in April. Given Pashinyan’s precarious domestic position, it is likely that Putin’s regime calculates that the disinformation campaign will be enough to unseat him.

Furthermore, the presence of the Russian military in Armenia provides Putin with other options as well. The passage by the State Duma of the draft law allowing the use of force to protect Russian citizens abroad on May 13, after it goes through the legislative process (approval by the Federation Council followed by Putin’s signature), will give Moscow a legal pretext for potential military intervention in Armenia, where, as of December 2025, 43,536 Russian citizens held residence permits, according to the Armenian interior ministry. On May 14, Pashinyan responded to the passage of this law by stating that he was not concerned and expressing his confident expectation that the Russian 102nd military base in Gyumri, “irrespective of what laws are in place in the Russian Federation, must function within the framework of Armenian laws and powers.” Nonetheless, under an extreme scenario, the Russian troops deployed in Armenia could be employed to carry out a coup to install a more Russia-friendly regime.

Armenia’s fate hangs in the balance as it is unclear how effective the deployment of the EU’s Hybrid Rapid Response Team to counter foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), in response to the Armenian government’s request, has been in limiting the impact of the Russian disinformation campaign ahead of the elections. Similarly, it is very unlikely that further institutionalization of EU-Armenia relations (through the establishment of the EU Partnership Mission in Armenia with a two-year mandate in April) will stave off potential Russian military intervention should Putin decide to use force to bring Armenia to heel.

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About the Author:

Alex Melikishvili is a senior country risk analyst with more than a decade of experience working in the private sector (S&P Global, IHS Markit) with a focus on Eurasian security. Alex holds a master’s degree in International Affairs from the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

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By Vusal Guliyev

Disruptions to energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz once again reveal the structural vulnerabilities of global oil markets. As the world’s largest crude importer, China is particularly exposed to such shocks. Historically, a significant share of China’s crude oil imports has been sourced from the Middle East, with a substantial portion transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

An estimated 52% of China’s oil imports currently pass through the strategic chokepoint. However, Beijing’s dependence remains lower than that of other major East Asian economies. By comparison, around 95% of Japan’s oil imports and roughly 70% of South Korea’s transit the same route. This demonstrates China’s relatively more diversified supply structure than its Asian neighbors. China’s exposure also extends beyond oil. As the world’s largest importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG), about 30% of its LNG imports are linked to flows via the Strait of Hormuz. A considerable share of these supplies originates from Qatar, followed by the United Arab Emirates and Oman.

Against this backdrop, the Hormuz blockade is not merely a disruption but a catalyst, accelerating China’s shift toward continental energy suppliers and overland transport corridors. Over the past two decades, Beijing has pursued a systematic diversification strategy aimed at reducing its reliance on vulnerable maritime routes. As a result, non-Gulf suppliers—particularly Russia and Central Asia—have gained increasing prominence. The current crisis has accelerated this shift. It has reinforced China’s turn toward geographically resilient, land-based energy networks and a broader portfolio of alternative suppliers.

Russia Becomes Beijing’s Fall-Back Supplier

Amid disruptions to Iranian oil exports, Russia has diplomatically positioned itself as a critical fallback supplier for China’s energy needs. During a meeting with Xi Jinping in Beijing on April 15, 2026, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that Moscow is capable of fully compensating for any energy shortfall China may face due to the restricted supply of Iranian energy. Unlike Middle Eastern oil flows, Russian exports—particularly via pipelines—remain largely insulated from geopolitical chokepoints and naval disruptions.

Russian crude is delivered to China via oil pipelines such as the Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean (ESPO) route, which has become a particularly important component of China’s import portfolio. By early 2026, Russia has emerged as China’s top crude oil supplier, accounting for approximately 19.6% to over 20% of China’s total crude imports in 2024 and 2025. Imports frequently exceed 2 million barrels per day (bpd), driven by discounted prices on grades such as ESPO and Urals. These discounts are largely a consequence of Western sanctions imposed since 2022 in response to the Ukraine crisis, which have constrained Russia’s access to European markets as well as to Western shipping, insurance, and financial services.

This deepening energy interdependence is even more evident in the gas sector. The operational Power of Siberia pipeline—linking eastern Siberian gas fields to northeastern China—has rapidly scaled up deliveries to around 39 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually. Discussions are also underway to increase gas flows up to 44 bcm per year through upgrades and operational optimization.

The bilateral energy relationship is set to deepen further with the proposed Power of Siberia-2, designed to deliver up to 50 bcm of gas annually from western Siberia to China via Mongolia. However, this roughly 2,600-km pipeline remains closely tied to the broader pricing dynamics shaping Russia–China energy relations. Despite years of negotiations, progress has stalled primarily due to disagreements over gas pricing. China seeks to preserve discounted terms, while Moscow aims to secure higher returns to justify the investment. This impasse reflects a wider asymmetry in bargaining power. As Russia continues to offer gas at reduced prices amid limited alternative markets, Beijing faces little urgency to finalize a long-term agreement. Consequently, the future of the pipeline remains uncertain. This underscores the fact that infrastructure expansion is not merely a technical matter but also a function of shifting economic leverage between the two sides.

China’s Energy Bridge to Central Asia

Beyond the Russia–China axis, Central Asia plays a vital role in shaping Beijing’s overland energy architecture. However, similar patterns of constrained capacity and strategic recalibration can be observed across the region’s energy corridors. Region wide pipeline networks linking Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states to western China provide critical overland alternatives that bypass maritime chokepoints altogether. The Kazakhstan–China Oil Pipeline, operational since 2006, has a capacity of around 20 million tons per year (approximately 400,000 bpd) and typically delivers 250,000–400,000 bpd, accounting for roughly 3–5% of China’s total crude oil imports.

At the same time, the Russia–Ukraine war—particularly drone attacks on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) facilities at Russia’s Black Sea port terminal at Novorossysk— has significantly disrupted Kazakhstan’s oil export infrastructure, prompting renewed efforts to diversify routes. During the second Caspian and Central Asia Oil Trading and Logistics Forum held in Baku on April 23, 2026, the Chairman of the Board of PetroCouncil.kz Assylbek Jakiyev highlighted the vulnerability of Kazakhstan’s existing export system, citing disruptions affecting routes linked to the CPC. He noted that Kazakhstan is actively evaluating two principal alternatives, the Trans-Caspian route via Azerbaijan (the Middle Corridor) and the China-bound export route supported by existing infrastructure. Although the China route offers immediate capacity of up to 20 million tons annually, its current utilization remains significantly below potential, at approximately 3 to 5 million tons, primarily due to operational constraints.

In parallel, the Central Asia–China Gas Pipeline—linking Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan to China—supplies around 55 bcm of natural gas annually through its three existing lines (A, B, and C), with long-term agreements (particularly with Turkmenistan) targeting up to 65 bcm per year. This framework is expected to deepen further with the proposed Line D expansion, a fourth branch of the pipeline system designed to add 25–30 bcm per year via a new route through Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Although the project has faced delays since 2014 due to financing constraints and complex transit negotiations, it remains a strategically important priority for Beijing. Once the long-awaited Line D becomes operational, the Central Asia–China Gas Pipeline system will reach an annual capacity of approximately 85 billion cubic meters, making it the largest gas transmission system in Central Asia.

Importantly, this infrastructure expansion is reinforced by recent high-level political engagement between the two countries. During a meeting in Beijing on March 18, 2026, Xi Jinping and Turkmenistan’s National Leader and former president, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow held comprehensive talks aimed at deepening bilateral cooperation across multiple sectors, with energy remaining a central pillar. Both sides emphasized the importance of expanding cooperation in natural gas, with particular attention being paid to the continued development of the Galkynysh field and the strengthening of long-term supply arrangements. The meeting also highlighted efforts to align Turkmenistan’s development strategy with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, further embedding energy cooperation within a broader framework of connectivity and regional integration.

This momentum was further reinforced in subsequent engagements. During high-level talks held in Turkmenistan in mid-April 2026, Chinese Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang and Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow reaffirmed their commitment to deepening bilateral energy cooperation, with natural gas remaining central to the partnership. The discussions— held alongside the launch of new development phases at the Galkynysh gas field—emphasized expanding the scale of gas cooperation and accelerating key joint projects. A central outcome was an agreement to further develop Turkmenistan’s vast gas reserves and strengthen long-term supply arrangements to China through existing and planned pipeline infrastructure.

Shortly thereafter, Türkmengaz signed a $4.6 billion gas field contract with China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) to design and construct production facilities capable of processing up to 10 bcm of gas annually as part of the development of Phase 4 of the Galkynyshgas field. As one of the world’s largest natural gas fields, Galkynysh forms the backbone of Turkmenistan’s export capacity to China via the Central Asia–China pipeline network.

Still, Central Asia provides a relatively modest share of China’s crude oil imports but remains a major source of pipeline gas, at times accounting for around one-third of the country’s natural gas imports. Beyond their quantitative contribution, these overland supply channels are strategically indispensable, enabling stable, long-term deliveries into China’s Xinjiang region under frameworks such as the Belt and Road Initiative. To some extent, they mitigate China’s exposure to vulnerable maritime chokepoints while reinforcing its broader energy diversification strategy.

Beyond its deepening engagement with Central Asia—especially the energy-rich Caspian littoral states of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan—China is well positioned to expand its energy and connectivity footprint across the wider Caspian basin, where Azerbaijan is emerging as a pivotal energy and transit hub. Offshore production from the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli (ACG) complex and the Shah Deniz gas field underpins Azerbaijan’s export capacity, while logistics centered on Baku—supported by the Port of Baku and its integration with the Port of Aktau in Kazakhstan and Turkmenbashi International Seaport in Turkmenistan—could facilitate the trans-Caspian movement of hydrocarbons, including potential eastward flows over the longer term.

China’s involvement in Azerbaijan’s hydrocarbon sector remains limited, particularly in core offshore oil and gas projects dominated by Western and regional consortia. Its presence is more visible in renewables, technical services, and infrastructure cooperation across various regions of Azerbaijan. By contrast, China is far more active along the eastern Caspian littoral, particularly on Kazakhstan’s shores. Through China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Beijing controls about 86% of the Aktobe oil fields and holds roughly 8.4% in the Kashagan oil field. It is also more broadly engaged in pipeline and energy infrastructure, though it does not exercise dominant control over the sector as a whole.

Concurrently, Azerbaijan’s growing alignment with Central Asian producers—reinforced through multilateral frameworks such as the C6 platform and the Organization of Turkic States—is consolidating a more cohesive trans-Caspian corridor. This integration enhances multimodal flexibility and enables the rerouting of flows in response to geopolitical or market disruptions. Rising Asian demand—evidenced by Japan’s recent efforts to secure crude from Azerbaijan’s and Kazakhstan’s offshore oil fields—further underscores the system’s growing multidirectional character. For Beijing, deeper engagement with this Azerbaijan-centered network is unlikely to generate immediate large-scale import volumes, given existing infrastructural and capacity constraints. However, this would reinforce a parallel, non-Russian Eurasian corridor, diversifying supply pathways and reducing concentration risk, while enhancing China’s long-term strategic optionality within an increasingly complex and interdependent energy landscape.

Outlook

Despite significant progress in diversifying supply routes and expanding overland energy corridors, China’s energy security strategy remains fundamentally constrained by structural realities. The country continues to rely heavily on Gulf hydrocarbons—particularly oil—much of which still transits through the Strait of Hormuz. In practice, no combination of pipelines from Russia or Central Asia can fully replicate the scale, flexibility, and liquidity of global seaborne energy markets. Crucially, pipeline-based supply remains limited in scale relative to the vast volumes transported via maritime routes, underscoring the structural limits of overland diversification.

At the same time, China’s pivot toward continental suppliers introduces a new set of risks rather than eliminating existing ones. Deepening dependence on Russia raises the prospect of strategic overexposure to a single supplier operating under sanctions, potentially enhancing Moscow’s leverage over pricing and long-term contractual arrangements. Meanwhile, Central Asian energy corridors remain constrained by limited capacity, complex transit frameworks, and infrastructure vulnerabilities. Key interregional energy initiatives, such as the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline and Central Asia–China Gas Pipeline Line D, continue to face delays, uncertainty, and political friction, underscoring the fragility of China’s long-term diversification strategy.

To this end, the Hormuz disruption reveals a central contradiction in China’s energy strategy. While Beijing has managed to reduce some of its most acute vulnerabilities, it remains deeply reliant on global transport networks, underscoring the persistent limits of its diversification efforts. Over the longer term, China’s push toward renewable energy and electrification may further mitigate its exposure to external shocks. What emerges is not a fully secure system, but a more complex and layered one—where resilience has improved, yet systemic risk remains deeply embedded.

About the Author:

Vusal Guliyev is a frequent contributor to The Saratoga Foundation. He is a Sinologist, TCSOL Specialist, and Policy Analyst specializing in the geopolitical affairs of Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific region. Mr. Guliyev currently works as a Leading Advisor at the Baku-based Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center) and serves as the Head of the Shanghai Office at AZEGLOB Consulting Group.

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Thank you for your support! Please remember that The Saratoga Foundation is a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization. Your donations are fully tax-deductible. If you seek to support The Saratoga Foundation, you can make a one-time donation by clicking on the PayPal link below! You can also subscribe to our website to support our work.

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