On March 18, Israeli military planes carried out attacks on Bandar Anzali, headquarters of Iran’s Northern Fleet and its largest port on the Caspian. Reports about the air strikes the following day noted that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) hit the port and other adjoining areas, destroying infrastructure and at least five Iranian naval vessels and merchant ships during the nighttime attack.

Not only did the air strike signal to Tehran and the Iranian people that US-Israeli attacks would no longer be limited to Iran's southern portions of that country—effectively eliminating any safe havens—but it also threatened to spill over into Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Turkmenistan, as well as their trading partners in China and Europe. By suggesting that north-south and east-west trade corridors, which make use of shipping via the Caspian Sea, are now at risk, the incident sparked a foreign ministry protest in Moscow and still silent anger elsewhere.

In the wake of these attacks, some analysts and officials in the region are already suggesting that this could lead to shifts in these trade corridors away from one’s dependent on the use of the Caspian Sea to the use of overland land routes, benefiting a few countries but harming others. But all who have offered commentaries on these attacks agree that the Israeli move has brought the Iranian war to the Caspian and that even if there are no further strikes in the near term, the littoral countries as well as their trading partners must be alert and ready to respond to such attacks in the future, lest those attacks drag in one or more of the countries involved into a broader war around Iran.

In addition, regional commentators are also warning of other, less obvious but potentially equally or even more disastrous consequences from strikes like this, including both the triggering of an ecological disaster for the Caspian or even possibly the revival of the Islamic State movement (ISIS), which operates in the region and would threaten not only the neighboring states but the world as a whole.

*The photo above is a damaged ship after the Israeli air strike on Bandar Anzali on March 18.

The Israeli attack on the Caspian port damaged at least five ships at the headquarters of Iran’s Northern Fleet, and also caused significant damage to the port itself, the surrounding military facilities, and the ships, but it involved no casualties. What it did do was send important messages to the Iranian government and people, to the governments of the littoral states, and to all countries and international corporations involved in both east-west and north-south trade in the Caspian region.

The March 18 air strike on Bandar Anzali clearly demonstrated to the Iranians that the Israel, and potentially the United States, are quite prepared to expand their attacks beyond Iranian nuclear facilities and southern economic infrastructure and that no one in Tehran or Iran as a whole should count on their being any safe havens where people and officials can go about their business with little need to fear a military attack. Clearly, that was the primary reason for the attack, although Israeli officials suggested that what they really wanted to do was degrade trade between Iran and its supporters in Moscow, given that the Caspian has been a major channel for such trade, especially in sanctioned items and weaponry, as it becomes part of a Russia-Iran arms corridor.

Regional Repercussions

All things considered, if the Israeli attack was directed in the first instance at Iran, it also sent shockwaves through the other four Caspian littoral states and the governments and businesses that are seeking to develop both east-west and north-south trade routes via the Caspian, given the existing political difficulties and infrastructure shortages in both Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Moscow has been especially outraged by the Israeli action because it challenges the 2018 accord on the delimitation of the Caspian signed by all five littoral states (but not yet ratified by Iran) that specifies that none of the countries will allow other states any military presence on that body of water. However, what Israeli planes have done is to show how hollow that accord is.

But more than that, this attack has shown that plans to use the Caspian for either north-south trade between Russia and the Indian Ocean via Iran or east-west trade from China and Central Asia to Europe via the South Caucasus are not as well-situated as the Kremlin has insisted. Instead, all countries involved are now waiting to see what happens next, thus casting doubt on both these corridors: the Russian-led route and the one backed by China and the West. The Israeli attack has, at a minimum, put these plans on hold for moving forward and quite possibly may have derailed them permanently.

Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have been seeking to develop land routes for each of these corridors, and now are certain to press the advantage that the caution the Israeli attacks have instilled in the other littoral states and businesses, and their policies may lead outside actors to focus more on railway and pipeline construction through or from them than at any point in the recent past. If Israel pursues any additional attacks, then there certainly could be a fundamental reordering of the geo-economic and geo-political order in Central Asia and the Caucasus, a reordering that will call into question recent assumptions about Russian retreats and American gains in both places.

Threat to TRIPP?

The Israeli move in the Caspian is a significant development—despite the limited attention it has received in the Western media. It may also be a potential turning point for the wider region and might even have repercussions as far east as China and as far west as the United States. It also raises a level of uncertainty concerning the future of the US-backed Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) should there be additional airstrikes on Iranian ports and vessels in the Caspian as the specter of a wider war threatens the Caucasus. After all, TRIPP was one of several reasons that promoted US Vice President J.D. Vance to visit the region only the month before.

Finally, in addition to these changes, two other developments are likely to cast a far larger shadow than anyone is currently prepared for. On the one hand, the Israeli attack has released a variety of poisonous materials into the Caspian, a sea that is closed off to the rest of the world and one that will suffer greatly if these materials are not contained and cleaned up quickly. And on the other hand, what Israel has done might give aid and comfort to those who want to restart the Islamic State (ISIS), a group quite prepared to take its message and its terrorism far beyond where they come from. Such people may see the instability that is now spreading to the north of Iran as a result of the ongoing military campaign by Israel and the United States as a perfect time to come back together and launch new attacks. That one can even think about such a possibility is one more reason why both the campaign and the Israeli attack on northern Iran is likely to have deleterious consequences, however tempting it may have been as a military target.

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👉 ‘The Russian Orthodox Church has evolved from a religious body into a strategic Kremlin asset in Africa, providing help in intelligence operations & facilitating military recruitment.’

By Paul Goble

The Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (ROC-MP) came to Africa about five years ago to expand its influence in the Orthodox world after the Ecumenical Patriarchate extended autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine to weaken the Patriarchate’s claim to primacy even across the former Soviet space. In the last two years, however, the ROC-MP has assumed a vastly more important role as Moscow’s agent on the African sub-continent. It also simultaneously provides a cover for Russian intelligence and covert action operations and even helps Moscow to conduct such operations. More recently, its portfolio has expanded to another new dimension - helping the Kremlin to recruit Africans to fill the depleted ranks of the Russian invasion force in Ukraine, although the church denies doing so.

The Moscow Patriarchate has had some success on the ground and even more in the Kremlin, but by its actions, it has completely compromised itself as a church committed to religious principles. That will not only accelerate the demise of its influence across the former Soviet space but also should alert religious leaders in other countries that when they are dealing with the ROC-MP, they are interacting with an organization that is not so much a religious body but an arm of the Russian state.

*Map of Russian Orthodoxy in Africa: 2022 to 2024: Source Bloomberg

History of ROC Ties to the Russian Intelligence Services

The ROC-MP has a long history of being closely connected with the Soviet and Russian intelligence services, with many of its hierarchs having been and presumably still being officers in those services. But remarkably, it only rarely had much to do with Africa because that continent had long been recognized in the Orthodox world as the canonical territory of the Alexandrian patriarchate, one of the most ancient but smallest and poorest of the Orthodox hierarchies in the world.

The Moscow Patriarchate sought its support and did not want to undermine that chance by poaching Alexandrian churches. However, when the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople granted autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the Alexandrian patriarchate did not oppose it, the Moscow church adopted the position that the old rules were no longer applicable and moved to take over churches in Africa to expand its own network there. It was able to do so because small amounts of aid brought it enormous returns on the ground, opening the path for Moscow to establish its own exarchate to manage its own parishes and bishoprics in Africa, beginning as early as 2022, when the ROC-MP announced it had a presence in 19 countries.

That network quickly fell under the influence of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, the SVR, which viewed the church as a useful cover for its own agents and an even more useful way to penetrate the political elites of African countries who might have been put off by a more direct approach by Russian intelligence. This subtle form of infiltration served as a necessary alternative to the often heavy-handed tactics of Russian “Private Military Companies” (PMCs), like the Prigozhin-founded Wagner Group, which spearheaded the Kremlin’s overt military presence across sub-Saharan Africa.

The actual number of converts, parishes, and priests is a matter of dispute but appears to be in the hundreds, dozens, and a smaller number, respectively. And the activities of the SVR using the ROC-MP as cover and assistant are also a matter of dispute because what the church does in this regard is hidden beyond a veil of secrecy, something that encourages exaggeration. Regardless, it is beyond question that the Kremlin is using the ROC-MP to achieve its goals in Africa.

The ROC Pivots to African Manpower Recruitment

In the past several months, the ROC-MP has devoted greater attention to attracting Africans not only to join Russian PMCs operating there, such as the Wagner Group, but also to serve as a source of recruitment to replenish the depleted ranks of the Russian army fighting in Ukraine. While the actual number of African recruits is a matter of dispute, ranging from 200 to more than 1500, and should be treated with caution, the ROC-MP is now playing another covert role in helping Moscow in new ways. According to Novaya Gazeta, there is strong evidence that the ROC-MP has become “the African Orthodox Military Commissariat,” a role of increasing importance given the growing manpower shortages in the Russian army. The impact of such recruitment is almost certainly greater in the Russian PMCs that are operating in the African countries from which these troops come than in the battlefields of Ukraine to which at least a few have been sent, but probably far fewer than some claim and others fear.

The Kremlin is undoubtedly pleased with the fact that the ROC-MP is helping to boost the number of Africans cooperating with its PMCs in Africa and even providing much-needed manpower for Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine. The ROC-MP is certainly using this to try to bolster its standing with the Kremlin after losing its dominant position in Ukraine and, at risk of similar losses, any influence it retains across the former Soviet space.

Outlook

For both the Kremlin and, especially, the ROC-MP, these gains have come at a high cost. This highlights the way in which the ROC-MP—which was created during World War II when Stalin restored an Orthodox church in Russia—has willingly accepted the role as handmaiden of the Russian security services, while further undermining its influence in the Eastern Orthodox world. Its contempt for the canonical space of the Alexandrian Patriarchate and the influence of the Ecumenical Patriarchate are destroying whatever influence the ROC-MP had in the Orthodox world and the ecumenical movement. In fact, the day may come when the Kremlin and the Patriarchate will recognize that the price they paid for short-term successes will be an ever-larger failure across the former Soviet space and the world.

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👉‘The strategic triangle region of al-Muthalath at the borders of Libya, Egypt, & Sudan is emerging as a critical flashpoint in Egypt’s strategy to halt the flow of arms to RSF forces backed by the UAE.’

By Andrew McGregor

In a brutal war for control of Sudan, Egypt has avoided direct military intervention despite recognizing the Sudan Armed Forces/Transitional Sovereignty Council (SAF/TSC) administration as the legitimate government of Sudan over the rival Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Cairo has, however, observed both the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Khalifa Haftar’s unrecognized government of eastern Libya joining to support the Arab-supremacist RSF in their effort to seize control of Sudan and suppress its non-Arab communities. Crucial to the outcome of Sudan’s civil war is the question of who will dominate the so-called “Triangle” (Al-Muthalath) region, where Libya, Egypt, and Sudan meet.

On January 9, Egypt carried out airstrikes on a UAE-supplied Libyan weapons convoy passing south from Benghazi, through the Kufra Oasis and past Jabal ‘Uwaynat into northern Darfur, where they were to be received by the RSF. Egypt’s previous warnings to Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) to desist from such activity appear to have been ignored. The convoy is reported to have lost dozens of vehicles carrying arms and fuel to the RSF, with significant loss of life. The strike came only two days before an official visit to Cairo by Saddam Hafter, son (and presumed heir) of LNA commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Saddam is in charge of LNA operations in south-eastern Libya and the Triangle region.

The RSF’s reliance on material support from the UAE and its ties with the LNA provide further cause for Egypt to seek an end to refugee flows and the restoration of a true national government in Sudan. While Egypt and the Emirates both support Haftar’s LNA (Haftar has received military aid in the past from both Egypt and the UAE), the refusal of the UAE to acknowledge its long-suspected military support of the RSF has complicated relations between Cairo and Abu Dhabi. Despite its size and power, Egypt has limited leverage over the UAE, a substantial and much-needed investor in Egypt.

Saharan Supply Line: From Kufra to Jabal ‘Uwaynat

Libya’s Kufra Oasis, 640 miles south of Benghazi and 185 miles from Sudan, is the historic launching point for caravans connecting Libya to Chad and Darfur. Its airport is recently renovated and expanded, and now receives regular arrivals of transport aircraft, many of them carrying arms. Shipments of arms from Kufra to Darfur began in May 2025 despite a UN arms embargo on Sudan. Videos and geolocation techniques have confirmed the establishment of an RSF base in Kufra.

A little more than a century ago, Jabal (Mount) ‘Uwaynat, roughly located at the meeting point of the Libyan, Egyptian, and Sudanese borders, was one of the planet’s most remote locations, more legendary than real, and visited only rarely by Tubu herders and raiders. However, in recent years, it has become a heavily militarized nexus of desert trade, artisanal gold mining, drug smuggling, migrant trafficking, and arms-running.

Egypt has sought to establish a long-term presence in the region with the development of the East Uwaynat Desert Reclamation Project, 37 miles from the Sudanese border. Included in the largely agricultural project is a two-runway airport begun in 2018 and finished in 2024. Beginning in mid-2025, Egyptian authorities started delivering Turkish-made drones and other military equipment to the base in East ‘Uwaynat. Some Turkish Air Force cargo flights have arrived directly from Turkey. Satellite images have confirmed that Egypt is deploying advanced Turkish-built Bayraktar Akinci drones at this base.

*Fighters from the Kufra-based Subul al-Salam militia: Source 👉Libya Observer

RSF fighters and Libyan troops (likely members of Kufra’s Islamist Subul al-Salam militia) first arrived in the Triangle region near Jabal Arkenu on June 10, 2025, forcing out units of the SAF and allied militias of the Joint Forces (former Darfur rebels) and looting local markets of anything of value. The Libyans returned north, while the RSF declared it had complete control of the region.  Control of the Triangle helped secure overland supply convoys to the RSF and provided a potential launching point for RSF incursions into lightly defended northern Sudan. Shortly after the occupation, RSF commander Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti” offered to transform the Triangle into a regional trade and economic hub for Sudan, Libya, and Egypt. Uninterested in a scheme that would involve recognition of the RSF as a regional authority, Cairo instead promised SAF leader General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan that it would not permit the RSF to use the Triangle region as a base for the invasion of Sudan’s Northern Province.

Arms and Mercenaries

When the RSF consolidated its authority over the tri-border region last June, it took control of the supply routes running through it while denying access to the Sudanese military. Supplies and mercenaries arriving from Kufra allowed the RSF to recover from its loss of Khartoum to take al-Fashir and consolidate its control of Darfur. However, the move also brought the RSF, a regional source of instability, into contact with the perpetually instability-averse Egyptian state. Cairo has dedicated diplomatic and political resources to finding a solution to the Sudanese conflict, preferably one that provides unity, prosperity, and stability. In its search for a solution, Cairo has maintained an official neutrality, while leaning toward the familiar, Sudan’s army and traditional political class, rather than the unfamiliar and unpredictable future offered by the RSF and its new political manifestation, the Tasis government. Cairo has strongly rejected the creation of what it terms as “parallel entities that threaten Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity,” calling such efforts a “red line” that threatens Egyptian security, a point that has been emphasized in meetings between LNA leaders and Egyptian intelligence and military officials.

Contradictions are the order of the day when trying to sort out who backs whom in the Triangle region. Kufra’s LNA-allied Subul al-Salam militia is undeniably Salafist and Islamist in nature, yet it appears to be strongly involved in the transit of arms and mercenaries to the RSF, which insists one of the main motives for its military campaign is to prevent an Islamist return to power in Sudan. Hemetti recently acknowledged the RSF’s use of Colombian mercenaries who arrive in convoys from Kufra, saying they are used to supervise drone operations, while accusing the SAF of using Ukrainian and Iranian mercenaries. The RSF leader also claimed Sudanese intelligence is trying to bring in Islamist al-Shabaab fighters from Somalia, promising to eliminate them when they arrive.

Conclusion

Egypt’s willingness to attack RSF supply convoys may force the Sudanese paramilitary to switch to a much longer supply route through Libya’s southwestern Fezzan region, through Chad, and into western Darfur, or a return to a previously-used route by air to eastern Chad’s Amdjarass airstrip, followed by a convoy to western Darfur. However, these possibilities have been complicated by diplomatic pressure from Egypt and Saudi Arabia, as well as Chad’s decision to close its border with Sudan following military clashes with RSF personnel carrying out operations against the Zaghawa people in northwestern Darfur.

Cairo prefers a diplomatic solution to the Sudanese conflict, which now threatens to become a regional war capable of creating years of instability along Egypt’s borders. Nonetheless, Egypt remains the region’s most powerful military state and will deploy whatever forces are necessary to preserve the peaceful existence of its 120 million people.

About the Author:

Dr. Andrew McGregor is director of Aberfoyle International Security, a Toronto-based consultancy specializing in the security issues of Africa and the Islamic world.

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By Yuri Lapaiev

The development of unmanned systems technology of all types and purposes is rapidly increasing its intensity in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, as the use of drones for both sides is turning into a high-speed race. The use of drones and their rapid evolution, in all their various modifications, has become a symbol of the extremely rapid development of technologies, which have turned into an endless cycle of competition between offensive and defensive weapons. This means that no new weapons or systems can remain effective on the battlefield for a long time, as countermeasures are also constantly changing.

Despite the rapid pace of change, preliminary conclusions for the future of drone warfare can be drawn today from the war. Ukraine’s experience for the time being will be more accessible due to open sources than Russian forces, but both sides to date face similar successes, challenges, and problems. For example, this applies to the development of Electronic Warfare (EW) systems. The appearance of a large number of drones on the battlefield immediately prompted the development of countermeasures, primarily EW systems. Today’s front lines are impossible to imagine without various EW systems: dome-shaped, directional, “guns,” “backpacks,” mobile versus stationary, proliferating throughout the front lines.

The Impact of Electronic Warfare

The development and creation of such EW systems is extremely complex and expensive. Often, the EW systems required to counter First Person View (FPV) drones are more expensive than the drone itself, which can end up destroying them. Given that FPV drones frequently change frequencies, it sometimes makes countermeasures completely useless. At the same time, the increased use of EW has affected not only drones but also other high-precision weapons that use GPS guidance, such as HIMARS and 155mm M982 Excalibur precision-guided shells, making them less effective.

These developments require a rethinking of the protection of important military equipment/weapons and critical infrastructure, retrofitting them with relatively inexpensive modular EW systems capable of quickly changing the frequency spectrum. The problem is becoming even bigger with the introduction of fiber-optic-controlled drones, which are virtually immune to EW-jamming. At the time of their appearance, they became an extremely effective weapon with no defense. However, there are now several ways to combat this type of drone, demonstrating the speed with which technologies and countermeasures emerge to counter Russian innovations on the battlefield.

UAV Supply Chains: The Risk of External Dependence

Another key lesson from the drone battlefields of Ukraine is the importance of sustaining UAV development and mass production. In modern warfare, drones are expendable and consumed in large quantities, creating constant pressure to ensure an uninterrupted supply and rapidly scale effective designs. This exposes production bottlenecks: if access to critical materials or components is disrupted, development and output can quickly stall. Suppliers of such components gain leverage that can be translated into political influence. Conversely, political decisions by supplier states can restrict access to essential parts, directly affecting battlefield capabilities and operational effectiveness.

This arose when China supplied spare parts for UAVs to Russia, but also somewhat restricted supplies to Ukraine while continuing to sell components to Russia despite official bans. When a country like Ukraine cannot produce all the components for its drones, it must rely on imports, which creates a gap between battlefield lessons and the manufacturer’s ability to adapt. In Ukraine’s case, many key components initially came from China, either directly or through third parties. This distance slowed the feedback loop between frontline experience and technical modification. However, as Ukraine expands domestic production of drone components, that gap is rapidly narrowing.

The irony for Ukraine is that Chinese restrictions actually had a positive impact. It forced Ukraine to seek options for maximum localization of production. Already in 2025, a Ukrainian manufacturer presented the first serial batch of UAVs made entirely from domestic components. One of the benefits of local production is that it allows immediate feedback and permits rapid improvement of the technology, which enhances military effectiveness. In this regard, close cooperation and communication between some mil-tech companies and the military personnel who use them is immensely important.

Building the Right FPV: Drones as ‘Lego Blocks’

Designing effective military drones increasingly resembles assembling Lego bricks from interchangeable parts. Each component has distinct features—especially in electronic frequencies. If one frequency is jammed, it must be quickly replaced with another. This modular approach allows rapid adjustment of the final product, making drones more adaptable and better suited to evolving battlefield conditions.

The issue of dependence on technology stands apart. For example, the use of Starlink gave Ukrainian drones a significant advantage, but it was quickly copied by the Russian military. Blocking Starlink for Russia at Ukraine’s request revealed the strategic vulnerability of the Russian army. However, the Ukrainian armed forces have the same vulnerability and are completely dependent on the political preferences of SpaceX owner Elon Musk or the whims of American authorities.

The Race for Cheaper, Simpler, & Easier Solutions

Measures to ensure sustainability demand the constant search for simpler and cheaper solutions. It is worth noting that the successful Russian strategy of using Geran/Shahed strike UAVs is attributed to their relative cheapness. As of September 2025, for example, one Shahed drone costs approximately $70,000. Simplicity matters. This is especially true when compared to the cost of cruise or ballistic missiles. Each has a price tag estimated to be between $4 to $1 million, and remains the main mass terror weapon used by Russia along Ukraine’s entire strategic depth. However, Moscow has not stopped there and is constantly developing newer versions of this specific kind of drone, while also creating other, even cheaper UAVs.

Particularly noteworthy is the Molniya drone, which, due to its extremely low cost and simplicity, has become widespread and therefore poses a significant threat. Currently, inexpensive Molniya’s have become the primary means for striking Ukraine’s tactical depth instead of the more expensive Russian-made Lancets (one of the main UAV weapons used by Russia back in 2023). This also applies to air defense. After all, shooting down large numbers of cheap drones with expensive and scarce missiles, as happened in Poland in September 2025, for example, is economically unfeasible to use F35s against inexpensive drones, as the Arab Gulf states are now experiencing with the current war with Iran.

The answer to this problem is the use of interceptor drones, with corresponding changes in military doctrines and the deployment of production. Mouad M’Ghari, head of France’s defense company Harmattan AI, notes that Western defense companies are entering an era where the outcome of conflicts is determined not by the technological superiority of individual models, but by the mass production of inexpensive unmanned systems. In today’s world, armies cannot wait years for defense manufacturers to produce an expensive ideal model. Instead, simpler, mass-produced, quick-to-manufacture solutions are urgently needed.

New Weapons, New Rules: The Expanded Radius of FPV Kill Zones

The emergence and use of the first unmanned combat systems at the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 had an immediate and significant impact on the tactics and principles of warfare that existed at the time. Some of these, such as massive mechanized assaults, have become simply impossible in today’s conditions of maximum battlefield transparency and extremely fast cycle chains of “detect-kill.”

Nearly every month, there is a news report from the frontlines about yet another new type of UAV, ground drones, or autonomous combat modules emerging, including reports by sea of Uncrewed Surface Vessels (USVs), underwater drones, interceptor drones, AI drones with machine sight, jet drones, drone carriers. This, in turn, allows commanders to invent new tactics, constantly changing their approaches to unmanned warfare.

Probably, the most prominent example was back in 2025, when, during the Operation Spiderweb, the Ukrainian security services managed to destroy about a third of Russia’s strategic bombers right in their home airfields. The same is true for the constantly increasing radius of the unmanned kill zones. In 2022, the kill zone used to be around 3 kilometers; now, FPVs have a kill zone up to 25 km and growing. In the future, we can expect to see even more options and tactics for using FPV drones; sometimes, they will become quite exotic. This requires changes in the deployment of forces and military training. Some NATO countries are already gradually introducing the use of drones and countermeasures in exercises with their armies. Here, the Ukrainian army can fill the important role of instructors, sharing their advanced and up-to-date experience with allied armies.

The Race for Training Qualified Personnel

The rapid rise in the use of unmanned weapons and the tactics related to their use means that urgent changes are needed in the organizational and staffing structure of military units. The changes currently taking place in the Ukrainian armed forces and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are quite indicative. For example, both armies are actively developing their own Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), turning them into separate branches of their military. In 2026, Russia plans to increase the number of its USF troops by 79,000, bringing the total number of Russian unmanned troops to 165,000.

At the same time, however, they are gradually increasing the number of UAV units in other branches of the military, abandoning less relevant weapons such as anti-tank missile systems in favor of drones. For the Ukrainian army, increasing the number of unmanned units is one way to overcome problems with mobilization and the shortage of recruits. The ability to fight remotely instead of directly on the battlefield has become quite attractive to many prospective recruits and is used by most Ukrainian units to find new personnel. For Western countries, this is an example of the direction in which their armies should develop. Without unmanned systems units (and countermeasures against them), no army stands a chance in modern conflict.

UAVs: Neither a Panacea Nor Wunderwaffe

At the same time, the increased emphasis on the development of unmanned systems and the growing use of drones also creates negative consequences for the capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces. For example, the Ukrainian army has repeatedly faced situations where virtually all the reconnaissance efforts in a certain area of the frontlines are carried out exclusively by drones. In the event of deteriorating weather conditions, this often leaves the command practically blind, while Russian forces frequently take advantage of this to launch their attacks.

In addition, some Ukrainian frontline commanders complain about the deterioration of their soldiers’ skills due to this new phenomenon. Ukrainian officers argue their units are paying less and less attention to fire and tactical training. Despite their increasing effectiveness, drones cannot fully replace human soldiers on the front line; control over territory still requires “boots on the ground.” At the same time, the influx of new recruits into Ukraine’s new USF units is, in a sense, “cannibalizing” or diverting potential recruits needed for slots in other branches of the Ukrainian army, primarily the infantry, thereby indirectly adding to the personnel shortage.

The Nightmare of Frontline FPV Coordination

With the increase in the number of UAV crews and drones of various types, surfaces, and ranges of operation, the issue of coordination of efforts becomes more acute. Unfortunately, there are quite a few cases in the Ukrainian armed forces when several drones from different units are simultaneously engaging the same target on the frontlines. Often, the reason for this is the lack of normal communication between units and the desire to earn points for hits. This, in turn, is creating a coordination nightmare as units frequently compete against units, creating a new type of friction on the frontlines.

Another common problem that emanates from this frontline competition in the Ukrainian Army is the rise in the number of FPV-related incidents of friendly fire. This occurs when the frontline drones cannot perform tasks due to EW-“friendly fire” from other neighboring units. This problem could be partially solved by improving the ‘mission control’ system, which Defense Minister Fedorov recently announced would be corrected.

The growing number of various unmanned systems on the battlefield also poses a growing challenge for modern commanders in terms of complicating the coordination of ongoing combat operations. The solution to this problem may lie in increasing modern situational awareness and command systems that use Artificial Intelligence (AI) to reduce the burden on frontline commanders, which could ease, if not eliminate, the coordination problem.

Rubicon’s Exploitation of Drones at the Operational Level

Another remaining challenge is the division of tasks in terms of depth, from the tactical to the strategic level. According to one prominent military expert, Ryan O’Leary, Ukraine is currently losing the battle for depth by paying too much attention to the tactical level of war. Not all experts and commanders agree that the current focus on destroying as much of the enemy’s manpower as possible is the right approach to conducting the war.

This contrasts with the tactics employed by Russia’s Rubicon UAV unit. Rubicon focuses its efforts almost exclusively on the operational-tactical level of war and achieving operational depth, namely, using its drone units to destroy Ukrainian logistical capabilities. For Ukraine, the solution could be to clearly prioritize targets and scale up the USF (without cannibalizing other units, especially from front-line brigades). It is also necessary to delineate areas of responsibility. Ukrainian USF Commander Robert Brovdi recently noted that the USF plans to devote more attention to its efforts at the operational level, leaving tactical operations to the newly established corps, for example, the 3^rd,7^th, 10^th, and 14^th corps. However, this can only happen after the relevant units have built up their capabilities to a sufficient level.

Outlook

In the final analysis, the Russian-Ukrainian war has demonstrated the high effectiveness of drones in modern armed conflict, and the rapid rise in the development of technology, primarily AI, promises even greater military effectiveness in the near future. In preparation for a possible future conflict with Russia, Western armies should intensify their learning from the Ukrainian experience by accelerating the introduction of drones (as well as means to counter them) into their frontline units.

At the same time, drones alone will not be an advantage; they require trained personnel, new tactics, and more advanced coordination and control systems. Ukraine, as a bearer of the most modern combat experience and sophisticated technologies, will be an important partner for the rest of NATO. The United States and its European allies should review their current economic and production models in order to be self-sufficient in the production of unmanned systems and means of countering them.

Solutions and systems must be sufficiently inexpensive, standard among allies, and easily scalable. Supporting Ukrainian production of unmanned systems (through direct financing or joint companies) presents our allies with a unique opportunity to test the systems in real combat conditions and identify the most effective drone systems for further production.

About the Author:

Yuri Lapaiev is currently the editor-in-chief of Tyzhden (The Ukrainian Week) magazine. He graduated from the Ivan Kozhedub Air Force University in Kharkiv with an MA in computer network engineering. Between 2006 and 2011, he served in the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence, including as an analyst. In 2011-2015, Lapaiev worked as a marketing analyst in the head office of one of Ukraine’s largest mobile operators. From 2015 to 2016, he served in the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces and participated in the Anti-Terrorism Operation (ATO) in eastern Ukraine.

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By Vusal Guliyev

Amid intensifying competition over Eurasian connectivity, Japan is positioning itself as a consequential partner in the digital modernization of the Middle Corridor—formally known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. At a moment when traditional trans-Eurasian logistics are increasingly constrained by geopolitical tensions, sanctions regimes, and structural vulnerabilities from the conflict in Ukraine and the ongoing conflict in the Persian Gulf, the Middle Corridor is emerging as a new corridor for trade and connectivity.

Stretching from East Asia through Kazakhstan, across the Caspian Sea, and onward via Azerbaijan and Georgia to Europe, the Middle Corridor has gained renewed strategic relevance not only as an alternative to geopolitically exposed maritime routes such as the Suez Canal, but also to overland arteries like the Trans-Siberian Railway, whose reliability has been fundamentally undermined since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Its contemporary importance, however, comes not from geography alone, but from its capacity to adapt to a fragmented logistics environment through accelerated digital transformation.

Historically, trade flows between East Asia and Europe have relied predominantly on maritime routes via the Suez Canal or on overland transit across Russia along the Trans-Siberian Railway, commonly referred to as the Northern Corridor. The route’s potential was underscored in 2018, when the first Japanese rail cargo shipment crossed Russian territory with official backing from both Tokyo and Moscow, reflecting early efforts to diversify transport options beyond sea and air freight. The Kremlin’s war in Eastern Europe, however, has fundamentally reshaped this landscape. What once constituted a viable logistical alternative has increasingly become a strategic liability, as sanctions, geopolitical tensions, and heightened uncertainty have rendered reliance on Russian transit routes progressively impractical.

Against this backdrop of heightened complexity and uncertainty, Japan has advanced its own connectivity agenda, seeking to strengthen resilient transport, energy, and digital linkages across Eurasia while reducing exposure to geopolitical risk and supply-chain disruption. Tokyo’s interest in modernizing Eurasian connectivity is closely tied to its broader economic and resource-security objectives, particularly the need to secure reliable access to critical raw materials sourced from regions traversed by the Middle Corridor. As a resource-poor economy with limited domestic reserves, Japan depends heavily on stable external suppliers for energy, critical minerals, and industrial inputs. Central Asia—especially Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan—has therefore assumed growing strategic importance, given its substantial reserves of oil, natural gas, uranium, rare earth elements, and non-ferrous metals that underpin Japan’s energy security, manufacturing base, and high-technology sectors.

Beyond resource availability, Central Asia offers Japan an opportunity to diversify supply chains away from over-reliance on politically sensitive, congested, or vulnerable routes and markets. Uranium imports from Kazakhstan remain integral to Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle, while copper, zinc, and other metals support its electronics, automotive, and green technology industries. In the context of the global energy transition, the region’s prospective role as a supplier of minerals critical to batteries, renewable energy systems, and hydrogen technologies further enhances its long-term strategic relevance.

Ensuring that these strategically important resources can move reliably from Central Asia to global markets, however, depends on the efficiency and resilience of the transport corridors linking the region to East Asia and Europe. As global supply chains become increasingly data-driven and risk-sensitive, the Middle Corridor’s competitiveness hinges less on physical capacity alone than on the deployment of smart customs systems, electronic transit documentation, real-time cargo tracking, and interoperable digital platforms that integrate rail, port, and maritime operations across multiple jurisdictions. Japan’s growing engagement reflects a strategic recognition that, under conditions of disrupted trans-Eurasian logistics, leadership in standards, software, and systems can be as consequential as investment in hard infrastructure.

This emphasis on digital connectivity is most evident in Japan’s push for customs digitalization, where operational bottlenecks undermine the corridor’s credibility as an alternative to disrupted Eurasian routes. Customs modernization is an area where targeted interventions can yield disproportionate strategic returns. In this context, Japan pledged in August 2025 to support the upgrading of customs services at Kazakhstan’s Port of Aktau, a critical maritime hub linking Central Asia’s rail networks with Caspian Sea crossings along the Middle Corridor.

By supporting smart customs systems, automated risk-management tools, and electronic documentation, Japan seeks to reduce clearance times, limit bureaucratic friction, and enhance the predictability of cross-border movements along a corridor whose attractiveness depends fundamentally on reliability amid widespread logistical disruption elsewhere in Eurasia.

Japan’s MUFG Finances the Nakhchivan-Kars Railway

At the same time, Japan’s engagement extends beyond digital governance and technical assistance to encompass substantive financial support for strategic infrastructure that reinforces the corridor’s physical continuity. In this context, Japan’s largest financial institution, Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group (MUFG Bank), has committed to financing the Nakhchivan–Kars railway route—an initiative aimed at enhancing direct rail connectivity between Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave and Türkiye. This commitment forms part of a $2.6 billion external financing package led by MUFG Bank, in partnership with Sweden’s EKN and Austria’s OeKB export credit agencies, as well as the Islamic Development Bank.

The Nakhchivan–Kars rail line is expected to deepen the integration of the South Caucasus segment of the Middle Corridor and further consolidate Türkiye’s role as a gateway to European markets. MUFG’s involvement demonstrates that Japan’s participation in the Middle Corridor is not merely diplomatic or conceptual in nature, but anchored in substantial financial instruments that support the corridor’s long-term structural development and resilience.

Importantly, developments along the South Caucasus segment of the Middle Corridor have also complemented Tokyo’s broader strategic calculus. In April 2023, the Port of Baku concluded a cooperation agreement with Qingdao Port—one of China’s largest maritime hubs—to deploy advanced digital solutions aimed at enhancing operational efficiency, security, and competitiveness. Beyond reciprocal visits and institutional knowledge exchange, the agreement established a logistical channel enabling cargo from Japan and South Korea to transit through Qingdao and onward to Baku via the Middle Corridor. This arrangement effectively embeds East Asian supply chains more directly into the Trans-Caspian network and complements Japan’s parallel push for customs digitalization and interoperable logistics systems across Central Asia.

Even before these institutional consolidations, Japan had tested the corridor’s operational feasibility. In early 2025, Japan successfully conducted a trial shipment via the Middle Corridor, transporting cargo from Japanese ports to Türkiye through a combination of rail and maritime links across Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. The journey was completed in just over 20 days and was coordinated by Danish shipping and logistics company Maersk. The pilot demonstrated that Japanese goods can traverse this land–sea route efficiently and within competitive timeframes despite multiple border crossings and modal shifts. Beyond its symbolic significance, the shipment underscored the operational feasibility of integrating Japanese supply chains into the Trans-Caspian network. It also illustrates how improvements in customs digitalization, electronic documentation, and logistics coordination are mitigating risks that have intensified since disruptions to established Eurasian corridors.

These operational and financial initiatives were further embedded within a broader diplomatic architecture in December 2025. At the inaugural Summit of the Central Asia plus Japan Dialogue (CA+JAD), held in Tokyo, participating leaders adopted the Tokyo Declaration, elevating connectivity and logistics modernization to a shared strategic priority in response to evolving geopolitical risks. Within this framework, advancing the Middle Corridor emerged as a central element of the summit’s connectivity agenda. Moreover, to support business development and interstate trade, Japan set a ¥3 trillion (approximately $19 billion) target for business projects in Central Asia over the next five years under the Tokyo Initiative. The meeting also launched the Japan–Central Asia Partnership for AI Cooperation, signaling Japan’s intention to apply advanced digital tools to the practical challenges of Eurasian transit. Envisaged applications include AI-enabled cargo tracking, predictive logistics planning, and more advanced customs risk-management systems.

Nevertheless, the corridor’s long-term viability depends on addressing the structural complexities inherent in multimodal transport. Reliance on rail networks, maritime crossings over the Caspian Sea, and onward rail connections to Europe requires a level of coordination that paper-based systems cannot provide, particularly amid heightened regulatory scrutiny and geopolitical fragmentation. Each modal transition introduces additional documentation requirements, compliance checks, and scheduling risks. Accordingly, Middle Corridor-involved states have increasingly prioritized digitizing multimodal data exchange, harmonizing electronic documentation, and adopting international standards that enable real-time information sharing across borders.

Outlook

Within this context of heightened strategic volatility, Japan’s connectivity agenda represents a deliberate effort to manage geopolitical risk and reinforce supply-chain resilience. By prioritizing customs modernization, interoperable digital systems, and emerging AI-driven logistics solutions, Japan is addressing the Middle Corridor’s most persistent operational constraints while reinforcing its strategic value as a diversified Eurasian trade route. This approach moves beyond conventional infrastructure assistance toward shaping the standards, governance practices, and technological norms that underpin long-term corridor performance. For the Central Asian states, Japanese involvement complements domestic digital reforms and enhances corridor reliability amid geopolitical uncertainty.

Meanwhile, Tokyo is directly advancing its economic security objectives by embedding resilience, predictability, and diversification into its transcontinental supply chains, thereby reducing exposure to persistent disruptions in trans-Eurasian logistics and strengthening access to alternative East–West transit corridors. As competition over connectivity intensifies, the evolution of the Middle Corridor suggests that the future of Eurasian trade will be defined as much by digital integration and institutional coordination as by the physical routes themselves.

About the Author:

Vusal Guliyev is a Sinologist, TCSOL Specialist, and Policy Analyst specializing in the geopolitical affairs of Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific region. He currently works as a Leading Advisor at the Baku-based Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center) and serves as the Head of the Shanghai Office at AZEGLOB Consulting Group.

Additionally, he holds affiliations as a Geopolitical Analyst and Associate Expert with several policy research institutes, including the Topchubashov Center, the Caspian-Alpine Society, Khazar University China Studies Center, and the European Geopolitical Forum. A graduate of Shanghai International Studies University, he previously held long-term Visiting Research Fellowships at Ankara University, Harvard University, and Boğaziçi University.

He has authored numerous academic and analytical articles in Azerbaijani, Turkish, English, and Chinese, examining the socio-political, socio-economic, and scientific-technological dynamics of Wider Eurasia, with a particular focus on the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Greater China, and the broader East Asia region.

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Following the outbreak of the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war, the Starlink satellite communication system became a critically important element of tactical and operational communications’ tool on the battlefields of Ukraine. Originally transferred to Ukraine by US officials as a means for ensuring stable connectivity, Starlink’s unique technical characteristics soon made it not only a tool of strategic importance but also an object of attempted use by Russia. Authoritative Russian information outlets openly admitted in 2024 that Russian armed forces were, in fact, frequently using Starlink systems in Donetsk Oblast in Russian occupied territories in eastern Ukraine.

By late 2025, individual episodes involving the use of Starlink by Russian forces had become a common trend that could no longer be ignored. According to Ukrainian officials, Russian units were using Starlink terminals to coordinate operations and control UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles), including the so-called “killer drones.” In response, Kyiv introduced a verification mechanism – the so-called “white list” system – under which only verified Ukrainian devices could be activated. By early 2026, Ukrainian authorities announced that they had reached agreements with SpaceX to block the unauthorized use of terminals by the Russian military.

This resulted in the blocking of unverified terminals and prompted investigative reports into the possible involvement of third countries in facilitating the re-export or transit of Starlink equipment to Russia. At the forefront of these countries involved in the clandestine Russian effort was the Central Asian country of Kyrgyzstan. Crucially, the issue appears to be less about mere “physical access” to the hardware than about registration and network authorization. The fact that Russian forces were able to operate Starlink systems suggests that supply channels were intertwined with activation mechanisms and the circumvention of restrictions through third-party jurisdictions.

*Image above: Starlink Shipments with Emaross Cargo stickers

The Air Waybill Trail to Bishkek

Several investigative reports identified a specific shipment recorded under Air Waybill No. 501-16267215, dated May 10, 2024. The documentation lists the cargo as “routers and adapters not subject to restrictions,” ostensibly outside the scope of sanctions. However, the shipment was classified under HS code 87089900—corresponding to automotive parts rather than telecommunications equipment—and transported from Dubai World Central (UAE) to Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan). This discrepancy is analytically significant: misclassification under a non-sensitive customs code can reduce regulatory scrutiny and facilitate the movement of controlled or dual-use goods. According to an investigation by Nordsint, Starlink terminals subsequently appeared in Russian conformity registries, indicating likely downstream redistribution.

According to several investigative reports, three main actors were involved in the operational and logistical mechanism:

· Emaross Group FZE (UAE) – founded in 1994, the firm specializes in sourcing, transporting, and delivering goods, including both new and used vehicles, textiles, auto parts, and other freight categories, with capabilities for ocean, air, and land freight – appeared in customs documentation as the manufacturer; the company, however, stated that it only specializes in logistical and trans-shipment operations. The episode resulted in an internal investigation, discovering that the Starlink equipment that ended up in Russia had been shipped to Kyrgyzstan.

· Archie and Co LLC (Kyrgyzstan) – registered in Ak-Jol village (Chuy region), the company, whose declared business activity is “wholesale non-specialized trade”, was listed as the consignee/recipient of the above-mentioned cargo from the UAE, whose broad commercial classification, rural registration, and the lack of sectoral specialization made it an ideal actor for such transshipment. Importantly, the use of such an opaque actor provides de facto no direct evidence that could directly implicate the Kyrgyz government, whereas the structural characteristics of such entities make them suitable as buffer nodes in re-export operations.

· Polarstar Logistics – the carrier identified on the air waybill was a Uzbekistan-originated company with a Dubai link, under US sanctions at the time of shipment (it was added to the list in February 2024) – which was described by Emaross as “an active logistics agent within the UAE infrastructure”. Emaross explained the discrepancy in HS codes as a “technical administrative error” by Polarstar’s forwarder, who had used an outdated air waybill template for automotive components. The involvement of a sanction-exposed logistics operator raises compliance questions and suggests that high-risk transport intermediaries may play a functional role in Russia-oriented trade corridors.

Why the Middle East – Central Asia Link?

Understanding how Starlink systems ultimately appeared on Russian frontlines in Ukraine requires recognition as to why the “Kyrgyz case” is not an isolated incident, but is part of a broader sanctions-evasion network, involving multiple regional actors in Central Asia – including Uzbekistan - working with Russia-aligned logistical hubs in the Greater Middle East. Since 2022, Central Asia has seen a significant increase in a covert system of re-export flows back to Russia. Although much of this trade is lawful, investigative reporting and trade data patterns indicate that certain categories of high-technology goods have transited the region before reaching Russian end users. In this context, Kyrgyzstan—and Central Asia more broadly—possesses several structural characteristics that make it an effective transit node for smuggling high-tech goods within complex, multi-layered supply chains.

A. Membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and absence in the international sanction lists facilitate Kyrgyzstan`s ability to conduct cross-border trade with Russia.

B. Flexible wholesale trade registration: Kyrgyz law allows companies to choose broad business activity codes (including wholesale non-specialized trade), and this form of business registration is relatively straightforward and flexible.

C. Limited enforcement capacity relative to major Western export hubs. Analysts note that resource constraints, underdeveloped strategic trade control systems, and weak oversight of complex financial crimes have hindered the effective implementation of sanctions and regulatory measures.

D. Kyrgyzstan’s strategic geographic position between Russia and China facilitates multimodal transit routes. At this juncture, it is important to note the role of China, whose growing economic footprint in Central Asia adds complexity to both actual and future sanction evasion mechanisms. In the future, increased regional connectivity through Chinese logistics corridors may further complicate monitoring mechanisms.

The inclusion of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in this configuration further complicates the picture. The UAE’s high cargo throughput, well-developed system of free trade zones, sophisticated re-export ecosystems, and its non-sanctioned status collectively strengthen the Central Asia–Middle East scheme. Together, these factors create a multi-layered buffer system in which global logistics origins are followed by regional transit jurisdictions.

Conclusion

The Kyrgyzstan–UAE episode in the Starlink supply chain underscores a profound transformation in the architecture of international sanctions: it is abundantly clear that existing sanctions regimes are no longer limited to restricting physical flows of goods; they increasingly operate at the intersection of hardware, software, licensing, and network authorization. At the same time, the Starlink case demonstrates that even when advanced technologies physically reach a sanctioned environment through multi-layered transit corridors and buffer jurisdictions, their operational effectiveness ultimately depends on activation mechanisms controlled by origin-state actors. For example, the ability of Ukraine and SpaceX to introduce verification mechanisms and block unauthorized terminals illustrates that, for the time being, the West retains significant control and leverage over critical digital infrastructures and dual-use technologies.

In the long term, the strategic implications of this episode may prove even more consequential. The exposure of transit corridors through jurisdictions such as Kyrgyzstan and the UAE, combined with the demonstrated vulnerability of foreign-supplied systems to remote restriction, is likely to accelerate efforts by Russia, China, and other non- or anti-Western powers to prioritize “sovereign” technological ecosystems. These efforts encompass domestically controlled satellite communications, payment systems, semiconductor production, and digital infrastructures insulated from Western regulatory reach. In other words, while the current system enables Western actors to impose meaningful constraints, it simultaneously incentivizes technological decoupling. The Starlink case, therefore, should not be viewed merely as another episode of sanctions evasion; rather, it signals a broader structural shift toward a fragmented global technological order in which control over activation, standards, and digital governance is becoming as strategically significant as control over physical supply chains.

About the Author

Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at The Saratoga Foundation specializing in Russian military and security affairs, as well as Russo-Chinese relations. He is also an Advisor at Gulf State Analytics (Washington, D.C.) and Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defense and Security Network (Canada).

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Like many other peoples overrun by European imperial powers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Africa’s Somalis found themselves divided into regions governed by rival powers: French Somaliland (Djibouti), British Somaliland (modern Somaliland), and Italian Somaliland (modern Somalia).

A former British protectorate, Somaliland joined the former Italian Trust Territory of Somaliland to form the new nation of Somalia in 1960. However, after General Siad Barre, the Marxist-Leninist commander of the Somali Army, took control of Somalia in a coup d’état in 1969, he mounted a brutal repression of the Isaaq clan, the dominant clan of the Somaliland region. When Barre fled from power in 1991 in a tank loaded with Somalia’s gold reserves, Somaliland broke with the rest of Somalia to declare independence. Since then, it has struggled to find international recognition as a sovereign state in the face of Mogadishu’s claim that it remains part of Somalia.

Map of Somaliland: (Source: Port Management Association of Eastern and Southern Africa (PMAESA)

A territory of 68,000 square miles and over 6 million people, Somaliland has a highly strategic location on the south coast of the Gulf of Aden near the Bab al-Mandab strait that provides access to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Though several states have proved sympathetic to Somaliland, last December Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced Israel would be the first UN-member state to recognize Somaliland’s independence. Somaliland’s intention to accede to the Abraham Accords was confirmed by Netanyahu on January 30. Problems exist, however, with the legitimacy of the PM’s announcement, as Netanyahu apparently failed to ask for the approval of the cabinet or the Knesset, possibly rendering the recognition invalid under Israeli law. At the center of Netanyahu’s recognition of Somaliland is Israeli access to the port of Berbera, used and expanded for naval use by both the Soviets and later the Americans.

Israel Recognizes Somaliland

Israel’s initiative was opposed by 50 countries and groups, including Somalia, Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Ethiopia, Djibouti, the African Union, the European Union, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Riyadh described the new partnership as “an action that entrenches unilateral secessionist measures that violate international law.” Qatar suggested that if Israel wanted to recognize new nations, it could start with the State of Palestine.

Israel needs another port in the region; Eilat, its port at the northernmost point of the Gulf of Aqaba, normally gives Israel access to the Red Sea, but after two years of disruption and a Houthi drone strike in September 2025, revenues at Eilat have dropped to zero as the port barely functions. Aware of its exposure, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) carried out military exercises in Eilat on February 12, simulating attacks from both Iran, Yemen, and various armed groups.

The Houthi conflict with Israel began in October 2023, with missile strikes on Israeli-bound ships and even Israel. In response, Israel mounted long-range bombing strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen. Use of Berbera’s airstrip for Israeli Air Force operations would reduce flying distance to Yemen by more than two-thirds while allowing for regular manned and drone surveillance operations in the sensitive Gulf of Aden region. At the same time, however, Berbera could become an easily reachable target for Houthi missiles; Houthi leader ‘Abd al-Malik al-Houthi warned that an Israeli presence in Berbera would be a threat to Yemen and Somalia, and would therefore be treated as a “military target.”

Believing that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) had attacked its national unity and sovereignty by facilitating Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, Mogadishu cancelled all agreements with the UAE relating to ports, security, and defense, though it has no enforcement power in Puntland or Somaliland. Hersi Ali Haji Hasan, chairman of Somaliland’s ruling Waddani party, defended Somaliland’s agreement with Israel, claiming that “There is no choice before us but to welcome any country that recognises our existential right.” News of the deal brought thousands of residents of the Somaliland capital of Hargeisa into the streets in protest, some waving Palestinian flags. Large protests against the agreement were also observed in most Somali cities.

Despite denials from both Israel and Somaliland, Somalia’s Defence Minister, Ahmed Moalim Fiqi, claimed in January that Somalia had confirmed the existence of an Israeli plan to resettle Gazan Palestinians in the breakaway state, claiming as well that Israel’s recognition of a Somaliland state was part of a regional strategy: “Israel has long had goals and plans to divide countries — maybe for 20 years — and it wants to divide the map of the Middle East and control its countries... it wants to create a military base to destabilise the region.” Both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority condemned Somaliland’s acceptance of Israeli recognition and suggestions that the territory might act as a destination for expelled Gazans.

Israeli sources quoted a leading member of Somaliland’s foreign ministry on January 8 as saying there are active discussions regarding an Israeli military base at Berbera and the establishment of an embassy in Jerusalem. The official added that accepting Gazans was not part of the agreement with Israel.

DP World Berbera and the Emirati Network

The UAE’s DP World, one of the planet’s largest logistics companies, began a major modernization and expansion of the Berbera port in 2016. DP World holds a 51% stake in the $442 million project, the Somaliland Ports Authority 30%, and British International Investment (BII) the remaining 19%. The BII is a development finance institution whose sole shareholder is the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO). The BII works “in partnership with DP World to strengthen economic development across the African continent by investing in improving and expanding ports.”

The project includes the construction of the Berbera Corridor, a highway connecting Berbera to Hargeisa and land-locked Ethiopia. A 2024 agreement laid the groundwork for an Ethiopian lease of facilities at Berbera, leading to eventual recognition of Somaliland as a state by Addis Ababa. Berbera will provide a valuable option for Ethiopia, 95% of whose trade currently goes through Djibouti.

In 2017, Hargeisa agreed to the establishment of an Emirati naval and air base near the Berbera commercial port. The site includes an existing Soviet-built 4-kilometer-long runway, once leased by NASA as an emergency landing strip for the space shuttle. US Africa Command has inspected the airport twice recently, in 2022 and 2025. Berbera is now one of a network of Emirati bases established around the Red Sea region and the Gulf of Aden, including the port of Bosaso in neighboring Somali Puntland, the Yemeni port of Mocha, and various islands, including Mayun, a strategically important rock in the middle of the Bab al-Mandab.

In July 2025, Somaliland offered to host a US military base at Berbera and grant access to critical mineral resources in exchange for diplomatic recognition. The White House, however, demonstrated no interest; when asked for comment on the offer last December, President Trump replied, “Big deal,” adding, “Does anyone know what Somaliland is, really?”

Conclusion

Somaliland’s growing relations with Israel are a bold gambit to attract international recognition at the risk of antagonizing other potential regional partners. Israel is likewise antagonizing important nations already signed on to the Abraham Accords in order to have one small, non-Arab country join the pact. Israel’s motivation is more likely to be found in its perceived need to create alternative access points to the Red Sea and not to be left out of the ongoing militarization of the Red Sea as tensions increase with Iran and its Houthis in Yemen. In the process, Somaliland risks becoming a target for the Islamic State and al-Qaeda (al-Shabaab), both of whom operate in Somalia.

About the Author

Dr. Andrew McGregor is director of Aberfoyle International Security, a Toronto-based consultancy specializing in the security issues of Africa and the Islamic world.

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by Paul Goble

A December 2025 conference in Vilnius is proving to be a turning point in the history of the Circassian national movement, not only because representatives of the Circassian community met with parliamentarians of an EU and NATO-member country. Perhaps even more importantly, the meeting has become a model for Circassian efforts elsewhere to counter Moscow’s information war against their nation and to unify what is the largest and most divided people among the non-Russian nationalities whose homeland is inside the current borders of the Russian Federation.

If the symbolic importance of the Vilnius conference was recognized immediately not only by participants but by observers the practical impact of that meeting was not long in coming, with activists in yet another country – in this case, Azerbaijan -- moving to recognize the actions of the Russian state against the Circassians as an act of genocide and a prominent Circassian expert pointing to how the Vilnius meeting can help to unify the divided Circassian nation and show what needs to be done yet as that nation seeks to recover its rightful place in the world.

*Picture above is from the Azerbaijani website Minval and its discussion of the plight of the Circassians. 

The holding of international conferences about the Circassian genocide has sometimes drawn criticism by a few because the events they focus on took place in the 19^th century, even though the impact of those actions and new genocidal moves by the Russian state have taken place right up to the present. But the Vilnius meeting shows that such criticism is misplaced. Not only have two countries, Georgia and Ukraine, recognized Russian actions against the Circassians as genocides, but those recognitions have helped power the Circassian and other national movements inside the current borders of the Russian Federation.

            Chechen Opposition Leader Akhmed Zakayev in Vilnius

Instead, talking about the genocide in the case of the Circassians is a way of building bridges to other peoples who have been victims of Russian acts of genocide. Azerbaijanis would not have taken part in that meeting or spoken as they did about the Circassian genocide had they not experienced similar tragedies in their own national history. This demonstrates that Circassian activists who focus on the genocide are on the right track, and that their efforts create an opening for the Circassians to unite behind their cause with other nations that have suffered genocide, first and foremost at the hands of the Russian state, but more broadly as well. The implication is clear: this approach offers the Circassian movement a way to break out of the ghetto in which it has sometimes found itself and could prove even more powerful than the highly successful Circassian mobilization surrounding the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, which Moscow insisted on holding on what had once been the killing fields of its genocidal campaign against the Circassians.

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The other lesson of the Vilnius conference was one that was drawn by Adel Bashqawi, a participant in that meeting, a distinguished historian of Circassia and the Circassians, and the irreplaceable editor of the essential website, Justice for the North Caucasus. In his remarks, which he entitled “Silencing the Circassian Exile, Bashqawi spoke about the way in which Moscow, before, during, and after the Soviet period, has worked tirelessly to keep the Circassians from uniting and speaking with a common voice to people of goodwill throughout the world.

Of all the victims of Russian imperialism, the Circassians have been the most divided, with 90 percent of their number expelled from their homeland by the original act of Russian genocide against them, and with the 10 percent who remain in the homeland divided as a result of Soviet ethnic engineering, which seeks to destroy the nation by dividing it into parts. Instead of a common Circassian nation, there are the Adygeys, the Cherkess, and the Kabards, who enjoy statehood of a kind, and other smaller groups who do not. In fact, they are all Circassians, but Moscow knows that if they come to understand that and develop the means to speak with one another, Russia’s oppressive regime in the North Caucasus will end.

Outlook

Russia has had an important advantage in its information war against the Circassians. Of the seven million abroad, many do not know Circassian but instead Arabic, Turkish, or other languages; and of the 700,000 in the homeland, while the three “recognized” nations speak mutually intelligible languages, they have been encouraged to think of themselves as different peoples. Eventually, one hopes that all the Circassians will be able to return to a restored Circassia and that they will develop the rich traditions of the Circassian language. But that is a long-term goal.

In the short term, something else is needed, something that is implied by Bashqawi’s words. What the Circassian movement needs now, as the meeting in Vilnius showed, is a common Circassian portal to which all Circassians can turn and then toggle between the languages they know today, the international languages others can use to learn about them, and the Circassia they will eventually recover.

Creating such a portal will not be easy – the tasks of compiling and editing it are enormous, and the translation tasks are not minor either – but this is the obvious next task for the Circassian national movement, one that if undertaken will drive the final nail into the coffin of Russian imperialism and the history of the genocides it has inflicted wherever it has ruled and will guarantee that the Circassians, their country and their language will flourish. Given what can be gained, as Vilnius has suggested, this is the task to which the Circassians and their supporters should now direct their efforts.

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by Vasif Huseynov

The South Caucasus is entering a new phase of regional energy reconfiguration as Azerbaijan moves forward with plans to transmit electricity to its Nakhchivan exclave through southern Armenia, along the Zangezur corridor.

What was once understood mainly as a transport initiative is now, under the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), evolving into an energy corridor with significant regional and geopolitical consequences. The launch of construction on the Zangezur high-voltage transmission line and parallel political signals from Baku, Yerevan, and Ankara suggest that trans-regional energy connectivity may become the most immediate and transformative dimension of post-conflict normalization.

On January 29, it was reported that Azerbaijan had begun construction of the Zangezur high-voltage power transmission line, a technically complex project designed to integrate the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic into the country’s unified electricity system and to form a critical segment of an emerging Azerbaijan–Türkiye–Europe electricity corridor. Implemented by AzerEnergy, the project centers on a two-circuit 330 kV transmission line with a total capacity of 1,000 megawatts. The first sections include a 74-kilometer line from Jabrayil to Aghbend and a 105-kilometer line from Nakhchivan to the Ordubad border, following the Araz River and crossing mountainous terrain that requires advanced engineering solutions. A subsequent phase envisages the construction of an additional 44-kilometer segment across the Zangezur corridor to connect Aghbend and Ordubad into a continuous internal transmission route, alongside a new 330 kV substation in Nakhchivan city.

Beyond eliminating Nakhchivan’s long-standing status as an energy island, the project enables centralized dispatch, access to reserve capacity, and more stable system operation. In parallel, Azerbaijan plans to build a 230-kilometer, 400 kV transmission line from Nakhchivan to Türkiye, including a 400 kV converter substation, which would align Azerbaijan’s grid more closely with European technical standards and significantly expand cross-border electricity transmission capacity. When completed, this will constitute an electricity line connecting the South Caucasus and Europe, and in the future, Central Asia and Europe via Azerbaijan and Armenia.

This internal integration is unfolding in parallel with a broader diplomatic and economic opening. In January 2026, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan confirmed that the energy systems of Armenia and Azerbaijan would be interconnected, allowing for mutual electricity imports and exports. He framed the initiative as one of the most practical early deliverables of TRIPP, arguing that a high-voltage transmission line could be built faster and at lower cost than rail infrastructure, while generating immediate economic returns.

According to Armenian experts, it would take around one year for Armenia’s electricity grid to be connected with that of Azerbaijan and Türkiye, although full integration of the energy systems would take several years. Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan has confirmed that this had been discussed previously with President Ilham Aliyev and was reflected in the framework documents signed between Armenia and the United States earlier this month.

Reaction to these developments inside Armenia, however, has been mixed. While independent experts find this development critical for Armenia’s energy independence, opposition figures and pro-Russian expert circles portrayed the grid integration efforts as a threat to Armenian sovereignty, warning that Yerevan would be “handing the switch” of its energy system to Baku and Ankara. Such rhetoric reflects deeper anxieties about Armenia’s long-standing dependence on Russia, particularly in the electricity sector. Roughly 40 percent of Armenia’s power generation comes from the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant, whose fuel supply and operation remain closely tied to Moscow. In addition, significant portions of the remaining infrastructure are controlled by Russian companies.

Yet Armenia’s energy dilemma is more paradoxical than these arguments suggest. The country produces roughly as much electricity as it consumes – around seven billion kilowatt-hours annually – and maintains substantial idle capacity that generates costs rather than revenue. Armenian officials have openly acknowledged that without regional interconnections, export potential remains largely theoretical. In this context, linking Armenia’s grid to Azerbaijan’s would provide it with access to synchronized systems in Georgia, Russia, and, via Georgia, Türkiye. For Yerevan, this would enable entry into a regional electricity market that cannot be reached independently, transforming surplus generation from a burden into a potential asset.

From Baku’s perspective, energy interconnection is a continuation of a long-standing strategy rather than a concession. Azerbaijan remains the only energy- exporting country in the South Caucasus, supplying oil, gas, and electricity to its neighbors while expanding its role as a supplier to Europe. President Aliyev recently emphasized that Azerbaijan exports natural gas to 16 countries, ten of them EU members, and ranks first globally in terms of the geographical reach of its pipeline gas exports. Electricity connectivity, particularly through Nakhchivan and the Zangezur corridor, adds a new layer to this profile by positioning Azerbaijan not only as a producer but also as a central transit and balancing hub.

Impact on the Zangezur Corridor

The Turkish dimension reinforces this shift. Ankara has repeatedly signaled that the Zangezur corridor will become a primary route for energy flows into Türkiye. Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar stated that while Azerbaijani electricity currently reaches Türkiye via Georgia, all energy resources (including oil, gas, electricity, and future green energy from Central Asia) are expected to transit through Zangezur in the near future. This would integrate logistical and energy routes, reducing dependence on single corridors and strengthening Türkiye’s role as a gateway between the Caspian region and European markets.

Such statements are not rhetorical flourishes but reflect concrete planning. Alongside hydrocarbons, Azerbaijan is investing heavily in renewable generation in its newly regained former western territories, including hydropower and large-scale wind projects. These projects are designed to feed into expanded transmission infrastructure, supporting export routes toward Türkiye and Europe, as well as the Black Sea Energy Corridor linking Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania, and Hungary. Internal grid integration through Zangezur is thus a prerequisite for sustaining predictable cross-border electricity flows, especially as renewable capacity grows.

The geopolitical implications of these developments extend beyond energy economics. For Armenia, participation in a regional energy network represents a gradual reorientation away from exclusive dependence on Russia and toward a more diversified, market-based model. This helps explain the intensity of opposition from pro-Russian actors, who view interconnection with Azerbaijan as part of a broader erosion of Moscow’s leverage. Similar fears accompanied earlier Azerbaijani fuel supplies to Armenia, which were initially denounced as dangerous but were quickly accepted by consumers when lower prices disrupted existing monopolies.

Outlook

For Azerbaijan and Türkiye, the evolving energy landscape enhances their strategic depth and resilience. By developing multiple, interconnected routes for hydrocarbons and electricity, both countries are reducing their vulnerability to geopolitical disruptions while increasing their importance to European energy security. EU officials have already expressed interest in these new developments, pointing to routes via Nakhchivan and Georgia as strategic links connecting Central Asia to Europe and complementing the Southern Gas Corridor and emerging green energy initiatives.

That said, Azerbaijan’s Zangezur power line, Armenia’s willingness to interconnect grids, and Türkiye’s push to reroute energy flows signal a fundamental change in the region’s energy landscape. The South Caucasus is moving away from fragmented, dependency-driven systems toward a more integrated energy space shaped by market logic and strategic interdependence. Whether this transformation stabilizes the region in the long term will depend on political follow-through and regulatory coordination, but the direction is increasingly clear: energy is becoming the backbone of a new regional order.

About the Author

Dr. Vasif Huseynov is the head of the Western Studies department at the Center for Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center) in Baku, Azerbaijan. He is a faculty member at Khazar University in Baku. Dr. Huseynov had previously worked for the Center for Strategic Studies (SAM) and Public Administration Academy (DIA) in Baku. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in International Relations from the Academy of Public Administration in Azerbaijan, a Master of Arts degree in Global Political Economy from the University of Kassel in Germany, and a PhD in Political Science from the University of Göttingen, also in Germany. His MA and PhD studies were supported by full scholarships of German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). He has authored several op-eds, articles, and academic publications, including a book titled “Geopolitical Rivalries in the ‘Common Neighborhood’: Russia’s Conflict with the West, Soft Power, and Neoclassical Realism”, which was published by Ibidem Press in 2019 and distributed by Columbia University.

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by Yuri Lapaiev

One of the enduring lessons of the Russia–Ukraine war is that battlefield advantage—and in some cases victory—can stem from an adversary’s ability to rapidly copy, adapt, and scale the most effective tactical or technological solutions of its opponent. This dynamic has been especially evident in the race to develop unmanned systems across the battlefields of Ukraine. The relatively low cost of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), the ease and speed of pilot training, and the precision of drone strikes have made these systems highly attractive, driving their rapid proliferation and encouraging the formation of specialized UAV units integrated into core military operations. Nowhere has this competitive adaptation been more visible than in Russia’s evolving approach to drone warfare, which initially mirrored Ukraine’s drone development but has since diverged in important ways.

The most elite and experienced units in the Russian military—special forces and airborne troops—were among the first to employ drones in combat. Similar to their use in Ukrainian formations, Russian units initially employed simple quadcopter First-Person View (FPV) drones equipped with explosive payloads. However, Russian forces reached a significant milestone with the development and widespread use of the Lancet loitering munition, which became one of their key strike systems used during their response to Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive, which initially proved to be highly effective. Lancet drones, in addition to their exclusively military significance, also served a propaganda function: the Russian Federation exaggerated the scale of production through selectively edited strike footage and visual effects, while omitting evidence of unsuccessful attacks.

The situation changed dramatically in February 2024, when the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) announced the creation of its Unmanned Systems Forces (USF). Eleven months later, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov reacted to this development by unveiling plans in December 2024 to establish a Russian analogue to the USF. By January 2025, the first specialized Russian UAV units had been formed, most notably the 7th UAV Regiment within the Central Military District. The regiment was expected to consist of approximately 1,300 personnel. It is organized into 102 reconnaissance and strike drone crews and is equipped with Lancet, Supercam, and Orlan-30 UAVs. The unit was officially presented to the Russian public on May 9, 2025, during Moscow’s annual Victory Day parade.

By November 2025, the Russian military had formally announced the creation of a new branch of the armed forces—the Unmanned Systems Forces—explicitly modeled on the Ukrainian example. Beyond forming combat units, the deputy commander of the new branch, Colonel Sergei Ishtuganov, also announced plans to establish a specialized higher military educational institution to train personnel to man these forces.

The Birth of Rubicon

At the forefront of Moscow’s most effective—and perhaps best-known—newly formed UAV units is the Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies. Established by order of Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov in August 2024, Rubicon was designed as a model elite unit while also serving an experimental role. As a result, it is staffed primarily with the best specialists in their respective fields and receives preferential funding compared to other units of the Russian Armed Forces. The Center also appears to employ modern, business-style project management practices rather than what exists within the traditional Russian military bureaucracy, which tends to hinder development. Just the opposite has occurred within Rubicon. Its units operate much faster in adaptation and are more innovative than other units of the Russian army.

According to investigations by journalists and OSINT specialists, one of the possible locations for the Center is the Patriot Congress and Exhibition Center in the Moscow region. The location was identified thanks to a video by well-known Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov. Hall D and part of Hall C of the Patriot Exhibition Center, located in the southern part of the complex, have been allocated for the Rubicon Center. At the same time, it cannot be ruled out that the location was deliberately shown in order to mislead Western experts about the actual whereabouts of the Center.

A key factor driving Rubicon’s success is its doctrinal emphasis on integrated drone warfare and advanced operator training. Beyond conducting combat missions, Rubicon instructors disseminate advanced UAV tactics across other Russian units, accelerating force-wide adaptation. The Center is also prioritized for access to the latest equipment and emerging technologies—particularly systems incorporating artificial intelligence and machine vision—many of which are experimental platforms used to test concepts and refine tactics before broader scaling.

Rubicon’s advantages include its elite status, direct subordination, operational flexibility and independence, business-style approaches to project management, strong financing, and superior provision of personnel and equipment. In addition, it functions as a showcase state Russian project, and a personal initiative of Defense Minister Belousov, who—following scandals associated with his predecessor, Sergei Shoigu—has sought a clear success story; and the rapid growth of Rubicon has provided him with one.

Rubicon’s activities extend beyond UAV systems. The Center maintains a specialized department dedicated to the development of Uncrewed Surface Vessels (USVs), comparable to Ukraine’s Magura and Sea Baby maritime drones. Russian USVs first appeared publicly during the July 2025 July Storm naval exercises in the Baltic Sea, and in August 2025, a Russian USV was used to strike a Ukrainian vessel on the Danube River, marking their operational debut.

Equally important is Rubicon’s close cooperation with private defense manufacturers, mirroring elements of the Ukrainian innovation model. This partnership enables rapid feedback from the battlefield and the swift incorporation of design improvements. In parallel, Rubicon operates its own research and development division focused on enhancing drone effectiveness, integrating AI into control systems, and advancing robotics integration. The Center also studies the physiological and operational demands placed on drone pilots, to improve long-term performance while mitigating stress and other harmful effects on operators.

*Photograph of current Rubicon commander: Colonel Sergei Budnikov

Leadership

Little public information exists on the leadership of Rubicon. According to Russian media, the current commander of the Rubicon Center is Colonel Sergei Budnikov. His background is in the Russian artillery and naval infantry, and one of his primary responsibilities is integrating drone operations into conventional military forces. In the spring of 2025, there were seven publicly known Rubicon units, each consisting of approximately 130–150 personnel. By the fall of 2025, that number had expanded to 12 units, while overall personnel increased from an estimated 1,000–1,500 to approximately 5,000. Current Russian plans are to establish a Rubicon group within each military formation: North, Center, West, South, East, and Dnepr.

Each detachment within the unit has its own area of specialization, like aerial reconnaissance (Orlan, Zala, Skat, SuperCam), strike UAVs (FPVs, Lancet, Molnia, KVN etc), and anti-drone air defense. Although the structure of the Rubicon Center is fairly typical, its success is attributed to the support of its founder, Minister Belousov, and Evgeny Shmyrin (head of the Department of Prospective Interdisciplinary Research and Special Projects of the Russian Ministry of Defense).

*Photograph: Founder of Rubicon: Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov

In addition, thanks to its subordination to the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Federation (formerly the GRU), the Center receives advanced technologies, increased funding, and up-to-date intelligence on the most important targets, as well as almost complete independence and autonomy in its actions. On the other hand, this model allows the Center to operate not only as a drone strike and reconnaissance force, but also as an intelligence - supported unit capable of rapid sensor - to - shooter cycles.

Rubicon’s high visibility inside Russia is attributed to the extensive attention it receives from the Russian media. The unit is extremely active in the information domain, maintaining its own Telegram channel where it publishes strike results and updates about the Center, while also using the platform for advertising and recruitment. In addition, the Russian information resource Lostarmour—which tracks and analyzes Ukrainian losses in the war. operates a separate section specifically dedicated to Rubicon, publishing data on the Center’s claimed damage and statistics. Rubicon’s media activity serves a dual purpose: supporting recruitment efforts and exerting psychological pressure on the Ukrainian military by cultivating the image of an omnipresent and highly dangerous unit.

Rubicon’s Role as Frontline Fire Brigade

The main difference in Rubicon’s tactics is its focus on several key areas. The first is the destruction of Ukrainian UAVs (primarily strike and heavy bombers such as the Vampire, but also reconnaissance drones). Like the Ukrainians before them, the Russian command understands that clearing the airspace of enemy drones is critical to protecting personnel and equipment and, ultimately, to carrying out combat missions. The second is hunting down the crews of AFU UAVs. Training a truly experienced and effective pilot takes a long time, and unlike the drones themselves, they cannot be quickly replaced. Therefore, the loss of drone pilots is a key factor for both sides.

But the most painful thing for the AFU was Rubicon’s focus on cutting off Ukrainian logistics. The Russian tactic was to flank the AFU units to form a semi-encirclement with one or two accessible logistics routes. Each of these routes was taken under fire control by Rubicon’s UAV crews. This strategy used by Rubicon is similar to the use of artillery for fire control, but it provides more accurate strikes and, with effective reconnaissance, almost immediate conducting of the “detection-attack” cycle. This makes it virtually impossible to deliver supplies and reinforcements to frontline Ukrainian units, as well as to evacuate wounded soldiers or damaged equipment to the safe zones. The first place Rubicon utilized this tactic was during its deployment during the Russian counteroffensive in the Kursk region last year. At that time, Rubicon managed to practically cut off the main Ukrainian transport artery between Yunakivka and Sudzha, which was used to supply and evacuate Ukrainian forces operating in the Kursk region. Rubicon’s successful use of these tactics was one of the main reasons for the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the region.

Following its successes in the Kursk direction, the Russian high command extended this tactic to other critical areas of the Ukrainian frontlines by utilizing Rubicon as a form of rapid response fire brigade. For example, Rubicon is currently attempting to cut off the critically important Izyum-Slovyansk highway, which is one of the main supply routes to Ukrainian forces in Donbas. Rubicon’s units have also begun operating in the Kupiansk and Pokrovsk directions. Since May 2025, Rubicon has been operating mainly in the Donetsk region, supporting the Russian Federation’s offensive in the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka area.

Rubicon’s drone crews have also been spotted in the Kupiansk, Lyman, Sumy, Novopavlivka, and Zaporizhzhia areas as they extend their operational capabilities against the Ukrainian frontlines. The geographical scope of the divisions’ drone warfare activities is likely expanding in line with the growth of the Center itself and the formation of new territorial units, as mentioned earlier. The probable goal is to transform the Center from being a “fire brigade” that is frequently transferred from one frontline area to another on request by Russian commanders, into a full-fledged structure able to simultaneously operate on all areas of the Russian frontlines.

Countering Rubicon

Rubicon’s effectiveness has not gone unnoticed by Ukrainian commanders and experts, many of whom have expressed serious concern about the unit’s operations. Among the recommended responses are a close study of Rubicon’s methods and the development of targeted countermeasures. Maria Berlinska, head of the Victory Drones project, which focuses on strengthening Ukraine’s Security and Defense Forces through technology, has identified three main steps to counter Rubicon's effectiveness. The first step would be to create specific, dedicated Anti-Rubicon units tasked with identifying and neutralizing Rubicon crews; second, the adoption of Rubicon’s most effective operational practices; third, the designation of personnel within each brigade responsible for collecting, refining, and scaling successful technological solutions. Some of this work is likely already underway, as reports have begun to emerge of Rubicon crews and command posts being destroyed by Ukrainian precision strikes.

At the same time, Rubicon appears to be encountering growing challenges related to its expansion, including potential shortages of qualified personnel, particularly in analysis and development roles. Sustaining the growth of an elite, high-technology unit also requires substantial and continuous funding. Moreover, the operational independence of Rubicon units may not be fully acceptable to more conservative Russian army or corps commanders with whom they must coordinate. Finally, Rubicon’s demonstrated effectiveness has made its crews and command posts priority targets for Ukrainian precision strikes.

Outlook

The Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies represents the cutting edge of Russian efforts to catch up to Ukraine in its innovative use of drones in the war following the Kremlin’s 2022 re-invasion. Moscow continues to professionalize, innovate, and institutionalize drone warfare. Russia’s drone arm has evolved from initial experiments with simple quadcopters to the use of sophisticated platforms like the Lancet, Supercam, and Orlan-30. Rubicon has made significant strides by combining elite personnel, cutting-edge AI-enabled systems, and business-style project management to accelerate adaptation and battlefield effectiveness. Its role extends far beyond combat operations to training, doctrinal development, R&D, and integrated use of USVs in its recent drone attacks on the Danube.

Despite operational successes, including disrupting Ukrainian logistics and neutralizing opposing UAVs, Rubicon faces challenges in sustaining rapid expansion, ensuring adequate skilled personnel, and mitigating vulnerabilities to Ukraine’s increased use of precision strikes to neutralize its effectiveness. Looking ahead, Rubicon is poised to evolve from its former role as a frontline fire brigade into a permanent, multi-domain force capable of operating simultaneously across all of Russia’s operational sectors in its ongoing war against Ukraine. Its true test will be whether it can fully integrate into the broader Russian military—initially skeptical but increasingly recognizing Rubicon as a frontline necessity.

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About the Author

Yuri Lapaiev is currently the editor-in-chief of Tyzhden (The Ukrainian Week) magazine. He graduated from the Ivan Kozhedub Air Force University in Kharkiv with an MA in computer network engineering. Between 2006 and 2011, he served in the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence, including as an analyst. In 2011-2015, Lapaiev worked as a marketing analyst in the head office of one of Ukraine’s largest mobile operators. From 2015 to 2016, he served in the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces and participated in the Anti-Terrorism Operation (ATO) in eastern Ukraine.

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by Yuri Lapaiev

On January 23, newly appointed Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced the creation of Mission Control, a unified system for coordinating, managing, and reporting on all missions involving Ukrainian forces’ unmanned aerial vehicles. This decision, one of the first for the new defense minister, demonstrates the vital importance that drones have gained on the battlefields of Ukraine. Fedorov’s appointment can also be seen as part of this trend, since, as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation of Ukraine, he was one of the main drivers for the development of the Ukrainian army’s capabilities in unmanned warfare.

At the very beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, drones played a rather secondary role, their use being limited mostly to aerial reconnaissance and artillery targeting. However, this changed quickly when Ukrainian operators first adopted the idea of dropping hand grenades and improvised explosive devices from commercial Mavic-like quadcopters in ground combat. But the real revolution came with the start of using First Person View (FPV) drones as disposable weapons. Their appearance was rather forced as the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) sorely lacked artillery and anti-tank weapons. This effectively transformed what was deemed a civilian toy into a high-precision, versatile system capable of striking both infantry and armored vehicles, at a price of approximately $500 per drone. Therefore, in terms of its military utility, FPV drones offered an extremely high cost-to-kill ratio relative to the cost of potential targets.

The combat effectiveness of FPV drones has led to the gradual emergence of drone crews in most Ukrainian frontline units. Initially small in number and rather amateurish, some of these units began to show truly significant results, creating a certain system and infrastructure around themselves as their role and missions evolved. The success and uniqueness of these units led to a review of the strategy for their use, resulting in a historic decision—the creation of the world’s first Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) as a separate branch of the military.

The Formation of the USF

The corresponding decree was signed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on December 6, 2024. According to this decision, the most successful military units versed in drone warfare were separated from the Land Forces (mainly), and the USF was created along these lines. This spurred the transformation of classic mechanized units, such as the K-2 battalion and the 59th separate motorized infantry brigade, into separate USF brigades, which is quite indicative. It was these groups of enthusiastic pioneers who laid the foundation for the creation of UAV companies, then battalions, regiments, and now brigades of unmanned systems.

As of January 2026, there are now an estimated 12 units within the structure of USF. The most famous among them are the 412th Separate UAV Brigade Nemesis, the 414th Separate UAV Brigade “Birds of Magyar,” the 429th Separate UAV Brigade “Achilles,” and the 1st Separate Unmanned Systems Center. In December 2025, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, stated that unmanned systems now account for up to 60% of all battlefield strikes.

The attitude of state authorities and the military top brass towards UAVs has notably evolved as well. From the rather dismissive name “wedding drones” used by former Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov in the winter of 2022 to the somewhat naive call to Ukrainian citizens to assemble drones at home (to help soldiers on the frontline) made by the aforementioned Minister of Digital Transformation Fedorov back in 2024, Ukrainian officials are now touting the effectiveness of drones. Today, officials are making statements touting their vital strategic importance to the “Line of Drones” (a state program to scale up the best UAV units and introduce an automated damage evaluation system), to the expansion of the “18-25” recruitment program to fill UAV units in 2025.

In another notable milestone made last year, the state program of direct defense procurement, DOT-Chain Defense, was expanded to include drones, which permit Ukrainian military units to directly sidestep the cumbersome military acquisitions bureaucracy by directly purchasing the most effective UAVs themselves. From 2024 to 2025, drones not only became widely used but also began to be used at all levels, tactical, operational, and strategic. Needless to say, Ukraine is actively catching up with Russia in terms of the number of middle and long-range strikes it is now conducting.

Another unique Ukrainian innovation was in the area of surface and, later, Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV). Thanks to the USV forces, the Russian Black Sea Fleet was initially neutralized, and the Black Sea was virtually liberated, which opened up the possibility of exporting Ukrainian goods (mostly grain) from the ports of Odesa. Moscow was forced to urgently relocate the ships from its Black Sea Fleet (BSF) in Sevastopol to the base in Novorossiysk. Ukrainian drones (air and sea) also reach them there as well, demonstrating that there is little or no safe haven for the Russian navy to operate in the Black Sea. Ukrainian USVs, such as the Magura 5, operated by the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence unit, and SeaBaby by the Security Service of Ukraine, have also destroyed several helicopters and even combat jets. Recently, Ukrainian aerial drones began targeting Russia’s oil industry, attacking oil terminals in Novorossiysk and Tuapse, as well as striking Russian-operated oil tankers belonging to the Kremlin’s “shadow fleet.”

The Innovation Race with Russia

One of the major takeaways from the Russian-Ukrainian war is the unique innovation race between the two sides, as one side achieves an exclusive advantage technologically, but often only for a short period of time. The other side immediately copies the weapons of the opponent. In 2022, thanks to the active use of drones and modern Western weapons, the Armed Forces of Ukraine had an advantage in reconnaissance and strike capabilities (UAVs for target detection and strike coordination, long-range weapons for striking the enemy). However, the Russian army also set about improving its own capabilities and, by 2023-2024, had gradually achieved at least parity and, given the greater number of long-range weapons (primarily Iskander ballistic missiles), even superiority in this area.

A major factor accounting for the Russians’ success was the reduction in the time between target detection and target engagement. As the war evolved, that gap narrowed. For example, in 2022, this could take up to several days; now it takes only a few dozen minutes before modifications are made. But most importantly, there has been a significant increase in the use of reconnaissance drones such as Zala, Supercam, Skat, and Orlan at the tactical and operational levels of war. This success, along with the growing use of strike drones such as FPV, Lancet, and Geran, has forced Ukrainian military engineers to look for ways to win the skies in the conditions of a lack of traditional air defense systems. The response was again drones, but this time it was in the realm of unmanned anti-aircraft systems. Currently, modified Ukrainian-made FPV drones have become interceptors of various types used against aerial targets, from strike UAVs to helicopters. Their effectiveness and cost-effectiveness (compared to air defense missiles) have been proven on the battlefield and have already attracted the interest of Ukraine’s foreign partners.

The problem of copying and countering could be seen in another game-changer in modern warfare: the introduction of fiber-optic-controlled drones, which are invulnerable to the effects of electronic warfare systems. First introduced by the Russian military, they were quickly copied and scaled up by the Ukrainians. Now, fiber-optic-controlled drones are being used extensively by both sides, while they simultaneously try to find effective solutions to counter their use. Another race - the development of ground robotic platforms, mostly used by both sides for logistics and medical evacuation, but also for testing them in combat missions.

Outlook

The appointment of Mykhailo Fedorov as the new Ukrainian Minister of Defense is poised to vastly accelerate the development of the unmanned capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). Fedorov underscored this priority during his parliamentary confirmation speech and reinforced it through his initial personnel appointment decisions made since taking the reins as defense minister.

On January 19, he appointed Pavlo Yelizarov—the founder of the highly effective ‘Lazar’ unmanned unit—as deputy commander of the Ukrainian Air Force to spearhead the integration of interceptor drone systems designed to neutralize Russian strike drones. This was followed by the appointment of veteran advisor Serhii Sternenko, on January 23, further signaling a commitment to long-term unmanned systems development.

Facing an adversary with vast conventional superiority, Ukraine’s path to victory relies on maintaining a technological edge on the battlefield. The institutionalization of unmanned systems across all domains—air, land, and sea—serves as the critical pillar of Ukraine’s asymmetric strategy and played a critical role in Fedorov’s appointment as defense minister. By prioritizing these systems under a unified command, Ukraine can achieve the flexibility necessary to reverse Russian advances and codify the hard-won lessons of the last four years.

About the Author

Yuri Lapaiev is currently the editor-in-chief of Tyzhden (The Ukrainian Week) magazine. He graduated from the Ivan Kozhedub Air Force University in Kharkiv with an MA in computer network engineering. Between 2006 and 2011, he served in the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence, including as an analyst. In 2011-2015, Lapaiev worked as a marketing analyst in the head office of one of Ukraine’s largest mobile operators. From 2015 to 2016, he served in the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces and participated in the Anti-Terrorism Operation (ATO) in eastern Ukraine.

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By Vasif Huseynov

The unveiling of the TRIPP Implementation Framework has not only accelerated the Armenia–Azerbaijan normalization process but has also triggered visible reactions from regional powers whose influence over South Caucasus connectivity is being recalibrated. While the project is framed as an economic and infrastructural initiative anchored in sovereignty and reciprocity, it directly affects long-standing geopolitical balances in a key crossroads of Eurasia. Among regional actors, Russia and Iran have emerged as the most vocal critics or skeptics of TRIPP, reflecting broader concerns over diminishing leverage, U.S. involvement, and shifting regional alignments.

The Russian response has been characterized less by outright opposition than by an attempt to secure a place within a process Moscow can no longer block. On December 16, 2025, Mikhail Kalugin, Director of the Fourth CIS Department at Russia’s Foreign Ministry, publicly stated that Russia was ready to consult with Armenia regarding possible participation in the TRIPP project. Acknowledging that the Armenian–American initiative still required detailed study, Kalugin nevertheless argued that “there are sufficient grounds for Russian participation,” pointing to Russia’s existing role in managing Armenia’s railways through its subsidiary South Caucasus Railways, Armenia’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union, and the presence of Russian border guards along key sections of the proposed route. His conclusion – “It is clear that our partners cannot do without Russia” – was quite telling. It reflected an understanding in Moscow that while Russia lacks the capacity to prevent TRIPP, it seeks to preserve relevance amid a rapidly changing regional environment shaped by the war in Ukraine, weakened leverage in the South Caucasus, and the unprecedented personal involvement of U.S. President Donald Trump in advancing the project.

Armenia, however, has moved quickly to close the door on Russian participation in TRIPP itself. On January 14, 2026, Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan stated unequivocally that “the framework of TRIPP is already quite clear,” signaling that the project's parameters leave little room for renegotiation or additional stakeholders. While stressing that Yerevan does not seek to exclude Russia politically and acknowledging Moscow’s existing footprint in Armenia’s infrastructure, Mirzoyan made it quite clear that Russia would not participate in TRIPP as a managing or operational partner. Armenian officials have instead suggested that any future cooperation with Russia could only occur in adjacent or parallel projects, not within the U.S.–Armenian framework that underpins TRIPP.

*Map of Trump Route for International Peace & Prosperity (TRIPP)

Moscow has countered this position by invoking its control over Armenia’s railway network. Russian officials have argued that since Armenian railways are operated by South Caucasus Railways under a 2008 concession agreement with Russian Railways, Russian participation in TRIPP would be logical and even necessary. The response from Yerevan, however, has been well-thought-out. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has publicly called on Russia to fulfill its existing obligations by restoring several key railway sections inside Armenia, including the Ijevan–Gazakh, Yeraskh–Nakhchivan, and Gyumri–Kars lines. Armenian officials have openly acknowledged that Russian Railways is in no financial position to undertake such investments.

By early 2026, Russian Railways was facing a deep financial crisis, with debts exceeding 4 trillion rubles (more than $50 billion), severe budget cuts, declining freight volumes due to sanctions, and mounting losses in its Armenian subsidiary. Against this backdrop, Pashinyan has increasingly framed the issue in legal terms, signaling that Armenia may reclaim control over its railways if promised investments are not delivered. The 2008 concession agreement, which transferred management but not ownership to the Russian side, provides Armenia with a legal pathway to terminate or revise the arrangement should Russia fail to meet its contractual obligations. In this sense, Yerevan appears to be using Russia’s financial weakness to lay the groundwork for restoring its sovereign control over the country’s strategic infrastructure.

Iranian Reaction to TRIPP

Iranian reaction to TRIPP has been more consistently negative. From the outset, Iranian officials have portrayed the project as a geopolitical threat rather than an economic initiative. On December 17, 2025, Ali Akbar Velayati, senior adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader, criticized TRIPP during a meeting with the Armenian ambassador, equating it with the much-contested “Zangezur corridor” and declaring Tehran “firmly opposed” to the U.S. initiative. Velayati argued that the route could facilitate a NATO presence near Iran’s northern border, posing security risks not only to Iran but also to southern Russia. Although Armenian officials have repeatedly stressed that TRIPP operates under Armenia’s full sovereignty and does not involve extraterritorial arrangements, Iranian skepticism has persisted, reflecting Tehran’s broader unease with increased U.S. involvement in the South Caucasus and the shifting transit dynamics emerging along its northern frontier.

Concerns about external interference have also been echoed domestically within Armenia. In January 2026, Armenia’s Foreign Intelligence Service published its annual assessment, warning that hybrid threats against Armenia were likely to intensify in the run-up to the June 2026 parliamentary elections. While the report did not explicitly name Russia, it referred to “states with the goal of maintaining and expanding their influence in the region” as likely sources of malign activities aimed at sabotaging peace initiatives, including TRIPP. The intelligence assessment also highlighted key risks such as disinformation campaigns, cyber operations, and economic pressure designed to undermine public support for normalization and connectivity projects—an indirect but clear reference to Moscow’s often-used toolkit in the post-Soviet space.

Russian Soft Power in Armenia

This report came on the heels of concrete evidence of an expanded Russian soft-power and information campaign targeting Armenia. In late 2025, Russian media reported that the Kremlin had allocated roughly 13 billion rubles (around $165 million) from the presidential administration to finance a project aimed at strengthening Russia’s influence abroad, with Armenia identified as the primary focus ahead of the 2026 parliamentary elections. The initiative is being overseen by Sergei Kiriyenko, First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Presidential Administration, who, according to earlier reporting, had been explicitly tasked with advancing Russian interests in Armenia “through soft power” as Yerevan’s leadership continued to drift westward.

While officially described as “informational rather than electoral,” the project reportedly involves Kremlin-linked structures such as Rossotrudnichestvo and RT and is widely understood to seek the erosion of public support for Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Armenia’s normalization agenda. The intelligence concerns outlined by Yerevan were further underscored in January 2026 by incendiary statements from Kremlin propagandist Vladimir Solovyov, who openly suggested that Russia could justify a “special military operation” against Armenia should it continue to move beyond Moscow’s perceived zone of influence.

Support from Türkiye

Not all regional actors, however, have reacted with suspicion. Türkiye has emerged as one of the strongest supporters of TRIPP and the broader Armenia–Azerbaijan normalization process. On January 15, 2026, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan endorsed the project, emphasizing its significance for the Middle Corridor and regional connectivity. He confirmed that he had held extensive discussions with Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov on the TRIPP framework and that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had been fully briefed. Fidan also reiterated Ankara’s commitment to the signing of a final peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan and stated that the political will exists in all three capitals—Baku, Ankara, and Yerevan—to normalize relations. In this context, the reopening of the Armenia–Türkiye border, closed since 1993, is increasingly seen as a realistic prospect once the peace treaty is finalized.

Outlook

The geopolitical shock waves caused by TRIPP will continue to reverberate throughout the greater Caspian region. Taken together, external reactions to TRIPP underscore the project’s transformative potential. For Russia and Iran, it represents a challenge to established patterns of influence and control; for Türkiye, it offers an opportunity to anchor peace in connectivity and regional integration. For the two directly involved countries, Armenia and Azerbaijan, TRIPP constitutes a unique historic opportunity for achieving a lasting peace in the region. Both countries seem determined to advance the peace agenda while seeking to neutralize external threats. The support of the United States and the direct involvement of President Trump are critical factors that further insulate the process from external spoilers and will remain a major influence on the transformational changes unfolding in the South Caucasus.

About the Author

Dr. Vasif Huseynov is the head of the Western Studies department at the Center for Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center) in Baku, Azerbaijan. He is a faculty member at Khazar University in Baku. Dr. Huseynov had previously worked for the Center for Strategic Studies (SAM) and Public Administration Academy (DIA) in Baku. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in International Relations from the Academy of Public Administration in Azerbaijan, a Master of Arts degree in Global Political Economy from the University of Kassel in Germany, and a PhD in Political Science from the University of Göttingen, also in Germany. His MA and PhD studies were supported by full scholarships of German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). He has authored several op-eds, articles, and academic publications, including a book titled “Geopolitical Rivalries in the ‘Common Neighborhood’: Russia’s Conflict with the West, Soft Power, and Neoclassical Realism”, which was published by Ibidem Press in 2019 and distributed by Columbia University.

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by Paul Goble

Thirty-six years ago, Moscow dispatched the Soviet army to Baku ostensibly to defend Armenians but in fact to crush Azerbaijan’s drive toward independence. In the years since, the details of that event have been forgotten as many of the witnesses to those events have passed from the scene. But the importance of that event has only grown, not only for Azerbaijan but also for Moscow as well as for all those who have sought or are seeking independence from the Imperial center. And because that is the case, what Moscow did and how Azerbaijanis responded must never be forgotten by those who seek to understand why Baku has reacted to recent Russian actions and why others are increasingly doing the same, given the moves and threatening language coming out of the Russian capital.

Thirty-six years ago this week, on Mikhail Gorbachev’s order, Soviet troops by land, sea, and air invaded the Azerbaijani capital of Baku, killing hundreds and enflaming ethnic hatreds, in an action the Soviet president, five years after the events, acknowledged was “the greatest mistake” of his political career. That event, known to this day as “Black January” in Baku, was the result of Azerbaijan’s drive to recover its independence and what many Azerbaijanis saw as Moscow’s tilt toward Armenia, a combination that the Soviet government skillfully used in terms of propaganda to cover what was an act of aggression against those it insisted were its own citizens.

*The picture above was taken by Radio Free Europe of Russian forces occupying the Azerbaijani capital in January 1990

Gorbachev’s Crackdown

In the weeks before Gorbachev ordered the invasion, Azerbaijanis tore down the border fences dividing them from the much larger community of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran, and the Popular Front of Azerbaijan took over an increasing number of government offices around the republic. From Moscow’s perspective, the situation deteriorated on January 9 when the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR voted to make Nagorno-Karabakh, the predominantly ethnically Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan, a de facto part of Armenia by including it within the Armenian SSR budget and allowing residents of Karabakh to vote in Armenian elections.

That outraged many Azerbaijanis, but they were also furious that Moscow failed to respond to the Armenian action. As a result, ever more Azerbaijanis then called for complete independence from the USSR and prompted the Azerbaijani Popular Front to set up committees for the defense of the nation. Officials in Baku were quite obviously losing control of the situation, and they directed the 12,000 troops of the republic’s Interior Ministry to stay in their barracks lest their appearance spark violence in the city. That quickly led to a breakdown in public order in parts of Azerbaijan and to attacks on Armenians, many of whom appealed to the Soviet government to help them leave. In response, the Azerbaijan Popular Front took control in many regions of the republic, and on January 18, it called on residents of Baku to block the main access routes into the Azerbaijani capital to block any Soviet forces that might be sent against them, and its activists surrounded Soviet interior force barracks there as well.

These developments led the Soviet officials on the ground to pull back to the outskirts of the city where they established a new command post to direct the Soviet response. That response was not long in coming. On January 19, Gorbachev signed a decree calling for the introduction of forces to restore order, block the actions of the People’s Front, and prevent anti-Armenian pogroms. Almost immediately, an estimated 26,000 Soviet troops entered the Azerbaijani capital. To justify their acts of violence, which claimed at least 100 lives and perhaps as many as 300, Moscow propagandists claimed that Azerbaijanis had fired on them. But a subsequent investigation by a Russian human rights group found no evidence of that.

Moscow worked hard to block information about what was going on from reaching the West or even reaching the Azerbaijanis. It blocked power to Azerbaijani state radio and television and banned all Azerbaijani print media. As a result, the main source of news, as the violence continued, became the Azerbaijani Service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Soviet forces occupied the city, but they did not break the Azerbaijanis’ drive for independence. Hundreds of Azerbaijanis turned in their communist party cards, and on January 22, after the Soviet violence had died down, the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR met and condemned the actions of the Soviet forces.

The events in Baku quickly echoed throughout the USSR, prompting the formation of self-defense units in Tajikistan and encouraging national movements in Ukraine, Georgia, and the three Baltic states. And while Black January did not and still does not attract as much attention in the West as the far less murderous Soviet attacks elsewhere in Lithuania and Latvia, it is increasingly recognized that the events in Baku in 1990 triggered the final delegitimization of the USSR and thus played a central role in the demise of that country the following year.

Not surprisingly, the Azerbaijanis have never forgotten Black January. The holiest of holies in Baku is the Alley of Martyrs – in Azeri, Şəhidlər Xiyabanı – a cemetery and memorial to those killed by the Soviets during the 1990 events as well as during the First Nagorno-Karabakh war. The Azerbaijani government invariably takes important foreign visitors to this site, and Azerbaijanis themselves make pilgrimages to it, leaving flowers and other mementos to this day. That, as well as statements by senior Azerbaijani officials and commentators, has kept Black January very much at the center of the Azerbaijani understanding of the world, and especially about Baku’s relations with Moscow. Indeed, without this background, it is impossible to fully understand why Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and his government have taken such a tough line on more recent Russian outrages including the shooting down of a civilian Azerbaijani airliner in December 2024 and attacks on ethnic Azerbaijanis in Russian cities without reference to Black January – even when those events do not take place on the round anniversaries that the Azerbaijani government marks.

The Continuing Impact of Black January Beyond Azerbaijan

But even more important, perhaps, is the growing impact the image of Black January has had in recent years on nations that have not yet achieved their independence from Moscow. The clearest case of this is the way in which Bashkir activists responded to the Putin regime’s moves against them in 2023 and 2024 by calling them a new Black January. Ever more non-Russians believe that what Moscow did in Baku so long ago represents Russia’s inevitable alternative when faced with serious challenges, something that has intimidated many but that has led even more to recognize that when Moscow does use such indiscriminate force, that will backfire on the center and speed the further demise of the Russian imperial state.

*Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov

That sense has been heightened as a result of a statement made earlier this month by Kremlin propagandist Vladimir Solovyov, perhaps Moscow’s most prominent pro-Putin and pro-war television personality. He said that Moscow should launch “special military operations” like the one it is already carrying out in Ukraine against Central Asian and Caucasian countries if they do not do what Moscow demands. Solovyov further declared that what happens in “our Asia” and Armenia – in this diatribe, he did not mention Azerbaijan -- is far more important to Moscow than what happens in Venezuela, that international law is dead, that Russia should not care about the reaction of European countries, and that it should even expand its efforts to defeat Ukraine and bring Ukraine to heal.

Outlook

Not surprisingly, Solovyov’s words have sparked outrage in these countries and prompted their governments to raise the issue with Moscow, which sought to calm the situation by suggesting Solovyov’s words were only his “personal opinion.” Other analysts have suggested that the commentator’s words were his response to what the US had done in Venezuela and an assertion that Russia has the right to pursue similar steps in Moscow’s backyard. But others have pointed out that Solovyov is close to the Kremlin, hardly an independent actor, and that his threats are likely designed to intimidate non-Russians and prepare Russians for future “special operations” in Central Asia and Armenia, which provoked outrage in both Tashkent and Yerevan.

However that may be, what Solovyov has said is already generating a backlash, further deepening the divide between Russia and its neighbors and making it less likely that Moscow will be able to get its way with them however the war in Ukraine turns out, yet another way that the events of January 1990 in Baku continue to grow in importance even if many have forgotten the details of Gorbachev’s actions in Black January.

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On January 14, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan signed the Implementation Framework for the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). This step marked the most concrete outcome to date of Washington’s effort to anchor the Armenia–Azerbaijan normalization process in regional connectivity rather than abstract political commitments. The framework builds on the trilateral Joint Declaration signed on August 8, 2025, by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, and U.S. President Donald Trump, alongside the initialing of the peace treaty by the foreign ministers of the two South Caucasian republics. That declaration resolved one of the most contentious post-war issues by committing Armenia to guarantee unimpeded connectivity between mainland Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic through its territory.

The newly agreed TRIPP Implementation Framework between Armenia and the United States provides intricate details on how this connectivity agenda will be executed. According to the agreement, Armenia will grant the U.S.-managed TRIPP Development Company exclusive rights to plan, design, construct, operate, and maintain multimodal transit infrastructure – including railways, roads, energy, and digital networks – along the designated route for a minimum of 49 years, with the option of a further 50-year extension. The ownership structure allocates 74 percent control to the United States and 26 percent to Armenia, with Armenia’s share set to increase to 49 percent in the event of an extension. Crucially, the framework explicitly affirms that Armenia’s sovereignty, jurisdiction, and authority over border and customs controls are “absolute and nonnegotiable,” addressing longstanding Armenian concerns over loss of control.

In this sense, TRIPP should be seen less as a standalone initiative than as the logical continuation of the Washington Summit of August 8. That meeting brought the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace treaty process close to legal finality through the initialing of the peace treaty. The TRIPP framework reinforces this approach by anchoring peace in infrastructure and trade, thereby raising the costs of renewed confrontation and reducing the space for spoiler behavior in a volatile regional environment marked by Russia’s war against Ukraine and escalating tensions in the Middle East.

*Image is the first load of Kazakh wheat shipments to Armenia to transit via Azerbaijani territory.

Energy and Food Diplomacy

Since the Washington Summit, a series of developments between Armenia and Azerbaijan have demonstrated that normalization is no longer confined to diplomatic statements. Instead, it is gradually being translated into practical cooperation across economic, institutional, and societal domains. One of the clearest indicators of this shift was Azerbaijan’s decision in October 2025 to lift all restrictions on the transit of goods to Armenia last October that had been imposed since the occupation of Azerbaijani territories in the early 1990s. Announcing the move during a joint press conference with Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, President Ilham Aliyev emphasized that the first shipment – a consignment of Kazakh grain – symbolized peace “not only on paper, but also in practice.”

Armenia’s response was equally significant. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan publicly welcomed the decision and expressed gratitude to President Aliyev, describing the lifting of transit restrictions as a highly important step toward regional connectivity and institutionalized peace. The reopening of transit routes quickly moved beyond symbolism. By December 2025, Russia had resumed shipping wheat to Armenia via Azerbaijani territory, reviving a rail corridor that had been dormant since the 1990s.Energy cooperation has further reinforced this trend. In December 2025, Azerbaijan began direct shipments of petroleum products to Armenia, with the first delivery consisting of 1,220 tons of AI-95 motor fuel. In January, a second, larger batch followed in January 2026, including gasoline and diesel fuel, which were transported by rail. These deliveries were made possible by Azerbaijan’s earlier decision to lift transit restrictions and reflect a pragmatic understanding in Baku that economic interdependence can serve as a stabilizing force in post-conflict relations. For Armenia, access to Azerbaijani fuel supplies carries both economic and political significance, signaling a readiness to normalize trade relations between the two countries.

Importantly, this emerging economic relationship is not one-directional. Armenian officials have confirmed that discussions are underway regarding potential exports from Armenia to Azerbaijan. Economy Minister Gevorg Papoyan has outlined a preliminary list of goods that could be supplied to the Azerbaijani market, including aluminum foil, ferromolybdenum, textiles, and agricultural products such as tomatoes, peppers, and flowers. While timelines for these exports remain undefined, the very fact that such negotiations are taking place reflects a qualitative change in bilateral relations.

**Picture taken above is from the 12th meeting of the State Commission on the delimitation of the state border between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia.

Border Delimitation

Beyond trade and energy, institutional cooperation has also advanced. In November 2025, for the first time in the post-Soviet period, Azerbaijan hosted the Armenian delegation for an official bilateral meeting when the 12th meeting of the joint state commissions on border delimitation took place in the city of Gabala. Co-chaired by the deputy prime ministers of both countries, the meeting focused on technical and organizational issues related to comprehensive border delimitation, building on an earlier agreement to begin work from the northern tripoint with Georgia and proceed southward toward the Iranian border. The two sides agreed to hold the next meeting of the commissions in Armenia.

At the societal level, normalization has been supported by renewed engagement from civil society. Under the “Bridge of Peace” initiative, Armenian and Azerbaijani civil society representatives held reciprocal meetings in Yerevan and Baku in late 2025. These discussions addressed a wide range of issues, from humanitarian cooperation to media engagement and expert exchanges, and were explicitly linked to the Washington Declaration of August 8. While such initiatives cannot substitute for formal agreements, they play a complementary role by broadening the constituency for peace and reducing the risk that normalization remains a government-driven process detached from society.

Outlook

Taken together, these developments suggest that the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process has entered a phase of accelerated implementation. The Washington Summit provided the political and legal framework; TRIPP has supplied an infrastructural and economic backbone; and subsequent steps – transit liberalization, fuel shipments, trade talks, border negotiations, and civil society exchanges – have begun to fill that framework with substance. This progress is unfolding despite a broader regional environment characterized by geopolitical uncertainty and great-power rivalry.

Yet the direction of travel is clear. The post-August 2025 period demonstrates that peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan is no longer a hypothetical concept. It is being constructed incrementally through decisions that alter incentives, normalize interaction, and embed cooperation into everyday economic and institutional practices. Whether this momentum will culminate in the formal signing and ratification of a peace treaty remains contingent on the removal of territorial claims against Azerbaijan from Armenia’s state constitution, which is expected to happen through a constitutional reform following Armenia’s parliamentary elections scheduled for June 2026. Still, the trajectory since the Washington Summit suggests that both sides are moving steadily toward a new regional reality grounded in territorial integrity, sovereignty, connectivity, and negotiated peace.

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About the Author

Dr. Vasif Huseynov is the head of the Western Studies department at the Center for Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center) in Baku, Azerbaijan. He is a faculty member at Khazar University in Baku. Dr. Huseynov had previously worked for the Center for Strategic Studies (SAM) and Public Administration Academy (DIA) in Baku. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in International Relations from the Academy of Public Administration in Azerbaijan, a Master of Arts degree in Global Political Economy from the University of Kassel in Germany, and a PhD in Political Science from the University of Göttingen, also in Germany. His MA and PhD studies were supported by full scholarships of German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). He has authored several op-eds, articles, and academic publications, including a book titled “Geopolitical Rivalries in the ‘Common Neighborhood’: Russia’s Conflict with the West, Soft Power, and Neoclassical Realism”, which was published by Ibidem Press in 2019 and distributed by Columbia University.

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by Michael Horton

In late 2025, Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council (STC) launched “Operation Promising Future.” The well-planned offensive rapidly seized territory held by forces allied with Yemen’s Internationally Recognized Government (IRG). By December 8, the flag of the formerly independent south Yemen flew over almost all of the territory that once made up the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). The STC’s lightning-fast advance caught IRG forces off guard and evicted them from Yemen’s two largest governorates, Hadramawt and al-Mahra.

The STC’s goal was clear: move from de facto separation from the north to something more formal and durable. However, the STC and its primary backer, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), underestimated Saudi Arabia’s willingness to tolerate the usurpation of its influence in the Hadramawt and al-Mahra. Saudi Arabia has long regarded both governorates, but especially Hadramawt, as vital security buffers. Israeli recognition of Somaliland, a formerly independent state that subsequently joined Somalia, followed the STC’s move to seize all of the territory of the former PDRY. Israeli recognition of Somaliland set off more alarm bells in Riyadh.

The Kingdom issued multiple warnings to the STC and, more quietly, to the leadership of the UAE about crossing non-negotiable red lines. The STC refused Riyadh’s request to withdraw its forces. The refusal, even more than the initial offensive, marked a major strategic miscalculation by the STC and the UAE. The miscalculation is reshaping Yemen and may have awakened a sleeping regional giant.

A Do-Over in Yemen?

On January 2, the Saudi-backed National Shield Forces (NSF) launched a counter-offensive initially focused on northern Hadramawt. In early 2023, Saudi Arabia helped create, fund, and train the NSF. These forces, drawn from pre-existing less formal military units, operate under the command of the Yemeni president. Before the formation of the NSF, the president did not directly command any military forces. The lack of direct command was due in large part to Yemen’s fractured status and the April 2022 creation of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). President Alimi headed the eight-member council, but unlike many other members, did not enjoy direct command of armed forces.

The NSF was the tip of the spear for the counter-offensive. Within days, the NSF and allied units swept across Hadramawt and the neighboring governorate of al-Mahra. The Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) provided air support. However, the air support was limited and highly disciplined. Six days after launching the counter-offensive, NSF and allied forces had retaken control of Hadramawt and al-Mahra and were moving to secure Aden. STC-allied forces fled, shifted loyalties, and or returned to their home districts. The rapid collapse of the STC followed the late December withdrawal of Emirati advisors and CT units from Yemen. After warnings from Riyadh, the UAE withdrew its personnel from the Yemeni mainland and the island of Socotra.

While there are no vetted casualty numbers, casualties among STC militias are likely fewer than 400 killed. Low casualties were an objective of the Saudi-backed campaign. Where possible, RSAF used flares and ordinance as deterrents rather than directly targeting STC formations. NSF commanders issued warnings and negotiated surrenders first; only after negotiations failed did they engage STC forces.

This Saudi-backed NSF-led counter-offensive stands in contrast to the Saudi-led Operation Decisive Storm launched against Yemen’s Houthi rebels in 2015. Operation Decisive Storm relied heavily on air power, unreliable Yemeni allies, and failed to achieve its core objective of restoring the legitimate Yemeni government to power. In comparison, the counter-offensive had the clearly defined aim of clearing Hadramawt and al-Mahra of STC forces with minimal casualties to STC militias and civilians. Additionally, the Saudis imposed strict limits on engaging targets where there was a risk of harming civilians or damaging private property and infrastructure. The Saudis incorporated many lessons from Operation Decisive Storm and, so far, have achieved and exceeded the objectives of the counter-offensive.

Reshaping Yemen

On January 7, the president of the STC, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, fled Yemen, traveling first by boat to Berbera, Somaliland, and then flying via Mogadishu to exile in the UAE. Zubaidi refused Saudi demands that he join the other members of the STC on a flight to Riyadh. Most of the STC’s senior leadership traveled to Riyadh, where they agreed to dissolve the STC. At the same time, NSF units moved to secure all of Aden as well as military bases in multiple governorates that the STC and its allies formerly held.

On the strategically important island of Socotra, Emirati assets were removed, and direct flights from Socotra to Abu Dhabi were cancelled. They will be replaced with flights to the Yemen mainland and Saudi Arabia. Before the end of December, tourists could secure visas through Emirati-licensed tour operators and then fly directly to the island from the UAE. Many Yemenis viewed this as a violation of Yemeni sovereignty. The Yemeni government cancelled the licenses of Emirati companies operating in Socotra, and these companies are evacuating staff and assets.

Building momentum to reassert sovereignty, the Internationally Recognized Government of Yemen (IRG) is establishing mechanisms to re-centralize command of all military units in the areas it controls. Clear chains of command greatly aided the NSF during the counter-offensive. In contrast, fractured chains of command were a feature of STC-allied forces. Many of the commanders of STC-allied units regarded their particular units as private armies. IRG-allied forces face similar issues. However, there are indications that, with firm Saudi backing, the IRG is taking decisive action to assert full authority over military units and militias operating in non-Houthi-controlled areas. If these efforts are successful, they could reshape the martial realities in much of Yemen. However, the window for asserting IRG authority is narrow, and many officers—often self-appointed—who oversee a complex array of quasi-formal military units and hybrid militias will contest these efforts.

Rapid recentralization of authority over military units is critical to sustaining momentum behind the IRG’s attempt to unify areas outside of Houthi control. The dissolution of the STC and the UAE’s removal of its advisors and CT units risk creating security vacuums in vulnerable governorates like Abyan and Shabwa, where AQAP is active. STC-allied militias were engaged in a bloody war against AQAP operatives and smugglers—often the same—in Abyan, Shabwa, and southern Hadramawt. AQAP and the Houthis, which maintain relations with AQAP, will exploit these vacuums. Both organizations will also work to exploit southern grievances.

The defeat of the STC and the reassertion of IRG authority across south Yemen risks sparking a new insurgency that pits well-armed southern separatists against IRG forces. Separatist sentiment remains undiminished across the south. To address this, Saudi Arabia will host a series of dialogues in Riyadh to address southern grievances. However, southerners are unlikely to be satisfied with dialogues alone. Power sharing and significant improvements in governance, security, and economic opportunities will be required to reduce the risk of a return to violent resistance to IRG rule in the south.

Saudi Arabia will need to walk a fine line between backing the IRG, which is required, and not being viewed as a hegemon imposing its will on a weaker neighbor and, in particular, on southerners. Worryingly, there are reports that a Saudi team visiting Shabwa was targeted by an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) on January 13.

Regional Spillover

Saudi Arabia’s decisive actions in response to STC moves in Yemen are reverberating well beyond Yemen. The Kingdom has, almost overnight, replaced its subtle and often quiet behind-the-scenes foreign policy with one that is active and robust. Saudi Arabia markedly increased its efforts to aid the Government of Sudan in its fight against the Emirati-backed Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and has condemned Israeli recognition of Somaliland, where the Emirates is a key supporter and investor. Following Israeli recognition of Somaliland, Saudi Arabia increased the tempo and depth of its engagement with the Somali government. On January 12, the government of Somalia annulled all agreements with the UAE. The UAE has long-standing interests in semi-autonomous Puntland, located in northern Somalia, where a DP World subsidiary runs the port of Bossaso.

Saudi Arabia, in coordination with Egypt, which supports the government of Sudan, is also exerting pressure on multiple nations in the Horn of Africa to restrict access to their airspace for cargo flights originating from the UAE. This is an attempt to impede Emirati efforts to deliver supplies to the RSF. The Emirates is a major investor in Egypt. However, the UAE’s support for the RSF and for Ethiopia has led to a cooling of relations between Cairo and Abu Dhabi. On January 9, reports suggested that Saudi Arabia is considering financing the Sudanese government’s purchase of Chinese-designed JF-17 jets and other weapons from Pakistan. Saudi backing, along with enhanced support from Egypt, will almost certainly shift the balance of power in Sudan decisively in favor of the government.

Efforts to deepen cooperation with Turkey and Qatar are also ongoing as the Kingdom explores expanding the defense pact it signed with Pakistan in the wake of the Israeli bombing of Hamas operatives in Doha in September 2025.

Outlook

Except for its 2015 intervention in Yemen, Saudi foreign policy is most often cautious, methodical, and plodding. The Kingdom’s successful backing of the IRG’s counter-offensive in Yemen, along with the linked actions and responses in the region, mark a break with history. After repeated warnings to both the STC and the UAE, the Saudi government acted decisively to reassert its influence in Yemen and in the broader region. The counter-offensive in Yemen and the subsequent dissolution of the STC provide the Yemeni government with what may be its last chance to re-centralize command and control over military forces and reunify Yemen. However, as the Saudis learned in their failed intervention in 2015, Yemen’s political, tribal, and military terrain is fiendishly complex. It favors spoilers as much as it disfavors outside intervention. To sustain momentum in Yemen, the Saudis will need to deftly manage perceptions among Yemenis, especially southerners, while firmly guiding a government that has a history of enervating divisions and mismanagement. At the same time, the Kingdom will be navigating a rapidly changing regional security environment beset with brittle regimes.

About the Author:

Michael Horton is the co-founder of Red Sea Analytics International (RSAI) and a contributing author at Eurasia Outlook. He has two decades of experience as an analyst and researcher in Yemen and the Red Sea region. Michael has written policy briefs and conducted briefings and seminars for the US National Security Council, the British Foreign Ministry, the British Ministry of Defense, the US State Department, and senior members of the British Parliament and the US Congress. He has written extensively about the region for Jane’s Intelligence Review, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Oxford Analytica, The Economist, and other publications.

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As Russia enters 2026, many Russian opposition figures, especially those living in exile, have suggested that Putin is leading their country to disaster; even though, to this day, most Russians instinctively dismiss those who advance such views as renegades or even traitors. A new commentary, however, more sweeping and damning than theirs was offered last week by retired Russian Colonel General Leonid Ivashov in response to Putin’s direct line television program held on December 19.

Ivashov is someone whom all Russians recall as the hero of Pristina. In 1999, General Leonid Ivashov, as a senior Russian military official, led a rapid deployment of Russian forces into Pristina ahead of NATO troops blocking their advance in an effort to assert Russian influence during the Kosovo conflict. His act heightened tensions with NATO, signaling Moscow’s willingness to challenge Western operations and complicating alliance coordination in the region.

Ivashov is now appearing once again in a different form, this time emerging once again to challenge Russian President Putin, predicting Russian defeat in its war with Ukraine. While the aging Ivashov – now 82 – has previously criticized Putin and his policies, most notably in 2022 when he denounced the war in Ukraine and even called on Putin to resign, his remarks this past week came immediately after Putin’s live call-in address.

The retired general’s comments represent his most sweeping condemnation of both Putin and the war to date from within Russia. If Ivashov avoids sanction for this renewed criticism, it could prompt segments of the Moscow elite already uneasy about Russia’s trajectory to connect the dots and potentially coalesce into a more serious and consequential opposition.

Ivashov Details Demise of Russia

Ivashov begins his remarks by saying “we are in trouble” abroad because Russia has isolated itself as a result of its invasion of Ukraine, with only a few remaining friends at the United Nations and retains almost no influence over the former Soviet republics which Moscow has long viewed as part of its sphere of influence. At home key Russian industries are in shambles, corruption is widespread, and food and medicine are in increasingly short supply - all things that recall the final days of the Soviet Union and make one wonder what is ahead for Russia.

During his online statement Ivashov offered a long laundry list of things that were failing inside Russia:

* Planes: “We can’t build our own passenger jets. We’re basically cannibalizing old Boeing’s for spare parts.”

* Space: Ivashov describes how the last working manned launchpad at Baikonur was accidentally destroyed due to poor maintenance. Russia in effect can no longer deploy men into space.

* Food: Ivashov warns that the food available in Russians stores is becoming extremely harmful because it is filled with palm oil because the economy is so constrained.

* Corruption: He mentions that 11 trillion rubles ($1.2 trillion) were allegedly stolen by the Russian Ministry of Defense. He points out that almost every major corrupt official is a member of the ruling party.

Economic & Demographic Decline

General Ivashov then turns to address Putin’s “direct line” performance this year during his live call in program held on December 19. He mocks Putin by noting the Russian leader “put on a superb theatrical performance” in which everything was staged, all questions and answers were clearly rehearsed, and in which he dodged questions from foreigners with jokes or dismissive remarks. And Ivashov points out that while Putin was beaming to his audience and telling everyone how well the Russian economy was doing, even Moscow television showed scenes of people in Russia’s federal subjects begging for water, road repair, and money for medicines.

Ivashov declared that he and many others really are worried that the Russian people are simply dying out with the fertility rate – the number of children per woman per lifetime – far below replacement level, and that the Putin regime is not doing anything serious to correct the situation. Indeed, the retired general says, Putin excuses the Kremlin’s inaction on this point by arguing that it is “simply part of a global trend.” That may be true, but it can’t be a real justification for doing nothing, Ivashov argues.

But it is about Putin’s war in Ukraine that the retired general is the most critical. In a direct jab at the Russian Chief of the General Staff Valerii Gerasimov, and the way he has conducted the war, Ivashov says, the Russian High Command is not impressing anyone, and Putin remains stuck at “the tactical level,” talking about taking this or that tiny village or even a single house, noting that Ukraine, backed by NATO tech and satellite intel, is hitting Russia where it hurts (oil refineries and airfields), while Russia is just firing off its weapons at easy targets like apartment blocks and schools rather than militarily significant ones.

Ivashov sums up his conclusions in the following way: “Look, I’ve been a professor, a general, and a student of geopolitics for decades. I watched [Putin’s] whole 4-hour show, and I didn’t see a leader, a commander, or a protector of the people. I just saw a guy living in a fairy tale while the rest of the country is struggling to survive on 16,000 rubles [$130] a month.”

One reason Ivashov’s comments are likely to gain traction, especially among Russian elites, is that they are confirmed by Russian investigations and commentaries and by what they see around them, including those pieces that do not draw conclusions or point blame. That can be seen again and again in recent months. (On Russia’s loss of influence abroad, see ridl.io/ru/sosedi-strategicheskoj-vazhnosti/; on rising poverty even as Putin says people are living better and better, see tochno.st/materials/risk-bednosti-u-semei-so-skolnikami-pocti-vdvoe-vyse-srednego-naibolsii-u-nepolnyx-semei; on Russia’s demographic problems and Moscow’s failure to address them, see tochno.st/materials/v-2025-godu-v-rossii-iscezli-140-datasetov-i-perestali-obnovliatsia-425-pokazatelei-bolse-vsego-postradala-demograficeskaia-statistika and on the tactical versus strategic approach of Moscow’s military policy in Ukraine, learn more here.)

Yet another and perhaps even more compelling reason for making that assumption is the sense many Russians have that the situation in their country is rapidly deteriorating and that 2026 will be worse than 2025. Indeed, one Russian observer this week even recalled the old Soviet joke about the pessimist and the optimist, where the former gloomily says “it can’t get any worse,” and the latter joyfully replies, “Oh yes, it can!”

Outlook

When Russians return from their nearly two-week-long winter holiday ten days from now, they will be compelled to face all this; and when they do, at least some in the Russian elites are likely to focus on what Ivashov has said and wonder whether the time for correcting things has come or instead has already passed. Moreover, the dire warning coming from the retired general is yet another reminder to the Russian public that Putin’s war against Ukraine, entering its fifth year after February, is now longer than Stalin’s war against Nazi Germany. It is also a harbinger of more difficult days ahead in Russia as opposition to the war resurfaces again with a stern warning from the hero of Pristina.

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For at least the last decade, the Circassians have positioned themselves to be the first non-Russian nation to lead what is likely to become a parade of currently colonized peoples out from under Muscovite rule. The last twelve months have increased this possibility, largely because of the coming together of the three sources of the particular strengths of the Circassian people in their struggle against Russian occupation – the increasing moves toward unity of the seven-million-strong Circassian diaspora on an anti-Russian basis, the expanded cooperation of Circassian activists in the remaining bi-national republics and elsewhere with representatives of other nationalities, and the growing ties of both with countries around the world who are committed to justice for and independence of the nations under Moscow’s yoke. That combination and especially its intensification over the last year is something no other non-Russian nation within the current borders of the Russian Federation has come even close to matching.

First and foremost, the Circassians have long had two key advantages: a seven-million-strong diaspora and a 700,000-member nation within the borders of the Russian Federation, which is broken down into three Circassian-populated republics in the North Caucasus consisting of: Kabardino-Balkharia, Adyghea,and Karachayevo-Cherkessia. This means that Moscow in trying to control the national movement must fight on two fronts, something that both the diaspora and the homeland populations have become increasingly adept at countering and whose experience in doing so has made them increasingly anti-Moscow and pro-independence.

Over the past twelve months, the two Circassian communities have become ever more adept at countering Russian penetration and disinformation efforts and now truly constitute a single nation more than ready to stand up to Moscow, including the remarkable first ever gathering of Syrian Circassians held in Damascus since the downfall of Hafez al-Assad, buttressed by the sizable Circassian community in Turkiye, estimated to-be 3-5 million.👇

Second, more than most other non-Russian nationalities in the Russian Federation, the Circassians have been compelled by circumstances and tradition to cooperate with other non-Russian groups. In order to control the Circassians, the Soviet state put many of them in bi-national republics, two of which, Karbardino-Balkaria and Karachayevo-Cherkessia, remain. While Moscow hoped that this would divide the Circassian nation and keep it at odds with its neighbors, the reverse has been true. Kabards and Cherkesses overwhelmingly recognize themselves as Circassians; and their leaders because of necessity and because of Circassian traditions have learned to work with other non-Russians more closely than is the case with most non-Russians. In the last year, this pattern has become ever more pronounced. (For a discussion of the most recent examples of this, see: windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/10/kbr-officials-struggle-to-damp-down.html and the sources cited therein.

And third, the Circassians have appreciated that they can achieve their goals not only by cooperating with other non-Russians inside the Russian Federation but also with those countries in the international community who support their goals. Among these countries are Jordan where there is a large Circassian population and Turkiye where there is an even larger diaspora. But especially important are Circassian contacts and cooperation with two countries that once were ruled from Moscow: Ukraine and Lithuania. Circassian activists have secured Kyiv’s recognition of the 1864 expulsion of Circassians from the North Caucasus as an act of genocide and its commitment seeking support from other countries around the world to do the same. And the Circassians over the last year have become perhaps the most active in cooperating with Ukrainian efforts to reach out to the non-Russian peoples which has energized the movement.

Moreover, the Circassians have also made important strides in developing contacts with the Seimas, the Lithuanian parliament. On December 17, the Seimas will host an international conference in Vilnius on “The Circassian Genocide in the Context of History and Contemporary Politics.” Circassians view this event as a turning point in their struggle. In the words of Circassian activist Kase Kik, with this meeting “for the first time, a state – a member of the European Union – is not only recognizing the importance of the Circassian tragedy but also creating an international forum to discuss a genocide, exile and historical justice that has lasted for more than 160 years;” and that represents “a moment when the Circassian diaspora can speak in one voice, not fragmented and not just locally but at the level of world politics and international law.”

“For the Kremlin,” he continues, “this event is a painful signal. Moscow has ignored the Circassian issue for decades, tried to dissolve the memory of the genocide in the formulations of ‘tragic circumstances’ and ‘historical complexity.’” But this international conference translates the problem into the plain language of politics, law and responsibility. This is no longer a topic that can be simply silent.” And it is clear that Moscow is worried and has already launched a series of measures to counter this upsurge of Circassian activism and the support it receives around the world.

Russian propagandists, of course, have stepped up their campaign against Circassian “secessionists” But more seriously, the Russian authorities are working to divide the titular nations of the binational republics and to dispatch extreme right Russian nationalist thugs into them to cause trouble. (For background on that policy, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/10/extreme-right-russian-community.html.)

But as so often with Putin’s repressive efforts, these moves are likely to prove counterproductive in the coming year, not only leading Circassians to work even harder to expand ties between the diaspora and the homeland, to work with other non-Russians within the Russian Federation, and to get support from those countries which are ever more interested in supporting the Circassian cause. And that means what has occurred in 2025 is likely to be even more fateful for what happens in the Circassian homeland in 2026 than even the most optimistic Circassians and people of good will now think.

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Romania has entered a period of accelerated defense-industrial modernization, and its new military-drone sector sits at the center of this transformation as the European Union announces the creation of a new drone wall to counter repeated Russian drone intrusions into Poland, Romania, and other frontline countries in NATO’s east.

Bucharest’s new push to develop an indigenous drone industry is driven by Romania’s strategic geography—bordering Ukraine and facing repeated violations of its air space by repeated Russian drone intrusions upon its territory. The menacing drone environment has motivated Bucharest to strengthen its indigenous drone production capabilities and reduce its dependence on external suppliers and aligning with regional NATO priorities.

State-owned defense manufacturer Carfil S.A. represents the most visible pillar for Romania’s emerging drone ambitions. Historically known for artillery and ammunition, Carfil has shifted into UAV development through a cooperation agreement with Periscope Aviation, a United States–based drone systems company. The partnership aims to produce multi-role drones suitable for surveillance, reconnaissance, and potentially strike missions. According to company announcements, manufacturing is beginning at Carfil’s Brașov facility, marking the country’s first entry into domestic serial drone production.

Initial production includes a small family of drone systems, beginning with the Cuda and Sirin models. These early platforms emphasize simplicity, reliability, and low-cost production—reflecting lessons learned from ongoing drone warfare in Ukraine, where attritable systems often outperform complex but expensive platforms. While full technical specifications remain limited in open sources, Romanian officials state that the Brașov plant could scale to produce up to several thousand drones per year, with output increasing through 2025.

Romanian goals extend beyond equipping its own armed forces. Bucharest is shaping its drone sector to become a regional exporter and potential NATO supplier as part of its new long-term national industrial strategy. Toward this goal Romania seeks to move from being a consumer of foreign drone systems to that of an active European producer. Romanian objectives aligns with its broader national investments in explosives, munitions, and defense-industry infrastructure, including cooperation agreements with German and American partners.

One of the most strategically significant milestones in Romania’s drone development is its signing of a joint drone-production venture agreement with Ukraine whereby Bucharest seeks to tap into Kyiv’s vast drone experience after four years of war with Russia. Backed by European Union defense-industrial funding Romania’s drone initiative would merge Ukraine’s combat-tested UAV technology with its own emerging drone manufacturing sector. If implemented, the partnership could turn Romania into a regional hub for mass-produced reconnaissance and strike drones—while also cementing closer defense ties between the two countries at a time of protracted tension with Russia.

Carfil Enters the Drone Race

Romania reached a major milestone in the pursuit of a drone defense industry in November when the military manufacturer Carfil located in the Romanian city of Brasov tested the first FPV (First-person view) kamikaze drones (Cuda and Sirin), which constitute one of the first UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) ever produced in Romania.

The same Romanian factory achieved a major technological breakthrough by launching a new rocket system named Hydra that uses drone systems to target potential threats from a very high distance (approximately 6 kilometers). These events highlight not only an important technological evolution for Romania, but also a geopolitical one. Drones and unmanned systems generally represent a new strategic asset with a tremendous potential.

Strategically located in Southeastern Europe, Romania has access to two areas which are critical from a strategic and economic point of view - the Danube river and the Black Sea. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has had a direct effect on the security of these two important areas, due to constant outbreaks in fighting between Russian and Ukrainian forces as Russian drones frequently violate Romanian airspace. Drone warfare has become a constant reality in these areas, with repeated strikes of Russian UAVs and USVs on Ukrainian ports in nearby Izmail and Odessa.

Since 2022, Romania has experienced several drone provocations in the Danubian and Black Sea Region, with a notable incident occurring on the 13th of September 2025, when a Russian Geran drone entered Romanian airspace for approximately 50 minutes. The most recent drone incident occurred during the night of November 10-11, 2025, with a Russian UAV falling on Romanian territory near Tulcea, a city located in the Danube Delta. These reoccurring security threats required a strong response, which can only be achieved by modernizing and reinforcing Romanian military capacities, with unmanned systems (UAVs, USVs, Kamikaze FPV drones etc.) being a top priority.

The Black Sea Region and the Danube Delta have emerged as a major ‘’laboratory’’ of drone warfare, with dozens of UAV and USV fights between the Russian and Ukrainian forces every day. The war at the border underscores a crucial reality for Romanian defense industry: unmanned systems have become an indispensable part of modern war. Drones are relatively cheap products that can inflict severe damage to the enemy’s military infrastructure (the successful attacks of Russian battleships by Ukrainian USVs is a relevant example). Moreover, these new components of everyday conflict ensure an efficient operational deterrence, while offering medium and small sized geopolitical actors better defense capabilities (asymmetric warfare). With all these aspects taken into account, it would be reasonable to ask ourselves: how does Romania, as a key regional actor, treat the question of integrating unmanned systems into its armed forces and in which way?

Romanian UAV Priorities

Since 2022, the Romanian Government has begun purchasing UAV’s from foreign manufacturers to bolster its drone capabilities, notably the Turkish made Bayraktar TB2 model purchased from Turkey, three systems for a total of 18 drones. Other important acquisitions made by Romania, in terms of unmanned systems, include 7 Watchkeeper X systems (in partnership with the United Kingdom and Israel), MQ-9B SeaGuardian systems from the US, which use VTOL drones (Vertical Take-Off and Landing) and last but not least, the American-built Switchblade 300/600 loitering ammunition

The new Romanian army equipment plan 2025-2034 prioritizes the purchase of military unmanned systems (especially UAVs). Their purpose is dual nature: consolidating ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) capabilities and preparing potential military operations, with full cover (aerial, land and maritime).

The joint drone project with Ukraine to establish a drone factory in Romania will help strengthen Romanian capacities outlined in the army 2025-2034 plan and enable it to become a true technological hub in terms of producing unmanned systems. In addition it will help Bucharest solidify its aspirations to become a pillar of aerial and maritime operational deterrence along NATO’s volatile eastern flank. This aspect would also represent an economic breakthrough, as it fosters cooperation and continuous development of defense-related businesses, particularly in Romanian efforts to demonstrate its strategic importance to the EU.

Romania’s Role in the EU Drone Wall

Russian drone intrusions into Polish airspace this past September proved to be a wake-up call for the EU. On September 10, 2025, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen publicly proposed the creation of a European Drone Wall — a continent-wide air-defense network designed to counter a surge in drone and airspace incursions believed to be carried out by Russian forces. Rather than a physical barrier, the Drone Wall would consist of a layered “system of systems”: sensors, radar, electronic-jamming and interceptor drones or other counter-UAV weapons that can detect, track, and neutralize unauthorized drones entering EU airspace — especially along the bloc’s eastern flank. The initiative gained broad support from EU leaders in Copenhagen days after Russian conducted multiple airspace violations over Poland, Denmark and other member states which triggered alarm across the continent. According to a draft of the outgoing Defense Readiness Roadmap 2030, the EU aims to have a fully integrated drone-defense capability in place by the end of 2027.

By contributing toward the establishment of an EU Drone Wall, Romania will ensure an efficient defense of the eastern flank and enable Romania to bolster its aerial defense to ward off the constant security threats created by the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and the drone incidents that occur regularly on the EU border with countries of the Eastern Flank (Baltic States, Poland, Romania). Romania stands to play a crucial role in ensuring the establishment and development of this ‘drone wall’ defense strategy being called for by the European Union.

Geographically, Romania can assume the role of an eastern anchor for the ‘drone wall’ because it shares both land and maritime borders with Ukraine, which has an approximate length of 649 kilometers (403 miles). This makes Romania the EU country with the largest border with Ukraine, which highlights the key role it will have in putting this initiative into practice. In addition, Romania also shares a 681 kilometer (423 miles) border with the Republic of Moldova, a country historically linked to Romania, but strongly affected by Russian hybrid war operations and disinformation campaigns. The Russian backed separatist region of Transnistria constitutes a major security threat for both Moldova and Romania. Therefore, establishing an efficient drone wall in the east would foster greater operational deterrence for Romania in a highly unstable neighborhood.

Conclusion

Looking toward the future, Romania’s emerging drone industry faces several challenges. First, Romanian authorities need to find a way to integrate UAVs into its northeastern border, for surveillance and defensive purposes. Second, concerning the Danube Delta and the maritime border with Ukraine, the EU drone wall would have to integrate a mix of UAVs and USVs, in order to deter and counter any potential threat and any violation of Romanian territory. Third, the Romanian military and civilian authorities would have to create a unified system of air defense that incorporates its emerging drone capabilities into its national security architecture.

Despite rapid progress, other challenges remain. Open-source analysis suggests that Romania is planning to produce only a limited number of drone prototypes as part of its early production runs. It remains unclear how quickly Romania can expand its new joint Ukraine drone venture into the creation of more advanced UAV classes or even Uncrewed Surface Vessels (USVs). Romanian industry must adapt continually to the evolving realities of drone warfare—from electronic warfare survivability to low-cost FPV systems—if it is to remain competitive in an autonomous drone market that is growing by leaps and bounds .

Nonetheless, Romania’s military-drone sector is advancing swiftly. If current plans come to fruition, Romania could transition within a few years from having virtually no indigenous drone production to becoming a meaningful European supplier—bolstering NATO capabilities and improve its own capacity to intercept Russian drones intruding into Romanian airspace

By adding new “Drone forces’’ Romania would be developing a new element of operational deterrence for its armed forces as both the Romanian Navy and Air Force would likely oversee the integration of these platforms. Romania’s drone predicament is particularly urgent given the repeated Russian provocations Romania has endured since the start of the Russo-Ukrainian war in 2022. Aside from filling the drone gap in its armed forces, Romania must also introduce changes to its military doctrine and prioritize what kinds of drones it seeks to bring into production given that it has an array of foreign made drone systems in combination with the short range drones being produced by Carfil.

Officials in Bucharest are searching for a cheaper and more reliable way of ensuring border and maritime security to adapt to the emerging geopolitical challenges emerging within the Black Sea region, particularly in the Danube Delta. New combat drone systems would allow the Romanian Armed Forces to counter its external threats more strategically and cost-effectively, but to do so it must first establish the drone production infrastructure to be able to deal with these long-term threats.

Romania’s drone initiative reflects a broader trend of medium and small states using technology to offset security disadvantages, moving away from traditional notions that military strength depends merely on large numbers of ground forces and conventional military equipment.

In the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the lessons of that war demonstrate how technology can overcome numerical disadvantages caused by superior manpower. Romania’s recent progress in unmanned systems marks the beginning of a broader effort to incorporate wartime lessons into its defense-modernization plans and to strengthen its dual role as both the anchor of NATO’s eastern flank and a frontline state contributing directly to the EU’s emerging “drone wall.”

About the Author:

Andrei Veres is an independent defense and security analyst specializing in Romanian defense and security issues.

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The war in Ukraine has evolved into a complex geopolitical conflict while demonstrating the transformative role that drone technology has played in shaping the course of the war. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Ukrainian Armed Forces began to actively embrace modern warfare technology, especially the use of First-Person Drones (FPVs) which were critical in inflicting grave damage on Russian forces using ‘meat grinder’ tactics to storm Ukrainian front line positions.

In the past two years, Ukrainian forces have used FPV drones for real-time intelligence and reconnaissance of Russian positions and troop movements while also deploying cost-effective “kamikaze” drones to target Russian recruits, tanks, howitzers, and other armored vehicles. Although drone technology is now a core part of Ukraine’s struggle against Russian intervention, Kyiv initially faced an acute shortage of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the early stages of the war, while the requirements of its frontline forces were partially met by civilian drones, mostly produced by the Chinese company DJI. During that time China has risen to become the dominant force in the supply of low-cost commercial drones being supplied to the global market in the past two decades to use that leverage increasingly over the worldwide supply chain. According to some estimates DJI controls as much as 70 percent of the world’s global commercial drone market.

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, Ukrainian officials became adamant about their need to purchase as many drones as possible on the global market. Former Ukrainian Prime Minister Dennys Shmyhal, for example, hoped that by 2023, his country could procure up to 60% of the world’s DJI Mavic production, a statement that was fiercely criticized by DJI as “overrated numbers.”

Ukraine’s purchase of Chinese drones in 2022 were described as no longer a systematic process, but a rather chaotic one in its race to acquire as many civilians drones as possible on the global market. Throughout 2023-2024, Kyiv purchased thousands of Chinese UAVs and components primarily through Western intermediary companies thanks to Chinese commercial exports to Europe. China’s close alliance with Russia and refusal to condemn Russian intervention in Ukraine created a rather tense diplomatic confrontation between Beijing and Kyiv over its acquisition of Chinese drones from third parties in Europe. During this time Ukraine and its Western allies frequently accused China of providing military-technical support to Russia and strategically significant “dual-use” technologies, such as semiconductors and drone engines.

China Tilts the Drone Divide

China halted its exports of DJI Mavic drones to Ukraine in May 2025, creating a major supply chain crisis after Moscow reportedly increased pressure on Beijing to “prevent its drones from being used in warfare.” an oblique reference to China’s role in shaping the drone dimension of the war. Chinese officials on the other hand publicly stated that it had stopped sending drones to both sides despite a vast amount of evidence that contradicted Chinese claims that it had suspended commercial drone sales to Russia.

Recently the drone divide between Ukraine and Russia has significantly widened. According to recent reports Chinese shipments of fiber-optic cables and lithium-ion batteries to Russia surged in the second half of 2025. This influx of supplies has boosted Russian production of fiber-optic drones and increased their capability to hit enemy targets 20-30 kilometers deep behind Ukrainian lines. The sudden surge in Chinese exports of fiber-optic drones have significantly undermined Ukraine’s ability to reinforce its frontline positions, particularly in the recent fighting around the besieged city of Pokrovsk in Donbas. Fiber optic drones are strategically important because they are almost impenetrable to jamming by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems,. The arrival of this new fiber-optic technology marks a significant stage in the use of drones to shape the battlefields of eastern Ukraine.

Ukraine’s Drone Dependence on China

Ukraine’s reliance on the import of Chinese drones and other technologies is not a new phenomenon, as currently it is virtually impossible to assemble a drone anywhere in the world unless it has some form of Chinese components inside. Moreover, the irony is that despite Beijing’s announced “neutrality” in the Russo-Ukraine War, China de facto remains a key actor, influencing the warring parties through its control over the military technology supply chains directed to the war. In this vein, Beijing likely estimates that it has the capability to alter the balance of power in the Russia-Ukraine war conflict by simply restricting the flow of drones and their components to Russia and Ukraine simultaneously.

Due to geographic and economic factors, both countries have a strong interest in each other’s survival. In addition, the protracted Russo-Ukraine war gives China room to blame Kyiv’s Western allies for dispatching weapons and military aid to support Ukraine. From Beijing’s perspective, the full-scale war in Ukraine is a “good case” to monitor the conflict and derive key lessons learned from the war while adhering to the view that a Ukrainian military victory over Russia will likely embolden its Western allies to turn their full-scale attention to China.

For this reason, China appears to have given tacit approval to Chinese national commercial drone manufacturers to help Russian UAV manufacturers expand their production and develop components specifically designed for combat applications against Ukraine. Unlike Russia, Ukraine’s drone industry remains constrained by its limited access to critical components and manufacturing capacity, making purchases from China vitally important. Notwithstanding the firm support of wealthy NATO member countries to give a battlefield advantage to Ukrainian forces, a significant portion of Ukraine’s domestic drone production still greatly depends upon Chinese components for its Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). Ukrainian data indicates that nearly 89 percent of its UAS-related imports by value were still originating from China in the first half of 2024 — a slight decline from 97 percent during the first year of the war. Hence, despite these efforts many Ukrainian drone factories continue to primarily rely upon Chinese drone parts in assembling their drones rather than produce the parts domestically.

Conclusion

In the current critical phase of the war Ukrainian efforts to develop its drone independence are becoming a critical test of its military resilience. The West’s continued support in purchasing Chinese drones without addressing Ukraine’s core supply chain vulnerabilities, runs the risk of strengthening the Russia-China alliance. Moreover, Beijing’s selective restrictions regarding FVP drones and components have largely bolstered Moscow’s drone capabilities and could ultimately change the course of the war in Russia’s favor.

Nowhere is this more visible than in the surge of Russian drone and missile attacks against Ukraine since 2024. The number of Russian strikes and Shaheed suicide drone attacks have more than quadrupled in 2025 against Ukrainian positions, armaments, and critical infrastructure due to the flow of Chinese drone parts. Consequently, as long as China maintains a decisive grip over the global drone supply chain, Kyiv’s battlefield effectiveness and the broader geopolitical balance will continue to hinge upon Beijing’s supply of dual-use components to each of the combatants.

About the Author:

Fuad Shahbazov is a political scientist and analyst focused on regional security in Eurasia and the Middle East. He holds a master’s degree in Political Science from Vytautas Magnus University, a professional master’s degree in Terrorism and Countering Religious Radicalization from the University of Bergamo, and a master’s degree in Defense and Diplomacy from Durham University.

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On November 17, Poland reopened two border crossings with Belarus. The Kuźnica checkpoint had been closed in 2021 amid the migrant crisis at the Belarusian border, while the Bobrowniki crossing was suspended in 2023 after Belarus sentenced Andrzej Poczobut, a Grodno-based journalist and Polish community organizer, to an eight-year prison term.

Warsaw had planned to reopen the crossings weeks earlier, having apparently reached some kind of a deal with Minsk. However, Warsaw reluctantly delayed its decision due to solidarity with Lithuania, which on October 29 closed its own border crossings with Belarus to protest the launch of cross-border meteorological balloons carrying cheap Belarusian cigarettes. In response, Minsk claimed that this smuggling operation was entirely organized and directed by Lithuanian citizens.

Despite tensions with its Baltic neighbors, Belarus still maintains a visa-free regime for Lithuanians, Latvians, and Poles, and cigarettes are one of the key items routinely purchased en masse by Lithuanians, who most frequently take advantage of the visa-free travel to Belarus despite their government’s persistent requests to cease this activity. Even so Vilnius has now declared its border with Belarus reopened as of November 20—well ahead of previous announcements and in stark contradiction to the intransigent stance emphasized by Lithuanian Prime Minister Inga Ruginienė on many recent occasions.

Aside from these place-specific considerations, what has prompted this latest tentative—and possibly inconsequential—rapprochement between Belarus and its western neighbors is the unexpected appointment of John Coale as President Trump’s Special Envoy to Belarus and his upcoming second visit to Minsk. In this way, the U.S. president has signaled that Washington’s relationship with Minsk now holds a special, elevated status—compelling its junior allies in the region to play along with American efforts to engage Minsk.

One arguably bizarre aspect of Coale’s appointment is that it bypasses routine U.S. diplomatic channels. Whereas Belarus’s embassy in Washington has never stopped functioning—albeit with a chargé d’affaires (currently Pavel Shidlovsky) as the top diplomat—the U.S. embassy in Minsk largely remains empty, with its staff residing nearby in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius. This situation dates back to 2020, when, in response to the post-election protests in Minsk and the ensuing emigration of opposition presidential hopeful Svetlana Tikhanovskaya to Lithuania, the newly appointed U.S. ambassador Julie Fisher made numerous statements that Minsk perceived as hostile. Belarus declined to issue her a visa, then withdrew its earlier agrément.

Although there have been two changes of guard at the U.S. State Department since then, the inertia in that entity’s actions (or inactions) appears out of step with the quick paced decision-making at the White House. This appointment, obviously, means that despite the lasting demonization of Alexander Lukashenka, his fortunes in the eyes of the United States have improved. For those unversed in Belarus-watching, this may seem surprising: a “brutal dictator” and Vladimir Putin’s closest ally is once again deemed an important interlocutor by the U.S. president, who has twice referred to Lukashenka as a “highly respected” statesman.

Crackdown vs Rapprochement: The Patterns of Normalization

Most seasoned Belarus-watchers, however, are hardly surprised. They have witnessed multiple Western normalization cycles with Lukashenka following seemingly irredeemable anathemas. That was the case after the 1996 constitutional crisis in Minsk, when Lukashenka essentially extended his term by two years and cracked down on the legislative branch. It happened again in 1998, after Lukashenka evicted several Western ambassadors from their residences for being too close to his own. It also followed the 2001, 2006, and 2010 presidential elections, which sparked post-election protests of ever-growing intensity—responding to ever-growing Western backing for the opposition. This, in turn, led to ever-harsher crackdowns on those protests, even as a significant portion of the electorate (possibly up to a half, if not more) remained loyal to Lukashenka.

Belarus’s late foreign minister Vladimir Makei once predicted in 2020, shortly before his death, that the lag between crackdown and rapprochement would be longer than usual—and this has proven true. Assuming the “regime” is stronger than it seems and enjoys a solid base of support, Makei also warned the West against rocking the boat. To Western policymakers, a solid base of support for an authoritarian regime often seems inconceivable; their worldview posits that no people would tolerate an autocrat. Yet they often do, in many parts of the world—as even Belarusian opposition-minded pollsters confirm when it comes to Belarus. The sheer number of times Western leaders have reconciled with Lukashenka after irreconcilable rebukes only bolsters his domestic support.

This may be especially true today, when the early stages of reconciliation coincide with: a) the exiled opposition having lost most of its domestic support base, and even some of it in Poland and Lithuania (where most Belarusians who fled the 2020 crackdown on post-election protests and ongoing repressions now reside); b) high-level corruption in Ukraine, with which many East Slavs (Belarusians, Russians, and Ukrainians) compare Belarus; and c) the activation of American attempts to end the war between Russia and Ukraine—attempts that have solicited and received support from Minsk.

Accordingly, events in Belarus account for only a partial explanation of the fractured rhythm in its relations with the West—the oscillations observed over decades. The missing piece resides in the worldview of Western foreign policymakers. Three aspects come to mind.

First, as this author has underscored on numerous occasions, foreign policy decision-makers in the West have been “blue-pilled” when it comes to Belarus (in reference to the term used in popular film series The Matrix). In their judgment, the regime’s lack of democracy is all that matters to Belarusians, so they expect the populace to embrace the liberal, democratic West. In fact, a modicum of homework on Belarus would reveal it as a country with unfinished nation-building, divided along cultural and geopolitical lines, where authoritarianism fits local traditions—so much so that anyone lacking a strongman aura would scarcely qualify as a leader in the eyes of many Belarusians.

Second, the tenacious perceptual inertia about Belarus may be attributed to now-defunct entities like USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy. In Belarus, their emissaries behaved like bulls in a china shop: routinely cozying up to the self-proclaimed “democratic” opposition, funding their activities, and establishing an echo chamber that Western sponsors invariably mistook to be the only authentic source of information about Belarusians and the situation inside Belarus.

The third aspect of this worldview is an idealistic, all-or-nothing mindset. An anecdote shared by Dźmitry Hurnievič of the Belarusian Service of Radio Liberty illustrates this point. He encountered a Belarus travel blog by Polish citizen Tomasz Jakimiuk that infuriated many opposition-minded Belarusians and Poles but delighted Hurnievič. On Facebook he explained why: “Those outraged were outraged by the fact,” writes Hurnievič, “that Yakimiuk does not talk about Belarus as the European North Korea... But Belarus is NOT ONLY about this… Yakimiuk showed something else. What Belarusian cities and villages look like… This is exactly what is missing in Poland about Belarus… That is why Yakimiuk’s videos have triggered so many people in Poland, because they break away from black and white narratives: that there is hell on the planet, or at the other extreme—that Belarus is paradise and an island of stability.”

Converging Realisms: Belarus and the United States

By the same token, when news broke of Trump’s appointment of Coale as special envoy to Belarus, another BSRL associate posed this question to Andrei Korobkov of Middle Tennessee State University: “If I understood you correctly, one of Trump’s goals is to pull Belarus out of Russia’s orbit.” Korobkov’s response hit the mark: “I don’t think that Trump, unlike his predecessors, is counting on taking Belarus out of the Russian orbit. It’s enough for him that Lukashenko will somehow maneuver, give something, create some platforms that are useful for the Americans. Trump is a hard-core realist. This means not only that he evaluates politics and political decisions from the point of view of power as such, not ideology, but he is also a realist in the sense that he knows the limits of his influence.”

A hard-core realist who knows the limits of his influence. Arguably, this is the point of convergence between Trump and Lukashenka—and the point of divergence between them, on one hand, and Western democracy activists and modern West European foreign policy decision-makers, on the other. The latter think in idealistic all-or-nothing terms; the former achieve desired outcomes, if only in part. Yes, the Belarusian president is an autocrat; yes, he enjoys considerable domestic support; and yes, there is ample room for normal life in Belarus—life that not only Belarusians themselves but also some Western guests perceive as normal.

This perception is exacerbated by several facets of tangible reality. Though he became a willy-nilly co-aggressor against Ukraine in 2022, Lukashenka also has shielded Belarusians from immediate participation in the war: they are neither bombed like Ukrainians nor conscripted like Ukrainians and Russians, or even dispatching its military forces to fight side by side with Moscow in its ongoing war.

In retrospect, however, Lukashenka has always favored maintaining ties with both Russia and the West, balancing his relations with Moscow similar to the way Kazakhstan deals with Russia, skillfully resisting Russian expansionism. Moreover, at one point Lukashenka expelled the Russian ambassador for treating Belarus like a Russian federal district. In the final analysis, Lukashenka’s demonstrated political skills are far more out of proportion to the small country he leads, having survived Western sanctions for decades and is now on the verge of normalizing relations with the United States.

About the Author:

Grigory Ioffe is Professor Emeritus, Radford University. Dr. Ioffe is the author of: Understanding Belarus and How Western Foreign Policy Misses the Mark, published in 2008 and more recently Reassessing Lukashenka: Belarus in a Cultural and Geopoltical Context. He also has published several hundred articles on Belarus.

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