<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:itunes="http://www.itunes.com/dtds/podcast-1.0.dtd" xmlns:googleplay="http://www.google.com/schemas/play-podcasts/1.0"><channel><title><![CDATA[The Saratoga Foundation: Eurasia Outlook]]></title><description><![CDATA[Recent analysis on Eurasia ]]></description><link>https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/s/eurasia-2025-outlook</link><generator>Substack</generator><lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 20:01:42 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><copyright><![CDATA[The Saratoga Foundation]]></copyright><language><![CDATA[en]]></language><webMaster><![CDATA[glen@saratoga-foundation.org]]></webMaster><itunes:owner><itunes:email><![CDATA[glen@saratoga-foundation.org]]></itunes:email><itunes:name><![CDATA[The Saratoga Foundation]]></itunes:name></itunes:owner><itunes:author><![CDATA[The Saratoga Foundation]]></itunes:author><googleplay:owner><![CDATA[glen@saratoga-foundation.org]]></googleplay:owner><googleplay:email><![CDATA[glen@saratoga-foundation.org]]></googleplay:email><googleplay:author><![CDATA[The Saratoga Foundation]]></googleplay:author><itunes:block><![CDATA[Yes]]></itunes:block><item><title><![CDATA[Ukrainian Drone Strikes Push Moscow to Renew Efforts to Co-opt the Circassian Diaspora]]></title><description><![CDATA[Moscow is intensifying its efforts to co-opt the global Circassian diaspora to blunt rising anti-Kremlin sentiment in the North Caucasus over Russia's mobilization drive for the war in Ukraine.]]></description><link>https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/ukrainian-drone-strikes-push-moscow</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/ukrainian-drone-strikes-push-moscow</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[The Saratoga Foundation]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 19:52:25 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8fH4!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe4d04b6a-72be-4025-bfd9-ce05c2c07246_599x396.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8fH4!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe4d04b6a-72be-4025-bfd9-ce05c2c07246_599x396.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8fH4!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe4d04b6a-72be-4025-bfd9-ce05c2c07246_599x396.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8fH4!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe4d04b6a-72be-4025-bfd9-ce05c2c07246_599x396.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8fH4!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe4d04b6a-72be-4025-bfd9-ce05c2c07246_599x396.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8fH4!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe4d04b6a-72be-4025-bfd9-ce05c2c07246_599x396.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8fH4!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe4d04b6a-72be-4025-bfd9-ce05c2c07246_599x396.png" width="599" height="396" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/e4d04b6a-72be-4025-bfd9-ce05c2c07246_599x396.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:396,&quot;width&quot;:599,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:165202,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/225236116?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe4d04b6a-72be-4025-bfd9-ce05c2c07246_599x396.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8fH4!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe4d04b6a-72be-4025-bfd9-ce05c2c07246_599x396.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8fH4!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe4d04b6a-72be-4025-bfd9-ce05c2c07246_599x396.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8fH4!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe4d04b6a-72be-4025-bfd9-ce05c2c07246_599x396.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8fH4!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe4d04b6a-72be-4025-bfd9-ce05c2c07246_599x396.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><strong><a href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/149778185/valeriy-dzutsati">By Valery Dzutsati</a></strong></p><p>War-related drone strikes by Ukraine are increasingly reaching Russia&#8217;s Northwest Caucasus, underscoring the growing vulnerability of the historic Circassian homeland even as Moscow intensifies efforts to win over the global Circassian diaspora <a href="https://caliber.az/en/post/circassian-genocide-in-the-caucasus-surpassed-roman-empire-s-cruelty">estimated to be 5 to 7 million</a>.</p><p>On November 10, a residential building in the town of Novaya Adygea, located in the republic of Adygea, caught fire during a reported Ukrainian <a href="https://t.me/astrapress/130736">UAV attack</a>, according to an OSINT analysis. Residents of the affected residential complex reported seeing a helicopter flying over the area and hearing machine-gun fire. Shortly afterward, video emerged showing the roof of one of the buildings on fire. Residents said the blaze was caused by drone debris falling onto the building. The complex sits across the Kuban River from Krasnodar, just a few minutes&#8217; drive from the city. Preliminary reports indicate that no one was injured. However, residents said some buildings sustained broken windows, with the damage appearing localized and resembling bullet impacts.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!27qj!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F97445f75-fb1e-45d7-91a8-5106797c27e9_462x438.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!27qj!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F97445f75-fb1e-45d7-91a8-5106797c27e9_462x438.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!27qj!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F97445f75-fb1e-45d7-91a8-5106797c27e9_462x438.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!27qj!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F97445f75-fb1e-45d7-91a8-5106797c27e9_462x438.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!27qj!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F97445f75-fb1e-45d7-91a8-5106797c27e9_462x438.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!27qj!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F97445f75-fb1e-45d7-91a8-5106797c27e9_462x438.png" width="462" height="438" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/97445f75-fb1e-45d7-91a8-5106797c27e9_462x438.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:438,&quot;width&quot;:462,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:260633,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/225236116?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F97445f75-fb1e-45d7-91a8-5106797c27e9_462x438.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" title="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!27qj!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F97445f75-fb1e-45d7-91a8-5106797c27e9_462x438.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!27qj!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F97445f75-fb1e-45d7-91a8-5106797c27e9_462x438.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!27qj!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F97445f75-fb1e-45d7-91a8-5106797c27e9_462x438.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!27qj!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F97445f75-fb1e-45d7-91a8-5106797c27e9_462x438.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Previously, on the night of November 4, Ukrainian <a href="https://theins.ru/news/299123">drones struck</a> an Ozon logistics center in Adygeysk, also in Adygea. Ozon is one of Russia&#8217;s largest e-commerce companies, often described as the Russian equivalent of Amazon. The company said all employees were evacuated and there were no reported injuries. The facility is one of Southern Russia&#8217;s largest logistics hubs. At its opening in 2024, <a href="https://tass.ru/ekonomika/19030989">Adygea&#8217;s authorities</a> stated that the center had an area of more than 100,000 square meters (about 1 million square feet) and would employ nearly 2,000 people.</p><p>However, it is not always Ukrainian drones that damage this Circassian republic. In January 2026, an explosion struck a residential complex in Novaya Adygea, killing one person and injuring 13 others. Murat Kumpilov, head of Adygea, said the building had been attacked by a Ukrainian drone. For example, one OSINT group&#8217;s analysis of eyewitness videos concluded that the building most likely was struck by a <a href="https://t.me/astrapress/102422">Russian air-defense missile</a>. Later, another investigative group geolocated an <a href="https://t.me/astrapress/103100">S-300/400 air-defense</a> position in Adygea and said it was the launch site of the missile that struck the complex on January 20, 2026.</p><p>Adygea is less than 300 miles away from the battlegrounds in Ukraine. Since Ukraine has attacked multiple Russian targets hundreds of miles into Russia, Adygea, as well as other North Caucasian republics, is well within the range of Ukrainian aerial drone strikes. Adygea is the closest to the Ukrainian war theater. In addition, it is quite close to the Krasnodar region, which is packed with dozens of potential military targets for Ukrainian drone attacks, including Putin&#8217;s billion-dollar palace at <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2024/05/06/new-joint-investigation-returns-to-putin-s-palace-with-hidden-camera-for-updated-tour-of-russian-president-s-billion-dollar-hideout">Gelendzhik</a>.</p><h4><strong>Moscow Renews its Outreach to Circassian Diaspora</strong></h4><p>Even as the conflict encroaches on Adygea&#8212;the westernmost Circassian republic&#8212;the Kremlin has stepped up soft-power outreach to Circassian communities abroad, seeking to reinforce historical ties and blunt growing anti-Moscow sentiment in the volatile North Caucasus.</p><p>A delegation of 40 representatives from Circassian diaspora communities abroad recently took part in a Russian government-sponsored familiarization tour under the &#8220;Russia - Land of Opportunity&#8221; program in late October 2026. The event was organized by Russian state agencies and the International Circassian Association (ICA), a Russian front organization <a href="https://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2017/01/fsb-overplays-its-hand-in-circassian.html">controlled and operated by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)</a>. According to the ICA, the trip was designed to strengthen ties between <a href="http://intercircass.org/?p=11076">diaspora Circassians</a> and Russia. Russian Foreign Minister <a href="https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2157960/">Sergei Lavrov</a> and <a href="http://intercircass.org/?p=11070">Igor Chaika</a>, head of Russia&#8217;s state cultural outreach agency Rossotrudnichestvo, sent greetings to the participants.</p><p>The ICA-sponsored delegation visited Moscow, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachay-Cherkessia, touring historical, cultural, educational, and religious sites connected to Circassian heritage. Activities included visits to museums, universities, memorials, cultural centers, government institutions, and tourist attractions, as well as roundtables on Circassian history, language preservation, and cooperation with diaspora communities.</p><p>ICA organizers emphasized the historical connection between Circassians and Russia, the promotion of Circassian culture and languages, educational opportunities, and strengthening engagement between Russia and Circassian communities in countries such as Syria, Turkey, Jordan, Israel, and Germany.</p><p>Not all Circassian diaspora groups were happy with the Russian-backed visit. The Circassian Associations Federation (CAF) in Turkey, which is home to 90 percent of the diaspora, issued a statement strongly <a href="https://cerkesfed.tr/haberler/kafkasya-haberleri/cerkes-dernekleri-federasyonu-kamuoyu-aciklamasi/">criticizing</a> the Moscow meeting held on October 28. Entitled &#8220;Through the Centuries, Hand in Hand with Russia, Gaining Honor and Glory.&#8221;  The CAF statement clearly expressed dissatisfaction with the way Moscow whitewashed Russian involvement in the 19th-century deportations of the Circassians and the way ICA brought together Russian officials and carefully selected representatives of Circassian organizations from the homeland and diaspora.</p><p>According to CAF, the event was not merely a cultural gathering but part of a broader effort by Russia to incorporate the Circassian diaspora into its official historical and political narrative. The statement rejected the portrayal of Circassian-Russian relations as a story of voluntary unity beginning in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, arguing instead that Circassians experienced a long war, genocide, and mass exile.</p><p>The organization also challenged Russian claims that Circassian language and culture are being adequately protected, pointing to educational reforms that reduced mandatory instruction in local languages. It also criticized diaspora organizations that participated in the meeting, arguing that they cannot speak on behalf of all Circassians or declare historical reconciliation. The CAF&#8217;s statement called for recognition of the Circassian genocide and exile, concrete legal protections for language and cultural rights, and greater transparency from organizations that engage with Russian authorities. The Circassian organization stated that while it supports dialogue, it also rejects perceived attempts to rewrite history and use diaspora institutions to advance Russian state interests.</p><h4>Outlook</h4><p>With the increase in Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian military targets in Adygea, Moscow appears to be panicking that Circassians in the North Caucasus and their powerful overseas diaspora are increasing their opposition to the Ukraine war. This was particularly evident <a href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/putins-conscription-drive-in-north">in the recent death</a> of Nurdin Qaraf, a Circassian repatriate from Syria whose family relocated to the North Caucasus. Qaraf was forced into the Russian army and later died, causing his father, Nurdin Qaraf, to launch a campaign in Adygea to search for his son, which sparked an outpouring of public support among Circassians both in the North Caucasus and overseas. Circassian mistrust and fears of forced Russian military conscription have been exacerbated by the threatening behavior of the Russian security services against the Qaraf family.</p><p>Cases of non-Russian nationalities refusing to fight in the Ukraine war inside Russia are not confined to just the North Caucasus. Across Russia&#8217;s non-Slavic republics, years of disproportionate battlefield deaths and coercive conscription are rapidly exhausting the pool of local manpower in these regions. In the non-Russian region of Bashkortostan, for example, it was recently revealed that the Middle Volga republic <a href="https://zona.media/news/2026/07/03/200">has suffered the highest number of absolute losses of residents</a> due to the war in Ukraine. At the beginning of 2023, the republic ranked as one of the top five regions in terms of the number of combat deaths, and in September 2024 it rose to first place on the list of Russian regions <a href="https://ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/11/14/vlasti-bashkortostana-priznali-chto-v-regione-konchayutsya-zhelayuschie-idti-na-voinu-v-ukrainu-a211358">with 11,990 confirmed war dead</a> as of November 2026. Bashkortostan recently became the first region in Russia to officially admit in its budget documents that fewer residents are signing military contracts, forcing the non-Russian republic to slash 2027&#8211;2028 sign-on bonus allocations by 1 billion rubles ($12.2 million).</p><p>In light of these developments, Russian mobilization efforts across the board are increasingly heading toward a dead end as Moscow is simply running out of personnel to throw into the war. Non-Russian nationalities like the Circassians and Bashkirs are paying for it. Mindful of these developments, critics and diaspora activists among the Circassians point to a stark contradiction between Moscow&#8217;s carefully curated cultural outreach and its domestic policies in the North Caucasus.</p><p>Despite an estimated 5-7 million Circassians living in Turkey and the Middle East, Russian authorities tightly restrict repatriation and diaspora business investment in their ancestral homeland in the North Caucasus, which consists of three non-Russian republics: Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachai-Cherkessk. Circassian activists in these regions have long accused the Russian security services of harassing and <a href="https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/425525">persecuting</a> returnees. While the Kremlin frames the ICA-sponsored tours around cultural preservation, observers warn that Moscow&#8217;s renewed interest in foreign Circassian communities&#8212;particularly in the Middle East&#8212;could also serve broader geopolitical goals, including narrative control and even potential recruitment pools as the war in Ukraine drags on.</p><p><strong>About the Author</strong></p><p>Valery Dzutsati is a Fellow in Eurasian Affairs at The Saratoga Foundation and is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the Department of Social Sciences at <a href="https://dzutsati.com/">Augusta University.</a> He received a Ph.D. in Political Science from Arizona State University in 2017 and is a long-time expert on Russia and the North Caucasus. </p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/ukrainian-drone-strikes-push-moscow?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/ukrainian-drone-strikes-push-moscow?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p><p></p><p>Thank you for your support! Please remember that The Saratoga Foundation is a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization. Your donations are fully tax-deductible. If you seek to support The Saratoga Foundation, you can donate by clicking on the PayPal link below! Alternatively, you can also choose to subscribe to our <a href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/">website</a> to support our work.</p><p><a href="https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA">https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA</a></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">This Substack is reader-supported. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p></p><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Ukraine Fights to Keep Black Sea Shipping Lanes Open After Surge in Russian Attacks ]]></title><description><![CDATA[Escalating Russian drone strikes near NATO waters threaten Ukraine&#8217;s Black Sea shipping corridor. Kyiv, Romania, and Alliance partners are exploring ways to counter the intensifying Russian attacks.]]></description><link>https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/ukraine-fights-to-keep-black-sea</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/ukraine-fights-to-keep-black-sea</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[The Saratoga Foundation]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 19:58:12 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!yY6n!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7746725f-fcc7-4c27-98af-cc231f43ab6f_1536x1024.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!yY6n!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7746725f-fcc7-4c27-98af-cc231f43ab6f_1536x1024.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!yY6n!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7746725f-fcc7-4c27-98af-cc231f43ab6f_1536x1024.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!yY6n!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7746725f-fcc7-4c27-98af-cc231f43ab6f_1536x1024.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!yY6n!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7746725f-fcc7-4c27-98af-cc231f43ab6f_1536x1024.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!yY6n!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7746725f-fcc7-4c27-98af-cc231f43ab6f_1536x1024.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!yY6n!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7746725f-fcc7-4c27-98af-cc231f43ab6f_1536x1024.png" width="1456" height="971" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/7746725f-fcc7-4c27-98af-cc231f43ab6f_1536x1024.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:971,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1617345,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/224528002?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7746725f-fcc7-4c27-98af-cc231f43ab6f_1536x1024.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" title="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!yY6n!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7746725f-fcc7-4c27-98af-cc231f43ab6f_1536x1024.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!yY6n!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7746725f-fcc7-4c27-98af-cc231f43ab6f_1536x1024.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!yY6n!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7746725f-fcc7-4c27-98af-cc231f43ab6f_1536x1024.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!yY6n!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7746725f-fcc7-4c27-98af-cc231f43ab6f_1536x1024.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><strong><a href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/149778185/andrii-ryzhenko">By Andrii Ryzhenko</a></strong></p><p>On the weekend of November 14&#8211;15, 2026, Russian <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/post/90181">drones struck four commercial vessels</a> within 24 hours near the Danube Delta off the Sulina channel&#8212;including the Palau-flagged cargo ship <em>Larissa 1</em> inside Romania&#8217;s territorial waters, prompting the Romanian Air Force to scramble F16 fighter jets twice. This brazen attack inside the territorial waters of Romania underscores how Moscow&#8217;s maritime campaign is escalating on the Black Sea coast of a major NATO ally. These latest strikes represent a dangerous new phase in a strategy Russia has pursued since the start of its full-scale invasion in 2022 as part of its efforts to choke off Ukraine&#8217;s economic lifeline by imposing a maritime blockade and attacking any vessels that try to circumvent it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Before the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, approximately 60&#8211;65% of Ukraine&#8217;s total foreign trade turnover was transported through Ukrainian ports. At the same time, 85&#8211;90% of Ukraine&#8217;s agricultural products (grains, oilseeds, and vegetable oil) were transported by sea, and <a href="https://ports.ua/morskij-transport-zabezpechiv-54-eksportu-u-2022-roczi/">more than 95%</a> of container traffic was handled by sea. Subsequently, any form of blockade, followed by the seizure of Ukrainian ports, was and remains one of the main objectives of Russian aggression in the Black and Azov Seas. After several unsuccessful attempts <a href="https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/rf-hotila-uzyati-odesu-kiltse-i-potim-visaditi-1720277511.html">to land troops in Odesa</a> at the onset of the war in March 2022, Russia has continuously sought to block Ukrainian efforts to resume commercial shipping from its Black Sea ports through the Bosporus Strait. </p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O3hR!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e56d4d2-e0a4-4a76-953b-5d6a2b049cdc_1536x982.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O3hR!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e56d4d2-e0a4-4a76-953b-5d6a2b049cdc_1536x982.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O3hR!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e56d4d2-e0a4-4a76-953b-5d6a2b049cdc_1536x982.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O3hR!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e56d4d2-e0a4-4a76-953b-5d6a2b049cdc_1536x982.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O3hR!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e56d4d2-e0a4-4a76-953b-5d6a2b049cdc_1536x982.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O3hR!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e56d4d2-e0a4-4a76-953b-5d6a2b049cdc_1536x982.png" width="1536" height="982" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/5e56d4d2-e0a4-4a76-953b-5d6a2b049cdc_1536x982.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:982,&quot;width&quot;:1536,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:3427543,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/224528002?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F50ebf4f9-67c2-4bc3-978c-89fd7b5450c4_1536x1024.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O3hR!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e56d4d2-e0a4-4a76-953b-5d6a2b049cdc_1536x982.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O3hR!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e56d4d2-e0a4-4a76-953b-5d6a2b049cdc_1536x982.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O3hR!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e56d4d2-e0a4-4a76-953b-5d6a2b049cdc_1536x982.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O3hR!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e56d4d2-e0a4-4a76-953b-5d6a2b049cdc_1536x982.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Ukraine&#8217;s 2023 &#8220;Humanitarian Corridor&#8221;</strong></h4><p>To break that blockade, and later replace the UN-brokered grain deal after Moscow withdrew from it in July 2023, Kyiv had first to dismantle Russian naval dominance in the northwestern Black Sea. This became militarily possible beginning with the April 2022 sinking of the Black Sea Fleet flagship <em>Moskva</em> by Ukrainian Neptune anti-ship missiles, which stripped Russian vessels of long-range air cover and enabled the liberation of Snake Island that June. Ukraine&#8217;s introduction of Uncrewed Surface Vehicles (USVs) and missile strikes forced Russia&#8217;s remaining warships to retreat toward eastern Crimea, allowing Kyiv to unilaterally establish a coastal &#8220;humanitarian corridor&#8221; in August 2023, following Moscow&#8217;s withdrawal from the UN-brokered grain deal.</p><p>Having degraded the Russian Black Sea Fleet&#8217;s operational reach in the western Black Sea through sustained naval drone and missile strikes, Kyiv moved unilaterally to reopen its sea lanes. In August 2023, Kyiv created a &#8220;humanitarian corridor&#8221; operating from its three principal southern ports: Odesa, Chornomorsk, and Pivdennyi. Ukraine independently secured safe passage for vessels along this route&#8212;stretching from Odesa to the territorial waters of Bulgaria and Romania. It did so by deploying mine countermeasures, naval patrols, air defense, and counter-sabotage operations. To sustain these efforts, the Ukrainian Navy even formed a dedicated maritime task force.</p><p>Under this new corridor<strong>,</strong> maritime shipping from Odesa no longer required Russia&#8217;s political consent, unlike the UN- and T&#252;rkiye-brokered &#8220;grain corridor&#8221; of 2022&#8211;2023. Commercial vessels began traveling exclusively within the territorial waters and exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, and T&#252;rkiye, <a href="https://suspilne.media/odesa/551781-z-portu-odesi-timcasovim-koridorom-virusilo-perse-sudno/">avoiding deep-water areas</a> where Russian combat assets operate. As a result, in 2024 and 2025 alone, more than 140 million tons of cargo were transported from the Greater Odesa ports.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Since then, Ukraine&#8217;s coast, port infrastructure, anchorages, and narrow sections of its maritime shipping routes have been reasonably well protected from Russian aerial threats and drones, including Russian-made Shahed-type drones, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles, primarily by relying upon Ukraine&#8217;s well-layered air defense systems and mobile counter-drone teams operating along its Black Sea coast.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">To protect its shipping routes, Ukraine regularly surveys its territorial waters, conducting operations to sweep and scan channels with sonar to detect drifting Soviet-pattern moored mines and bottom mines dropped from aircraft. Also important for the maritime economy was the fact that state guarantee funds and insurance mechanisms backed by the London insurance market provide protection for shipowners and cargo against threats associated with missile strikes and naval drones.</p><h4><strong>Russia&#8217;s Post-July 2026 Surge in Shipping Attacks </strong></h4><p>In operation since 2023, Ukraine&#8217;s one-way humanitarian corridor has increasingly experienced an intensifying series of Russian aerial drone attacks against commercial shipping operating in the western part of the Black Sea. In 2025, for example, 20 confirmed attacks directly targeted merchant vessels in Odesa Oblast ports and adjacent Black Sea waters, damaging <a href="https://www.apk-inform.com/uk/news/1552839">approximately 40 civilian vessels</a> while loading or at anchor.</p><p>By 2026, however, the intensity of attacks along the maritime corridor reached its highest level since the start of the war. Since the beginning of the year, more than 570 attacks on civilian vessels and port facilities have been recorded across the Black Sea basin, killing 40 crew members. The sharpest spike occurred in the third quarter (July&#8211;September 2026), when roughly 390 vessels came under fire&#8212;five times the rate recorded at the start of the year.</p><p>Alongside this surge in volume, Russia significantly expanded the geographic reach of its strikes after July 2026, targeting vessels within the exclusive economic zones of Romania and Bulgaria along the route to T&#252;rkiye&#8217;s Bosporus Strait. In October 2026 alone, Russian drones struck at least nine civilian vessels and tankers near Bulgarian and Romanian waters, critically damaging several and sinking two. Simultaneously, Russia kept up strikes on Odesa Oblast ports; in early October, an attack on a Liberian-flagged vessel <a href="https://zmina.info/news/rosiya-atakuvala-czyvilne-sudno-v-portu-odeshhyny-zagynuv-moryak-troye-poraneni/#:~:text=%D0%86%D0%BB%D1%8E%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%BD%D0%B5%20%D1%84%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%BE%20">killed one crew member</a>.</p><p>Russia&#8217;s sustained offensive on Black Sea shipping has severely disrupted Ukraine&#8217;s maritime trade, causing a significant fall in port volume. While approximately 400 vessels called at Greater Odesa ports in July, <a href="https://lb.ua/society/2026/11/03/778238_cnn_rosiyski_ataki_bezpilotnikiv.html#:~:text=*%20%D0%90%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%B8%20%D0%B2%D1%96%D0%B4%D0%B1%D1%83%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%8E%D1%82%D1%8C%D1%81%D1%8F%20%D0%BD%D0%B5%20%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%88%D0%B5%20%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%B7%D1%83%20%D1%83%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%97%D0%BD%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%BE,%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%87%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%BA%D1%83%20%D0%B6%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%82%D0%BD%D1%8F%2C%20%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B8%20%D0%B7%D0%B0%D0%B3%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%83%D0%BB%D0%B8%20%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%8F%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BE%20%D1%87%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%96%D0%B2%20%D0%B5%D0%BA%D1%96%D0%BF%D0%B0%D0%B6%D1%83">only 10 did so in October</a>. Consequently, the share of Ukrainian agricultural exports shipped through Odesa plunged from approximately <a href="https://intent.press/news/society/2026/porti-velikoi-odesi-priiniali-mensh-nizh-10-suden-za-misiats/#:~:text=%D0%9D%D0%B0%20%D1%82%D0%BB%D1%96%20%D0%B7%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8F%20%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%B1%D0%B5%D0%B7%D0%BF%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%B8%20%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%82%D0%B8%20%D0%92%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%97%20%D0%9E%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%B8,%D0%BF%D0%B8%D1%88%D0%B5%20%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%20%D0%B7%20%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8F%D0%BC%20%D0%BD%D0%B0%20Financial%20Times">87% to 8%</a>. Left unchecked, this renewed blockade and continued strikes on the humanitarian corridor threaten to cost Ukraine&#8217;s agricultural sector <a href="https://agroportal.ua/news/ukraina/zupinka-morskogo-eksportu-koshtuvatime-agrosektoru-ukrajini-4-6-mlrd-2">an estimated $4.6 billion in lost export revenue</a>.</p><h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>What Alternative Routes Exist to Replace Maritime Shipping?</strong></h4><p>One of the key questions to emerge from the upsurge in attacks is whether a viable alternative exists to replace this sea corridor. For example, could a land corridor through Moldova ensure grain exports to offset the maritime route via Bulgaria and the Black Sea? The answer is yes. But only as an additional route, not as a full replacement for the use of Ukraine&#8217;s deep-water ports. A land corridor through Moldova by rail, such as the reopened Basarabeasca&#8211;Berezino section, as well as logistics hubs at the Moldovan Port of Giurgiule&#537;ti, can handle around 10% of Ukraine&#8217;s grain exports (approximately 600,000&#8211;1,000,000 tons over a given period).</p><p>The Port of Giurgiule&#537;ti is Moldova&#8217;s only port accessible to seagoing vessels and is located on the Danube River and sits at the exact confluence where the Prut River flows into the Danube. Its main berths and terminals sit directly along the northern bank of the Danube River (about 133 km from the Black Sea), giving it deep-water access for both river barges and seagoing vessels.</p><p>A standard Handymax vessel carries 35,000 to 50,000 tons of cargo, and moving that volume by rail would require hundreds of railcars. The overland route through Moldova to the Romanian port of Constan&#539;a or the Danube adds approximately &#8364;50&#8211;90 ($55 to $95) per ton to the transit costs, significantly reducing farmers&#8217; profits compared with direct maritime loading in Odesa.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Western rail crossings bolster the transport total up to 2.0&#8211;2.6 million tons per month, which is the physical limit of their throughput capacity by rail. Danube ports can handle <a href="https://gmk.center/ua/posts/morskij-kolaps-ukraini-neobhidno-vidnoviti-eksport-cherez-porti-velikoi-odesi/">up to 20% of total export volumes</a> but lack sufficient capacity to replace the deep-water ports.</p><h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>NATO&#8217;s Response to Black Sea Shipping Attacks</strong></h4><p style="text-align: justify;">Russian mass attacks on Black Sea shipping in October in the immediate vicinity of and within the territorial waters of Romania and Bulgaria prompted a strong response from NATO member countries. Romanian F-16 fighter jets <a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2026/11/01/8060710/">began patrolling and intercepting drones</a>, while Bulgaria and Romania deployed additional satellite reconnaissance and air defense/counter-drone systems. In addition, the EU announced additional funding of up to <a href="https://www.railinsider.com.ua/ukrayina-z-partneramy-praczyuye-nad-dronovym-suprovodom-suden-u-chornomu-mori-prezydent/">&#8364;50 million</a> ($55 million) and accelerated the establishment of a Joint Maritime Security Center in the Black Sea. First announced in 2025 as part of the EU&#8217;s Black Sea Strategy, the EU&#8217;s Maritime Security Center has lagged in implementation, and it was not until the intensification of the recent attacks in the Black Sea that the EU <a href="https://www.railinsider.com.ua/yes-vydilyt-50-mln-yevro-na-stvorennya-czentru-morskoyi-bezpeky-v-chornomu-mori/">moved forward</a> with the creation of the Black Sea maritime security hub.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">On November 11, while visiting Denmark, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that cooperating together with officials in Copenhagen, Kyiv would begin work on a project to escort ships in the Black Sea using various types of drones to protect against Russian attacks. Zelensky <a href="https://www.railinsider.com.ua/ukrayina-z-partneramy-praczyuye-nad-dronovym-suprovodom-suden-u-chornomu-mori-prezydent/">noted</a> that: &#8220;Today, as you know, the Black Sea is blocked. For agriculture, it is extremely important to ensure the escort of ships&#8230;.we are discussing and working on organizing the escort of ships using various types of drones,&#8221; he said.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Due to the strong NATO response, the Kremlin's policy <a href="https://news.liga.net/ua/war/news/rumunski-f-16-zbyly-dva-drony-nad-chornym-morem">faced the risk</a> of direct military escalation with NATO member countries over the maritime attacks on shipping. Meanwhile, Ukraine began <a href="https://news.liga.net/ua/war/news/rumunski-f-16-zbyly-dva-drony-nad-chornym-morem">implementing initiatives</a> to protect vessels with maritime drones and aerial escort (drones and aircraft), which have significantly hindered the Russians&#8217; unimpeded use of drones in the western part of the Black Sea.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As it has become increasingly difficult to strike moving vessels in waters covered by NATO countries&#8217; air defenses, the Russian forces are again shifting the main focus of their air attacks directly to the port and logistical infrastructure in and around Greater Odesa and the Danube region, striking warehouses, terminals, and berths.</p><h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Outlook</strong></h4><p>Several promising ways exist to restore navigational safety in the western Black Sea, including organizing vessels into a &#8220;humanitarian convoy&#8221; from Odesa to the Bosporus. One option under consideration is for Ukraine to route ships strictly within the 12-nautical-mile territorial waters of NATO littoral states, placing them inside Alliance territory and affording these cargo vesselsf some corresponding protection. This vulnerability continues to persist because commercial ship captains sometimes lose sight of the maritime threat along the Black Sea coast and frequently drift outside the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, and then come under attack.</p><p>In many cases, these incidents stem from navigational errors or ship captains disregarding official maritime safety guidance&#8212;specifically NAVAREA III # 0034/23 and NAVTEX # 124/23. Issued under the Navigational Area (NAVAREA) system&#8212;an international maritime safety framework coordinated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Hydrographic Organization to broadcast urgent hazard warnings across 21 global sea regions (with Area III covering the Mediterranean and Black Seas). Alongside automated coastal NAVTEX safety broadcasts, these notices outline recommended coastal transit corridors and war-risk advisories for commercial vessels. Consequently, these errors and lack of vigilance, this accounts for the surge in recent attacks off the coast of Romania and Bulgaria in recent weeks as Russian military planners take advantage of these discrepancies in navigation.</p><p>Another potential option to restore navigational safety is to task NATO and the national armed forces of its member states in the Black Sea with conducting coordinated maritime and aerial reconnaissance patrols&#8212;using both manned aircraft and unmanned systems&#8212;to detect approaching surface and aerial drones in advance and also change the rules of engagement for Romanian F-16s involved in deterring the Russian aerial and drone attacks on shipping</p><p>One approach being considered by Ukraine is for it to deploy mobile armed security teams aboard Black Sea commercial vessels to counter the Russian drone threats, an arrangement that would require bilateral agreements with countries along the western Black Sea coast. Navigational safety could be strengthened by deploying electronic warfare systems along the shipping corridor to sever Russian command-and-control links, preventing its drones from operating effectively in this western quadrant of the Black Sea.</p><p>Taken together, these layered measures would help re-establish a secure maritime lifeline for Ukraine&#8217;s economy and regional trade to deter further Russian attacks. This can be done through a combination of Air, Land, Sea deployed manned and unmanned assets in a combat network capable in advance of timely detection, identification and neutralization of threats to shipping. As a result of Ukraine&#8217;s experience in dealing with this threat along its own maritime seaboard, it should with its NATO partners the lessons learned from creating its own deterrence architecture, such as integrated coastal radar / creating a drone-interceptor perimeter around Odesa, to help Romania develop its own anti-air and anti-surface capabilities in the maritime domain.</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/ukraine-fights-to-keep-black-sea?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/ukraine-fights-to-keep-black-sea?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p><h4>About the Author</h4><p>Captain (ret.) Andrii Ryzhenko is an expert on Russian naval forces and naval strategy. He is a former officer in the Ukrainian Navy and retired from the Armed Forces of Ukraine with the rank of Navy Captain. Captain Ryzhenko served over 35 years at sea and ashore: aboard surface warships, at Ukrainian Navy HQ on maritime tactics and PfP exercises, and as a defense and strategic planner. He also worked on Ukrainian Navy transformation to Euro-Atlantic standards and on contributions to NATO-led operations and NATO Response Forces. He served in NATO on partner nation units&#8217; evaluation methodology (OCC E&amp;F) at Supreme Allied Headquarters Europe (SHAPE) (Mons, Belgium), and he developed maritime aspects of the National Security Strategy in Ukraine. Capt. Ryzhenko is currently a strategic expert at the defense and logistics consulting firm, Sonata.</p><div><hr></div><p>Thank you for your support! Please remember that The Saratoga Foundation is a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization. Your donations are fully tax-deductible. If you seek to support The Saratoga Foundation, you can make a donation by clicking on the PayPal link below! Alternatively, you can also choose to subscribe on our website to support our work.</p><p><a href="https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA">https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA</a></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">This Substack is reader-supported. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Balancing Act or Trojan Horse? Tokayev’s Surprising Move to Invite Moscow into the Organization of Turkic States]]></title><description><![CDATA[By Fuad Shahbazov]]></description><link>https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/balancing-act-or-trojan-horse-tokayevs</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/balancing-act-or-trojan-horse-tokayevs</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[The Saratoga Foundation]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 16:07:09 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O6Nx!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fec33415a-0a13-4fc4-8983-117f9fd5267b_1677x938.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O6Nx!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fec33415a-0a13-4fc4-8983-117f9fd5267b_1677x938.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O6Nx!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fec33415a-0a13-4fc4-8983-117f9fd5267b_1677x938.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O6Nx!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fec33415a-0a13-4fc4-8983-117f9fd5267b_1677x938.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O6Nx!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fec33415a-0a13-4fc4-8983-117f9fd5267b_1677x938.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O6Nx!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fec33415a-0a13-4fc4-8983-117f9fd5267b_1677x938.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O6Nx!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fec33415a-0a13-4fc4-8983-117f9fd5267b_1677x938.png" width="1456" height="814" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/ec33415a-0a13-4fc4-8983-117f9fd5267b_1677x938.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:814,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:2416352,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/224533892?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fec33415a-0a13-4fc4-8983-117f9fd5267b_1677x938.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O6Nx!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fec33415a-0a13-4fc4-8983-117f9fd5267b_1677x938.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O6Nx!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fec33415a-0a13-4fc4-8983-117f9fd5267b_1677x938.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O6Nx!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fec33415a-0a13-4fc4-8983-117f9fd5267b_1677x938.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!O6Nx!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fec33415a-0a13-4fc4-8983-117f9fd5267b_1677x938.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><strong>By Fuad Shahbazov</strong></p><p>On October 30, members of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) <a href="https://turkicstates.org/en/news/13th-summit-of-the-organization-of-turkic-states-held-in-ankara-under-the-theme-turkic-century--unity-in-language-thought-and-deed">gathered together in Ankara</a> for the leaders&#8217; 13th annual summit, as the main agenda was about deepening strategic, economic, and cultural integration among member and observer states.  </p><p>Originally established in October 2009 as the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States (commonly known as the Turkic Council), the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) was officially renamed the Organization of Turkic States on November 12, 2021, during its 8th Summit in Istanbul. The OTS brings together T&#252;rkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan as full members, and fosters enhanced cooperation across a wide range of strategically important sectors, including the economy, energy, trade, education, tourism, and culture.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Since 2021, the OTS has rapidly evolved into an influential interregional organization spanning the broader Eurasian region, providing its members with an alternative platform for cooperation independent of major regional powers such as Russia and China. However, this issue could be on the verge of changing. During the recent OTS  summit in Ankara, Kazakhstan President Kassym Jomart Tokayev <a href="https://timesca.com/turkish-official-questions-tokayevs-proposal-of-ots-observer-status-for-russia/">made a surprise decision</a> to invite Russia into the organization through the OTS Plus mechanism as an observer. Indeed, such <a href="https://astanatimes.com/2025/10/bigger-ambitions-strategic-vision-behind-ots-expansion/">a proposal stirred debates</a> within the organization and beyond regarding the motivations behind Tokayev&#8217;s proposal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">President Tokayev <a href="https://www.akorda.kz/en/kassym-jomart-tokayev-addresses-the-13th-summit-of-the-organization-of-turkic-states-319348">justified his announcement</a> by stating that &#8220;Russia has maintained centuries-old historical and cultural ties with the Turkic world, is home to many indigenous Turkic populations.&#8221; While the Russian authorities enthusiastically reacted to such news, the Kazakh proposal drew sharp criticism within the Turkic community as the organization&#8217;s <a href="https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/does-russia-belong-turkic-world-ken-moriyasu">main charter requires</a> an observer state to recognize a Turkic or related language as an official nationwide language, a criterion Russia does not meet. Moreover, the criticism among Turkic states stems mainly from the fact that, with the gradual involvement, Russia may quickly absorb the OTS and turn it into a Russia-centric entity.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Diplomatic protocol generally requires such initiatives to be discussed within the organization before being announced publicly. In this case, however, it appears <a href="https://minval.az/news/124561233">unlikely that Astana conducted</a> prior consultations with any of the other member states before putting forward its proposal. Azerbaijan and T&#252;rkiye seem confident that Russia&#8217;s involvement in the OTS will not give the entity a particular impulse, given that Russia is already engaged with some of these Turkic states through the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Conversely, Russian involvement in the OTS could result in the delay of implementation of important initiatives within the regional format. Unsurprisingly, Russia reacted positively to Tokayev&#8217;s proposal, claiming that <a href="https://en.apa.az/cis-countries/kremlin-responds-to-tokayevs-proposal-for-russia-to-join-organization-of-turkic-states-533545">Russia&#8217;s participation</a> in OTS is entirely understandable and appropriate.</p><h4 style="text-align: justify;">Tokayev&#8217;s Balancing Act</h4><p style="text-align: justify;">At the same time, President Tokayev&#8217;s unexpected proposal can largely be understood through the prism of <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-russia-observer-status-organization-turkic-states/33893964.html">Astana&#8217;s broader balancing</a> strategy and its commitment to maintaining stable relations with Moscow. Despite periodic divergences in their foreign policy agendas, Kazakhstan continues to value constructive ties with Russia, not least because of the <a href="https://news.az/news/russia-at-the-doorstep-of-the-ots-will-ankara-baku-and-tashkent-support-tokayevs-proposal-expert-opinions">sizable ethnic Russian</a> population residing in the country&#8217;s northern regions, which have occasionally been referenced in territorial claims and revisionist rhetoric by certain Russian nationalist figures.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">On the other hand, Tokayev&#8217;s statement might have been influenced by a request from Moscow that Astana relay the message to other members on its behalf, thereby allowing Russia to convey its position indirectly and avoid potential criticism or diplomatic pushback from the organization&#8217;s member states. Indeed, amid widening security challenges across the broader Eurasian region, compounded by the Russo-Ukrainian War and the conflict involving Iran, <a href="https://timesca.com/turkish-official-questions-tokayevs-proposal-of-ots-observer-status-for-russia/">Moscow may increasingly</a> view the OTS as an emerging geopolitical factor in its immediate neighborhood.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As such, <a href="https://caspianpost.com/analytics/russia-and-the-turkic-world-why-tokayev-proposed-closer-ties-with-moscow-and-what-they-could-mean-for-the-ots">Russia may seek to establish</a> channels of engagement with the organization in order to mitigate potential risks along its southern periphery and prevent the emergence of strategic blind spots similar to those that preceded the war in Ukraine. Such engagement would also enable Moscow to address concerns at an early stage and gain a better understanding of the organization&#8217;s evolving agenda and regional ambitions.</p><h4 style="text-align: justify;">Outlook</h4><p style="text-align: justify;">Kazakhstan&#8217;s proposal to grant Russia an observer status might best be seen as a pragmatic and rational choice, as it will reduce the likelihood <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2026/11/who-should-the-turkic-states-organization-open-its-doors-to/">that Russia will view a</a> stronger OTS as a threat to its interests. With such a stance, Astana signals that the OTS is not a military bloc and is unlikely to become one in the near future, <a href="https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2026/10/30/tokaev/">focusing instead</a> on enhancing trade, economic, and cultural partnerships, as well as developing critically important regional infrastructure.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Nevertheless, two of the leading members of the OTS, Azerbaijan and T&#252;rkiye, do not appear to be in a hurry <a href="https://minval.az/news/124560713">to extend an invitation</a> to Russia at this stage. For Baku, maintaining a degree of distance from Moscow remains a priority given the strains in bilateral relations in recent years. Simultaneously, Ankara has been steadily expanding its soft-power influence across Central Asia and the Caspian region, strengthening its position within the Turkic world. Consequently, both Azerbaijan and T&#252;rkiye are unlikely to share Astana&#8217;s pragmatic approach toward granting Russia a formal status within the OTS. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Another important reason for adhering to this stance is that Russia&#8217;s growing influence within the OTS <a href="https://www.eureflect.com/tokayevs-russia-proposal-what-are-the-implications-for-euots-relations">could hamper the EU&#8217;s growing</a> engagement with Central Asia and the Caucasus regions. The EU is one of the major non-regional actors that backs the evolving role of the OTS in Central Asia, providing a suitable cooperation format. Notwithstanding disparities and challenges within the Eurasian region and beyond, Russia&#8217;s close engagement with the OTS in the near future can not be ruled out, though accession seems unrealistic going forward.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>About the Author:</strong></p><p>Fuad Shahbazov is a political scientist and analyst focused on regional security in Eurasia and the Middle East. He holds a master&#8217;s degree in Political Science from Vytautas Magnus University, a professional master&#8217;s degree in Terrorism and Countering Religious Radicalization from the University of Bergamo, and a master&#8217;s degree in Defense and Diplomacy from Durham University.</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/balancing-act-or-trojan-horse-tokayevs?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/balancing-act-or-trojan-horse-tokayevs?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p><div><hr></div><div><hr></div><p>Thank you for your support! Please remember that The Saratoga Foundation is a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization. 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To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p style="text-align: justify;"></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Six Years After the Second Karabakh War: The Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Process and the Road Ahead]]></title><description><![CDATA[Six years after the 2nd Karabakh War, Armenia and Azerbaijan are transitioning from negotiating conflict termination to a durable peace.]]></description><link>https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/six-years-after-the-second-karabakh</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/six-years-after-the-second-karabakh</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[The Saratoga Foundation]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 17:00:05 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!m0IB!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83ea136a-59ef-4611-9af5-736d34186251_1296x658.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!m0IB!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83ea136a-59ef-4611-9af5-736d34186251_1296x658.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!m0IB!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83ea136a-59ef-4611-9af5-736d34186251_1296x658.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!m0IB!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83ea136a-59ef-4611-9af5-736d34186251_1296x658.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!m0IB!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83ea136a-59ef-4611-9af5-736d34186251_1296x658.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!m0IB!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83ea136a-59ef-4611-9af5-736d34186251_1296x658.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!m0IB!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83ea136a-59ef-4611-9af5-736d34186251_1296x658.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!m0IB!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83ea136a-59ef-4611-9af5-736d34186251_1296x658.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!m0IB!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83ea136a-59ef-4611-9af5-736d34186251_1296x658.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!m0IB!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83ea136a-59ef-4611-9af5-736d34186251_1296x658.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><strong>By Vasif Huseynov</strong></p><p style="text-align: justify;">On November 10, 2020, a trilateral statement ended the 44-day Second Karabakh War. Six years later, Azerbaijan and Armenia are no longer negotiating the end of a conflict but the terms of coexistence. The <a href="https://president.az/en/articles/view/69572">Washington Joint Declaration</a> of August 8, 2025 saw both leaders initial the text of a peace agreement at the White House, and less than a month later the OSCE Ministerial Council <a href="https://www.osce.org/chairpersonship/596899">closed the Minsk Process</a> by consensus, a closure <a href="https://www.osce.org/node/660952">completed</a> on November 30, 2025.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The treaty, however, remains unsigned. At the CICA summit in Baku on October 15, President Ilham Aliyev <a href="https://en.apa.az/official-news/president-ilham-aliyev-we-took-revenge-on-the-battlefield-and-offered-peace-to-armenia-530204">warned</a>: &#8220;This peace is still fragile, and it must be protected and strengthened.&#8221; Currently, the process now runs along four tracks: Armenia&#8217;s constitution, border delimitation, transport links and bilateral trade. Against this backdrop, officials in Baku contend that the next move lies with Yerevan, which they believe should act quickly or lose the historic momentum created by the end of the conflict, sustained US engagement and an unusually favorable regional environment.</p><h4>Armenia&#8217;s Constitution: The Remaining Legal Barrier</h4><p>Of the two conditions set by Baku in March 2025, only one remains: the Minsk Group is dissolved, but the Armenian constitution remains unchanged. President Aliyev said in Munich in February that Azerbaijan could sign an agreement <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/azerbaijans-aliyev-says-peace-treaty-possible-very-next-day-if-armenia-amends-constitution/3829705">&#8220;the very next day&#8221;</a> once Armenia removed what Baku regards as territorial claims. Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov repeated this point on October 30, noting that Yerevan must take the <a href="https://en.apa.az/foreign-policy/azerbaijani-fm-armenia-must-take-necessary-steps-to-sign-peace-agreement-533165">necessary political and legal steps</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The dispute concerns a single cross-reference. Armenia&#8217;s constitution does not mention Karabakh, but its preamble invokes the 1990 Declaration of Independence, which in turn cites the 1989 decision on the &#8220;<a href="https://gov.am/en/independence">reunification</a>&#8221; of Soviet Armenia and &#8220;Nagorno-Karabakh.&#8221;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Baku&#8217;s demand rests on sound legal logic: a peace treaty binds the governments that sign it, whereas a constitution binds every government that follows, so a future government in Yerevan could invoke the current reference to Karabakh&#8217;s unification with Armenia to challenge the treaty. Removing it would give the peace a solid legal basis that does not depend on whoever holds power in Yerevan. Ireland, for example, set a clear precedent in 1998, when, under the Good Friday Agreement, more than 94 percent of voters approved amending Articles 2 and 3 of the constitution to drop its territorial claim on Northern Ireland, a step that made Dublin a credible guarantor of the settlement rather than weakening its sovereignty. Germany <a href="https://x.com/HuseynovVasif/status/2118283807379923260">did the same</a> in 1990, amending its Basic Law under the Two Plus Four Treaty before signing its border treaty with Poland.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The obstacle now boils down to simple arithmetic rather than diplomacy. Armenia&#8217;s Minister of Justice Srbuhi Galyan has said the draft has been <a href="https://iz.ru/en/node/2192392">ready since March</a>, and the Constitutional Reform Council must approve it by <a href="https://www.pan.am/en/626317">December 30, 2026</a>, ahead of a referendum planned for 2027. But putting it to a vote requires a two-thirds majority in parliament, which Civil Contract <a href="https://en.apa.az/cis-countries/armenias-central-election-commission-completes-vote-count-in-parliamentary-elections-updated-510410">lost in the June 7 election</a>, and both opposition blocs <a href="https://en.apa.az/cis-countries/armenian-speaker-calls-on-opposition-to-allow-new-constitution-draft-to-go-to-referendum-533135">reject</a> changes they see as imposed under Azerbaijani pressure. On October 22, Pashinyan raised the possibility of holding another snap election to break the deadlock.</p><h4>Borders and the Enclave Question</h4><p style="text-align: justify;">The least visible track has been the most consistent. At their 13th meeting in Aghveran on April 29, the state commissions led by Deputy Prime Ministers Shahin Mustafayev and Mher Grigoryan agreed on guidelines covering expert groups, <a href="https://en.armradio.am/2026/04/29/armenia-azerbaijan-agree-on-new-border-delimitation-guidelines-at-aghveran-meeting/">delimitation maps and the publication of results</a>, the procedural scaffolding without which no line can be drawn.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The substantive question is the Soviet-era enclaves. On October 14, Pashinyan proposed that Armenia&#8217;s territory of 29,743 square kilometers be delimited based on the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration, that enclaves be eliminated through <a href="https://armenpress.am/en/article/1262730">exchanges of equivalent territory</a>, and that both states <a href="https://www.pan.am/en/626319">renounce all claims against each other</a>. However, his deputy said two days later that no agreement on an exchange exists, and Baku has said only that the issue should be <a href="https://en.apa.az/asia/pashinyan-there-are-two-options-for-resolving-the-enclave-and-exclave-issue-with-azerbaijan-515284">resolved within the delimitation process</a>.</p><h4>TRIPP Moves from Agreement to Implementation</h4><p style="text-align: justify;">Meanwhile the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), linking mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan through Armenia&#8217;s Syunik province, crossed a major threshold on October 28, when Armenia&#8217;s National Assembly <a href="https://armenianweekly.com/2026/10/29/yerevan-ratifies-tripp-lacks-two-thirds-for-constitutional-changes/">ratified the Armenian-American framework agreement</a> by 63 votes to 32. A joint development company will manage the route, with the United States holding 74 percent and Armenia 26 percent for an initial 49 years.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">On October 21, an Armenian government delegation visited Syunik to launch design work on the railway, road and power lines. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan declared the project to be <a href="https://en.apa.az/cis-countries/pashinyan-says-tripp-has-entered-practical-implementation-phase-531625">entering its implementation phase</a> while the Armenian ambassador to the United States Narek Mkrtchyan announced that he expects the <a href="https://massispost.com/2026/10/tripp-has-entered-implementation-phase-groundbreaking-possible-in-early-2027-armenian-ambassador-says/">groundbreaking for TRIPP to begin in early 2027</a>. On November 6, the project acquired its first trilateral working mechanism. In a <a href="https://news.am/en/news/1073257">joint statement</a> issued by the three governments, US Assistant Secretary of State Brendan Hanrahan and Deputy Foreign Ministers Elnur Mammadov of Azerbaijan and Vahan Kostanyan of Armenia <a href="https://www.azernews.az/karabakh/266982.html">launched technical planning groups</a> on transport and electricity transmission, tasked with resolving complex technical issues and preparing the next phases of implementation, including connections to other regional infrastructure.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regardless, TRIPP should not be viewed merely as a transportation project. A functioning route through Syunik would create daily, practical cooperation between two states that were at war six years ago, embedding customs, border and security procedures that require constant coordination. It would also give Armenia transit revenues and access to regional markets after three decades of closed borders, turning peace into a tangible economic interest for Armenian society rather than only a commitment of its government. Every kilometer built reduces the risk of any return to confrontation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">TRIPP is also the one element of the settlement that gives all three parties, including the United States, a material stake in its success. From Baku&#8217;s perspective, with ratification complete and the trilateral groups in place, officials in Yerevan should maintain the project&#8217;s positive momentum. Design studies are no substitute for actual construction, given that Washington&#8217;s commitment to unimpeded connectivity has existed on paper for over a year.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The regional environment around the route, however, is less settled than the progress on paper suggests. Iranian opposition has hardened. In an <a href="https://1news.az/en/news/20261105171012291-Khamenei-s-adviser-Iran-is-ready-to-break-the-legs-of-those-promoting-TRIPP">article</a> in the Tehran daily Ettelaat on November 5, Ali Akbar Velayati, adviser on international affairs to Iran&#8217;s Supreme Leader, called Yerevan&#8217;s approval of TRIPP &#8220;blind submission to the interests of the West,&#8221; describing any change of borders in the region as an Iranian red line to be defended &#8220;by any means,&#8221; and recalled <a href="https://www.tasnimnews.ir/en/news/2026/11/05/3741276/velayati-warns-against-crossing-iran-s-red-lines-in-tripp-project">warning the Armenian ambassador</a> that &#8220;if Trump and his allies want to cross this Iranian red line, we will break their legs.&#8221; </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Russia&#8217;s stance is more ambiguous. Speaking in Baku after the CICA summit on October 15, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Moscow had &#8220;<a href="https://en.iz.ru/en/2184790/2026-10-15/lavrov-announced-absence-russian-federation-among-participants-trump-route-caucasus">not yet received any requests</a>&#8221; to join the project, while stressing that Russia is <a href="https://report.az/en/other-countries/lavrov-russia-ready-to-participate-in-tripp-project">ready to take part</a> and pointing to the concession under which Russian Railways operates Armenia&#8217;s rail network. Neither Tehran nor Moscow, in other words, has yet come to terms with a transportation route being built with American participation on their doorstep.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Neither position should be allowed to slow the project down. TRIPP is a matter for the sovereign decision of Armenia and Azerbaijan, the two states through whose territory and for whose benefit the route will run, and no third country should hold a veto over infrastructure that two neighbors agree to build. Nor does the route alter any borders, which is Tehran&#8217;s stated concern. It connects them.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For Yerevan, this is a further argument for speed, since every month of delay gives outside actors more room to raise the project&#8217;s political cost.</p><h4>The Trade Dimension: Symbolic, Small, but Lopsided</h4><p style="text-align: justify;">The most tangible change in relations has come in commerce. On October 21, 2025, President Aliyev announced that Azerbaijan had <a href="https://www.azernews.az/business/258804.html">lifted all restrictions on cargo transit to Armenia</a>. On December 18, <a href="https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/azerbaijan-continues-fuel-exports-and-transit-shipments-to-armenia-2026-6-22-52/">1,220 tons of Azerbaijani gasoline</a> left for Armenia, the first such delivery in over three decades, and by the anniversary of the Washington summit, close to <a href="https://armenpress.am/en/article/1257649">60,000 tons of goods</a> had moved to and from Armenia through Azerbaijan.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In September, trade became two-way when Armenia shipped <a href="https://oc-media.org/armenia-exports-aluminium-foil-to-azerbaijan-in-historic-first/">aluminium foil to Azerbaijan</a>. While symbolically important, trade figures remain small: Azerbaijani exports to Armenia reached <a href="https://anewz.tv/region/south-caucasus/25657/azerbaijan-armenia-trade-exports-reach-2345m-in-2026/news">$23.45 million in the first nine months of 2026</a>, about 0.1 percent of the country&#8217;s total exports, against Armenian exports of just <a href="https://oc-media.org/azerbaijani-exports-to-armenia-in-2026-reach-almost-23-5-million/">$96,460</a>. Much of the flow still travels by rail through Georgia, as no direct border crossing has opened yet.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The political significance, however, is considerable. By lifting transit restrictions before any treaty was signed, Azerbaijan demonstrated a remarkable gesture of good will toward Armenia and showed Armenians the concrete benefits of peace: cheaper fuel, new transit options and access to wider markets. Pashinyan himself has argued that economic ties will <a href="https://www.thearmenianreport.com/post/pashinyan-says-beyond-hostages-and-peace-deal-armenia-and-azerbaijan-must-build-lasting-relations">substantially strengthen the peace</a>.</p><h4>Outlook</h4><p style="text-align: justify;">As Azerbaijan makes progress in signing a treaty with Armenia that would settle borders and other claims, it would not close the moral chapter of the conflict. For nearly three decades, Karabakh and seven surrounding districts were occupied, hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis were displaced, and towns such as Aghdam and Fuzuli were left in ruins. On October 26, presidential aide Hikmet Hajiyev said every displaced Azerbaijani <a href="https://www.azernews.az/karabakh/266390.html">&#8220;expects an apology from Armenia&#8221;</a>, while Pashinyan has urged both sides to <a href="https://www.thearmenianreport.com/post/pashinyan-says-beyond-hostages-and-peace-deal-armenia-and-azerbaijan-must-build-lasting-relations">stop looking for Armenia in Azerbaijan</a> and vice versa.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">From Baku&#8217;s perspective, an apology by the Armenian government for the occupation would be the next logical step. In December 1970, for example, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt knelt before the Warsaw Ghetto memorial on the day he signed the treaty recognizing Poland&#8217;s western border, a turning point in <a href="https://www.dhm.de/blog/2016/12/07/392/">German-Polish reconciliation</a>. In 1995, Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama offered a &#8220;<a href="https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html">heartfelt apology</a>&#8221; for Japan&#8217;s colonial rule and aggression. The presidents of Serbia and Montenegro and of Croatia <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/1104299.html">exchanged apologies</a> in 2003, and in 2010 the Serbian parliament adopted a <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2010-03-31-serbia-apologises-for-srebrenica-massacre">declaration condemning the Srebrenica massacre</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">None of these acts was easy: half of West Germans rejected Brandt&#8217;s gesture, and Serbia&#8217;s declaration passed with a <a href="https://mg.co.za/?p=163672">bare majority</a>. Yet each side helped turn a legal settlement into a durable relationship. For Armenia, a sincerely acknowledgement of the cost of the occupation would reassure Azerbaijani society that peace is not merely a pause, making the treaty far more credible to those who lost their homes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Six years after the war, the question is no longer whether Armenia and Azerbaijan can stop fighting, but whether a peace that already exists in practice can become a durable peace, binding in law before the political window that produced it closes. The answer will be written over the next eighteen months, and lies largely in the hands of the Armenian parliament and at the ballot box.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Author&#8217;s Bio:</strong></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Dr. Vasif Huseynov is the head of the Western Studies department at the Center for Analysis of International Relations and Multiculturalism (AIR Center) in Baku, Azerbaijan.</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/six-years-after-the-second-karabakh?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:&quot;button-wrapper&quot;}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary button-wrapper" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/six-years-after-the-second-karabakh?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">This Substack is reader-supported. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><div><hr></div><p style="text-align: justify;">Thank you for your support! Please remember that The Saratoga Foundation is a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization. Your donations are fully tax-deductible. If you seek to support The Saratoga Foundation, you can make a one-time donation by clicking on the PayPal link below! You can also subscribe to our <a href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/">website</a> to support our work.</p><p><a href="https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA">https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA</a></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[New Report! From Combat Journal to Wartime Decision: Information Correction and Authority in Russian Military Command ]]></title><description><![CDATA[Hi everyone,]]></description><link>https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/new-report-from-combat-journal-to</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/new-report-from-combat-journal-to</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[The Saratoga Foundation]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 13:39:03 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WUxP!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2139094d-aac3-44e1-8064-932b90dead24_1536x1024.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WUxP!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2139094d-aac3-44e1-8064-932b90dead24_1536x1024.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WUxP!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2139094d-aac3-44e1-8064-932b90dead24_1536x1024.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WUxP!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2139094d-aac3-44e1-8064-932b90dead24_1536x1024.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WUxP!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2139094d-aac3-44e1-8064-932b90dead24_1536x1024.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WUxP!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2139094d-aac3-44e1-8064-932b90dead24_1536x1024.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WUxP!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2139094d-aac3-44e1-8064-932b90dead24_1536x1024.png" width="1456" height="971" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/2139094d-aac3-44e1-8064-932b90dead24_1536x1024.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:971,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:2786245,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/223351458?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2139094d-aac3-44e1-8064-932b90dead24_1536x1024.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WUxP!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2139094d-aac3-44e1-8064-932b90dead24_1536x1024.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WUxP!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2139094d-aac3-44e1-8064-932b90dead24_1536x1024.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WUxP!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2139094d-aac3-44e1-8064-932b90dead24_1536x1024.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WUxP!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2139094d-aac3-44e1-8064-932b90dead24_1536x1024.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Hi everyone, </p><p>The Saratoga Foundation is pleased to release a new report by Senior Fellow <a href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/149778185/roger-n-mcdermott-frhists">Roger N. McDermott</a>, entitled <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HSbfiBAmDSEPq9c1V_-WttTqB3KIydfx/view?usp=sharing">From Combat Journal to Wartime Decision: Information Correction and Authority in Russian Military Command</a>.</p><p>This timely report examines a central question about Russia&#8217;s military digital transformation: Does faster access to battlefield information actually enable commanders to make better decisions, correct mistakes, and improve operational performance?</p><p>Using Russia&#8217;s combat journal (<em>Zhurnal boevykh deistvii</em>, or ZhBD) and the process of recovering damaged military equipment as case studies, McDermott explores how battlefield reports become official records, how assessments are reviewed, and how information must reach officers with the authority to act.</p><p><strong>Below are eight major takeaways from the report:</strong></p><p><strong>1. Digital connectivity alone does not guarantee better command decisions.</strong><br>The military value of digital integration depends on whether corrected battlefield information changes an authorized decision in time to affect the mission&#8212;not simply on how quickly information is transmitted.</p><p><strong>2. Russia&#8217;s combat journal is an important institutional record.</strong><br>The ZhBD documents significant events and provides a reference for operational assessment, accountability, and the study of combat experience. Its significance rests partly on the authority attached to its entries and the consequences that follow from accepting them.</p><p><strong>3. Electronic journal use is documented, but the wider technical architecture remains unclear.</strong><br>Military-court testimony confirms electronic combat-journal use in one Russian brigade. However, the available evidence does not establish a standardized military-wide system, the journal&#8217;s precise software architecture, or an automatic connection between journal entries and command decisions.</p><p><strong>4. Correcting information requires more than updating a record.</strong><br>Commanders and staff must be able to challenge an accepted assessment, resolve competing accounts, distribute the correction to relevant users, and reconsider decisions made on the basis of earlier information. A correction that arrives too late may have little operational value.</p><p><strong>5. Equipment recovery illustrates the practical stakes.</strong><br>Returning damaged equipment to service requires more than locating it. Russian forces must assess damage, identify repair requirements, allocate specialists and spare parts, arrange evacuation, and determine when equipment is genuinely available for a mission. Information systems can help coordinate these steps, but cannot create resources that are not available.</p><p><strong>6. Russia&#8217;s newly created unified data interaction system, known as SVOD, needs to be evaluated for its operational effects on Russian military performance.</strong><br>By introducing SVOD, the Russian military is seeking to provide Russian frontline units and headquarters with their own shared, secure digital workspace combining maps, satellite imagery, weather data, and battlefield reports. SVOD&#8217;s purpose is to improve coordination and accelerate decisions by providing a more current operational picture. However, its actual effectiveness under battlefield conditions remains unproven.</p><p><strong>7. Institutional learning is different from recording combat experience.</strong><br>Russia has mechanisms for collecting and analyzing battlefield experience and proposing changes to equipment and procedures. But reports, databases, and modernization decisions do not by themselves prove that changes reach operational units or improve subsequent performance. Learning must be demonstrated through implementation and measurable results.</p><p><strong>8. Ukraine and NATO should assess whether digital integration restores combat power.</strong><br>The key indicators are whether revised information reaches the responsible officer, changes a decision, and improves execution under battlefield conditions. For equipment recovery, this means examining whether Russia returns assets to service sooner and sustains operations more effectively with the forces actually available.</p><p><strong>Why This Report Matters for Ukraine and NATO</strong></p><p>Russia&#8217;s digital command capabilities since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 must be judged by their operational results, not connectivity alone. Improved information flow can help Russia restore damaged equipment faster and sustain its combat power in a long war of attrition. For NATO policymakers, the key question from this report is how quickly Russian formations can recover and resume missions after major combat losses and how are they trying to improve that learning process. McDermott&#8217;s report offers a practical framework for distinguishing a more connected Russian military from one that can translate information into timely decisions, restore combat power, and adapt its conduct of war. </p><p>Please read the full report &#128073; <strong><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HSbfiBAmDSEPq9c1V_-WttTqB3KIydfx/view?usp=sharing">here</a></strong> and consider its implications for understanding Russian military command and adaptation.</p><p>Enjoy the report!</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><div class="image-link image2" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4BnQ!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c02137c-d8f7-47b9-aa09-76f169615c57_100x75.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4BnQ!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c02137c-d8f7-47b9-aa09-76f169615c57_100x75.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4BnQ!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c02137c-d8f7-47b9-aa09-76f169615c57_100x75.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4BnQ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c02137c-d8f7-47b9-aa09-76f169615c57_100x75.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4BnQ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c02137c-d8f7-47b9-aa09-76f169615c57_100x75.png" width="100" height="75" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/5c02137c-d8f7-47b9-aa09-76f169615c57_100x75.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:75,&quot;width&quot;:100,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1774,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/204961817?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c02137c-d8f7-47b9-aa09-76f169615c57_100x75.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" title="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4BnQ!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c02137c-d8f7-47b9-aa09-76f169615c57_100x75.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4BnQ!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c02137c-d8f7-47b9-aa09-76f169615c57_100x75.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4BnQ!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c02137c-d8f7-47b9-aa09-76f169615c57_100x75.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4BnQ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c02137c-d8f7-47b9-aa09-76f169615c57_100x75.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div></div></div></div></figure></div><p>Glen E. Howard<br>President<br>The Saratoga Foundation</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">This Substack is reader-supported. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/new-report-from-combat-journal-to?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:&quot;button-wrapper&quot;}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary button-wrapper" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/new-report-from-combat-journal-to?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p><div><hr></div><p>Thank you for your support! Please remember that The Saratoga Foundation is a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization. Your donations are fully tax-deductible. If you seek to support The Saratoga Foundation, you can make a one-time donation by clicking on the PayPal link below! You can also subscribe to our <a href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/">website</a> to support our work.</p><p><a href="https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA">https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA</a></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Ukraine’s Black Sea Blockade Forces Russia to Seek Alternative Grain Export Routes]]></title><description><![CDATA[By Alexander Melikishvili]]></description><link>https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/ukraines-black-sea-blockade-forces</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/ukraines-black-sea-blockade-forces</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[The Saratoga Foundation]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 14:08:16 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oOy9!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7077cd4e-83db-4021-9777-81c52e3b228b_1200x800.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oOy9!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7077cd4e-83db-4021-9777-81c52e3b228b_1200x800.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oOy9!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7077cd4e-83db-4021-9777-81c52e3b228b_1200x800.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oOy9!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7077cd4e-83db-4021-9777-81c52e3b228b_1200x800.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oOy9!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7077cd4e-83db-4021-9777-81c52e3b228b_1200x800.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oOy9!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7077cd4e-83db-4021-9777-81c52e3b228b_1200x800.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oOy9!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7077cd4e-83db-4021-9777-81c52e3b228b_1200x800.jpeg" width="1200" height="800" 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oOy9!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7077cd4e-83db-4021-9777-81c52e3b228b_1200x800.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oOy9!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7077cd4e-83db-4021-9777-81c52e3b228b_1200x800.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oOy9!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7077cd4e-83db-4021-9777-81c52e3b228b_1200x800.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oOy9!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7077cd4e-83db-4021-9777-81c52e3b228b_1200x800.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><strong>By Alexander Melikishvili</strong></p><p>For the first time since July 10, Russian authorities issued permits for vessels to depart from the ports of Temryuk and Kavkaz in the Sea of Azov, according to a Bloomberg <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-10-28/russia-grants-permission-for-grain-vessels-to-leave-azov-sea-mvsd0y7p">report</a> on October 28. Three industry sources quoted by the news agency claim that the Azov Sea Port Administration began issuing permits on October 26 and that at least one ship had passed through the Kerch Strait and entered the Black Sea. The report was corroborated by Reuters, as <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/10/28/russia-issues-permits-for-first-grain-vessels-to-leave-sea-of-azov-since-july-a94112">quoted</a> by <em>The Moscow Times</em>, also on October 28. Seven industry sources told Reuters that the permits would be issued only until November 15, and two of them added that the ships would be protected in the Black Sea by a Russian naval escort.</p><p>This announcement appears to have caught the Ukrainian side by surprise. Ukraine&#8217;s Minister of Agrarian Policy, Taras Vysotskyi, stated that his agency was verifying the information about the resumption of grain shipments by Russia via the Sea of Azov, Interfax-Ukraine <a href="https://interfax.com.ua/news/economic/1227838.html">reported</a> on October 29. The Ukrainian military has issued no statements indicating that it would unilaterally stop attacking Russian ships in the Black Sea or the Sea of Azov in the absence of reciprocal commitments from Russia. Prior to the deterioration of the security situation in the northern part of the Black Sea due to tit-for-tat attacks targeting commercial navigation by Russia and Ukraine, about one-third of Russia&#8217;s wheat exports passed via the Sea of Azov, reflecting its strategic importance.</p><p>In the absence of a comprehensive ceasefire or moratorium on naval attacks in the Black Sea, a one-off resumption of maritime traffic by Russia, even if true, does not resolve Moscow&#8217;s main problem, which is finding ways to export its bumper grain harvest that is <a href="https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/119375/">forecast to reach</a> 140 million tons in 2026. Even though Ukraine has repeatedly expressed a readiness to halt its attacks, Russia has demonstrated no willingness to reciprocate. Speaking at the annual Valdai Club meeting on October 1, Putin <a href="https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/russia-rejects-limited-black-sea-truce-227650">rejected</a> the proposal for a limited truce in the Black Sea. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov further confirmed this position on October 2, when he stated that &#8220;piecemeal arrangements&#8221; could not bring about &#8220;a peaceful settlement.&#8221; Russia links the cessation of its attacks against Ukraine-bound ships and Ukraine&#8217;s critical energy infrastructure not only to Kyiv&#8217;s halt of attacks on Russian refineries but also to the lifting of Western sanctions on Russian oil exports.</p><h4><strong>Looking North and East</strong></h4><p>The double blockade of the Black Sea forces Russia to seek alternative routes to transport grain, but these efforts are seriously restricted by geopolitical factors and infrastructure constraints. A good example of the former is Estonia&#8217;s decision to ban the transit of Russian and Belarusian grain, as <a href="https://x.com/Tsahkna/status/2105560252183687528">announced</a> by its foreign minister, Margus Tsahkna, on October 1. Moreover, on October 9, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/baltic-countries-seek-eu-ban-russian-grain-transit-2026-10-09/">proposed</a> introducing a European Union-wide ban on all Russian grain transit via the EU. Russia has five ports on the Baltic Sea (Ust-Luga, Primorsk, St. Petersburg, Vysotsk, and Kaliningrad). Still, their aggregate throughput capacity is<a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/8974255?ysclid=mvxv2n4org550336019"> limited</a> to only 7 million tons of grain per year. Although work is underway to expand port infrastructure to handle more grain, this will take some time and require considerable investment. In addition, grain will have to compete with other bulk dry cargo shipments, including coal and fertilizer.</p><p>As a result, Russia began exploring the northern or Arctic route. On October 28, it was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/russia-turns-arctic-ww2-route-export-grain-2026-10-28/">reported</a> that the port of Murmansk had received its first shipment of grain, amounting to 3,400 tons. This is likely intended for the Barbados-flagged dry bulk carrier New Born, which is <a href="https://ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/10/28/murmanskiy-port-otkryl-novyy-marshrut-eksporta-rossiyskogo-zerna-a209860">scheduled to deliver</a> 28,000 tons of wheat to Morocco, according to <em>The Moscow Times</em>. Russia has other ports along its vast northern coast, but Murmansk is the only one that remains ice-free throughout the year. In addition, other major northern ports are highly specialized in handling specific outbound cargo shipments (for example, Sabetta handles mostly LNG, while Dudinka handles metals and coal), and retrofitting their infrastructure to become multimodal is simply not economically feasible.</p><p>On September 12, Russian Agriculture Minister Oksana Lut <a href="https://iz.ru/2165964/v-minselkhoze-rf-soobshchili-ob-otsutstvii-problem-s-eksportom-rossiiskogo-zerna-izi">told</a> the Russian media that although the ports in the Far East had not been used for grain exports before, steps had been taken to &#8220;actively develop this direction,&#8221; without providing any details. She also denied that Russia was experiencing any problems with grain exports and noted that talks were underway with China to safeguard the transit of Russian grain for export to markets in Southeast Asia. Since then, however, there have been no reports in Russian media about Russian grain transits via China. Meanwhile, according to <a href="https://www.forbes.ru/biznes/569301-velikij-zernovoj-put-kak-rossia-perestraivaet-eksport-psenicy-na-vostok?ysclid=mvxzk7a3uc949842108&amp;utm_source=ya.ru&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_campaign=ya.ru&amp;utm_referrer=ya.ru">Forbes.ru</a>, the volume of grain exported via Russian ports in the Far East, including Vladivostok, reached only 734,000 tons in the first half of 2026.</p><p>Overland transit via Kazakhstan would seem like another option, but transporting grain in this direction is severely hampered by mutual <a href="https://kz.kursiv.media/en/2025-01-28/russia-seeks-tariff-agreement-with-kazakhstan-on-grain-transit/">disagreements</a> over tariffs for grain transit to countries outside the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia and Kazakhstan also have conflicting policy priorities, with the latter keenly interested in using Russian seaports to double its grain exports by 2028. Due to Ukraine&#8217;s <a href="https://glenhoward.substack.com/p/ukraines-asymmetric-drone-blitz-in">Black Sea naval blockade</a>, Russia naturally prioritizes its grain shipments rather than accommodating Kazakh grain exports. This has already resulted in Russia <a href="https://timesca.com/kazakh-grain-exports-russian-rail-bottleneck/">rejecting </a>Kazakhstan&#8217;s request to transport its grain via Russian railroads to the Estonian ports in October. Russia justified its refusal on the grounds of insufficient capacity in its railroad network.</p><p>Ukraine&#8217;s blockade of the Black Sea resulted in a 39.6% contraction in Russian wheat exports in July&#8211;October 2026 compared to the same period in 2025, as <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/9064207?ysclid=mvxzkns5p9794066800">reported</a> by Kommersant on October 30. Similarly, Russian barley and corn exports declined by 25% and 5.4%, respectively, during the same period year-on-year. Russia is mainly rerouting grain exports via its Baltic seaports, which now absorb 38.3% of wheat exports. The Caspian direction is also steadily growing, but there, again, infrastructure constraints do not allow for large volumes&#8212;the Russian analytical center Rusagrotrans estimates that only 582,000 tons of wheat were transported for export via the Caspian Sea in July&#8211;October 2026.</p><h4><strong>Outlook</strong></h4><p>Leaving aside the infrastructure bottlenecks at Russia&#8217;s northern, northwestern, and eastern seaports stemming from insufficient throughput capacity, rerouting grain exports substantially increases transportation costs, which ultimately must be borne by buyers or sellers. For example, freight charges for river-to-sea vessels transporting grain from Russia to Iran via the Caspian Sea <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/8989921?ysclid=mvz1awred518326695">increased</a> by 2.3&#8211;2.4 times. As of September 25, it cost $110-115 per ton to transport grain from Astrakhan to Iran (compared to $47 per ton in 2025).</p><p>Similarly, shipping grain from Russia&#8217;s Baltic ports to Morocco now costs $42 per ton&#8212;a 40 percent year-on-year increase. Measures offered by the Russian government to grain traders are <a href="https://ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/10/28/murmanskiy-port-otkryl-novyy-marshrut-eksporta-rossiyskogo-zerna-a209860">insufficient</a> because of increased transportation costs. Already in July, the Russian Ministry of Agriculture offered to subsidize 90% of rail costs, but because the full tariff for transporting grain from Russia&#8217;s Southern Federal District to Baltic ports is $80-120 per ton, even the remaining 10% ($8-12 per ton) represented a heavy burden on farmers.</p><p>The aggregate volume of announced state purchases of grain in 2026 is only on the order of 3 million tons, which also offers little relief given the size of the bumper crop. Russian authorities commenced state purchases on October 29, according to<a href="https://ukragroconsult.com/en/news/russian-grain-intervention-purchases-hampered-by-elevator-shortages-and-wheat-quality-risks/"> UkrAgroConsult</a>, but farmers&#8217; participation in trading sessions was limited due to a combination of systemic factors, including a shortage of storage silos, increased transportation costs, and red tape associated with obtaining approval to participate in auctions. As a result, only four trading sessions were organized instead of the eight scheduled.</p><p>The president of Russia&#8217;s Grain Union, Zlochevsky, <a href="https://www.fontanka.ru/2026/09/01/76618357/">estimates</a> that if its southern ports continue to remain idle, close to 40 million tons of grain will be stranded. Moreover, he adds that, under the best-case scenario, if all alternative routes are employed to the maximum, this will only allow compensation for the losses of not more than half of this volume. Overhauling port infrastructure to accommodate sharply increased grain volumes will take both time and money, which means that Russia is left with no short-term options.</p><p>Mounting logistical and economic pressures increase Moscow&#8217;s incentive to seek an accommodation, but it remains unclear whether the Kremlin will compromise on its broader strategic objectives (such as lifting Western sanctions or addressing &#8216;root causes&#8217;) in exchange for restoring maritime trade. Nevertheless, the growing costs of the Black Sea blockade could eventually make a limited truce an increasingly attractive option for Moscow. Following Zelensky&#8217;s <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/zelenskyy-says-he-agreed-with-president-erdogan-to-work-on-black-sea-grain-corridor/4107545">weekend visit</a> to T&#252;rkiye, this might even result in the revival of the Black Sea Grain Initiative from which Russia withdrew in 2023.</p><p><strong>About the Author:</strong></p><p>Alex Melikishvili is a senior country risk analyst with more than a decade of experience working in the private sector (S&amp;P Global, IHS Markit) with a focus on Eurasian security. Alex holds a master&#8217;s degree in International Affairs from the George Washington University&#8217;s Elliott School of International Affairs.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">This Substack is reader-supported. 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]]></title><description><![CDATA[By Michael Horton]]></description><link>https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/why-the-houthis-keep-winning-how</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/why-the-houthis-keep-winning-how</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[The Saratoga Foundation]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2026 12:45:24 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!eAh9!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99da518f-4e3f-4eac-a642-1b9ffa40b76d_1672x940.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>B<strong>y Michael Horton</strong></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!eAh9!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99da518f-4e3f-4eac-a642-1b9ffa40b76d_1672x940.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!eAh9!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99da518f-4e3f-4eac-a642-1b9ffa40b76d_1672x940.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!eAh9!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99da518f-4e3f-4eac-a642-1b9ffa40b76d_1672x940.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!eAh9!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99da518f-4e3f-4eac-a642-1b9ffa40b76d_1672x940.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>On October 26, Saudi Arabia&#8217;s defense minister, Prince Khalid bin Salman, who is also the younger full brother of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), flew to Tehran with Pakistan&#8217;s Chief of Army Staff General Syed Asim Munir and Turkey&#8217;s Director of the National Intelligence Organization (M&#304;T) &#304;brahim Kal&#305;n, whose countries joined the kingdom in signing the Mecca Defense Pact agreement in August. Riyadh called the trip an effort at de-escalation, but for all purposes the real aim of the trip was likely to ask Iran to rein in the Houthis. The prince <a href="https://www.israelhayom.com/2026/10/26/saudi-arabia-reportedly-offers-houthis-1-billion-in-iran-brokered-deal-to-halt-attacks/">reportedly brought</a> an offer of $1 billion for the Houthis, to be routed through Iran, while Riyadh has not confirmed this report. Eleven days earlier, a senior Saudi diplomat had said that <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/saudi-diplomat-says-iran-is-encouraging-houthi-escalation-of-attacks-on-the-kingdom">Iran was encouraging the Houthi attacks</a> and that the kingdom had not asked Tehran to mediate.</p><p>That reversal reflects how the war is going for Riyadh. The Houthis are winning again, and for the same reasons they won the last war. The forces arrayed against them, nominally under the recognized Government of Yemen (GoY), are divided, lack a unified command of their own, and are hollowed out by corruption that Saudi money has made worse. By contrast, the Houthi command is unified, and its local commanders have the authority to make battlefield decisions as required. Drones and missiles have only amplified the Houthis&#8217; advantage.</p><p>Meanwhile, the GoY&#8217;s offensive has stalled. Operation Dawn of Yemen, announced on October 4 with the stated aim of retaking Sanaa, <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/taiz-yemen-war/">lost momentum in its second week</a>. GoY forces retook positions around Dhubab and the Bab al-Mandeb but never consolidated their hold around Mokha, an important port on Yemen&#8217;s southern Red Sea coast, which the Houthis seized on September 10 and still control. The Houthis also hold the high ground above the Tihama, a low-lying coastal plain that stretches from the Bab al Mandeb to the Saudi border. Control over it leaves any GoY advance up the coast exposed and in danger of being outflanked. In Marib, GoY claims a handful of hills near the Maas camp and north of Harib. The defensive lines there, however, have scarcely moved in recent weeks.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IL91!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7f8ed2fc-414a-4a95-96b5-771d5c98e57b_866x552.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IL91!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7f8ed2fc-414a-4a95-96b5-771d5c98e57b_866x552.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IL91!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7f8ed2fc-414a-4a95-96b5-771d5c98e57b_866x552.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IL91!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7f8ed2fc-414a-4a95-96b5-771d5c98e57b_866x552.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IL91!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7f8ed2fc-414a-4a95-96b5-771d5c98e57b_866x552.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IL91!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7f8ed2fc-414a-4a95-96b5-771d5c98e57b_866x552.png" width="866" height="552" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/7f8ed2fc-414a-4a95-96b5-771d5c98e57b_866x552.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:552,&quot;width&quot;:866,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:228755,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/222521724?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F81f02f09-39bb-4d81-b616-6d08a51cb0fc_875x580.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" title="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IL91!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7f8ed2fc-414a-4a95-96b5-771d5c98e57b_866x552.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IL91!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7f8ed2fc-414a-4a95-96b5-771d5c98e57b_866x552.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IL91!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7f8ed2fc-414a-4a95-96b5-771d5c98e57b_866x552.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IL91!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7f8ed2fc-414a-4a95-96b5-771d5c98e57b_866x552.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>In recent weeks, the Houthis have tightened their grip on Taiz, Yemen&#8217;s third-largest city. On October 4, they took al-Turbah and cut the city&#8217;s main supply road to Aden. Al-Turbah is strategically important because it sits directly on the main highway connecting the city of Taiz with Aden (the interim seat of the internationally recognized Government of Yemen). Securing or severing this arterial road dictates whether forces in Taiz receive military reinforcements, humanitarian aid, and commercial goods. A week later, the Houthis had <a href="https://www.newarab.com/news/yemen-taiz-faces-humanitarian-disaster-houthis-tighten-siege">closed all four exits</a> from the GoY-held city. More than 600,000 people in and around Taiz are now beyond the World Food Program&#8217;s reach. Prices for basic goods have doubled, and fuel prices have tripled. By encircling Taiz rather than storming it, the Houthis tie down GoY forces and Saudi aircraft at little cost to themselves.</p><h4><strong>Another Flood of Cash</strong></h4><p>Saudi Arabia is once again trying to buy its way through a war in Yemen. By 2020, five years into its first war there, it had spent an estimated <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/a-fragile-but-enduring-truce-in-yemen/">$265 billion</a> and had not won. Much of that money went to <a href="https://www.newarab.com/analysis/yemen-only-houthis-can-defeat-houthis-now">allies who never formed a single army</a>. Islah-aligned forces which are broadly aligned with Yemen&#8217;s Islah party, held Marib. The separatists who held Aden took their money and their orders from Abu Dhabi, as did Tareq Saleh, who is the military commander of the National Resistance Force (NRF). Saleh is a member of Yemen&#8217;s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), and nephew of the late former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, and has built his own military force on the coast near Mocha. Their commanders <a href="https://jamestown.org/unwinnable-war-houthis-saudi-arabia-future-yemen/">answer first to their factions and their patrons</a>.</p><p>Little has changed with this influx of Saudi money. When the coast fell in September, Tareq Saleh withdrew to Aden, where southern units at first refused to let his men enter the city. The <a href="https://mei.edu/publication/riyadh-takes-the-helm-in-yemen/">Supreme Military Committee</a>, set up in January to reorganize and command GoY forces, is run by the Saudi-led coalition, not by GoY. Progress has been made in centralizing command, but Riyadh, rather than GoY, holds ultimate authority. This slows decision-making and places much of the authority in the hands of Saudi officers who have little experience operating in Yemen and who do not understand the country&#8217;s complex tribal dynamics. In the field, the strongest formations still answer to the commanders who formed them and to the factions those commanders serve. Now, the Emiratis, whom Riyadh forced out of Yemen last winter, have <a href="https://propakistani.pk/2026/10/18/uae-returns-to-yemen-war/">agreed to resume paying</a> some GoY forces in the south. Some southern commanders will now draw money from both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, further complicating loyalties and already murky chains of command.</p><p>The money from Saudi Arabia has only worsened the corruption. After the Emiratis left, Riyadh took over the salaries of tens of thousands of fighters paid by Abu Dhabi. The defense minister introduced a biometric payroll to purge ghost soldiers from its payrolls. Still, some commanders have resisted, reportedly because it would expose how many soldiers on their rolls do not exist. In August, the defense minister ordered those salaries be paid directly into soldiers&#8217; bank accounts rather than through their commanders. Some commanders threatened to pull their men off the front lines. One soldier said his last salary had been less than $40. Neither reform had cleaned up the rolls by September. When the Houthis attacked Mokha, some units there were <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2026/09/12/middleeast/yemen-houthi-saudi-us-blame-intl">close to 80% ghost soldiers</a>.</p><p>Much of the money never reaches the units fighting in the frontlines. In Marib, for example, which is a key oil producing region of Yemen, officers talk about farmhouses outside the city where commanders keep millions of riyals and dollars in cash, out of reach of auditors. Others continue to add to their property portfolios in Cairo, Egypt.</p><h4><strong>Tribal Threats Backfire</strong></h4><p>GoY has also handed the Houthis a remarkable gift. Last week, the defense ministry <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/10/22/houthi-recruitment-gatherings-are-legitimate-military-targets-yemen-warns/">warned</a> that Houthi-organized tribal gatherings, which it said were being used to recruit children, would be treated as legitimate military targets. The post was later deleted. The government called it an &#8220;erroneous and unacceptable statement,&#8221; and the defense minister apologized, saying tribal gatherings would not be targeted. The retraction did little though to repair the damage. In the highlands, tribal gatherings are how the tribes mobilize and settle their disputes. The Houthis seized on the statement as proof that Riyadh and its clients regard the tribes as targets. Before the fighting resumed, many sheiks in the outlying districts were reassessing their bargain with the Houthis. The threat to bomb tribal gatherings, combined with civilian casualties and perceptions of a Saudi alignment with Israel, will likely push many to continue their uneasy alliance with the Houthis.</p><p>The episode reinforced a perception that is already widespread in Yemen: that GoY takes its orders from Riyadh and remains more a Saudi tool than a Yemeni government. Saudi Arabia sponsored the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), which heads GoY, in 2022. Riyadh pays GoY&#8217;s soldiers, GoY&#8217;s offensive depends on Saudi aircraft, and its leaders spend long stretches of time in the Saudi capital. In contrast, the Houthis are deeply rooted in the socio-cultural matrix of Yemen&#8217;s northern highlands.</p><p><strong>A Mosaic Command</strong></p><p>The Houthi command does not share these weaknesses. Authority rests with Abdul-Malik al-Houthi and a small circle of advisers around him. Below that level, local commanders have wide latitude in choosing targets and timing. The structure was forged in the six Saada wars between 2004 and 2010, when the Houthis fought the Yemeni army in small units that had to act without orders from a leadership under constant threat. Iran calls its version mosaic defense. The Houthis practice their variant of this strategy daily on more than thirty fronts across contiguous territory, allowing them the flexibility to shift men and materiel from one front to another. In August 2025, Israeli strikes <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/10/israel-claims-responsibility-killing-houthi-military-chief-strike-what-know">killed the Houthis&#8217; prime minister</a>, Ahmad Ghaleb al-Rahwi, much of his cabinet, and the movement&#8217;s military chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Muhammad Abd al-Karim al-Ghamari. Nevertheless, the movement&#8217;s conduct did not change.</p><p>Another factor helping the Houthis is their superior intelligence services. When they seized Sanaa in 2014, they absorbed the state&#8217;s intelligence agencies, decades of files on Yemen&#8217;s elite, and many of the officers who had run the state&#8217;s human networks. Their Security and Intelligence Service (SIS) has since penetrated much of GoY and most of its military commands. During the September attack on Mokha, the Houthis ran a major deception operation feeding false withdrawal orders into a coastal command that had no joint operations room linking its five formations. Among them was a recording, <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/saudi-arabia-houthi/">apparently made with an AI-cloned voice</a>, in which the commander Tareq Saleh appeared to order his men to pull back.</p><p>Drones and missiles give the Houthis leverage over Riyadh. Saudi Arabia, roughly three times the size of Texas, offers a deep and rich target bank. In October alone, the Houthis struck or claimed strikes on airports in Riyadh, Dammam, Abha, and Najran and on Aramco facilities at Yanbu, Rabigh, Shaybah, and Dhahran. On October 8, a missile hit Riyadh&#8217;s airport, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/9/saudi-arabia-reopens-riyadh-airport-after-houthi-attack-kills-three">killing three people</a>, among them a captain for Saudia national airlines, and burning out a parked Saudia airliner. Two days later, another strike on the airport killed thirteen. With Hormuz effectively closed, the kingdom depends on the East-West pipeline and the port of Yanbu for its oil exports. Flows through the pipeline were <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/energy/2026/10/22/oil-tops-110-as-houthi-drone-strike-near-saudi-shaybah-field-rattles-markets/">reportedly halted on October 5</a> after a strike on a pumping station.</p><p>Saudi air defenses are limited and spread thin. Built mostly to face the threat from Iran, their interceptor stocks were drawn down early in the Iran Gulf war. Earlier this year, the kingdom ordered 730 Patriot missiles for $9 billion, or more than $12 million a missile, and restocking can take up to 30 months. Every battery that is moved to defend Riyadh, royal palaces, and other vanity projects leaves Jizan, Abha, or Yanbu more exposed.</p><p>Few easy targets remain in Yemen. On October 13, Saudi aircraft <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/13/houthis-threaten-saudi-arabias-aramco-facilities-and-airports">struck the Yemen Oil Company&#8217;s al-Sabah station</a> in Sanaa, which the coalition said was being used to store missiles and drones in underground fuel depots. The oil company said the tanks were empty. The Houthis are masters of physical and electronic camouflage, and many of their drone and missile production facilities are underground, in deep wadis, and under and within dense urban areas. On the ground, Riyadh is arming GoY-aligned forces with a wide range of drones, including first-person-view (FPV) drones, and these are inflicting losses on the Houthis. But the Houthis have FPV drones of their own and have been training with them far longer.</p><h4><strong>What Comes Next</strong></h4><p>The Houthis can continue striking Saudi Arabia for months. The war with Iran has already cut deeply into Saudi oil revenue, and the Houthi campaign compounds the damage. The IMF now <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/10/houthi-attacks-undermine-saudi-arabias-economic-ambitions">expects the Saudi economy to contract</a> by 3.3% this year; in July, it forecast 1.7% growth. The kingdom&#8217;s showcase for foreign investors, the Future Investment Initiative, has been canceled, and the United States has ordered non-emergency staff and their families to leave. The kingdom&#8217;s costs from damaged infrastructure, lost investor confidence, and curtailed exports could run into the tens, if not hundreds, of billions of dollars. No similar costs can be imposed on the Houthis. They rule what was the Arab world&#8217;s poorest country before the war began, and their leaders have lived under air attack, on and off, since 2004.</p><p>Yemen was a preview of what would happen in Iran, and both wars have exposed new limits on the ability of the United States to dictate the outcomes. In 2025, the United States launched Operation Rough Rider, which struck the Houthis more than 1,100 times in 52 days at a cost of over $1 billion. It also cost the U.S. seven MQ-9 Reaper drones shot down in its first six weeks, and ended in a ceasefire with the movement&#8217;s capabilities largely intact. The U.S.-Israeli war on Iran rested on the same assumption that enough firepower would force capitulation. Eight months on, the Iranian government is intact and is hosting the Saudi defense minister. Saudi Arabia should have learned the same lesson from its first war in Yemen. It did not, and it is failing again.</p><p>The weapons that exposed those limits are growing cheaper and more capable, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) is accelerating the process. For much of the past year, the Houthis have used AI to war-game scenarios, draft and test propaganda campaigns, and refine missile and drone designs. In September, Anthropic <a href="https://www.inquirer.com/news/nation-world/houthis-yemen-iran-weapons-development-manufacture-artificial-intelligence-claude-saudi-arabia-20260915.html">reported</a> that a group in Houthi-held northern Yemen had used its Claude model to write guidance and control software for a guided rocket, a long-range ballistic missile, and a hypersonic glide vehicle. Anthropic found no evidence that the group had fielded an operational weapon, but the group carried out a failed test of a guided rocket and built a simulation toolkit that runs without Claude. The Houthis, like Tehran, will learn from this war and refine their strategies and procurement for the next round of confrontation. According to a <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/houthi-missile-china-parts-5c2b2516">report on October13</a>, they are reportedly already seeking to build a more advanced medium-range ballistic missile with Chinese parts.</p><p>The Houthis are also <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/looking-west-the-houthis-expanding-footprint-in-the-horn-of-africa/">building greater strategic depth across the Red Sea</a>. They have deepened ties with al-Shabaab, whose fighters have reportedly <a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2026/09/al-shabaab-seeks-drones-from-houthis/">trained in Houthi-held areas</a> in drone operation and bomb making, and with factions in Sudan&#8217;s armed forces, whose personnel Houthi operatives have helped train on Iranian-designed drones. These groups are both clients and partners. They pay for Houthi weapons and expertise, and they help move materiel along smuggling routes in the Red Sea.</p><p>Lastly, Saudi Arabia has settled with its Yemeni enemies before. In 1970, it made peace with the republic it had fought for eight years. In 2023, it negotiated directly with the Houthis after seven years of bombing them. Now it is working through Tehran, which influences the Houthis but does not control them. In the end, Riyadh will likely buy the Houthis off and learn to live with them on its border, and the Houthis will come out of this war with more leverage than they had at its onset.</p><p><strong>About the Author:</strong></p><p>Michael Horton is the co-founder of Red Sea Analytics International (RSAI) and a contributing <a href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/a-sleeping-giant-awakens-saudi-counter">author</a> at <em>Eurasia Outlook</em>. He has two decades of experience as an analyst and researcher in Yemen and the Red Sea region. Michael has written policy briefs and conducted briefings and seminars for the US National Security Council, the British Foreign Ministry, the British Ministry of Defense, the US State Department, and senior members of the British Parliament and the US Congress. He has written extensively about the region for The Saratoga Foundation, Jane&#8217;s Intelligence Review, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Oxford Analytica, and The Economist.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">This Substack is reader-supported. 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Shahbazov]]></description><link>https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/tehrans-caspian-pivot-can-russia</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/tehrans-caspian-pivot-can-russia</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[The Saratoga Foundation]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 16:13:17 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RGWU!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F014f11cd-dd8c-4686-9a23-a3f3c9bf2aa3_1536x1024.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RGWU!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F014f11cd-dd8c-4686-9a23-a3f3c9bf2aa3_1536x1024.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RGWU!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F014f11cd-dd8c-4686-9a23-a3f3c9bf2aa3_1536x1024.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RGWU!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F014f11cd-dd8c-4686-9a23-a3f3c9bf2aa3_1536x1024.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RGWU!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F014f11cd-dd8c-4686-9a23-a3f3c9bf2aa3_1536x1024.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RGWU!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F014f11cd-dd8c-4686-9a23-a3f3c9bf2aa3_1536x1024.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RGWU!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F014f11cd-dd8c-4686-9a23-a3f3c9bf2aa3_1536x1024.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RGWU!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F014f11cd-dd8c-4686-9a23-a3f3c9bf2aa3_1536x1024.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RGWU!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F014f11cd-dd8c-4686-9a23-a3f3c9bf2aa3_1536x1024.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RGWU!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F014f11cd-dd8c-4686-9a23-a3f3c9bf2aa3_1536x1024.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><strong>By Fuad Shahbazov</strong></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Since the United States imposed <a href="https://www.turancenter.org/analysis/blockaded-in-the-south-iran-turns-north-and-into-russia-s-grip">a near-total blockade of Iran&#8217;s</a> major southern ports to stop the exports of Iranian crude oil, Tehran has increasingly turned to northern routes to circumvent the Gulf blockade and maintain a certain level of crude oil exports as well as imports of key commodities, such as grain. Indeed, since August, the Iranian economy has been severely affected by the American naval blockade, as relatively few Iranian oil tankers have managed to escape the Persian Gulf. As a result, China <a href="https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Irans-Disappearing-Oil-Is-Becoming-Everyones-Problem.html">received 980,000</a> barrels per day of Iranian oil in August but only 475,000 in September, with no arrivals since September 26. In the long term, the collapse of Iranian crude oil exports has boosted spiraling inflation inside Iran, taking a heavy toll on domestic social spending programs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In this vein, Iran is increasingly looking <a href="https://news.az/news/iran-turns-to-caspian-sea-as-blockade-disrupts-trade">to alternative northern trade routes</a>, particularly the Caspian corridor, to facilitate oil exports and secure imports of essential goods. However, given that the country&#8217;s principal export infrastructure and energy terminals are concentrated along its southern coastline, a meaningful northward shift would require substantial adjustments to existing transportation, logistics, and supply-chain networks. Nevertheless, at this stage, Iran&#8217;s Caspian route remains the only viable route for moving large volumes of cargo without American interdiction.</p><h4 style="text-align: justify;">Iran Turns Northward to Bandar Anzali</h4><p style="text-align: justify;">Following the outbreak of war with the United States in February 2026, and the extensive missile strikes <a href="https://breakbulk.news/caspian-sea-cargo-volumes-surge-as-iran-reroutes-trade-from-blockaded-hormuz/">that severely disrupted Iran&#8217;s</a> transportation and maritime infrastructure, Tehran accelerated its efforts to modernize and expand its northern port facilities, particularly Bandar Anzali and other Caspian ports, intending to reroute essential food imports and strategic cargo through the Caspian corridor. Indeed, Russia appears to be the main partner of Iran in this regard. <a href="https://breakbulk.news/caspian-sea-cargo-volumes-surge-as-iran-reroutes-trade-from-blockaded-hormuz/">According to the RusIranExpo company</a>, two million tons of Russian wheat previously shipped annually via the Black Sea are now transiting the Caspian instead. According to earlier data, during the 2024&#8211;2025 agricultural season, Russia exported approximately 1.3 million tons of wheat to Iran, of which only 64,000 tons passed through Caspian ports, while approximately 1.2 million tons went through Black Sea ports. Therefore, the potential redirection of 2 million tons of Russian wheat through the Caspian corridor would represent more than a thirtyfold increase over the previous season&#8217;s Caspian wheat shipments. This illustrates the scale of the proposed logistical shift and the growing strategic importance of the Caspian corridor to Iranian food security and trade connectivity.</p><p>Consequently, the <a href="https://breakbulk.news/caspian-sea-cargo-volumes-surge-as-iran-reroutes-trade-from-blockaded-hormuz/">Caspian corridor has</a> assumed both commercial and strategic significance for Moscow and Tehran, serving not only as a conduit for oil exports and essential goods imports but also as a channel for the transfer of military-related components, including drone technology, aimed at supporting Iran&#8217;s efforts to restore its offensive capabilities amid the ongoing conflict. The Iranian Economy Minister <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/can-iran-replace-sea-trade-with-land-routes/a-79211179">Ali Madanizadeh</a>, during his visit to Moscow on September 6, 2026, emphasized this point by reiterating his country&#8217;s commitment to activate its northern borders, while scaling down trade operations but not fully abandoning Iranian commercial activity along its southern littoral.</p><p>Nevertheless, one critical question remains unanswered: whether Iran&#8217;s northern ports have sufficient capacity to handle this shift amid regional geopolitical volatility. In other words, <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609305707">bringing goods into northern</a> Iran does not automatically provide the terminals, pipelines and shipping arrangements needed to move Iranian crude to international buyers, as the northern ports only have approximately 30 million tons of capacity. In this context, the key question is not whether Iran&#8217;s Caspian ports can operate as trade hubs, but whether the northern route route can serve the same economic purpose at a comparable scale as the southern ports on the Persian Gulf. Moreover, in September, Masoud Polmeh, secretary-general of the Shipping Association of Iran, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/9/27/can-iran-shift-trade-north-to-caspian-sea-as-war-impairs-strait-of-hormuz">told state-linked media that Iran&#8217;s</a> northern ports, which could once handle vessels weighing up to 6,000 tons, can now handle only 4,000-ton vessels, which is likely due to <a href="https://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/05/caspian-water-level-falling-so-fast.html">reduced water levels</a> in the Caspian.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Tehran&#8217;s ongoing efforts to restore its oil export capacity through alternative and relatively secure northern routes indicate a broader strategy aimed at mitigating the geopolitical risks and sustaining crude oil exports, albeit at reduced volumes. Despite Iran&#8217;s recent agreements with Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Tajikistan <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/irans-attempts-to-get-around-the-hormuz-blockade-are-hitting-a-wall-c1f42cbe">to expand overland trade connectivity</a>, these corridors remain costly and constrained by limited transportation capacity, making the diversion of large volumes of trade from traditional maritime routes both economically inefficient and logistically challenging.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Considering these dynamics, Iran is increasingly seeking to deepen its partnership with Russia in order to expand trade volumes through the Caspian corridor. Recent trends underscore the growing importance of this route: shipments from Russia across the Caspian have risen steadily since the spring, with the number of active Russian- and Iranian-flagged vessels <a href="https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1158593/Conflict-pushes-Russia-Iran-trade-deeper-into-the-Caspian">increasing by 21%</a> year-on-year in August, while general cargo capacity expanded by an estimated 36%.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This surge in trade reflects Tehran&#8217;s growing reliance on northern transit routes. However, the Caspian corridor is unlikely to accommodate export volumes comparable to <a href="https://economy.ac/news/2026/09/202609295753">those traditionally handled</a> through Iran&#8217;s southern ports due to the landlocked nature of the Caspian Sea, limited port infrastructure, and a shortage of maritime vessels. These structural constraints not only restrict the overall volume of cargo that can be transported but also narrow the range of goods that can be traded, crude oil and petroleum products that require larger shipping capacities.</p><h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Outlook</strong></h4><p style="text-align: justify;">To bolster their trade connectivity Iran and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/9/27/can-iran-shift-trade-north-to-caspian-sea-as-war-impairs-strait-of-hormuz">Russia must urgently modernize</a> their Caspian port infrastructure if they seek to significantly expand bilateral trade and facilitate larger volumes of crude oil shipments. This would require substantial investment in port and transport infrastructure, including the construction of a dedicated container terminal at Astrakhan, the replacement of largely Soviet-era cargo-handling equipment, and the expansion of rail connectivity linking Russian ports with Iran&#8217;s northern gateways, particularly Bandar Anzali.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">From Moscow&#8217;s perspective, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/can-iran-replace-sea-trade-with-land-routes/a-79211179">Tehran&#8217;s growing dependence</a> on the Caspian corridor provides it with additional political and economic leverage, as the Kremlin understands that Iran currently possesses few viable alternatives for sustaining large-scale trade flows. Moreover, the prospect of replacing maritime oil exports with land-based transportation <a href="https://economy.ac/news/2026/09/202609295753">remains economically</a> and logistically unrealistic. While a single large crude tanker can transport between around 2 million barrels of oil, replicating such capacity by road would require thousands of tanker trucks, highlighting the continued indispensability of maritime routes for Iranian energy exports.</p><p>In the final analysis, the Caspian route is <a href="https://thearabweekly.com/russia-helps-iran-rebuild-war-arsenal-through-caspian-sea-reports-says">emerging as the key link</a> between the Moscow-Tehran axis, while challenging the West, namely the US, by demonstrating how this maritime corridor can be used to restore Iran&#8217;s military capacity and oil exports despite long-standing sanctions. These dynamics would enable Russia to further deepen its strategic partnership with Iran, even though it is suffering from a huge budget deficit and growing international pressure.</p><p><strong>About the Author:</strong></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Fuad Shahbazov is a political scientist and analyst focused on regional security in Eurasia and the Middle East. He holds a master&#8217;s degree in Political Science from Vytautas Magnus University, a professional master&#8217;s degree in Terrorism and Countering Religious Radicalization from the University of Bergamo, and a master&#8217;s degree in Defense and Diplomacy from Durham University.</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/tehrans-caspian-pivot-can-russia?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:&quot;button-wrapper&quot;}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary button-wrapper" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/tehrans-caspian-pivot-can-russia?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:&quot;button-wrapper&quot;}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary button-wrapper" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><div><hr></div><p>Thank you for your support! Please remember that The Saratoga Foundation is a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization. Your donations are fully tax-deductible. If you seek to support The Saratoga Foundation, you can make a one-time donation by clicking on the PayPal link below! You can also subscribe to our <a href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/">website</a> to support our work.</p><p><a href="https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA">https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA</a></p><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Ukrainian Drone Strikes Over Maykop Coincide with Forced Conscription Drive in the North Caucasus]]></title><description><![CDATA[By Valery Dzutsati]]></description><link>https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/ukrainian-drone-strikes-over-maykop</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/ukrainian-drone-strikes-over-maykop</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[The Saratoga Foundation]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 13:02:40 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!mDg_!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F094869a1-c5e2-4d33-96f3-c340cd00fefe_1376x768.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!mDg_!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F094869a1-c5e2-4d33-96f3-c340cd00fefe_1376x768.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!mDg_!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F094869a1-c5e2-4d33-96f3-c340cd00fefe_1376x768.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!mDg_!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F094869a1-c5e2-4d33-96f3-c340cd00fefe_1376x768.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!mDg_!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F094869a1-c5e2-4d33-96f3-c340cd00fefe_1376x768.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!mDg_!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F094869a1-c5e2-4d33-96f3-c340cd00fefe_1376x768.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!mDg_!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F094869a1-c5e2-4d33-96f3-c340cd00fefe_1376x768.jpeg" width="1376" height="768" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/094869a1-c5e2-4d33-96f3-c340cd00fefe_1376x768.jpeg&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:768,&quot;width&quot;:1376,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:946728,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/jpeg&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/221373257?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F094869a1-c5e2-4d33-96f3-c340cd00fefe_1376x768.jpeg&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!mDg_!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F094869a1-c5e2-4d33-96f3-c340cd00fefe_1376x768.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!mDg_!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F094869a1-c5e2-4d33-96f3-c340cd00fefe_1376x768.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!mDg_!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F094869a1-c5e2-4d33-96f3-c340cd00fefe_1376x768.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!mDg_!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F094869a1-c5e2-4d33-96f3-c340cd00fefe_1376x768.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><strong><a href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/149778185/valeriy-dzutsati">By Valery Dzutsati</a></strong></p><p>On the night of October 4, 2026, a large-scale Ukrainian drone strike targeted the <a href="https://ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/10/04/ukraina-atakovala-voennii-aerodrom-vadigee-a207712">Khanskaya</a> military airfield, situated about 6 kilometers from the city of Maykop, the capital of the Republic of Adygea in the North Caucasus. Residents reported that the attack persisted throughout the night, prompting the activation of air raid sirens and causing multiple explosions and a large fire at the facility.</p><p>The <a href="https://t.me/SBUkr/18735">Security Service of Ukraine</a> (SBU) officially confirmed the attack, stating that their long-range drones successfully struck the airfield from a distance of roughly 500 kilometers (311 miles) from Ukrainian-controlled territory to the Khanskaya airfield. According to the SBU and subsequent satellite imagery analysis, the raid successfully hit and destroyed a Su-35 multirole fighter and a Su-34 fighter-bomber, along with an active ammunition depot on the base. The SBU emphasized the importance of destroying these specific aircraft because they serve as the primary carriers for Russian guided glide bombs, which Russian forces heavily rely upon in their frontline air strikes against Ukrainian cities.</p><p>The head of the Republic of Adygea, Murat Kumpilov, <a href="https://t.me/muratkumpilov/21959">played down</a> the gravity of the attack, stating that Russian air defenses intercepted and destroyed 28 Ukrainian drones in the Maykop area. He maintained that there were no casualties, noting only minor damage to the roofs and windows of several private homes. It is common for Russian officials to diminish the damage caused by Ukrainian attacks and exaggerate the number of destroyed Ukrainian drones. The Khanskaya airfield remains a vital strategic target for Ukraine. It also serves as a crucial refueling, training, and logistical hub hosting various Russian tactical aviation assets, including Su-30, Su-24, Su-34, and An-12 aircraft.</p><h4>Rising North Caucasus Casualties in Russia&#8217;s Ukraine War</h4><p>While the Khanskaya airfield has been attacked before, the October 2026 attack was apparently the most <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/post/86087">devastating</a> to date in this westernmost Russian republic in the North Caucasus. Perhaps more importantly, the Ukrainian drone strike also stands to bring Moscow&#8217;s war in Ukraine back to the North Caucasus as Moscow continues an intense mobilization drive to recruit and conscript soldiers for its five-year-old war in Ukraine. The timing of the attack occurs as six residents of Kabardino-Balkaria (KBR) were recently <a href="https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/427471">killed</a> while serving in Ukraine. </p><p>According to Caucasian Knot&#8217;s calculations, 483 servicemen from Kabardino-Balkaria alone have been killed in the Russian war against Ukraine as of mid-October. However, the joint project of Mediazona and BBC Russian Service puts the region's casualty count much higher at 862 as of October 7, 2026. Adygea alone has lost 652 people, while the North Caucasus republic of Karachay-Cherkessia has lost 541 people.</p><p>Circassian activists say that the Russian authorities forcibly mobilize <a href="https://www.facebook.com/share/v/14tHW2LhHyA/">Circassians</a> to fight in Ukraine. At the time of partial mobilization in the Russian Federation in the fall of 2022, Circassian women staged protests, and some were even <a href="https://www.svoboda.org/a/pravozaschitniki-kabardino-balkarii-potrebovali-ostanovitj-mobilizatsiyu-v-respublike/32084736.html">detained</a>. Circassian human rights activists have repeatedly appealed to Russian authorities to cease mobilization in Kabardino-Balkaria. The largest protests in the North Caucasus at the time of the partial mobilization took place in Dagestan. The then head of <a href="https://www.rbc.ru/politics/26/09/2022/6331b7e69a7947e567897d99">Dagestan</a>, Sergei Melikov, dismissed the protests as foreign-inspired events, as protesters <a href="https://meduza.io/news/2022/09/25/v-dagestane-zhiteli-perekryli-federalnuyu-trassu-protestuya-protiv-mobilizatsii-politsiya-otkryla-strelbu-v-vozduh">blocked</a> highways and clashed with the police.</p><h4>Russia&#8217;s &#8220;Quiet Mobilization&#8221; Drive in the North Caucasus</h4><p>Since the fall 2022 partial mobilization, Russian authorities have stopped large-scale and open mobilization efforts. However, activists claim that an undercover mobilization continues. Authorities in Kabardino-Balkaria have vehemently denied the accusations that a &#8220;quiet mobilization&#8221; is occurring in the republic. </p><p>Military Commissar of Kabardino-Balkaria Dmitry Pakhomov has tried to reassure its residents by stating that ongoing recruitment into the human mobilization resource reserve is a routine, strictly voluntary program rather than a covert <a href="https://kbrria.ru/obshchestvo/VoennyykomissarKBRDmitriyPakhomovoformirovaniimobilizatsionnogolyudskogorezerva1922">mobilization</a>. Pakhomov stated that reservists are tasked exclusively with protecting critical local infrastructure and countering drone threats in Kabardino-Balkaria, while retaining their civilian employment and receiving compensation equivalent to military contractors during specialized training.</p><p>At the same time, Pakhomov made several statements that highlight the exact type of &#8220;quiet mobilization&#8221; he had denied. The reservists are expected to voluntarily sign three- or five-year contracts, and the Military Commissar insisted that they cannot be dispatched to the war zone. Yet, he simultaneously confirmed that these contractors are legally equated to military personnel&#8212;a measure allegedly intended to ensure they can be held fully accountable while on duty.</p><h4>Outlook</h4><p>Conflicting assertions by Pakhomov contradict the well-documented track record of how Russia&#8217;s Ministry of Defense is managing localized military <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/how-russias-military-uses-volunteer-fighters-plug-gaps-ukraine-2024-02-24/">assets</a>. The historical precedent of Russia&#8217;s Combat Army Reserve (<a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&amp;source=web&amp;rct=j&amp;url=https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/01/15/glory-hunters-or-gold-diggers-the-shadowy-world-of-russias-volunteers-fighting-in-ukraine-a79766&amp;ved=2ahUKEwiE04ekur-XAxVcrokEHQRSB_YQy_kOegYIAAgQEAw&amp;opi=89978449&amp;cd&amp;psig=AOvVaw3dhqYN79LCHGN9FULr9BQa&amp;ust=1792271638524000">BARS</a>)&#8212;the precise reserve system Pakhomov is recruiting for&#8212;demonstrates exactly how these regional promises of army recruits serving locally function as a bureaucratic bait-and-switch operation designed to lure the locals into serving in the Russian army. </p><p>When BARS was initially created, volunteers were assured they would remain in their home regions to protect local infrastructure while keeping their civilian jobs; yet, immediately following the large-scale 2022 Russian re-invasion of Ukraine, these localized units were aggregated into volunteer <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&amp;source=web&amp;rct=j&amp;url=https://kyivindependent.com/russia-claims-to-repel-attack-on-kursk-belgorod-oblasts-amid-reports-on-anti-kremlin-militia-operation/&amp;ved=2ahUKEwiE04ekur-XAxVcrokEHQRSB_YQy_kOegYIAAgZEAs&amp;opi=89978449&amp;cd&amp;psig=AOvVaw3dhqYN79LCHGN9FULr9BQa&amp;ust=1792271638524000">battalions</a> and deployed directly into heavy front-line combat in Ukraine. Similarly, localized Territorial Defense forces in the Belgorod and Kursk border regions were quickly subsumed into active combat roles once regional security degenerated, while Rosgvardiya&#8212;originally a domestic internal security force&#8212;was rapidly deployed to the front lines as conventional infantry.</p><p>Because Russia&#8217;s military leadership forced all irregular, regional, and volunteer formations to sign direct military contracts, it gained the absolute legal authority to override local agreements. For a volunteer in Kabardino-Balkaria, signing a multi-year contract that &#8220;equates them to military personnel&#8221; means entering a rigid chain of command. If Moscow shifts its directives&#8212;as it has done repeatedly throughout this conflict&#8212;any regional reservist who refuses a subsequent order to deploy to the front line would legally constitute insubordination or desertion under the strict provisions of the Russian Military Criminal Code, carrying severe prison sentences. </p><p>Ultimately, Pakhomov&#8217;s emphasis on legal military accountability reveals that this regional anti-drone reserve is less of a local defensive shield and more of a gateway structure designed to facilitate covert enlistment under the radar. This supports Circassian activists&#8217; claims of quiet mobilization, indicating both the war's unpopularity and deep local distrust toward Russian authorities. Local anger has surged further following the forced mobilization and reported death of Syrian-Circassian repatriant  <a href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/putins-conscription-drive-in-north">Nurdin Qaraf in Nalchik</a>.  When his father publicly sought answers, Russian officials threatened him while state media attempted to spin Qaraf&#8217;s forced service as a patriotic duty&#8212;igniting fury both in the North Caucasus and throughout the overseas diaspora, where many sympathize with Ukrainian resistance against Russian rule.</p><p>Consequently, the October 4 Ukrainian drone attack on the Khanskaya airfield near Maykop comes at a pivotal moment of heightened tension across Adygea and the broader North Caucasus. By bringing the physical reality of the war directly to Maykop just as Moscow doubles down on forced conscription, the strike serves as a stark catalyst&#8212;linking the physical destruction of Russian strike aircraft on the ground to the growing regional backlash against the war's mounting human cost.</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/ukrainian-drone-strikes-over-maykop?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/ukrainian-drone-strikes-over-maykop?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p>Thank you for your support! Please remember that The Saratoga Foundation is a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization. Your donations are fully tax-deductible. If you seek to support The Saratoga Foundation, you can make a one-time donation by clicking on the PayPal link below! You can also subscribe to our <a href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/">website</a> to support our work.</p><p><a href="https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA">https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA</a></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Aliyev Doctrine: How Azerbaijan Defends Its Secular Identity Against Politicized Religion]]></title><description><![CDATA[Iranian meddling through its clerical networks, propaganda, and efforts is increasingly challenging Azerbaijan&#8217;s state-backed secularism.]]></description><link>https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/the-aliyev-doctrine-how-azerbaijan</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/the-aliyev-doctrine-how-azerbaijan</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[The Saratoga Foundation]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2026 17:14:51 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!miwc!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e2375c3-32c8-40d9-964d-f99146de309f_1080x710.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!miwc!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e2375c3-32c8-40d9-964d-f99146de309f_1080x710.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!miwc!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e2375c3-32c8-40d9-964d-f99146de309f_1080x710.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!miwc!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e2375c3-32c8-40d9-964d-f99146de309f_1080x710.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!miwc!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e2375c3-32c8-40d9-964d-f99146de309f_1080x710.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!miwc!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e2375c3-32c8-40d9-964d-f99146de309f_1080x710.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!miwc!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e2375c3-32c8-40d9-964d-f99146de309f_1080x710.png" width="1080" height="710" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/5e2375c3-32c8-40d9-964d-f99146de309f_1080x710.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:710,&quot;width&quot;:1080,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1499523,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/221165141?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e2375c3-32c8-40d9-964d-f99146de309f_1080x710.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!miwc!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e2375c3-32c8-40d9-964d-f99146de309f_1080x710.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!miwc!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e2375c3-32c8-40d9-964d-f99146de309f_1080x710.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!miwc!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e2375c3-32c8-40d9-964d-f99146de309f_1080x710.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!miwc!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5e2375c3-32c8-40d9-964d-f99146de309f_1080x710.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><em><strong>By Vasif Huseynov</strong></em></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Over the past month, Azerbaijan has been tested on a front that draws far less attention in Western capitals than its energy diplomacy or its peace process with Armenia. On September 21, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted <a href="https://jam-news.net/take-off-your-hijab-and-come-into-class-what-is-happening-in-azerbaijans-schools/">Resolution No. 309</a>, which prohibits clothing items in state schools that conflict with the uniform dress code and the principle of secular education, and on October 6 the government approved <a href="https://edu.gov.az/uploads/NK/2026/Nk-qerar-325.pdf">parallel dress requirements for teachers</a>. The measures drew limited protests at home and a louder reaction abroad, including a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/12/azerbaijans-school-hijab-ban-whats-behind-it-and-whats-next">demonstration outside the Azerbaijani consulate in Istanbul</a> on October 3.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">President Ilham Aliyev had already framed the issue in strategic terms. Addressing the <a href="https://en.apa.az/official-news/8th-congress-of-new-azerbaijan-party-held-updated-2-527721">8th Congress of the ruling New Azerbaijan Party</a> on October 2, he described ideological security <a href="https://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/4230861.html">as vital as physical security</a>, noting the country must protect itself from subversive provocations first and foremost through education, and insisted that Azerbaijan must shape its foreign policy so that <a href="https://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/4230420.html">no one interferes in its internal affairs</a>. This reflects the essence of what is emerging as <a href="https://theliberum.com/the-ilham-aliyev-doctrine-how-azerbaijan-defines-its-place-in-the-world/">the Aliyev doctrine</a>: whereby a state is truly independent only when it relies on its own resources, engages every center of power without subordinating itself to any, and neither practices nor tolerates interference in the internal affairs of others. Applied to religion, the doctrine means that the state guarantees freedom of belief, but it will not allow faith to become a vehicle for foreign political projects or a tool for dismantling the constitutional order.</p><h4>Secularism as a Foundation of Statehood</h4><p style="text-align: justify;">Secularism is not an administrative preference in Azerbaijan. It is one of the foundations of its statehood. The <a href="https://justice.gov.az/senedler/45?culture=en">Constitution</a> defines the republic as a secular state, separates religion from the state, and establishes that the country&#8217;s education system is secular. These principles were not imposed from the outside. In 1918, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic became the <a href="https://www.pacificcouncil.org/node/1762">first democracy in the Muslim world</a> and the first country in the Muslim world to grant women the right to vote, an important milestone in gender equality and women&#8217;s participation in public life. That heritage is visible in Baku&#8217;s public spaces, including the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statue_of_a_Liberated_Woman">Statue of a Liberated Woman</a>, which depicts a woman removing her headscarf.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Secularism is also a practical necessity. About <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/12/azerbaijans-school-hijab-ban-whats-behind-it-and-whats-next">96 percent</a> of Azerbaijanis identify as Muslim, divided between Shia and Sunni communities, alongside long-established Jewish and Christian minorities. In such a society, a neutral state keeps confessional differences from becoming political fault lines. Iraq, Lebanon and Syria show what happens when sect becomes the organizing principle of politics: the state is hollowed out and foreign patrons move in.</p><h4>The School Uniform Debate</h4><p style="text-align: justify;">Developments with school uniform amendments in Azerbaijan should be read in this light. These restrictions are not directed at any specific religion. They reflect Azerbaijan&#8217;s long-standing secular traditions and aim to uphold a unified dress code and the secular foundations of education. They are also consistent with the country&#8217;s multicultural traditions, maintaining a neutral educational environment in which pupils of different religious and ethnic backgrounds are treated equally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">While some protests have occurred, they mostly represent a relatively small minority, and some demonstrators may have received external support. More surprising than the domestic response was the reaction abroad, where the Istanbul demonstration was accompanied by a campaign on Turkish social media. Yet T&#252;rkiye&#8217;s ruling AK party quickly stated that the groups opposing Azerbaijan had no ties to the party or the government. Azerbaijan and T&#252;rkiye remain close allies bound by strong historical, cultural and fraternal ties, and it is not expected that this issue may affect allied bilateral relations. Teachers and pupils have already begun complying with the new regulations, and the situation remains stable. This leaves therefore no compelling reason for the government to revise the amendments at this stage.</p><h4>Iranian Interference Inside Azerbaijan</h4><p style="text-align: justify;">Baku&#8217;s firm stance on this issue is rooted in experience. Since independence, some external actors, primarily Iran, have sought to extend its religious-political model northward, not only by funding mosques and seminaries, but by cultivating loyalty to Iran&#8217;s Supreme Leader among Azerbaijani believers. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei maintained a personal representative in Baku from 1996, with an office housed inside a city mosque, until the authorities <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijan-shuts-iran-mosque-tensions/31494553.html">sealed the premises in 2021</a>. By 2017, official data cited in the local press showed that <a href="https://eurasianet.org/s/azerbaijan-wrestles-with-rising-iranian-influence">22 of the country&#8217;s 150 Shia madrassas</a> were under Iranian control, and government-linked media accused Iranian intelligence of recruiting Azerbaijani pilgrims in Karbala for anti-government propaganda.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Meanwhile, Iranian clerical and military voices have repeatedly inserted themselves into Azerbaijan&#8217;s domestic debates. When an earlier attempt to regulate school dress prompted a <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacja/18862/pdf">protest outside the Education Ministry in December 2010</a>, Grand Ayatollah Jafar Sobhani <a href="https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/234173">wrote from Qom</a> to President Aliyev demanding that the measure be revoked. In 2011, leaders of the banned Islamic Party of Azerbaijan <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran_declines_comment_baku_islamic_activist_accusations/24297463.html">stood trial</a> for calling for the overthrow of the secular government, while associates were accused of running an unregistered religious group funded through the Iranian cultural center in Baku. That same week, Azerbaijan summoned Iran&#8217;s ambassador after the chief of Iran&#8217;s armed forces general staff publicly accused the Azerbaijani government of acting against Islamic principles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The seminaries of Qom have also served as a recruiting ground. The Iran-backed militia Husseiniyon was <a href="https://jamestown.org/husseiniyon-a-profile-of-the-iranian-backed-militia-threatening-azerbaijan/">founded in Qom in 2016</a> by a cleric from Azerbaijan among Azerbaijani seminary students, who were given military training and sent to fight in Syria. Its name, &#8220;Islamic Resistance in Azerbaijan,&#8221; was reportedly chosen by Qasem Soleimani, the former commander of Iran&#8217;s Revolutionary Guards Force (IRGC) Quds Force, based on the model of Hezbollah, and its leader was received by Ayatollah Khamenei in 2017. The group openly rejects Azerbaijan&#8217;s secular government.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0Nu3!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7551513c-61e4-485d-863f-c3b63faa0d3a_958x586.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0Nu3!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7551513c-61e4-485d-863f-c3b63faa0d3a_958x586.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0Nu3!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7551513c-61e4-485d-863f-c3b63faa0d3a_958x586.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0Nu3!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7551513c-61e4-485d-863f-c3b63faa0d3a_958x586.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0Nu3!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7551513c-61e4-485d-863f-c3b63faa0d3a_958x586.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0Nu3!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7551513c-61e4-485d-863f-c3b63faa0d3a_958x586.png" width="958" height="586" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/7551513c-61e4-485d-863f-c3b63faa0d3a_958x586.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:586,&quot;width&quot;:958,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1130146,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/221165141?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc06661be-17cb-478d-b154-c4c0f26cb465_964x683.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0Nu3!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7551513c-61e4-485d-863f-c3b63faa0d3a_958x586.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0Nu3!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7551513c-61e4-485d-863f-c3b63faa0d3a_958x586.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0Nu3!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7551513c-61e4-485d-863f-c3b63faa0d3a_958x586.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0Nu3!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7551513c-61e4-485d-863f-c3b63faa0d3a_958x586.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p style="text-align: justify;">*A woman in a Chador walks past a Shia mosque in Nardaran, near Baku. Source: <a href="https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-islamic-party-trial-brings-fresh-scrutiny-to-religious-hamlet">Eurasianet</a>. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Indoctrination has repeatedly turned into violence. In November 2015, a security operation in the Baku suburb of Nardaran against the Muslim Unity Movement ended in deadly clashes when the radical group attacked police officers. According to the authorities, the movement had armed its supporters and <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/caucasus-report-azerbaijan-theologian-plotted-coup/27393340.html">sought to overthrow the constitutional order</a> and establish &#8220;a religious state under Shari&#8217;a law,&#8221; while officials said its leader tried to import the values of a foreign state. Moreover, in July 2018, an <a href="https://eurasianet.org/attacks-in-azerbaijan-raise-accusations-of-islamist-extremism-government-skullduggery">attack by a radical on the mayor of Ganja</a> was followed by the killing of two police officers. The government said the suspect had spent eight months in Iran and fought in Syria, seeking to establish an Islamic state under Sharia law. In early 2023, after a gunman stormed the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran, <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijan-iran-spy-network/32249571.html">dozens of people were detained</a> inside Azerbaijan after being accused of spying for Iran in a network suspected of using religion to spread pro-Iranian propaganda. Weeks later, authorities linked the shooting of parliamentarian Fazil Mustafa, a vocal critic of Iran, to an <a href="https://oc-media.org/?p=34404">Iran-directed network</a> that allegedly planned to establish a religious state and financed its activities through drug trafficking.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The threat is not limited to one sect. In January 2026, for example, the State Security Service <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/27/azerbaijan-arrests-three-people-over-planned-embassy-attack-in-baku">arrested three people</a> linked to the Islamic State&#8217;s Khorasan branch over a planned attack on the Israeli embassy in Baku. Whether Shia or Sunni in orientation, movements that seek to politicize religion treat Azerbaijan&#8217;s secular model as an obstacle to be removed.</p><h4>Iranian Networks Test Azerbaijan</h4><p style="text-align: justify;">These debates unfold against the most volatile regional backdrop in decades. During the recent Gulf War III in and around Iran, drones launched from Iranian territory struck the Azerbaijani enclave of Nakhchivan on March 5, an attack President Aliyev <a href="https://www.caucasianknot.org/articles/73333">called an act of terrorism</a>, in reference to the 2023 assault on the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A weakened Iran has fewer conventional options, which makes its low-cost instruments more valuable: seminaries that train Azerbaijani students, informal funding channels, clerical networks able to turn a local grievance into a cause and, above all, Azerbaijani-language media frequently directed northward. President Aliyev placed this threat at the center of his October 2 speech. &#8220;Why is a resource created in the Azerbaijani language in a foreign country? Is it to help us?&#8221; he asked. &#8220;No, it is to carry out provocations against us, mislead our people, and poison the minds of our youth.&#8221; Without naming any country, he warned that &#8220;right beside us, provocations are rained down on us day and night in Azerbaijani,&#8221; and concluded that the protection of the ideological space <a href="https://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/4230861.html">&#8220;is as vital as physical security.&#8221;</a></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The school uniform debate showed precisely what President Aliyev meant. On October 14, Azerbaijan&#8217;s Media and Broadcasting Council <a href="https://qafqazinfo.az/news/detail/bu-cur-qerezli-fealiyyetine-gore-kanal-qara-siyahiya-daxil-edilib-sahar-azeri-ile-bagli-aciqlama-524973">announced</a> that Iran&#8217;s Sahar TV had aired footage of an event in Diyarbak&#305;r, in T&#252;rkiye, and presented it as a campaign in Azerbaijan in support of women wearing the hijab. The Council described this as deliberate disinformation and confirmed that the channel had been blacklisted for its systematically biased coverage of Azerbaijan. Baku&#8217;s patience with such outlets has long been exhausted. As early as 2012, Azerbaijani officials <a href="https://en.majalla.com/node/34036">asked Tehran to halt Sahar&#8217;s broadcasts</a>, and in July of this year Azerbaijan&#8217;s Media Development Agency <a href="https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/azerbaiy%c3%a1n-proh%c3%adbe-actividades-de-un-canal-de-televisi%c3%b3n-y-una-agencia-de-prensa-de-ir%c3%a1n/91806117">banned the activities of Sahar TV and the Mehr news agency</a> in the country, citing activities contrary to its sovereignty, constitutional order and national security.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Yet the doctrine is not a recipe for confrontation. Aliyev has continued to keep channels open with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, including a phone <a href="https://president.az/en/articles/view/71452">call in January</a>, and he <a href="https://en.apa.az/foreign-policy/masoud-pezeshkian-iran-interested-in-expanding-relations-with-azerbaijan-in-all-areas-522286">thanked Azerbaijan</a> for the humanitarian assistance delivered during the war. Pragmatic diplomacy abroad and firm protection of the ideological space at home are two sides of the same policy.</p><h4>Outlook</h4><p style="text-align: justify;">Given these developments, why does all this matter? Azerbaijan is a Shia-majority, secular state on Iran&#8217;s northern border. Its success refutes the claim that Shia identity and theocratic governance are inseparable, which is precisely why it attracts so much hostile attention from Tehran. A stable, secular Azerbaijan is also the anchor of the Middle Corridor, and these connectivity projects are now unfolding at a rapid pace across the South Caucasus, while some Iranian officials are uncomfortable about this.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Finally, the Aliyev doctrine rests on a simple proposition: Azerbaijan&#8217;s religious tolerance is a product of its secularism, not a contradiction of it. Defending this secular order against external interference is not a departure from the country&#8217;s traditions; it is their continuation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Author&#8217;s Bio:</strong></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Dr. Vasif Huseynov is the head of the Western Studies department at the Center for Analysis of International Relations and Multiculturalism (AIR Center) in Baku, Azerbaijan.</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/the-aliyev-doctrine-how-azerbaijan?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/the-aliyev-doctrine-how-azerbaijan?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p><p class="button-wrapper" 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2026 19:49:02 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!GYpk!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0d0964e7-5edd-4a13-85c0-e8a0779aee41_1376x768.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!GYpk!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0d0964e7-5edd-4a13-85c0-e8a0779aee41_1376x768.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!GYpk!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0d0964e7-5edd-4a13-85c0-e8a0779aee41_1376x768.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!GYpk!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0d0964e7-5edd-4a13-85c0-e8a0779aee41_1376x768.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!GYpk!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0d0964e7-5edd-4a13-85c0-e8a0779aee41_1376x768.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!GYpk!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0d0964e7-5edd-4a13-85c0-e8a0779aee41_1376x768.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!GYpk!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0d0964e7-5edd-4a13-85c0-e8a0779aee41_1376x768.jpeg" width="1376" height="768" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/0d0964e7-5edd-4a13-85c0-e8a0779aee41_1376x768.jpeg&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:768,&quot;width&quot;:1376,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:974803,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/jpeg&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/220566794?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0d0964e7-5edd-4a13-85c0-e8a0779aee41_1376x768.jpeg&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!GYpk!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0d0964e7-5edd-4a13-85c0-e8a0779aee41_1376x768.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!GYpk!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0d0964e7-5edd-4a13-85c0-e8a0779aee41_1376x768.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!GYpk!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0d0964e7-5edd-4a13-85c0-e8a0779aee41_1376x768.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!GYpk!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0d0964e7-5edd-4a13-85c0-e8a0779aee41_1376x768.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><strong>By</strong> <em><strong>Emil Avdaliani </strong></em></p><p>Kazakhstan is actively seeking to diversify its export routes, particularly for oil. Currently, around 80 percent of its oil flows through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), a 1,500-kilometer pipeline linking the landlocked Central Asian country to Russia&#8217;s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk.  Recent disruptions in oil exports through Novorossiysk during July and August 2026, caused by Ukrainian aerial and drone attacks on the Black Sea port, have exacerbated Kazakhstan&#8217;s geopolitical and economic vulnerabilities. Chief among these is the dependence of its oil industry on a single export corridor passing through Russian territory.</p><p>Yet, Kazakhstan has found few alternatives. One option is through China, while the other two possibilities are to send its oil via Iran to the <a href="https://exclusive.kz/mozhet-li-omanskij-marshrut-stat-alternativoj-ormuzu/">Gulf region</a> and via Pakistan to the Arabian Sea. None is fully developed, nor efficient enough from an economic perspective. As a result, Astana is exploring multiple export options simultaneously. Consequently, the so-called Middle Corridor, which runs through the South Caucasus to Georgia&#8217;s Black Sea ports and onward to the European Union (EU), emerges as the most realistic route capable of absorbing a significant portion of Kazakhstan&#8217;s CPC-bound exports.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!07n5!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F488c9c11-b2bd-4d3c-9a40-12ab0c0eb5ea_600x433.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!07n5!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F488c9c11-b2bd-4d3c-9a40-12ab0c0eb5ea_600x433.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!07n5!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F488c9c11-b2bd-4d3c-9a40-12ab0c0eb5ea_600x433.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!07n5!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F488c9c11-b2bd-4d3c-9a40-12ab0c0eb5ea_600x433.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!07n5!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F488c9c11-b2bd-4d3c-9a40-12ab0c0eb5ea_600x433.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!07n5!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F488c9c11-b2bd-4d3c-9a40-12ab0c0eb5ea_600x433.png" width="600" height="433" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/488c9c11-b2bd-4d3c-9a40-12ab0c0eb5ea_600x433.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:433,&quot;width&quot;:600,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:488859,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/220566794?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6c68e06a-8d1c-405e-8a20-33b0ee92c9cd_600x480.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!07n5!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F488c9c11-b2bd-4d3c-9a40-12ab0c0eb5ea_600x433.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!07n5!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F488c9c11-b2bd-4d3c-9a40-12ab0c0eb5ea_600x433.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!07n5!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F488c9c11-b2bd-4d3c-9a40-12ab0c0eb5ea_600x433.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!07n5!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F488c9c11-b2bd-4d3c-9a40-12ab0c0eb5ea_600x433.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>The Middle Corridor has existed since the 1990s but remains limited in scope due to geographic constraints and the lack of proper infrastructure. This started to change in the 2000s with the emergence of a range of infrastructure projects in the region linking the Caspian with the Black Sea. From railways to roads to pipelines, the Caspian Sea and, by extension, Central Asia grew closer to the South Caucasus and the Black Sea basin. Yet this too has not shifted connectivity patterns, as transit through Russia to Europe remained strong. None of this changed until 2022, when Russia launched its war against Ukraine and the Central Asian countries intensified their search for alternative routes. The Middle Corridor gained strategic importance as a viable route situated between the war in Ukraine and ongoing instability in the Middle East.</p><h4>Astana Pivots to the BTC</h4><p>No wonder then that Astana announced in August that it was considering increasing exports via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and Baku-Supsa pipelines. Specifically, KazMunayGas, Kazakhstan&#8217;s national oil and gas company, <a href="https://1tv.ge/lang/en/news/kazakhstan-eyes-baku-tbilisi-ceyhan-and-baku-supsa-pipelines-as-alternative-oil-export-routes/">announced</a> in 2026 it would expand oil exports via the BTC pipeline by some 31 per cent to reach 1.7 million tons. Though the pipeline&#8217;s capacity stands at about 50 million tons of oil per year, the increase in Kazakhstan&#8217;s oil exports through this route is nevertheless significant.</p><p>Diversification, however, would not be efficient without attempting to shape geopolitics on the ground. This is where Kazakhstan has made major moves in the past year with a special focus on Georgia and Azerbaijan. In April, Kazakhstan&#8217;s Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev flew to the Georgian capital of Tbilisi <a href="https://1tv.ge/lang/en/news/kazakhstans-foreign-minister-visits-georgia/">to discuss regional connectivity</a>. Georgia and Kazakhstan then signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement on June 29, elevating their relationship to a higher partnership level. Meanwhile, bilateral relations between Baku and Astana have expanded to the level of strategic partnership following Azerbaijan&#8217;s admission as a full member of the Central Asian Consultative Meetings.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YyKP!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe3681882-c03d-4bdb-bcfe-46547492d4cf_500x334.webp" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YyKP!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe3681882-c03d-4bdb-bcfe-46547492d4cf_500x334.webp 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YyKP!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe3681882-c03d-4bdb-bcfe-46547492d4cf_500x334.webp 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YyKP!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe3681882-c03d-4bdb-bcfe-46547492d4cf_500x334.webp 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YyKP!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe3681882-c03d-4bdb-bcfe-46547492d4cf_500x334.webp 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YyKP!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe3681882-c03d-4bdb-bcfe-46547492d4cf_500x334.webp" width="500" height="334" 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YyKP!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe3681882-c03d-4bdb-bcfe-46547492d4cf_500x334.webp 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YyKP!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe3681882-c03d-4bdb-bcfe-46547492d4cf_500x334.webp 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YyKP!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe3681882-c03d-4bdb-bcfe-46547492d4cf_500x334.webp 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YyKP!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe3681882-c03d-4bdb-bcfe-46547492d4cf_500x334.webp 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Image above: President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and the Sultan of Oman Haitham bin Tariq Al Said (source: <a href="https://astanatimes.com/2026/10/kazakhstan-oman-deepen-ties-during-sultans-first-central-asia-visit/">Astana Times</a>)</p><h4><strong>Kazakhstan Forges Closer Economic Ties with Iran, Oman, and the Gulf</strong></h4><p>Kazakhstan&#8217;s search for alternatives through the South Caucasus should also be viewed from a broader perspective. For Astana, the Middle Corridor is valuable, but Kazakh officials understand that the route cannot serve as the main artery for the country&#8217;s goods and exports. This is driving Kazakhstan to seek further regional diversification. In late June, four months into the US-Israel-Iran war, the Iranian Ports and Maritime Organization <a href="https://daryo.uz/en/2026/07/08/kazakhstan-iran-sign-27-year-agreement-to-develop-logistics-terminal-at-shahid-rajaee-port/">reached an agreement</a> to transfer land to Kazakhstan at the Shahid Rajaee Port in the Persian Gulf. The document will allow for the construction of a transport and logistics terminal. The agreement is set to be effective for 27 years: two years for the terminal&#8217;s construction and the next 25 years for its operation. Commercial operation is planned to begin in the third year.</p><p>In an effort to build stronger economic ties with countries in the Persian Gulf, Kazakhstan has significantly expanded its relations with Oman. This is no coincidence. Oman&#8217;s geography offers prospects of Kazakh goods reaching the Indian Ocean. To that end, in April Oman and Kazakhstan signed a preliminary agreement to establish a strategic partnership. The two countries have been in talks for some time <a href="https://www.apk-inform.com/ru/news/1550633">on establishing a transport route </a>through Iran to be overseen by a joint Kazakh-Omani logistics company. This was followed by the first-ever visit to Astana by Oman&#8217;s Sultan Haitham bin Tariq Al Said. The joint statement, among other topics, covers developing connectivity between the two countries. As part of this broader push to deepen Gulf economic partnerships, Kazakhstan&#8212;along with Uzbekistan and the UAE&#8212;<a href="https://timesca.com/casa-1000-central-asia-seeks-a-route-to-the-indian-ocean/">signed a memorandum</a> in early October to study a railway corridor passing through Afghanistan to Pakistani ports.</p><h4><strong>Limitations and Technical Challenges</strong></h4><p>Despite its best efforts for regional diversification, it is unlikely that Kazakhstan will fully eliminate its dependence on the CPC. Geography remains a key obstacle, and there are business efficiency issues that complicate switching to other routes. CPC requires no additional loading, and it avoids the transportation challenges created by the multimodal Middle Corridor. This route, however, requires passing via the Caspian Sea, where transportation tankers are much smaller in size than those that traverse the world&#8217;s oceans. The CPC is also more cost-effective and represents a well-developed infrastructure. Nor is Astana willing to fully abandon the CPC because exporting via Russia in itself is part of the strategic resilience that Kazakhstan attempts to build by diversifying its trade routes.</p><p>Technical issues as well hinder the switch to the BTC. Crude quality matters because the pipeline transports predominantly Azeri Light, and its operators enforce specifications intended to preserve the commercial characteristics of the export blend. Consequently, Kazakhstan cannot just inject substantially larger quantities of crude into the system without additional technical and commercial agreements.</p><p>What emerges from the discourse among Kazakh analysts and officials is that export options through China increasingly appear unviable for two reasons. First, Kazakhstan does not want to become overly dependent on China. Second, logistically speaking, shifting exports eastward is economically inefficient because Kazakhstan&#8217;s major oil fields are located far from the Chinese border. Ideally, two principal options could be considered to substantially expand Kazakhstan&#8217;s oil transportation capacity across the Caspian Sea: the construction of a subsea pipeline connecting Kazakhstan with Azerbaijan or the development of a significantly larger fleet of oil tankers, but none of these options appear to be part of Astana&#8217;s search for a solution. </p><p>Either option could eventually provide transportation capacity of up to 35 million metric tons annually, equivalent to more than half of Kazakhstan&#8217;s current exports through the CPC and nearly 30 times the volume presently transported across the Caspian Sea. However, both alternatives would pose considerable financial, technical and logistical challenges. For example, a subsea pipeline would require immense upfront investment, complex environmental approvals and long-term commercial commitments, while the tanker option would necessitate expanding the Caspian fleet, upgrading loading facilities in Kazakhstan and increasing reception capacity at Azerbaijani ports. Moreover, both solutions would require corresponding investments in onward transportation infrastructure through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. Although the tanker option offers greater flexibility and could be implemented incrementally, a subsea pipeline would potentially provide more predictable, large-scale transportation over the longer term. Neither alternative is likely to emerge as a fully operational replacement for CPC in the near future.</p><h4><strong>Outlook</strong></h4><p>Regardless of these challenges, the emphasis on the Middle Corridor will increase as the war in the Black Sea rages on. Indeed, a recent report by Reuters, based on insights from two sources, <a href="https://nationalbusiness.kz/news/kazahstan-sobiraetsya-uvelichit-eksport-nefti-v-obhod-rossii-37e56e/">claims</a> that Kazakhstan will ship an additional 168,000 tons of oil via the BTC pipeline in October, up from 130,000 tons in September. The bulk of this volume (150,000 tons) will come from the Tengiz field, with the remaining 18 000 tons coming from the offshore Kashagan oil field in the Caspian.</p><p>What makes the trans-Caspian route more appealing is also the issue of declining Azerbaijani production, which means that the BTC and Baku-Supsa would have greater throughput capacity in the future. Therefore, the likeliest scenario is that the Middle Corridor and the CPC will coexist as dual export routes for Kazakhstan. They will remain complementary, with the majority of Kazakh oil exports still passing through the CPC.</p><p>In the final analysis, Kazakhstan will likely pursue a gradual diversification strategy rather than an expensive attempt to replace the CPC entirely. Its immediate priorities will likely involve increasing contracted volumes through Azerbaijan, expanding Caspian tanker capacity, improving railway and terminal infrastructure in Georgia, and incrementally strengthening west-to-east pipeline connections for exports to China. Astana will simultaneously seek closer coordination with American and European investors whose commercial interests give them incentives to defend the uninterrupted operation of CPC.</p><p>About the Author:</p><p><em>Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/kazakhstan-looks-south-to-ease-its?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/kazakhstan-looks-south-to-ease-its?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p>Thank you for your support! Please remember that The Saratoga Foundation is a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization. Your donations are fully tax-deductible. If you seek to support The Saratoga Foundation, you can make a one-time donation by clicking on the PayPal link below! You can also subscribe to our <a href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/">website</a> to support our work.</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:&quot;button-wrapper&quot;}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary button-wrapper" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p><a href="https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA">https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA</a></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Data Center Warfare: Ukraine’s Retaliatory Strategy Hits Russian Tech Hubs ]]></title><description><![CDATA[By David Kirichenko]]></description><link>https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/data-center-warfare-ukraines-retaliatory</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/data-center-warfare-ukraines-retaliatory</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[The Saratoga Foundation]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 18:13:48 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!tGJn!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9d8d8fff-202b-4678-a143-2caadb9d64a6_1365x768.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!tGJn!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9d8d8fff-202b-4678-a143-2caadb9d64a6_1365x768.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!tGJn!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9d8d8fff-202b-4678-a143-2caadb9d64a6_1365x768.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!tGJn!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9d8d8fff-202b-4678-a143-2caadb9d64a6_1365x768.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!tGJn!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9d8d8fff-202b-4678-a143-2caadb9d64a6_1365x768.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!tGJn!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9d8d8fff-202b-4678-a143-2caadb9d64a6_1365x768.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><strong>By David Kirichenko</strong></p><p>In recent weeks, Ukraine and Russia have traded strikes on one another&#8217;s data storage facilities. The damage to Russia, however, appears far worse due to its centralized infrastructure. Attacks on data centers are not a new phenomenon. In the early weeks of Russia&#8217;s full-scale invasion, Russian forces <a href="https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/06/22/defending-ukraine-early-lessons-from-the-cyber-war/">targeted</a> a governmental Ukrainian data center, but Ukraine had already prepared for such attacks by backing up its critical data with the help of Western partners. Similarly, <a href="https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2026/09/iran-strikes-on-amazon-data-centers-caused-permanent-loss-of-customer-data/">Iranian</a> drones in the ongoing Gulf War have also targeted Western data centers, signaling that these attacks on IT hubs are becoming part of a broader trend in drone warfare.</p><p>On September 11, <a href="https://defence.tech/digital-detox-inside-russias-campaign-against-ukraines-data-centers/">Russia</a> hit a data center in Kyiv, and escalated again on September 23, as the Kremlin <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/russias-latest-target-ukraines-internet/">hit</a> a few more Ukrainian data centers and internet providers in Kyiv. In addition to the capital, <a href="https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32223">Dnipro</a> and <a href="https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2109527307006140685?s=46">Odesa</a> were also targets during these attacks.</p><p>Moscow&#8217;s strategy is to target civilian infrastructure and exert maximum pressure on the civilian population in the hope that Ukraine&#8217;s leadership will give up. &#8220;Throughout the full-scale invasion, Russia has repeatedly struck civilian infrastructure to pressure the population, trying to make normal life uncomfortable enough that people break. That strategy has failed so far, so Russia keeps looking for new pressure points,&#8221; said Dmytro Zhluktenko (callsign &#8220;Liber&#8221;), a former drone operator and now an analyst with the 413th RAID Unmanned Systems Regiment.</p><h4>The &#8220;Digital Detox&#8221; Campaign</h4><p>Meanwhile, the Russian Ministry of Defense has branded the data center attacks as a part of its mandatory &#8220;<a href="https://meduza.io/en/news/2026/10/08/russia-called-its-strikes-on-ukrainian-data-centers-a-forced-digital-detox-zelensky-says-kyiv-has-answered-by-hitting-a-data-center-belonging-to-russian-tech-giant-yandex">Digital Detox</a>&#8220; campaign by posting an image of an Iranian-designed Geran drone flying over a burning city. Over the coming months, Russia is expected <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2026/09/28/russia-keeps-attacking-ukrainian-data-centers-calling-it-a-mandatory-digital-detox">to continue targeting</a> Ukrainian <a href="https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/data-center-in-kyiv-ukraine-suffers-critical-damage-and-goes-offline-after-russian-bomb-attack/">data centers</a>. The Kremlin started data center warfare, which has now exposed its vulnerabilities to centralization. &#8220;Two can play this game. We started hitting Russian centralized data centers in the European part of Russia,&#8221; said Zhluktenko. &#8220;That symmetry is the main reason for the spike in intensity.&#8221;</p><p>On October 8, Ukrainian drones struck a <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/10/12/ukraines-strikes-on-yandex-data-centers-explained-a93953">Yandex</a> data center in Sasovo, in Russia&#8217;s Ryazan region. The facility reportedly houses two of the three supercomputers used to train Yandex&#8217;s AI models. Further strikes targeted Yandex facilities in Kaluga on October 9 and Vladimir on October 11. Following the Ukrainian drone attacks Russian business began complaining of losing access to online services, while Yandex <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-yandex-says-second-data-centre-hit-by-drone-attack-2026-10-09/">fell</a> 4% on the Moscow stock exchange. Yandex is extremely important to the IT sector because it <a href="https://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-market-share/all/russian-federation">accounts</a> for 70% of the Russian search engine market. Yandex services across Central Asia were <a href="https://timesca.com/drone-strikes-on-russian-data-centers-disrupt-yandex-services-across-central-asia/">affected</a> as well. &#8220;This war moved from a purely battlefield fight into an economic and industrial contest a long time ago,&#8221; noted Zhluktenko.</p><p>On October 11, Dima Pirogov, head of Yandex&#8217;s fintech division,<a href="https://x.com/FirePointUA/status/2109390007622365231?s=46&amp;t=6TOJ0lSdH16vetyawQ1wqw"> </a><a href="https://x.com/yandex/status/2109367094361870832">published</a> a statement on social media stating: &#8220;This morning, another Yandex data center&#8212;our services&#8217; home&#8212;was damaged. Because of this, many of you still can&#8217;t check your balance, pay for a purchase, or transfer your money.&#8221; Fire Point, the Ukrainian defense company whose drones are <a href="https://en.defence-ua.com/news/ukrainian_fp_1_drones_strike_yet_another_yandex_data_center_in_russia-20067.html">being used</a> to strike the data centers, trolled Yandex, <a href="https://x.com/FirePointUA/status/2109390007622365231?s=20">writing</a>, &#8220;Dima, have you tried turning it off and on again?&#8221;</p><p>On October 12, Yandex <a href="https://status.yandex.cloud/ru/incidents/2136?installation=ru&amp;retpath=%2Fru%2Ftimeline">reported</a> that its &#8220;Cloud platform is operating in a limited mode.&#8221; The Russian newspaper <em>Kommersant</em> indicated that it could take <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/298226">months</a> to replace the data center equipment damaged by Ukrainian drones. &#8220;Yandex&#8217;s data centres and cloud services support a wide range of civilian and critical facilities, as well as countless small businesses that Russians rely on daily,&#8221; said defense analyst Olena Kryzhanivska and authors of the Ukraine Arms Monitor newsletter. &#8220;When they go down, delivery apps, taxi services and even Alice, Yandex&#8217;s voice assistant on smart speakers, stop working.&#8221;</p><p>According to Zhluktenko, who worked in the tech industry before the war, Ukraine&#8217;s internet is decentralized, with thousands of small providers and services distributed across different hosting companies. Since 2022, much of the country&#8217;s government and commercial data has been moved to cloud infrastructure abroad.</p><p>&#8220;Although the Russian strikes caused infrastructure damage, financial losses to companies and short-term internet disruptions for users, long-term service disruptions were avoided thanks to prior decentralization and the use of foreign infrastructure on which some of the servers are hosted,&#8221; said Serhii Kuzan, chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center.</p><p>Kateryna Chernohorenko, the former deputy minister of defense for digital transformation, <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2026/10/in-ukraine-data-centers-facing-increased-attacks-in-recent-weeks-ex-official/">noted</a> Ukraine has already been moving more of its digital infrastructure underground to protect it from Russian attacks, but not everything can be moved underground.</p><h4><strong>Will Moscow Move its Digital Data Centers Offshore?</strong></h4><p>Russia, by contrast, has concentrated much of its infrastructure among a handful of domestic providers. &#8220;A system built so that a few nodes control everything is also a system where a few strikes break everything,&#8221; Zhluktenko said, underscoring that the strike on Yandex&#8217;s Sasovo facility disrupted services used by Russian Railways, MegaFon, and several media outlets. Western sanctions and global demand for AI hardware also make replacing damaged equipment difficult. &#8220;Centralization is a vulnerability you cannot patch quickly,&#8221; he warned.</p><p>Furthermore, bringing these facilities back online could be hampered by Western sanctions, according to Kuzan, who pointed out that &#8220;The restoration of damaged facilities is also complicated by sanctions restricting official supplies of modern server equipment, network components and Nvidia accelerators, which are required, in particular, for training neural networks.&#8221;</p><p>Kremlin efforts to control its society had led to greater centralization efforts, making the data center strikes more impactful for Ukraine, &#8220;Moscow has attempted to create its own &#8216;sovereign internet&#8217;, similar to the &#8216;Great Firewall of China,&#8217; said Kuzan. &#8220;Federal Law No. 152-FZ requires that key operations involving the collection and storage of Russian citizens&#8217; personal data be carried out using databases located within the country.&#8221;</p><p>Another outcome of the Ukraine drone strikes on the data center has been <a href="https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/data-centers/russian-disinformation-bot-traffic-nearly-eliminated-overnight-after-ukraine-drone-strikes-cripple-multiple-of-russias-google-data-centers-ukraine-intensifies-bombing-of-yandex-data-centers-in-response-to-moscows-strikes-on-kyiv-data-centers">claims</a> of Russian <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/post/86830">bot traffic</a> falling off after the Yandex strikes. Ukraine in turn is actually implementing its own &#8220;digital detox&#8221; campaign against Russia. With the data centers being down, Russian bots reportedly have lost access to important Application Processing Interface (APIs) endpoints that help them translate and distribute mass propaganda, <a href="https://x.com/ioanaV_/status/2109564580376523116?s=20">according</a> to one analyst.</p><p>Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Zelensky also <a href="https://interfax.com.ua/news/telecom/1218269.html">weighed in on the data center campaign</a>, noting: &#8220;By the way, when we started responding to the Russian operation against our data centers, and when our strikes reached Yandex&#8217;s data centers, suddenly it became a little easier to breathe on many social networks.&#8221; He also noted: &#8220;Many people, a lot of people noticed this. And there was less hatred, less discord, and less provocations, because there were fewer bots. And it&#8217;s quite clear where these bots came from.&#8221;</p><h4>Outlook</h4><p>Similar to Ukraine&#8217;s drone strikes on the Wildberries warehouses, its recent attacks across Russia demonstrate the <a href="https://x.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/2109688138977169891?s=20">failure</a> of the Russian state. In fact, Kryzhanivska believes the data center strikes have delivered a major blow to Russian digital sovereignty. &#8220;They show that the state has failed to protect its citizens from the spillover of a war it started,&#8221; noted Kryzhanivska. In a major admission of its own failure, she added that: &#8220;The Russian state was unable and perhaps even unwilling to defend these critical facilities, and it has largely shifted responsibility for protecting them and restoring operations onto Yandex itself.&#8221;</p><p>In May, the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2026/05/russia-drone-defense-economy">highlighted</a> that Russian businesses were increasingly being forced to pay for their own defenses against Ukrainian drone attacks. Russian President Vladimir Putin <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/957f68f9-9f74-4857-9773-d3be3ef3f305">signed</a> a decree in August allowing the government to temporarily take control of critical infrastructure operated by businesses that failed to protect their facilities as a result of Kyiv&#8217;s drone strikes. Consequently, Russia is also now <a href="https://www.rbc.ru/technology_and_media/08/10/2026/6ac523999a7947776f6003e4?from=story_6a54ddcf9a794714667e24df_feed_14">considering</a> the deployment of AI data centers in friendly countries, which would require a revision on current data restrictions.</p><p>Taken together, Russia&#8217;s data center war&#8212;a campaign that it started&#8212;has put the Kremlin on its back foot. As Ukraine&#8217;s symmetrical response inflicts greater damage, it is yet another sign that Putin&#8217;s invasion has been a disaster, and that the war&#8217;s fallout continues to be felt by an ever-increasing number of Russians.</p><h4>About the Author</h4><p><em>David Kirichenko&#8239;is a Ukrainian-American freelance journalist who has been covering Russia&#8217;s full-scale war against Ukraine since 2022 and is an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society. He can be found on X/Twitter @DVKirichenko.</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/data-center-warfare-ukraines-retaliatory?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/data-center-warfare-ukraines-retaliatory?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:&quot;button-wrapper&quot;}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary button-wrapper" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p>Thank you for your support! Please remember that The Saratoga Foundation is a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization. Your donations are fully tax-deductible. If you seek to support The Saratoga Foundation, you can make a one-time donation by clicking on the PayPal link below! You can also subscribe to our <a href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/">website</a> to support our work.</p><p><a href="https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA">https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA</a></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[From Buyer to Builder: Azerbaijan’s Defense Industry Enters a New Stage of Expansion]]></title><description><![CDATA[By Vasif Huseynov]]></description><link>https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/from-buyer-to-builder-azerbaijans</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/from-buyer-to-builder-azerbaijans</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[The Saratoga Foundation]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 16:34:58 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_k_-!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F627a9e27-1441-4e1f-a73e-87f5d2175816_1172x677.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_k_-!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F627a9e27-1441-4e1f-a73e-87f5d2175816_1172x677.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_k_-!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F627a9e27-1441-4e1f-a73e-87f5d2175816_1172x677.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_k_-!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F627a9e27-1441-4e1f-a73e-87f5d2175816_1172x677.png 848w, 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_k_-!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F627a9e27-1441-4e1f-a73e-87f5d2175816_1172x677.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_k_-!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F627a9e27-1441-4e1f-a73e-87f5d2175816_1172x677.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_k_-!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F627a9e27-1441-4e1f-a73e-87f5d2175816_1172x677.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_k_-!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F627a9e27-1441-4e1f-a73e-87f5d2175816_1172x677.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><strong>By Vasif Huseynov</strong></p><p>The sixth Azerbaijan International Defence Exhibition (ADEX 2026), which opened at the Baku Expo Center on September 30 and lasts until October 2, was the largest in the event&#8217;s history. According to the <a href="https://president.az/en/articles/view/73614">Office of the President of Azerbaijan</a>, 277 companies from 30 countries took part in ADEX 2026 and its sister event Securex Caspian. As many as 59 foreign delegations from 39 countries registered, and 14 countries set up national pavilions. Record demand for the event forced organizers to open an additional pavilion, and for the first time an entire hall was reserved for Azerbaijan&#8217;s own national exposition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">President <a href="https://president.az/en/pages/view/president/biography">Ilham Aliyev</a> toured the exhibition on opening and was briefed by Defense Minister <a href="https://mod.gov.az/en/">Zakir Hasanov</a> and Minister of Defense Industry <a href="https://mdi.gov.az/en">Vugar Mustafayev</a>. In his <a href="https://president.az/en/articles/view/73611">address to the participants</a>, Aliyev stated that the country&#8217;s defense industry &#8220;has now entered a qualitatively new stage&#8221; and that its products stand out for their competitiveness in international markets. The exhibition floor offered evidence for both claims, but it also carried a more pointed message about the future direction of Azerbaijani air power.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Defense Industry Consolidation and Expansion</strong></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The clearest change since earlier expositions was the weight given to Azerbaijan&#8217;s growing defense industrial capabilities. At the center of the national exposition stood Azersilah, the defense industry holding created under the Ministry of Defense Industry by presidential order in 2023. The <a href="https://president.az/en/articles/view/73614">presidential press service</a> describes its mandate as organizing the production, sale, and export of weapons, expanding production capacity, and building international partnerships. Its consolidation of scattered state plants into one entity able to form joint ventures reflects a deliberate industrial policy rather than exhibition showmanship.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The second shift is the role of private capital. Speaking at the <a href="https://www.azernews.az/nation/264711.html">opening ceremony</a>, Defense Industry Minister Vugar Mustafayev noted that more than 20 local private companies are presenting products at ADEX and that most of these firms already supply the Armed Forces, while several have begun exporting weaponry. He tied this directly to the lessons of the 2020 Karabakh War, arguing that a strong national defense industry cannot rest on state-owned enterprises alone and needs the flexibility and investment capacity of the private sector.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The product line on display follows those battlefield lessons. Azerbaijani media <a href="https://www.azernews.az/analysis/264775.html">pointed</a> to the locally built Tufan mine-resistant vehicle, the ITX-15 and ITX-20 armored personnel carriers, including <a href="https://adex.az/en/news/azerbaijan-unveils-its-first-fireforce-c-uas-laser-system-at-adex-2024-8957">Fireforce</a>, described as the country&#8217;s first domestically produced air defense laser system. According to official information, Azerbaijan now <a href="https://www.azernews.az/analysis/264775.html">produces</a> more than 1,000 types of military products and exports them to over 30 countries. Several new systems made their public debut. Azersilah presented the <a href="https://defensehere.com/en/mgk-mk-82-laser-guided-munition-debuts-at-adex-2026/">MGK MK-82 &#8220;SkyDiver&#8221;</a>, a 250-kilogram laser-guided bomb produced in Azerbaijan in 2026, as well as <a href="https://www.timesofdefence.com.tr/azersilah-showcases-indigenously-developed-armed-unmanned-ground-vehicles-at-adex-2026-in-baku/">armed unmanned ground vehicles</a> carrying remote weapon stations with heavy machine guns or grenade launchers, the &#8220;kamikaze robots&#8221; the Ministry of Defense Industry had <a href="https://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/society/4226493.html">announced</a> ahead of the show. Domestic producers also unveiled the <a href="https://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/society/4229768.html">QIRAT and ARROW series</a> of reconnaissance and kamikaze drones, while Bayraktar Teknoloji Azerbaijan, the local subsidiary of Baykar that <a href="https://www.azernews.az/analysis/248355.html">began production in the Sumgayit Industrial Park</a> in 2025, debuted the <a href="https://report.az/en/military/kasirga-kamikaze-drone-produced-in-azerbaijan-makes-debut-at-adex-2026">KASIRGA</a>, a vertical take-off drone that can either strike as a loitering munition or return from a reconnaissance mission.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Baku&#8217;s Growing List of Foreign Defense Partners</strong></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The guest list at ADEX 2026 is itself a statement of Azerbaijan&#8217;s multi-vector defense diplomacy. T&#252;rkiye is the most widely represented country, with Baykar, Aselsan, Roketsan, and the shipbuilder Dearsan among the stands the President visited, according to the <a href="https://president.az/en/articles/view/73614">official account of the visit</a>. The same account lists Israel&#8217;s IAI, Rafael, and Elbit Systems, Italy&#8217;s Leonardo, Germany&#8217;s Rheinmetall, the UAE&#8217;s EDGE Group, the Czechoslovak Group, Slovakia&#8217;s national pavilion, and the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, which co-produces the JF-17 with China.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Two Western newcomers particularly stand out. Several prestigious American companies participated in ADEX for the first time, and the United Kingdom arrived with a Ministry of Defence stand that includes BAE Systems and a 14-company delegation from the Cambridge Chamber of Commerce. When President Aliyev received UK Minister of State for Defence <a href="https://president.az/en/articles/view/73615">Lord Vernon Coaker</a>, he described defense industry cooperation as a new chapter in the bilateral partnership and raised the prospect of joint ventures in Azerbaijan, not just purchases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The ADEX exhibition also produced several concrete agreements. Azerbaijan&#8217;s Defense Minister Hasanov and Haluk G&#246;rg&#252;n, head of T&#252;rkiye&#8217;s Defense Industry Agency, oversaw the signing of contracts with Turkish companies worth <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/business/defense/turkiye-inks-over-500m-in-defense-contracts-with-azerbaijan">more than $500 million</a>. The package includes 14 H&#252;rku&#351;-II trainer aircraft from Turkish Aerospace, which G&#246;rg&#252;n said will <a href="https://www.trtworld.com/article/a118e66067b2">begin arriving later this year</a>, a purchase that matters for pilot training as the Air Force transitions to new combat jets. It also covers Baykar&#8217;s M&#305;zrak smart loitering munitions and Antidot systems, Roketsan&#8217;s Barbaros coastal defense system, and a framework agreement on Aselsan&#8217;s ALP-100 radars.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Several deals went beyond mere procurement. Aselsan and the Azerbaijani company NOVASIS signed a term sheet to set up a <a href="https://defensetalks.com/aselsan-azerbaijan-defense-cooperation-adex-2026/">production facility in Nakhchivan</a> for laser guidance kits, TOLUN precision-guided munitions, and KORKUT air defense systems, while MKE, Otokar, Kay&#305; Defense, and Bo&#287;azi&#231;i Defense concluded cooperation agreements with Azerbaijani firms Miras and NOVASIS. Azerbaijan&#8217;s Ministries of Defense Industry and of Science and Education also signed a <a href="https://en.apa.az/foreign-policy/azerbaijan-turkiye-sign-memorandum-on-defense-industry-cooperation-527330">memorandum</a> with T&#252;rkiye&#8217;s Defense Industry Agency and Council of Higher Education on joint training of engineers and research, alongside a <a href="https://en.apa.az/military/memorandum-on-defense-industry-signed-within-framework-of-adex-2026-527409">separate memorandum</a> on personnel training and technology for the defense industry.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The largest localization project announced at the show came from Central Europe. The Czechoslovak Group said it will form a <a href="https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2026/09/30/3371887/0/en/csg-group-will-expand-its-industrial-presence-in-azerbaijan-through-a-second-joint-venture.html">second joint venture in Azerbaijan</a> in December 2026 for the gradual local production of self-propelled howitzers, with manufacturing to start in 2027 and business worth &#8364;1.8 billion ($2.03 billion) over seven years. It follows VEXA DS, a venture set up earlier this year to repair and modernize armored vehicles.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Uzbekistan signed a <a href="https://www.azernews.az/nation/264770.html">Bilateral Military Cooperation Plan for 2027</a> with Azerbaijan the same day, with Defense Minister Shukhrat Khalmukhamedov signing on behalf of Tashkent. ADEX 2026 took place in parallel with the &#8220;Power of Unity 2026&#8221; joint exercise of Azerbaijan, T&#252;rkiye, and Uzbekistan, which <a href="https://en.apa.az/military/joint-military-exercise-involving-azerbaijani-turkish-and-uzbek-troops-opens-in-khojavand-video-525606">opened on September 22</a> in the Karabakh region. According to the Ministry of Defense, its large-scale phase on October 1 involved <a href="https://en.apa.az/military/power-of-unity-2026-joint-military-exercise-held-in-the-khojavend-district-527456">3,579 military personnel</a>, 135 unmanned aerial vehicles, 27 aircraft, and 25 naval assets, and was monitored by observers from nine different countries, including Pakistan, Georgia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The ministry described it as the first exercise of its kind and scale held on Azerbaijani territories liberated from Armenian occupation.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4m4S!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1a29b3de-e4e5-46b5-ba63-69c580eac032_1600x900.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4m4S!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1a29b3de-e4e5-46b5-ba63-69c580eac032_1600x900.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4m4S!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1a29b3de-e4e5-46b5-ba63-69c580eac032_1600x900.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4m4S!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1a29b3de-e4e5-46b5-ba63-69c580eac032_1600x900.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4m4S!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1a29b3de-e4e5-46b5-ba63-69c580eac032_1600x900.jpeg 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4m4S!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1a29b3de-e4e5-46b5-ba63-69c580eac032_1600x900.jpeg" width="1456" height="819" 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class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Baku&#8217;s New Jet Fighter: China&#8217;s J-10CE in Azerbaijani Colors</strong></p><p style="text-align: justify;">One of the most widely discussed objects at ADEX 2026 was the display of a full-scale model of the Chinese-made J-10CE fighter, the export variant of the Chengdu J-10C, which was <a href="https://www.azernews.az/analysis/264775.html">displayed</a> by China&#8217;s AVIC <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202610/1371657.shtml">in Azerbaijani Air Force insignia</a>. The <a href="https://president.az/en/articles/view/73614">presidential press service</a> of Azerbaijan confirms that China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation, AVIC&#8217;s export arm, is among the exhibitors.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The display did not come out of nowhere. In November 2024, Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Namig Islamzade inspected the J-10CE at the Zhuhai Airshow and met his Chinese counterpart; the <a href="https://mod.gov.az/en/news/azerbaijan-air-force-commander-attends-airshow-china-53356.html%20https:/mod.gov.az/en/news/azerbaijan-air-force-commander-attends-airshow-china-53356.html#:~:text=Delegation%20led%20by%20Deputy%20Minister,held%20in%20Zhuhai%2C%20Guangdong%20Province">Ministry of Defense reported</a> that they discussed the state and prospects of military-technical cooperation between the two air forces. Since then, Baku has acquired the Chinese-Pakistani JF-17 Block III, and its neighbor Uzbekistan has publicly <a href="https://uzdaily.uz/ru/uzbekistan-pokazal-istrebiteli-j-10-na-video-minoborony/">unveiled</a> its own J-10CE into its air fleet. In late August 2026, Uzbekistan&#8217;s Ministry of Defense released footage of the jets, which it described as modern fighters guarding the country&#8217;s air borders, making it the aircraft&#8217;s second foreign operator after Pakistan.</p><p>The J-10CE would be a major qualitative improvement and sit above the JF-17 in Azerbaijan&#8217;s fleet, not replace it. Baku is already the largest export customer of the JF-17: the <a href="https://propakistani.pk/2025/11/12/another-country-inducts-pakistans-jf-17-thunder-fighter-jets/amp/">Government of Pakistan announced</a> in June 2025 that Azerbaijan expanded its order from 16 to 40 aircraft in a deal valued at $4.6 billion. Moreover, in a sign of their military significance, the Chinese-made fighter jets flew over Baku in the November 2025 Victory Day parade.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A two-tier fleet of JF-17 Block IIIs and J-10CEs would give Azerbaijan its most capable air force since obtaining independence in 1991. The JF-17s would carry the bulk of routine air policing and strike missions at an affordable cost per flight hour, while a smaller J-10CE force would cover the JF-17&#8217;s weaknesses in speed, payload, and air combat. Operating two aircraft from the same Chinese-Pakistani industrial and weapons ecosystem, including the PL-15E and PL-10E missiles, would also simplify training, logistics, and munitions stocks.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The geography of that capability matters. With the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process advancing, Baku&#8217;s air power planning is no longer framed solely by the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan&#8217;s energy platforms, pipelines, and the Middle Corridor ports on the Caspian Sea form some of the most valuable infrastructure in the wider region. Protecting that airspace requires fighter aircraft with the range and speed to reach threats quickly outside Azerbaijan&#8217;s national airspace. Moreover, the addition of the J-10CE fighters would be a meaningful step forward for Azerbaijan in obtaining regional air superiority over its sector of the Caspian.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Outlook</strong></p><p style="text-align: justify;">In conclusion, ADEX 2026 suggests that Azerbaijan&#8217;s defense industry is moving beyond its traditional role as a buyer of foreign equipment toward becoming a producer, exporter, and increasingly sophisticated partner in international defense cooperation. The financial commitment is quite robust: the draft 2027 state budget, for example, allocates 8.8 billion manats (about $5.2 billion) to defense and security, a <a href="https://report.az/en/finance/azerbaijan-s-defense-and-security-spending-to-rise-1-1-in-2027">1.1 percent increase</a> over 2026, and the Prime Minister has said these items will <a href="https://en.apa.az/finance/prime-minister-defense-and-national-security-to-remain-among-largest-expenditures-in-2027-budget-526033">remain among the largest expenditures</a> next year.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Should this trajectory continue, Azerbaijan&#8217;s defense industry will become an increasingly important component of its broader foreign policy and regional security posture, linking domestic production, military modernization, exports, and partnerships across the South Caucasus, Central Asia, T&#252;rkiye, Europe, and the wider Caspian region.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Author&#8217;s Bio:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Dr. Vasif Huseynov is the head of the Western Studies department at the Center for Analysis of International Relations and Multiculturalism (AIR Center) in Baku, Azerbaijan.</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:&quot;button-wrapper&quot;}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary button-wrapper" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/from-buyer-to-builder-azerbaijans?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:&quot;button-wrapper&quot;}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary button-wrapper" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/from-buyer-to-builder-azerbaijans?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p><p>Thank you for your support! Please remember that The Saratoga Foundation is a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization. Your donations are fully tax-deductible. If you seek to support The Saratoga Foundation, you can make a one-time donation by clicking on the PayPal link below! You can also subscribe to our <a href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/">website</a> to support our work.</p><p><a href="https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA">https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA</a></p><p style="text-align: justify;"></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[“The TANAP of Electricity”: Azerbaijan and Türkiye Add Renewable Power to the Middle Corridor]]></title><description><![CDATA[The Azerbaijan-T&#252;rkiye energy partnership is rapidly moving from oil and gas to electricity and will soon export power to Europe, utilizing the strategic value of Nakhchivan as a corridor for peace.]]></description><link>https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/the-tanap-of-electricity-azerbaijan</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/the-tanap-of-electricity-azerbaijan</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[The Saratoga Foundation]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:52:04 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!87yS!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6b830233-4189-49c6-82bf-8bbcef69e71c_841x544.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!87yS!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6b830233-4189-49c6-82bf-8bbcef69e71c_841x544.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!87yS!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6b830233-4189-49c6-82bf-8bbcef69e71c_841x544.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!87yS!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6b830233-4189-49c6-82bf-8bbcef69e71c_841x544.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!87yS!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6b830233-4189-49c6-82bf-8bbcef69e71c_841x544.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!87yS!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6b830233-4189-49c6-82bf-8bbcef69e71c_841x544.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!87yS!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6b830233-4189-49c6-82bf-8bbcef69e71c_841x544.png" width="841" height="544" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/6b830233-4189-49c6-82bf-8bbcef69e71c_841x544.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:544,&quot;width&quot;:841,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:757076,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/215536821?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6b830233-4189-49c6-82bf-8bbcef69e71c_841x544.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!87yS!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6b830233-4189-49c6-82bf-8bbcef69e71c_841x544.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!87yS!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6b830233-4189-49c6-82bf-8bbcef69e71c_841x544.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!87yS!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6b830233-4189-49c6-82bf-8bbcef69e71c_841x544.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!87yS!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6b830233-4189-49c6-82bf-8bbcef69e71c_841x544.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><span>By Vasif Huseynov</span></strong></p><p style="text-align: justify;">&#128073;<em>The Azerbaijan-T&#252;rkiye energy partnership is entering a new phase, moving from oil and gas toward electricity and renewable power. Three projects under development could extend their energy network to Europe, while a Nakhchivan connection could provide the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace corridor with a new economic and strategic dimension. </em></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><span>By Vasif Huseynov</span></strong></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span>Baku </span><a href="https://azertag.az/en/xeber/baku_hosts_5th_azerbaijan_turkiye_energy_forum-4408942"><span>hosted</span></a><span> the fifth Azerbaijan-T&#252;rkiye Energy Forum on September 11, bringing together Azerbaijan&#8217;s Energy Minister Parviz Shahbazov and Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar for a review of hydrocarbons, energy efficiency, the electricity market, renewables and mining under the two countries&#8217; Joint Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation, a format that was launched in 2021. It was on the margins of that forum that Bayraktar </span><a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/ekonomi/bakan-bayraktar-azerbaycan-ile-elektrik-baglantilarinin-gelistirilmesi-icin-calismalarin-surdugunu-soyledi/4054219"><span>confirmed</span></a><span> what regional energy officials have been signaling for months: after three decades of building oil and gas infrastructure together, Azerbaijan and T&#252;rkiye are now planning to move electricity across the same network of relationships. Bayraktar noted that the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) has carried a cumulative 100 billion cubic meters of gas since entering service, calling it a major contributor to Europe&#8217;s energy security.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><span>He then set out, for the first time in detail, three electricity projects the two countries are pursuing in parallel.</span></strong></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span>The hydrocarbon foundation beneath that announcement remains substantial in its own right. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline is currently carrying about 600,000 barrels a day against a capacity closer to a million, headroom Bayraktar said Ankara wants filled with Central Asian volumes moving through the same corridor. On the gas side, T&#252;rkiye&#8217;s state pipeline operator BOTA&#350; signed a 15-year agreement with SOCAR, TotalEnergies and ADNOC in June for 33 billion cubic meters of gas tied to the second phase of Azerbaijan&#8217;s Absheron field, with production due to begin in 2029, </span><a href="https://report.az/en/amp/energy/socar-botas-totalenergies-and-adnoc-sign-gas-supply-deal-from-absheron-field"><span>according to the Turkish Energy Ministry&#8217;s statement on the signing</span></a><span>.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span>Electricity is the addition to that picture. &#8220;We are working specifically on three projects,&#8221; Bayraktar </span><a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/ekonomi/bakan-bayraktar-azerbaycan-ile-elektrik-baglantilarinin-gelistirilmesi-icin-calismalarin-surdugunu-soyledi/4054219"><span>told</span></a><span> the reporters. The first is a transmission line bringing electricity from Azerbaijan to T&#252;rkiye via Nakhchivan; the second is a four-country &#8220;green energy corridor&#8221; linking T&#252;rkiye, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Bulgaria; and the third is a high-voltage line running under the Black Sea to Europe. He described the T&#252;rkiye-Georgia-Azerbaijan-Bulgaria project in particular as &#8220;the TANAP of electricity,&#8221; and said the two governments hope to move it to the next stage soon, potentially through an intergovernmental agreement signed by the two presidents at the COP31 climate conference in Antalya.</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!weMa!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Febf70433-e111-45df-9e20-27b89d113ff2_1375x784.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!weMa!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Febf70433-e111-45df-9e20-27b89d113ff2_1375x784.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!weMa!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Febf70433-e111-45df-9e20-27b89d113ff2_1375x784.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!weMa!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Febf70433-e111-45df-9e20-27b89d113ff2_1375x784.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!weMa!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Febf70433-e111-45df-9e20-27b89d113ff2_1375x784.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!weMa!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Febf70433-e111-45df-9e20-27b89d113ff2_1375x784.jpeg" width="1375" height="784" 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!weMa!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Febf70433-e111-45df-9e20-27b89d113ff2_1375x784.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!weMa!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Febf70433-e111-45df-9e20-27b89d113ff2_1375x784.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!weMa!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Febf70433-e111-45df-9e20-27b89d113ff2_1375x784.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!weMa!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Febf70433-e111-45df-9e20-27b89d113ff2_1375x784.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><span>The most geopolitically sensitive of the three is the Nakhchivan line, because Azerbaijan&#8217;s exclave has no land connection to the rest of the country, except through Armenian and Iranian territory.</span></strong></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span>Any electricity link that reaches both Nakhchivan and T&#252;rkiye points toward the same corridor now being rebuilt for rail traffic under the </span><a href="https://president.az/en/articles/view/69572"><span>Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity</span></a><span> (TRIPP), the transit framework that the United States, Azerbaijan and Armenia agreed to in their August 8, 2025 Joint Declaration at the White House. President Ilham Aliyev gave a detailed public account yet of that corridor&#8217;s physical progress </span><a href="https://azertag.az/en/xeber/tashkent_hosted_third_meeting_of_supreme_interstate_council_of_azerbaijan_and_uzbekistan_video-4378633"><span>while in Tashkent on August 23</span></a><span>, informing the third meeting of the Azerbaijani-Uzbek Supreme Interstate Council that the Horadiz-Aghband railroad on Azerbaijan&#8217;s mainland side is already largely complete and is set for completion next year, that construction inside Nakhchivan itself is already underway, and that on the Armenian side, work is expected to begin by early next year. He also said Baku is assembling an international consortium to help finance the Nakhchivan section.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span>None of that construction is designed to carry electricity. But it establishes, quite literally, the corridor along which the Nakhchivan-T&#252;rkiye transmission line would run. It also means that the project would be one of the first pieces of TRIPP-adjacent infrastructure whose purpose is neither symbolic nor purely commercial, but operational: to interconnect the two national power grids.</span><strong><span> </span></strong><span>A corridor negotiated in Washington specifically to end a conflict would in all likelihood become the route that keeps electricity flowing between Azerbaijan and one of its own regions. That is a different, and arguably stronger, form of American stake in the peace process than a declaration alone provides.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><span>The other two projects carry less political weight but have more direct relevance on Europe.</span></strong></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span>The T&#252;rkiye-Georgia-Azerbaijan-Bulgaria corridor is explicitly designed to carry renewable generation rather than fossil-fuel electricity, positioning Baku as a producer of green power rather than only oil and gas. The Black Sea subsea cable is the most technically ambitious of the three, delivering Caspian-basin electricity directly into the European market, the electricity equivalent of what TANAP and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline already do for gas, and a hedge against the same overland chokepoints that have periodically complicated Middle Corridor freight traffic. </span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span>According to Azerbaijan&#8217;s Energy Minister </span><a href="http://zerbaijan&#8217;s Energy Minister Shahbazov,"><span>Parviz Shahbazov</span></a><span>, the Azerbaijan-Georgia-T&#252;rkiye-Bulgaria corridor is also significant for linking into Europe&#8217;s energy system, and that work on a technical-economic feasibility study and a joint venture for the project is already under way. He has also said that T&#252;rkiye&#8217;s participation in a separate Caspian-Black Sea-Europe Green Energy Corridor, planned to be phased into operation starting in 2032, would be a natural extension of the two countries&#8217; energy partnership.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span>Electricity also serves Baku and Ankara differently than oil or gas ever could. Hydrocarbon pipelines lock in a commodity that Europe&#8217;s own climate targets are designed to phase down; transmission lines let Azerbaijan monetize the wind, solar and hydro capacity it has been courting foreign investment to build, without depending on European gas demand staying high indefinitely. For T&#252;rkiye, it extends the hub ambitions already visible in Middle Corridor freight and TANAP transit into the power sector. Shahbazov also </span><a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/ekonomi/bakan-bayraktar-azerbaycan-ile-elektrik-baglantilarinin-gelistirilmesi-icin-calismalarin-surdugunu-soyledi/4054219"><span>noted</span></a><span> that Turkish companies' participation in Azerbaijan&#8217;s green energy projects has been growing, and said that artificial intelligence and digitalization in the energy transition should become one of the new priority areas of Azerbaijan-T&#252;rkiye energy cooperation.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span>Whether that ambition attracts financing is an important question in bilateral discussions. President Aliyev </span><a href="https://president.az/en/articles/view/73034"><span>told</span></a><span> German Chancellor Friedrich Merz&#8217;s government during his July 21 visit to Berlin that with TANAP and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline already running at full capacity, any further gas deliveries to Germany depend on new interconnectors, and that financing for them from the European Investment Bank has largely dried up under the institution&#8217;s own green-transition mandates. A renewable-carrying electricity corridor, unlike a hydrocarbon pipeline, sits more comfortably inside the mandate European lenders have used to justify walking away from oil and gas projects.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><span>Outlook</span></strong></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span>The emerging electricity architecture therefore suggests that the Middle Corridor is becoming more than a route for moving goods between Asia and Europe. Azerbaijan and T&#252;rkiye are gradually adding an energy layer to the corridor, moving from oil and gas to electricity and from conventional hydrocarbons to renewable power. For Brussels, this emerging architecture could provide additional momentum for diversifying Europe&#8217;s energy supplies and strengthening its energy security through the Caspian region. If the three projects now under discussion are brought to completion, the result would be a network in which Caspian energy resources reach T&#252;rkiye and Europe through multiple channels, while the Nakhchivan connection could give the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace framework a tangible economic and infrastructural dimension.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span>Author&#8217;s Bio:</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Dr. Vasif Huseynov is the head of the Western Studies department at the Center for Analysis of International Relations and Multiculturalism (AIR Center) in Baku, Azerbaijan.</em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:&quot;button-wrapper&quot;}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary button-wrapper" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/the-tanap-of-electricity-azerbaijan?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:&quot;button-wrapper&quot;}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary button-wrapper" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/the-tanap-of-electricity-azerbaijan?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p><p>Thank you for your support! Please remember that The Saratoga Foundation is a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization. Your donations are fully tax-deductible. If you seek to support The Saratoga Foundation, you can make a one-time donation by clicking on the PayPal link below! You can also subscribe to our <a href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/">website</a> to support our work.</p><p><a href="https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA">https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA</a></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Powered by Siberia, Built by Beijing: Russia’s Bet on Chinese AI]]></title><description><![CDATA[By Sergey Sukhankin]]></description><link>https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/powered-by-siberia-built-by-beijing</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/powered-by-siberia-built-by-beijing</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[The Saratoga Foundation]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 13:15:40 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!DOQF!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8edcf411-3d59-47a7-80ca-1ddd0f72867f_1376x768.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!DOQF!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8edcf411-3d59-47a7-80ca-1ddd0f72867f_1376x768.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!DOQF!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8edcf411-3d59-47a7-80ca-1ddd0f72867f_1376x768.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!DOQF!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8edcf411-3d59-47a7-80ca-1ddd0f72867f_1376x768.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!DOQF!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8edcf411-3d59-47a7-80ca-1ddd0f72867f_1376x768.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!DOQF!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8edcf411-3d59-47a7-80ca-1ddd0f72867f_1376x768.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!DOQF!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8edcf411-3d59-47a7-80ca-1ddd0f72867f_1376x768.jpeg" width="1376" height="768" 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!DOQF!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8edcf411-3d59-47a7-80ca-1ddd0f72867f_1376x768.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!DOQF!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8edcf411-3d59-47a7-80ca-1ddd0f72867f_1376x768.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!DOQF!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8edcf411-3d59-47a7-80ca-1ddd0f72867f_1376x768.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!DOQF!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8edcf411-3d59-47a7-80ca-1ddd0f72867f_1376x768.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><strong><a href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/149778185/sergey-sukhankin"><span>By Sergey Sukhankin</span></a></strong></p><p><span>The </span><a href="https://ria.ru/20260716/ii-2105224143.html?utm_source=yxnews&amp;utm_medium=desktop&amp;utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fdzen.ru%2Fnews%2Finstory%2Fe1cafb99-72dd-5a97-a1a3-f1e214d7944c"><span>establishment</span></a><span> of the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO) in Shanghai on July 16, 2026, provides Russia and China with a new </span><a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202607/t20260717_11984747.html"><span>institutional framework</span></a><span> for technological cooperation. </span>The organization brings together 29 founding members&#8212;mostly non-democratic regimes from the Global South&#8212;to provide Beijing with another institutional platform <span>for shaping an alternative to Western AI cooperation and governance.</span></p><p><span>The more consequential question for Moscow, however, is not participation in another multilateral technology forum, but whether AI can become a new pillar of bilateral economic interdependence with an economically and technologically stronger, and demographically larger, neighbor. Russian commentary points toward a prospective &#8216;division of labor&#8217; intended to compensate for Moscow&#8217;s disadvantages vis-&#224;-vis China. Namely, MTS Web Services CEO Pavel Voronin argued that in the scope of this &#8220;</span><a href="https://tass.ru/ekonomika/27937085"><span>AI Alliance</span></a><span>&#8221; Russia could provide Russian-language and sector-specific training data and expertise in industry, energy, finance, science, education, and public administration, while China can offer model architectures, computing resources, equipment, and training technologies.</span></p><h4><span>Leverage Through Infrastructure</span></h4><p><span>This proposition reflects Russia&#8217;s technological limitations vis-&#224;-vis China: for instance, InfoWatch President Natalya Kasperskaya has </span><a href="https://news.ru/society/it-specialist-ocenila-effektivnost-zakona-o-podderzhke-ii"><span>argued</span></a><span> that Russia is unlikely to catch the United States or China in large foundational models and should concentrate its scarce resources on </span><a href="https://rtvi.com/news/shansov-dognat-poezd-net-kasperskaya-obyasnila-pochemu-zakon-o-podderzhke-ii-mozhet-ne-srabotat/"><span>applied AI</span></a><span> instead. In other words, Moscow has an incentive to seek leverage in the physical infrastructure underlying AI, and this asymmetry helps explain the growing Russian focus on Siberia and the Far East, where Moscow&#8217;s potential contribution to an &#8220;AI alliance&#8221; could take the form of physical inputs on which large-scale computing increasingly depends: electricity, land, cooling, fiber connectivity, and geographically distributed data-center capacity. Indeed, Siberia and the Far East offer substantial hydroelectric resources and a cold climate that can reduce cooling costs. Russia is effectively seeking to convert these factors into a </span><a href="https://www.tks.ru/technology/2026/07/22/0002/rossiya-i-kitaj-mogut-sozdat-ii-alyans-s-setyu-data-tsentrov-v-sibiri-i-na-dalnem-vostoke/"><span>higher-value export</span></a><span> (computational capacity) and bind part of Chinese demand to Russian territory and power systems, creating a new form of infrastructure interdependence.</span></p><p><span>Additionally, for Moscow, locating compute capacity east of the Urals supports a broader effort to redirect infrastructure and investment toward its Asian-facing regions that have historically suffered from geographic distance, thin markets, and population outflow. Clearly, data centers alone will not reverse those structural problems, but they can anchor power, telecommunications, engineering, and cloud-service investment around existing industrial centers. This makes AI infrastructure attractive as an instrument of territorial development as well as foreign economic policy. For Moscow, AI infrastructure could therefore serve three objectives simultaneously: developing Russia&#8217;s eastern regions, strengthening their economic integration with Asian markets, and fostering interdependence with China.</span></p><p><span>This operational model has clear precedents: the first steps in this direction occurred well before the current AI boom. For example, in 2015, Russia&#8217;s En+ Group </span><a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2723521"><span>discussed</span></a><span> Siberian data-center cooperation with Huawei, targeting approximately $5 billion in Chinese investment over five years. By September 2015, En+, Huawei, LANIT, Centrin Data Systems, and Irkutsk regional authorities</span> <a href="https://www.irk.ru/news/20150903/agreement/"><span>signed</span></a><span> a framework agreement in Beijing for a major Irkutsk Oblast data center. In May 2017, En+ launched the first module of its &#8220;</span><a href="https://www.enplusgroup.com/en/media/news/press/other/en-group-launches-pilot-data-centre-in-siberia/"><span>Clouds of Siberia</span></a><span>&#8221; (</span><em><span>Oblaka Sibiri</span></em><span>) network at the Novo-Irkutsk CHP plant. En+ said the facility would serve Russian and Chinese customers and highlighted two advantages: company-supplied electricity and year-round natural cooling. It </span><a href="https://www.interfax-russia.ru/siberia/novosti-pribaykalya/en-zapustila-centr-obrabotki-dannyh-oblaka-sibiri-na-novo-irkutskoy-tec"><span>estimated</span></a><span> that electricity accounts for 50&#8211;70 percent of cloud-processing costs and noted it was considering additional projects with Russian and Chinese partners. </span></p><p><span>The significance of these earlier projects lies less in their scale than in the model they anticipated: converting Siberia&#8217;s inexpensive electricity and climatic advantages into data-processing capacity partly oriented toward meeting Chinese demand. What is new in 2026 is the convergence of this older infrastructure logic with rapidly expanding AI-related compute demand. MTS and China Mobile International </span><a href="https://moskva.mts.ru/about/media-centr/soobshheniya-kompanii/novosti-mts-v-rossii-i-mire/2026-03-24/mts-i-china-mobile-naladyat-propusk-internet-trafika-na-dalnem-vostoke"><span>signed</span></a><span> a memorandum to establish a new cross-border internet route &#8211; as of now the route is planned rather than already completed &#8211; at Pogranichny&#8211;Suifenhe using DWDM equipment capable of 48 channels at 200 Gbit/s each. If completed, the project would strengthen the digital backbone required for cross-border cloud and compute services.</span></p><h4><span>Seeking AI Capacity in the East</span></h4><p><span>Russia is simultaneously building domestic AI capacity in the east, which (as of now) should not be treated as direct evidence of Chinese participation. Rather, it should be interpreted as a sign that Moscow was preparing the necessary infrastructure for the purpose of attracting Chinese interest. The specific steps include:</span></p><p><span>&#183; On August 19, Sakha (Yakutia) </span><a href="https://www.comnews.ru/content/246972/2026-08-19/2026-w34/1009/yakutii-razrabatyvayut-proekt-sozdaniya-dalnevostochnogo-ii-klastera-baze-cod"><span>disclosed</span></a><span> plans for a Far Eastern AI cluster based on a new data center.</span></p><p><span>&#183; On August 31, it was </span><a href="https://monocle.ru/monocle/2026/36/moschnost-sibiri-budet-prirastat-ii/"><span>reported</span></a><span> that En+ affiliate Cloud X is constructing a 154-megawatt AI/cloud data center near the Ust-Ilimsk hydroelectric plant, targeted for launch in May 2029 and envisioned as the first of three facilities totaling roughly 462 MW.</span></p><p><span>Importantly, a recent study by the Stolypin Institute </span><a href="https://stolypin.institute/publications/novosti/vostochnaya-sibir-mozhet-stat-novoj-tochkoj-rosta-rossijskoj-infrastruktury-dannyh"><span>argues</span></a><span> that Eastern Siberia could support 150&#8211;200 MW-class facilities and potentially develop data infrastructure into an export industry. Taken together, these developments suggest that Russia is expanding the supply side of a prospective AI-compute relationship before corresponding Chinese demand has been publicly demonstrated. Political signaling is also intensifying. At a recent Russia&#8211;China </span><a href="https://erdc.ru/news/rossiya-i-kitay-nametili-vektory-tekhnologicheskoy-kooperatsii-v-ramkakh-vyezdnoy-sessii-vef-v-pekin/"><span>session</span></a><span> in Beijing (August 12), officials and companies discussed cooperation in AI, e-commerce, and the green economy; the following day, a Chinese delegation </span><a href="https://erdc.ru/news/kitay-zainteresovan-v-sovmestnykh-tekhnologicheskikh-proektakh-s-intts-russkiy/"><span>visited</span></a><span> the Russky Innovation Science and Technology Center in Vladivostok to discuss links with Chinese technology clusters.</span></p><h4><span>Outlook</span></h4><p><span>For the time being no publicly confirmed Chinese company has committed capital or long-term compute demand to the new Russian-backed Siberian AI projects. However, the absence of commitments points to a deeper structural problem for Moscow. From a purely economic and technological perspective, China does not need Russian territory to expand its domestic AI-compute capacity. Beijing&#8217;s nationwide &#8220;</span><a href="https://baike.baidu.com/en/item/East%20Data,%20West%20Computing%20Project/1434305"><span>East Data, West Computing</span></a><span>&#8221; (&#19996;&#25968;&#35199;&#31639;) program, formally launched in February 2022, already shifts suitable workloads toward western and northern regions with abundant land, massive renewable energy, favorable climate, and extensive domestic fiber. Regions such as Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Ningxia, Sichuan, Guizhou already offer many of the same advantages while remaining inside Chinese jurisdiction and purview. Consequently, China already possesses domestic substitutes for most of the physical advantages Russia is offering. It also maintains a detailed </span><a href="https://www.cac.gov.cn/2026-01/30/c_1771505108953002.htm"><span>regulatory regime</span></a><span> for cross-border transfers of personal and important data, adding compliance friction to any model that relies on moving sensitive datasets into Russia which could become a matter of vulnerability for China should relations between Moscow and Beijing change their current vector.</span></p><p><span>This creates a tactical contradiction for Moscow. If Chinese companies eventually commit substantial AI workloads to Siberia, their participation would validate Russian efforts to convert energy and geography into digital leverage. Paradoxically, it could also deepen Russia&#8217;s technological dependence on China. Russian companies could provide electricity, land, cooling, and physical infrastructure while Chinese partners supply advanced computing hardware, networking equipment, model architectures, cloud technologies, and potentially the anchor demand determining the facilities&#8217; commercial viability. Russia could therefore capture part of the infrastructure rent while remaining dependent on China for higher-value technological inputs and customers. This also raises the question as to why Beijing would place substantial compute capacity in Russia when comparable domestic locations are already available. Any eventual Chinese investment would therefore merit scrutiny for actual Chinese motivations&#8212;such as expanding its data and technological footprint in Russia&#8212;extending well beyond basic economic considerations</span></p><p><span>In sum, the energy constraint ultimately limits Moscow&#8217;s leverage. Siberian electricity consumption </span><a href="https://www.so-ups.ru/odu-siberia/news/odu-siberia-news-view/news/26706/"><span>rose</span></a><span> 4.7 percent in 2024, with data centers, mining, and industry contributing to demand growth. If no additional electricity production powers enter into the picture, AI facilities would start competing with (and potentially cannibalizing) aluminum production, cryptocurrency mining, electrification, and other industrial loads for low-cost power. The strategic question is therefore not whether Siberia can host AI data centers &#8211; it almost certainly can &#8211; but who would control the hardware, demand, data, and economic rents generated by them. The emerging pattern is best understood as a Russian attempt to convert Siberia&#8217;s traditional resource geography into digital leverage. Ultimately, the decisive indicator will be a prominent Chinese firm committing capital, equipment, or contracted compute capacity to Russian facilities. Until then, Moscow continues to build the infrastructure for strategic interdependence faster than Beijing can demonstrate it requires it.</span></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/powered-by-siberia-built-by-beijing?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/powered-by-siberia-built-by-beijing?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p></p><div><hr></div><p></p><p>Thank you for your support! 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data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary button-wrapper" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/powered-by-siberia-built-by-beijing?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Türkiye’s Pivot in Libya Reshapes the Eastern Mediterranean]]></title><description><![CDATA[By Andrew McGregor]]></description><link>https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/turkiyes-pivot-in-libya-reshapes</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/turkiyes-pivot-in-libya-reshapes</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[The Saratoga Foundation]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2026 13:04:46 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Y3Xb!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffb5b475a-efdd-4643-9ad4-51e074379ca2_1536x1024.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Y3Xb!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffb5b475a-efdd-4643-9ad4-51e074379ca2_1536x1024.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Y3Xb!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffb5b475a-efdd-4643-9ad4-51e074379ca2_1536x1024.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Y3Xb!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffb5b475a-efdd-4643-9ad4-51e074379ca2_1536x1024.png 848w, 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Y3Xb!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffb5b475a-efdd-4643-9ad4-51e074379ca2_1536x1024.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Y3Xb!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffb5b475a-efdd-4643-9ad4-51e074379ca2_1536x1024.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Y3Xb!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffb5b475a-efdd-4643-9ad4-51e074379ca2_1536x1024.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Y3Xb!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffb5b475a-efdd-4643-9ad4-51e074379ca2_1536x1024.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><strong><span>By Andrew McGregor</span></strong></p><p><span>A growing dispute in the eastern Mediterranean over control of significant and recently discovered offshore energy reserves is aggravating already-tense relations between T&#252;rkiye and Israel and creating divisions within NATO while simultaneously assisting the unification of Libya&#8217;s rival governments. At the center of these developments is the pending implementation of the 2019 Turkish-Libyan Eastern Mediterranean maritime boundary memorandum.</span></p><p><span>After the fall of Mu&#8217;ammar Qaddafi in 2011, Libya became divided between the internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) of Prime Minister &#8216;Abd al-Hamid Dbeibah in the west (supported by the GNU&#8217;s Libyan Army) and the administration of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar (a long-time CIA asset), his so-called Libyan National Army (LNA) and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) in the east and south. The greatest obstacle to unification is the 82-year-old Haftar&#8217;s desire to establish a ruling family dynasty with his son Saddam next-in-line to rule Libya. In the meantime, T&#252;rkiye and the US continue to encourage a pathway to full Libyan military and economic integration. A unified Libya would easily become an attractive and embargo-free market for T&#252;rkiye&#8217;s rapidly expanding arms industry, </span><a href="https://turdef.com/article/tuerkiye-s-defence-and-aerospace-exports-hit-10-56bn-in-2025"><span>estimated</span></a><span> to be worth nearly $11 billion.</span></p><p><span>Ankara&#8217;s principal aim in shifting its sole support from the Tripoli-based GNU to a broader embrace of both the GNU and its LNA/HoR rivals in Benghazi and Tobruk is to encourage HoR ratification of the 2019 T&#252;rkiye -Libya Maritime Agreement</span><strong><span>.</span></strong><span> Despite having the largest oil reserves in Africa, Libya&#8217;s divided rule has inhibited </span><a href="https://thearabweekly.com/libyas-unity-push-moves-forward-power-struggle-far-over"><span>attempts</span></a><span> to increase foreign investment and raise daily production of oil from 1.4 million barrels per day to 2 million barrels per day within the next four years. Most of the oil fields and export terminals in Libya remain under the control of the Haftar family, which has received support from the UAE, Egypt and Russia</span><strong><span>.</span></strong></p><p><span>The maritime agreement would see most of the offshore energy resources in the eastern Mediterranean split between Libya and T&#252;rkiye, to the immense discomfort of Greece, Cyprus and Israel, all of whom have their own economic interests in the region</span><strong><span>.</span></strong></p><h4><strong><span>Israel and T&#252;rkiye</span></strong></h4><p><span>Turkish Defense Minister Ya&#351;ar G&#252;ler </span><a href="https://nordicmonitor.com/2026/08/turkey-plans-for-war-scenarios-amid-expanding-israel-greece-defense-ties-official-letter-reveals/"><span>informed</span></a><span> T&#252;rkiye&#8217;s parliament on August 10 that the military was preparing for &#8220;possible crisis, tension and war&#8221; with regard to the growing military alignment of Israel and traditional rival Greece in a Mediterranean region Ankara increasingly views as its own.</span></p><p><span>Allegedly acting on intelligence that suggested T&#252;rkiye&#8217;s army was preparing to station troops and weapons at Syria&#8217;s Abu al-Duhur airbase (70 km from the Turkish border), Israeli jets bombed the dormant base on August 18.</span></p><p><span>After the strike, Israeli president Benjamin Netanyahu </span><a href="https://www.ynetnews.com/article/hyxjabewfg"><span>told</span></a><span> an army podcast: &#8220;&#8221;We will not tolerate a Turkish military entrenchment moving southward, because it threatens us,&#8221; adding that an earlier warning against a Turkish military presence at the mostly empty base was ignored: &#8220;Apparently they didn&#8217;t hear it, so we made sure they understood it more clearly.&#8221; Israel opposes any move that could restrict the ability of Israeli warplanes to operate freely in Syrian airspace. According to Syrian foreign minister Asaad al-Shaibani, the base had been </span><a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/08/israel-and-turkey-step-warnings-over-syria-after-airbase-bombing"><span>visited</span></a><span> by a delegation of Turkish military officers several days before the strike, but this was only in the context of &#8220;training and an exchange of expertise.&#8221; Other officials </span><a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-requests-interpol-red-notice-netanyahu-over-sumud-flotilla"><span>claimed</span></a><span> that only a Turkish technical team was present at the base, charged with repairs to a runway and the control tower.</span></p><p><span>Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdo&#287;an suggested the strikes were </span><a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-wont-abandon-syria-or-let-israel-draw-red-lines-erdogan-says"><span>linked</span></a><span> to upcoming elections in Israel but would not deter Ankara&#8217;s cooperation with Damascus: &#8220;We will not stop supporting our neighbours in getting back on their feet merely because it unsettles murderous networks with the blood of innocent people on their hands.&#8221; Netanyahu in turn has </span><a href="https://x.com/netanyahu/status/2043014018680422825"><span>accused</span></a><span> President Erdo&#287;an of accommodating &#8220;Iran&#8217;s terror regime and its proxies&#8221; as well as &#8220;massacring his own Kurdish citizens.&#8221; The Israeli attack, </span><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/22/envoy-says-israel-did-not-give-the-us-notice-before-strikes-on-syrian-base"><span>carried</span></a><span> out without prior US notification, was the latest in a series of Israeli strikes on Syria since the overthrow of former Syrian president Bashar al-Asad.</span></p><h4><strong><span>Turkish Involvement in Libya</span></strong></h4><p><span>T&#252;rkiye&#8217;s connection to Libya stretches back to 1551, when Libya was added to the Ottoman Empire. It remained so (with an interlude of independent rule by the Karamanli Turks, 1711-1835) until the 1911-1912 Italo-Ottoman war led to the territory coming under Italian control. Over a century would pass before Turks would once more make their presence felt in their former African colony.</span></p><p><span>Khalifa Haftar&#8217;s Egyptian-backed 2019 LNA offensive on Tripoli came to a shuddering halt when T&#252;rkiye intervened on Tripoli&#8217;s side. Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones inflicted terrible damage on LNA formations while LNA Russian air-defense systems were jammed by Turkish electronic counter-measures. Ankara&#8217;s commitment </span><a href="https://www.meforum.org/mef-online/turkey-doesnt-need-f-35s-to-threaten-israel-its-already-testing-its-arsenal-in-libya"><span>increased</span></a><span> with the deployment of troops and trainers, eventually leading to a Turkish naval presence at Misrata and an airbase at al-Watiya. T&#252;rkiye&#8217;s military support of Tripoli has also been followed by hundreds of projects in the energy, construction and infrastructure sectors.</span></p><p><span>Turkish foreign minister Hakan Fidan visited Khalifa and Saddam Haftar (deputy commander of the LNA) in Benghazi on August 12, the latest in a series of moves establishing closer ties between T&#252;rkiye and the Benghazi-based Haftar regime that began in the spring of 2025. Fidan </span><a href="https://middle-east-online.com/en/fidan%E2%80%99s-haftar-meeting-signals-turkey%E2%80%99s-pragmatic-libya-reset"><span>noted</span></a><span> T&#252;rkiye&#8217;s &#8220;One Libya policy,&#8221; which &#8220;makes no distinction between Libya&#8217;s west, east and south.&#8221;</span></p><p><span>To avoid accusations of favoring one side over the other, Fidan first </span><a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/fm-fidan-meets-young-haftar-turkish-troops-in-libya"><span>visited</span></a><span> GNU prime minister &#8216;Abd al-Hamid Dbeibah in Tripoli before visiting the Libya Mission Group Command of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). Saddam had earlier been Fidan&#8217;s </span><a href="https://www.mfa.gov.tr/sayin-bakanimizin-libya-ulusal-ordusu-genel-komutan-yardimcisi-orgeneral-saddam-hafter-ile-gorusmesi--24-temmuz-2026--ankara.en.mfa"><span>guest</span></a><span> in Ankara on July 24, his third visit in a year. The latest discussions appear to have been aimed in part at addressing eastern Libya&#8217;s concerns about its prior exclusion from revenue streams and other financial benefits of enhanced oil exploration in the eastern Mediterranean.</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Cdzj!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F22cca404-c276-4363-96a0-8e8a6a4fbbf9_700x451.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Cdzj!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F22cca404-c276-4363-96a0-8e8a6a4fbbf9_700x451.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Cdzj!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F22cca404-c276-4363-96a0-8e8a6a4fbbf9_700x451.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Cdzj!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F22cca404-c276-4363-96a0-8e8a6a4fbbf9_700x451.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Cdzj!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F22cca404-c276-4363-96a0-8e8a6a4fbbf9_700x451.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Cdzj!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F22cca404-c276-4363-96a0-8e8a6a4fbbf9_700x451.png" width="700" height="451" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/22cca404-c276-4363-96a0-8e8a6a4fbbf9_700x451.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:451,&quot;width&quot;:700,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:568163,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/215107377?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F22cca404-c276-4363-96a0-8e8a6a4fbbf9_700x451.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Cdzj!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F22cca404-c276-4363-96a0-8e8a6a4fbbf9_700x451.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Cdzj!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F22cca404-c276-4363-96a0-8e8a6a4fbbf9_700x451.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Cdzj!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F22cca404-c276-4363-96a0-8e8a6a4fbbf9_700x451.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Cdzj!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F22cca404-c276-4363-96a0-8e8a6a4fbbf9_700x451.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>        *Image above: Hakan Fidan visiting the mausoleum of &#8216;Umar al-Mukhtar.</p><p><span>On August 12, Fidan </span><a href="https://x.com/trtafrika/status/2087815325647507637"><span>visited</span></a><span> the mausoleum of Libyan independence hero &#8216;Umar al-Mukhtar, who at one point in his long career fought in Libya alongside Ottoman volunteers including the Ottoman officer Mustafa Kemal (later Atat&#252;rk, founder of modern-day T&#252;rkiye), after the official Ottoman surrender in the Italo-Ottoman war of 1911-1912 (al-Mukhtar was captured and executed by Italian forces in 1931).</span></p><p><span>In a sign of the growing military cooperation between T&#252;rkiye and Libya, Turkish chief of staff General Sel&#231;uk Bayraktaro&#287;lu </span><a href="https://libyaobserver.ly/news/libya-turkey-discuss-military-co-operation-and-training"><span>hosted</span></a><span> his Libyan counterpart, Lieutenant General Salah al-Namroush, in Ankara on August 30. The meeting focused on air force and special forces operations as well as means of improving Libyan military performance. Ibrahim Kalin, head of the Turkish Mill&#238; &#304;stihbarat Te&#351;kilati (MIT - National Intelligence Organization), also met Saddam Haftar in Benghazi in late August.</span></p><p><span>Ankara pursues a &#8220;One Army, One Libya&#8221; approach to Libya&#8217;s divided military. To this end, T&#252;rkiye </span><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2026/05/06/turkish-exercise-sees-libyas-rival-forces-train-together-for-second-time-within-weeks/"><span>facilitated</span></a><span> the April-May Efes-2026 military exercise involving the cooperative participation of troops from both sides of the Libyan divide. T&#252;rkiye has also begun training of troops from </span><a href="https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/la-turchia-addestra-le-forze-del-generale-libico-haftar/"><span>both</span></a><span> the GNU&#8217;s Libyan Army and the LNA inside T&#252;rkiye.</span></p><p><span>Ankara&#8217;s shift to more equitable dealing with both Libyan factions is a sensitive undertaking; the Haftar clan is only onside so long as they see unification leading to their domination of a restructured Libya, while Dbeibah and the GNU watch closely for signs of Turkish backsliding.</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><div class="image-link image2" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oqr6!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99279c11-f957-4723-834c-97ea2dfd0ed7_391x240.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oqr6!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99279c11-f957-4723-834c-97ea2dfd0ed7_391x240.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oqr6!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99279c11-f957-4723-834c-97ea2dfd0ed7_391x240.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oqr6!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99279c11-f957-4723-834c-97ea2dfd0ed7_391x240.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oqr6!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99279c11-f957-4723-834c-97ea2dfd0ed7_391x240.png" width="391" height="240" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/99279c11-f957-4723-834c-97ea2dfd0ed7_391x240.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:240,&quot;width&quot;:391,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:89544,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/215107377?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faf6bba78-0b62-4d14-871a-68e37aea75be_426x240.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oqr6!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99279c11-f957-4723-834c-97ea2dfd0ed7_391x240.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oqr6!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99279c11-f957-4723-834c-97ea2dfd0ed7_391x240.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oqr6!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99279c11-f957-4723-834c-97ea2dfd0ed7_391x240.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oqr6!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F99279c11-f957-4723-834c-97ea2dfd0ed7_391x240.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div></div></div></div></figure></div><h4><strong><span>The Mediterranean Energy Scheme</span></strong></h4><p><span>T&#252;rkiye&#8217;s assertive approach to the eastern Mediterranean has its roots in the </span><em><span>Mavi Vatan</span></em><span> (Blue Homeland) maritime doctrine, which was developed in 2006 by senior commanders of the Turkish navy. The doctrine enables claims to roughly 178,000 square miles of maritime territory and its hydrocarbon resources, including large parts of the Black Sea, the Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean, all without regard to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), never ratified by T&#252;rkiye, the United States or </span><a href="https://treaties.un.org/pages/showdetails.aspx?objid=0800000280043ad5"><span>Israel</span></a><span>.</span></p><p><span>At the core of the regional dispute is T&#252;rkiye&#8217;s establishment of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), defined under UNCLOS as maritime regions extending as far as 188 nautical miles beyond the traditional 12-mile national territorial limit. An EEZ does not grant full sovereignty, but allows for sovereign rights over economic resources below the surface. This includes the exploitation of oil and gas resources. The eastern Mediterranean is believed to host significant offshore reserves of natural gas.</span></p><p><span>The 2019 Turkish-Libyan maritime agreement ignores certain Greek and Greek Cypriot claims in the Mediterranean. Cyprus has been divided since 1974 following a coup by Greek Cypriot nationalists and a subsequent Turkish military intervention in the northern half of the island.</span><a href="#_ftn1"><sup><span>[1]</span></sup></a><span> Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and Israel all reject the Turkish-Libyan maritime agreement as a violation of their own maritime claims in the region. Also in play is the proposed, but now </span><a href="https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/regions-of-interest/Eastern_Mediterranean"><span>stalled</span></a><span>, </span><a href="https://igi-poseidon.com/project/eastmed-poseidon/"><span>East Med Pipeline</span></a><span> that would ship natural gas from Israel&#8217;s offshore fields through Cyprus to Greece and Italy.</span></p><p><span>Greek opposition to the maritime agreement is focused on its failure to </span><a href="https://www.euractiv.com/news/greece-pushes-maritime-talks-with-libya-to-counter-turkeys-2019-pact/"><span>recognize</span></a><span> the EEZ boundaries of Crete and the Greek Island of </span><a href="https://www.dw.com/en/greece-turkey-clash-over-protected-aegean-marine-areas/a-78550021"><span>Kastellorizo</span></a><span>, which lies one mile off the southern coast of T&#252;rkiye. Questions have been </span><a href="https://nordicmonitor.com/2026/08/turkey-plans-for-war-scenarios-amid-expanding-israel-greece-defense-ties-official-letter-reveals/"><span>raised</span></a><span> in the Turkish parliament regarding the alleged militarization of Greek islands in the eastern Aegean close to T&#252;rkiye, including the deployment of Israeli anti-aircraft systems, including Patriot missile batteries. T&#252;rkiye maintains that </span><a href="https://www.mfa.gov.tr/lausanne-peace-treaty-part-i_-political-clauses.en.mfa"><span>under the 1923 Lausanne Agreement</span></a><span> (Article 4 and Article 13), these islands should be demilitarized due to their proximity to the Turkish mainland to prevent them from being used for potential military action against T&#252;rkiye. On the other hand, Athens </span><a href="https://nordicmonitor.com/2026/08/turkey-plans-for-war-scenarios-amid-expanding-israel-greece-defense-ties-official-letter-reveals/"><span>claims</span></a><span> the right to self-defense in the militarization of the islands, particularly in regard to &#8220;Turkish threats.&#8221;</span></p><p><span>In July, Greece </span><a href="https://nordicmonitor.com/2026/08/turkey-plans-for-war-scenarios-amid-expanding-israel-greece-defense-ties-official-letter-reveals/"><span>approved</span></a><span> the purchase of a &#8364;3.5 billion ($4 billion) AI-based radar and missile air defense system from Israel to form the core component of the so-called &#8220;Achilles Shield&#8221; system. The Israeli technology is already proven through use in Israel&#8217;s &#8220;Iron Dome&#8221; aerial defense system. The deal, which breaks from a larger European reticence to interact with Israel following its devastation of Gaza, was signed in Tel Aviv on August 31. As part of a broader military modernization (with one eye on Turkish military improvements), Greece is also preparing to buy as many as 40 American-built F-35 fighter jets as well as frigates from Italy and France. Popular </span><a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/israelis-in-greece-warned-to-lie-low-ahead-of-pro-palestinian-day-of-rage-protests/"><span>opposition</span></a><span> to Israeli operations in Gaza and the West Bank is strong in Greece , making Israel an unlikely ally in Greece&#8217;s long-standing rivalry with T&#252;rkiye, its NATO ally; former finance minister Yanis Varoufakis </span><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/31/why-has-greece-signed-a-3-5bn-missile-deal-with-israel"><span>described</span></a><span> the deal as part of &#8220;the transformation of Greece into an Israeli satellite.&#8221;</span></p><h4><strong><span>Containing Israel</span></strong></h4><p><span>Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has encouraged President Trump to prevent T&#252;rkiye&#8217;s return to the Lockheed Martin F-35 development program on the </span><a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/trump-on-israel-opposing-f-35s-to-turkey-nobody-tells-me-what-we-should-be-selling/"><span>grounds</span></a><span> that T&#252;rkiye is &#8220;a regime infected by the Muslim Brotherhood</span><em><span>,</span></em><span> an extreme movement that hates America and chants &#8216;Death to America.&#8217;&#8221; Left unsaid is that a fleet of Turkish F-35s could challenge Israel&#8217;s aerial dominance in the region, a necessary component of Israeli defense and expansion efforts.</span></p><p><span>Having so far failed in its ongoing effort to crush the Iranian threat or even to eliminate the menace of Hezbollah along its northern border, Israel is particularly sensitive to the danger posed by a Syrian-Turkish alliance against Israel. The promise of the Abraham Accords, once so favorable to Israel&#8217;s long-term security, has been shattered by regional opposition to Israeli methods in Gaza. Further challenges to Israel&#8217;s economic prosperity posed by the Turkish-Libyan maritime agreement have created alarm in the Israeli media, which has </span><a href="https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/rj11zcoldmg"><span>accused</span></a><span> Ankara of seeking &#8220;to delegitimize the Israel Defense Forces, isolate Israeli officials, and erode Israel&#8217;s sovereign right to self-defense&#8221; while serving as &#8220;a political, logistical, and financial sanctuary for senior Hamas leadership.&#8221; </span></p><p><span>A report by Israel&#8217;s Dor Moria think tank </span><a href="https://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2025/09/06/why-turkeys-presence-in-libya-threatens-israel/"><span>described</span></a><span> T&#252;rkiye&#8217;s moves in the region (including its activities in Libya) as a &#8220;strategic encirclement&#8221; of Israel, confining its operational space and its development of an independent energy sector. In the interim, T&#252;rkiye claims its chief motivation in Syria </span><a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/syria-s-territorial-integrity-must-absolutely-be-protected-turkish-president-erdogan/3419494"><span>is to assist in rebuilding the country</span></a><span>&#8212;a goal supported by the United States and the wider international community&#8212;and ultimately to bring an end to the Syrian civil war that has </span><a href="https://sana.sy/en/politics/2291954/"><span>devastated</span></a><span> the region for more than a decade.</span></p><h4><strong><span>Conclusion</span></strong></h4><p><span>T&#252;rkiye is a challenge to Israel&#8217;s plan to become the dominant regional power in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean. In the last three decades, T&#252;rkiye&#8217;s post-WWI embrace of the secular, Western-oriented ideology of Mustafa Kemal has been steadily challenged by neo-Ottomanism and a revival of T&#252;rkiye&#8217;s Islamic identity under President Erdo&#287;an leadership. These trends, endorsed by T&#252;rkiye&#8217;s ruling party, recall that Palestine, Libya, Egypt and Syria were all once part of the Turkish-dominated Ottoman Empire. While a return to imperial status is out of the question for a host of reasons, Ankara sees these nations as potential partners for a post-Iran War regional realignment independent of superpower dominance. The Mecca Joint Deterrence Agreement, </span><a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/analyses/mecca-agreement-idea-practice-deterrence-institutionalisation-and-new-security"><span>signed </span></a><span>on August 7 by T&#252;rkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, is a major step in this strategic realignment.</span></p><p><span>Working in Ankara&#8217;s favor is Washington&#8217;s growing interest in Libyan unification and stability; Chevron and Exxon Mobil have </span><a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-905829"><span>obtained</span></a><span> contracts this year to extract oil in both offshore blocks and in the Sirte Basin. Washington is nonetheless finding itself trapped in an uneasy situation as Israel&#8217;s principal ally and a NATO ally of both Greece and T&#252;rkiye, the latter still fielding the second-largest military in the alliance. The Erdo&#287;an government may see opportunities in the US administration&#8217;s increasing disinterest in the NATO partnership that would allow Ankara to abandon its long and fruitless attempts at European integration in favor of a return to regional leadership in a community of Islamic nations rather than its ongoing role as the West&#8217;s perennially spurned suitor.</span></p><div><hr></div><p><a href="#_ftnref1"><sup><span>[1]</span></sup></a> <span>The island has been divided since 1974 following a military coup in Cyprus backed by a military junta in Greece, which sparked a Turkish military intervention in northern Cyprus to protect the rights of its Turkish minority under Article IV because it is a guarantor power </span><a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/05/cy20gr20tr600816treaty20of20guarantee.pdf"><span>under the Treaty of Guarantee</span></a><span> signed in 1960 with Greece, and the United Kingdom.</span></p><p><strong>About the Author:</strong></p><p>Dr. Andrew McGregor is director of <a href="https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/">Aberfoyle International Security</a>, a Toronto-based consultancy specializing in the security issues of Africa and the Islamic world. </p><p> .</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/turkiyes-pivot-in-libya-reshapes?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:&quot;button-wrapper&quot;}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary button-wrapper" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/turkiyes-pivot-in-libya-reshapes?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:&quot;button-wrapper&quot;}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary button-wrapper" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><div><hr></div><p>Thank you for your support! 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You can also subscribe to our <a href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/">website</a> to support our work.</p><p><a href="https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA">https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA</a></p><div><hr></div><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/turkiyes-pivot-in-libya-reshapes?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/turkiyes-pivot-in-libya-reshapes?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[New Report! The Last Mile of Adaptation: How the Russian Military Is Turning Combat Experience into Reproducible Capability ]]></title><description><![CDATA[Hi Everyone!]]></description><link>https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/new-report-the-last-mile-of-adaptation</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/new-report-the-last-mile-of-adaptation</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[The Saratoga Foundation]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 08 Sep 2026 12:57:47 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!qvjG!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8bd826c1-f76c-4389-aa9d-b52b1bb1d5aa_1536x1024.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!qvjG!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8bd826c1-f76c-4389-aa9d-b52b1bb1d5aa_1536x1024.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!qvjG!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8bd826c1-f76c-4389-aa9d-b52b1bb1d5aa_1536x1024.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!qvjG!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8bd826c1-f76c-4389-aa9d-b52b1bb1d5aa_1536x1024.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!qvjG!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8bd826c1-f76c-4389-aa9d-b52b1bb1d5aa_1536x1024.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!qvjG!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8bd826c1-f76c-4389-aa9d-b52b1bb1d5aa_1536x1024.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!qvjG!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8bd826c1-f76c-4389-aa9d-b52b1bb1d5aa_1536x1024.png" width="1456" height="971" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/8bd826c1-f76c-4389-aa9d-b52b1bb1d5aa_1536x1024.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:971,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:2287668,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/214231426?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8bd826c1-f76c-4389-aa9d-b52b1bb1d5aa_1536x1024.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!qvjG!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8bd826c1-f76c-4389-aa9d-b52b1bb1d5aa_1536x1024.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!qvjG!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8bd826c1-f76c-4389-aa9d-b52b1bb1d5aa_1536x1024.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!qvjG!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8bd826c1-f76c-4389-aa9d-b52b1bb1d5aa_1536x1024.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!qvjG!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8bd826c1-f76c-4389-aa9d-b52b1bb1d5aa_1536x1024.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Hi Everyone!</p><p>We are delighted to announce the release of  a new special report by Senior Fellow Roger N. McDermott: &#8220;<strong><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1gNcrJho0MY76BoFo5lCmDQPoTnr2-RjH/view?usp=sharing">The Last Mile of Adaptation: How the Russian Military Is Turning Combat Experience into Reproducible Capability</a>,</strong>&#8220; which examines how the Russian military is attempting to institutionalize lessons learned from the war in Ukraine to bridge the &#8220;last mile of adaptation.&#8221;</p><p>Ten takeaways from the report include:</p><ul><li><p><strong>Reproducibility is a separate strategic variable</strong>. Innovation, diffusion, and codification are intermediate states; the decisive test is whether new people and formations can regenerate the military effect without the original innovators.</p></li><li><p><strong>Russia is building four overlapping mechanisms of force reproduction</strong>. Procedural, human, organizational, and material pathways connect battlefield experience to guidance, education, permanent structures, industry, maintenance, and force generation.</p></li><li><p><strong>The Russian lessons system is a network, not a single pipeline</strong>. Redundant links among command bodies, scientific committees, research institutes, universities, training organs, and industry can make learning uneven but resilient and difficult to suppress at one node.</p></li><li><p><strong>Human transmission remains the critical bottleneck</strong>. Combat-experienced instructors, mentors, specialists, and commanders carry tacit knowledge that documents cannot fully preserve, while casualties, rotation, and rapid technological change continually erode it.</p></li><li><p><strong>The &#8220;Last Mile of Adaptation:</strong>&#8221; Combat experience alone does not equal durable power. The central strategic challenge for Moscow is whether it can detach wartime knowledge from individual commanders and reproduce those military effects across new personnel, doctrine, and force generation.</p></li><li><p><strong>Reproducibility as a Strategic Variable</strong>: A military achieves true institutional capability only when it can regenerate battlefield innovations following heavy casualties, rotation, and organizational turnover. Without this, even sophisticated tactical advances remain institutionally fragile.</p></li><li><p>I<strong>nstitutional Architecture for Learning</strong>: Russian General Staff leadership&#8212;led by Colonel General Vasiliy Trushin&#8212;is using military-scientific committees as &#8220;transmission belts&#8221; to systematically collect, study, and convert frontline experience into force-wide guidance and updated military science.</p></li><li><p><strong>Massive Scale of Adaptation Efforts:</strong> Since February 2022, Moscow has issued over 450 methodological recommendations and amendments to combat regulations, conducted more than 400 military-technical experiments under combat conditions, and analyzed roughly 500 weapon types to modernize over 190 systems.</p></li><li><p><strong>Force Generation &amp; Education as the Critical Test</strong>: Following directives from Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, Russia is mandating combat experience across all officer training programs, doubling faculty battlefield placements, and introducing new military specialties to shorten the gap between frontline lessons and institutional training.</p></li><li><p><strong>NATO should develop force-generation intelligence.</strong> The most useful warning indicators increasingly lie in schools, training centers, curricula, instructor pipelines, qualifications, organizational standards, and the performance of newly generated formations: the institutions that determine what Russia can reproduce after the war.</p></li></ul><p>You can download the full report here &#128073; <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1gNcrJho0MY76BoFo5lCmDQPoTnr2-RjH/view?usp=sharing">here</a>.</p><p>Enjoy!</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><div class="image-link image2" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4BnQ!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c02137c-d8f7-47b9-aa09-76f169615c57_100x75.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4BnQ!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c02137c-d8f7-47b9-aa09-76f169615c57_100x75.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4BnQ!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c02137c-d8f7-47b9-aa09-76f169615c57_100x75.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4BnQ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c02137c-d8f7-47b9-aa09-76f169615c57_100x75.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4BnQ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c02137c-d8f7-47b9-aa09-76f169615c57_100x75.png" width="100" height="75" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/5c02137c-d8f7-47b9-aa09-76f169615c57_100x75.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:75,&quot;width&quot;:100,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1774,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/204961817?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c02137c-d8f7-47b9-aa09-76f169615c57_100x75.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" title="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4BnQ!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c02137c-d8f7-47b9-aa09-76f169615c57_100x75.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4BnQ!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c02137c-d8f7-47b9-aa09-76f169615c57_100x75.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4BnQ!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c02137c-d8f7-47b9-aa09-76f169615c57_100x75.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4BnQ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c02137c-d8f7-47b9-aa09-76f169615c57_100x75.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div></div></div></div></figure></div><p>Glen E. Howard</p><p>President, Saratoga Foundation</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/new-report-the-last-mile-of-adaptation?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/new-report-the-last-mile-of-adaptation?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p></p><p>Thank you for your support! Please remember that The Saratoga Foundation is a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization. Your donations are fully tax-deductible. If you seek to support The Saratoga Foundation, you can make a one-time donation by clicking on the PayPal link below! You can also subscribe to our <a href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/">website</a> to support our work.</p><p><a href="https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA">https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA</a></p><p></p><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Behind Enemy Lines: Crimean Tatars Underground Role in Ukraine’s War with Russia]]></title><description><![CDATA[By Paul Goble]]></description><link>https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/behind-enemy-lines-crimean-tatars</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/behind-enemy-lines-crimean-tatars</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[The Saratoga Foundation]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 05 Sep 2026 13:06:47 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TaMD!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdb294e74-8a7c-40bf-b722-9399f60ed434_1536x1024.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TaMD!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdb294e74-8a7c-40bf-b722-9399f60ed434_1536x1024.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TaMD!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdb294e74-8a7c-40bf-b722-9399f60ed434_1536x1024.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TaMD!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdb294e74-8a7c-40bf-b722-9399f60ed434_1536x1024.png 848w, 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TaMD!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdb294e74-8a7c-40bf-b722-9399f60ed434_1536x1024.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TaMD!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdb294e74-8a7c-40bf-b722-9399f60ed434_1536x1024.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TaMD!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdb294e74-8a7c-40bf-b722-9399f60ed434_1536x1024.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!TaMD!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdb294e74-8a7c-40bf-b722-9399f60ed434_1536x1024.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><h4><a href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/149778185/distinguished-fellow-emeritus"><span>By Paul Goble</span></a></h4><p><span>The Crimean Tatar underground organization, Atesh &#8211; &#8220;spark&#8221; in that national language -- is playing an increasingly important role in providing intelligence to Kyiv about Russian aggression and carrying out sabotage against Russian targets not only in Crimea but inside the Russian Federation as well. Because of the nature of its work, most of the actions </span><em><span>Atesh</span></em><span> has claimed or been blamed for cannot be independently corroborated and thus are often dismissed either as self-promotion in the first case or disinformation in the second. </span></p><p><span>As it enters the fifth year of its existence, Atesh and its role are becoming clearer, especially in the wake of Ukrainian attacks on targets within the Russian Federation. These developments justify the conclusion that this Crimean Tatar underground organization is a serious ally of Kyiv, and suggest that no discussion of Ukraine&#8217;s order of battle or its ability to inflict harm on Russian targets should take place without reference to Atesh and its actions.</span></p><p><span>After Putin seized Ukraine&#8217;s Crimea in 2014, more than 50,000 Crimean Tatars fled their homeland but others formed a series of small underground groups inside Russian occupied Crimea to harass Russian forces there. They had some success in the following years but did not come together to form a unified command until after Putin launched his expanded war against Ukraine in February 2022. Then, in the fall of that year, many in these groups united and formed Atesh both to continue their campaign inside the Crimean homeland and to assist Ukrainian forces elsewhere, something they viewed as central to the achievement of their own goals.</span></p><p><span>The group&#8217;s actions in 2022 through 2023 attracted relatively little attention because they were concentrated in Crimea and seldom could be independently confirmed; but by the start of 2024, its attacks had increased to the point that they attracted more attention, a trend that intensified as the group provided intelligence to Kyiv that allowed Ukrainian forces to sink Russian ships on the Black Sea and attack Russian positions in Ukraine itself. (For more information on the organization in that period, see </span><a href="https://cepa.org/article/behind-the-lines-inside-the-resistance-sabotaging-putins-plans-for-ukraine/"><span>CEPA. Feb 8, 2024</span></a><span> and the files for those years of Atesh&#8217;s own telegram channel, </span><a href="https://t.me/atesh_ua"><span>ATESH UA</span></a><span>, one that now has almost 50,000 subscribers.)</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!aen0!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff94b8010-253f-47a5-8456-16ce6e80d4dc_500x321.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!aen0!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff94b8010-253f-47a5-8456-16ce6e80d4dc_500x321.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!aen0!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff94b8010-253f-47a5-8456-16ce6e80d4dc_500x321.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!aen0!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff94b8010-253f-47a5-8456-16ce6e80d4dc_500x321.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!aen0!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff94b8010-253f-47a5-8456-16ce6e80d4dc_500x321.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!aen0!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff94b8010-253f-47a5-8456-16ce6e80d4dc_500x321.jpeg" width="500" height="321" 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!aen0!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff94b8010-253f-47a5-8456-16ce6e80d4dc_500x321.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!aen0!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff94b8010-253f-47a5-8456-16ce6e80d4dc_500x321.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!aen0!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff94b8010-253f-47a5-8456-16ce6e80d4dc_500x321.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!aen0!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff94b8010-253f-47a5-8456-16ce6e80d4dc_500x321.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><h4><span>Operations Inside Crimea</span></h4><p><span>Over the last year and especially this summer as Kyiv has pounded Russian targets with drone attacks, however, far more information about Atesh has come out about its role </span><a href="https://english.nv.ua/russian-war/atesh-fighters-locate-hidden-russian-fuel-storage-site-in-occupied-simferopol-50629338.html"><span>acting in support</span></a><span> of what the Ukrainian military is doing </span><a href="https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/06/10/komanda-ogon"><span>inside Crimea</span></a><span> and also inside Russia, such </span><a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/08/19/8049260/"><span>as in Kursk</span></a><span> both by its own attacks and by providing intelligence that a fuller picture of Atesh </span><a href="https://cepa.org/article/behind-the-lines-the-agents-driving-ukraines-covert-war-of-attrition/"><span>has emerged</span></a><span>.</span></p><p><span>Among the most important features of this picture, some but not all of which have been picked up by Western outlets media outlets, are the following:</span></p><p><span>&#183; First, Atesh operates on the basis of its leaders&#8217; understanding that in the current war, there is no chance that Ukraine will disappear but there is a very real risk that Russia could succeed in destroying the Crimean Tatars in their homeland, a possibility that compels the Crimean Tatars to form their own organization of self-defense.</span></p><p><span>&#183; Second, the group has succeeded in attracting what its leaders claim are 1800 to 2,000 members, although it acknowledges that only a fraction of these is actively engaged in sabotage or intelligence operations. Most, its leaders say, actively support the goals of Atesh but aren&#8217;t taking actions that could bring Russian retribution.</span></p><p><span>&#183; Third, Atesh has always identified itself as a Crimean Tatar operation; but it includes within its membership and supporters may ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians opposed to Putin&#8217;s aggressive war in Ukraine. That multi-national composition gives it advantages it would not have had if it had remained purely Crimean Tatar.</span></p><p><span>&#183; Fourth, as the war has evolved, Atesh has assumed an ever-larger role as a source of intelligence about Russian positions that Kyiv can use for targeting and about Russian plans in Crimea and the Black Sea where Crimean Tatars </span><a href="https://charter97.org/ru/news/2026/7/31/693078/"><span>have the ability to gather information</span></a><span>.</span></p><p><span>&#183; And fifth, as Moscow has </span><a href="https://meduza.io/feature/2026/08/07/nikogda-tak-strashno-ne-bylo-kak-seychas"><span>stepped up repression in Crimea</span></a><span> and forced other groups which have spoken out for the Crimean Tatars to disband, Atesh is thus likely to assume an ever more important role as far as the future of the Crimean Tatars are concerned.</span></p><h4><span>Outlook</span></h4><p><span>Like other Crimean Tatar organizations, Atesh seeks international recognition that the 1944 Soviet deportation of Crimean Tatars was </span><a href="https://www.svoboda.org/a/deportatsiya-krymskih-tatar-genotsid-kotoryy-dolzhen-bytj-priznan-mirom-pochemu-eto-vazhno-/33417301.html"><span>an act of genocide</span></a><span>&#8212;a step over the last decade that seven countries have done. Furthermore, Atesh shares the commitment of other Crimean Tatar leaders and groups and is committed to the expulsion of Russian forces from Ukraine and ensuring Crimea remains within the restored borders of the Ukrainian republic. </span></p><p><span>Atesh&#8217;s contribution to the Ukrainian cause now almost certainly in the future will give the Crimean Tatars a greater voice in what the role of Crimean Tatars within Ukraine will be, something that along with its current military contribution makes it a group to watch rather than to dismiss out of hand as something marginal.</span></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/behind-enemy-lines-crimean-tatars?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/behind-enemy-lines-crimean-tatars?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p><p>Thank you for your support! Please remember that The Saratoga Foundation is a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization. Your donations are fully tax-deductible. If you seek to support The Saratoga Foundation, you can make a one-time donation by clicking on the PayPal link below! You can also subscribe to our <a href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/">website</a> to support our work.</p><p><a href="https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA">https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA</a></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Bridging the Middle Corridor: How Azerbaijan and the EU Are Reshaping Eurasian Connectivity]]></title><description><![CDATA[Azerbaijan is expanding its role as a strategic transit hub&#8212;linking its mainland to Nakhchivan&#8212;to drive Middle Corridor growth while calling for more EU investment in regional infrastructure.]]></description><link>https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/bridging-the-middle-corridor-how</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/bridging-the-middle-corridor-how</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[The Saratoga Foundation]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 01 Sep 2026 15:22:21 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!XX4v!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F66b94c8d-57c1-45ee-806f-40af94d9f264_1536x1024.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!XX4v!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F66b94c8d-57c1-45ee-806f-40af94d9f264_1536x1024.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!XX4v!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F66b94c8d-57c1-45ee-806f-40af94d9f264_1536x1024.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!XX4v!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F66b94c8d-57c1-45ee-806f-40af94d9f264_1536x1024.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!XX4v!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F66b94c8d-57c1-45ee-806f-40af94d9f264_1536x1024.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!XX4v!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F66b94c8d-57c1-45ee-806f-40af94d9f264_1536x1024.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!XX4v!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F66b94c8d-57c1-45ee-806f-40af94d9f264_1536x1024.png" width="1456" height="971" 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!XX4v!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F66b94c8d-57c1-45ee-806f-40af94d9f264_1536x1024.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!XX4v!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F66b94c8d-57c1-45ee-806f-40af94d9f264_1536x1024.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!XX4v!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F66b94c8d-57c1-45ee-806f-40af94d9f264_1536x1024.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!XX4v!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F66b94c8d-57c1-45ee-806f-40af94d9f264_1536x1024.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><strong><span>By Vasif Huseynov</span></strong></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span>Trade volumes along the Middle Corridor &#8212; the rail and sea route linking China to Europe via Central Asia and the South Caucasus &#8212; have roughly </span><a href="https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-study-maps-investment-needs-rebuild-trade-routes-between-europe-and-central-asia-caucasus-2026-02-06_en"><span>quadrupled</span></a><span> since 2022. Transit times have been reduced from 53 days to between </span><a href="https://eutoday.net/middle-corridor-europe-must-invest-now/"><span>18 and 23 days</span></a><span>, as shippers are being forced to reroute their products around a sanctioned Russia and a volatile Red Sea, where up to </span><a href="https://eutoday.net/middle-corridor-europe-must-invest-now/"><span>90 percent</span></a><span> of shipping has been diverted since 2024. Beijing and Brussels are now competing openly for a stake in that realignment. China committed some </span><a href="https://eutoday.net/middle-corridor-europe-must-invest-now/"><span>$23 billion</span></a><span> to Kazakhstan&#8217;s side of the route in 2025 alone, while the EU has answered with </span><a href="https://www.diplomaticourier.com/posts/europes-big-bet-on-the-trans-caspian-transport-corridor---emil-avdaliani"><span>&#8364;12 billion</span></a><span> ($13.94 billion) in the form of the Global Gateway package and a dedicated coordination platform meant to keep European financing in the race.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span>Azerbaijan is currently routing nearly all of that corridor traffic through Georgia. The </span><a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/business/economy/turkiye-georgia-azerbaijan-launch-btk-railway-at-full-capacity"><span>Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway</span></a><span>, which entered full-scale operation in June following years of upgrades, remains the corridor&#8217;s only functioning rail link to </span>T&#252;rkiye<span> and the Black Sea coast, bypassing Armenia entirely while a parallel line through Armenian territory has remained dormant since 1993.</span></p><p><span>A second route is taking shape further south, functioning as an alternative rather than a substitute to the Georgian passage: the Zangezur corridor. Framed under </span><a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/gallery/president-donald-trump-signs-a-trilateral-joint-declaration-with-president-ilham-aliyev-of-azerbaijan-and-prime-minister-nikol-pashinyan-of-armenia/"><span>TRIPP</span></a><span>&#8212;the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, a U.S.-brokered initiative designed to restore transport links between mainland Azerbaijan to T&#252;rkiye via Armenia and the Nakhchivan exclave. Ongoing railway reconstruction in Nakhchivan will effectively extend TRIPP onto Azerbaijani soil as corridor construction transitions from a declaration to project  physical implementation. </span></p><h4><strong><span>Narrowing  the Rail Gap in Zangezur</span></strong></h4><p><span>The clearest recent progress report on that project came from President Ilham Aliyev himself. Speaking in </span><a href="https://en.apa.az/foreign-policy/tashkent-hosted-third-meeting-of-supreme-interstate-council-of-azerbaijan-and-uzbekistan-updated-video-521373"><span>Tashkent on August 23</span></a><span>, at the third meeting of the Azerbaijani-Uzbek Supreme Interstate Council, he gave a clear public accounting of where the Zangezur Corridor stands: on the Azerbaijani mainland side, the 110-kilometer Horadiz-Aghband railroad is already roughly </span><a href="https://www.azernews.az/business/262281.html"><span>three-quarters complete</span></a><span> and due for full completion next year. Across Armenia, under that same TRIPP framework, only </span><a href="https://en.apa.az/foreign-policy/tashkent-hosted-third-meeting-of-supreme-interstate-council-of-azerbaijan-and-uzbekistan-updated-video-521373"><span>42 kilometers</span></a><span> of track are required, with construction expected to begin by early next year. Meanwhile, inside Azerbaijan&#8217;s own Nakhchivan exclave, reconstruction covers </span><a href="https://caspianpost.com/azerbaijan/azerbaijan-advances-construction-of-nakhchivan-zangazur-railway-link"><span>194 kilometers</span></a><span> of main line &#8212; 264 kilometers counting sidings, where the sections nearest the border are already under construction.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span>While in Tashkent, Aliyev noted that Baku is now assembling an </span><a href="https://en.apa.az/foreign-policy/tashkent-hosted-third-meeting-of-supreme-interstate-council-of-azerbaijan-and-uzbekistan-updated-video-521373"><span>international consortium</span></a><span> of companies and states willing to invest in the Nakhchivan section in exchange for guaranteed transport volumes and returns. He also noted that work on the Armenian side is proceeding as well, as American partners are keeping Baku regularly informed about progress on the project. Once joined, the three sections are projected to carry </span><a href="https://transit.gov.az/en/ministry/projects"><span>5.5 million passengers</span></a><span> and 15 million tons of cargo a year, threading together east-west and north-south transport routes in a way that has not been physically possible since the railways of the South Caucasus suspended operating in the early 1990s.</span></p><p><span>The Zangezur corridor sits inside a much larger contest for the Middle Corridor&#8217;s future capacity, and disruption elsewhere has done as much as construction crews to raise its standing. For example, the near-collapse of tanker traffic through the </span><a href="https://eutoday.net/middle-corridor-europe-must-invest-now/"><span>Strait of Hormuz</span></a><span> this past March turned a route once seen as a niche alternative into what one recent assessment described as &#8220;</span><a href="https://eutoday.net/middle-corridor-europe-must-invest-now/"><span>a vital insurance policy for the European economy</span></a><span>.&#8221; Against that backdrop, the EU&#8217;s recent outreach to Baku appears less like Brussels conferring a favor and more like a deliberate move to secure a footprint in a corridor defined by Azerbaijan and its partners.</span></p><p><span>Earlier this year the EU and the EBRD agreed to fund a </span><a href="https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/eu-considers-nakhchivan-railway-crucial-for-regional-connectivity-2026-2-9-4/"><span>feasibility study</span></a><span> for the Nakhchivan railway, a step that followed a January visit to Baku by the European Commission&#8217;s </span><a href="https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/eu-considers-nakhchivan-railway-crucial-for-regional-connectivity-2026-2-9-4/"><span>Gert Jan Koopman</span></a><span> and reflects the Commission&#8217;s own stated goal of reducing transit times between Europe and Central Asia to roughly </span><a href="https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/eu-considers-nakhchivan-railway-crucial-for-regional-connectivity-2026-2-9-4/"><span>15 days</span></a><span> &#8212; a target that depends on exactly the link Baku is building. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, applied that same logic during her </span><a href="https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/stories/M-010018"><span>July 1-2</span></a><span> visit to Baku and Yerevan, unveiling a </span><a href="https://www.eunews.it/en/2026/07/01/eu-allocates-200-million-for-connectivity-and-peace-in-the-south-caucasus/"><span>&#8364;200 million</span></a><span> ($232 million) Global Gateway package to establish greater South Caucasus connectivity. While modest relative to the total capital the corridor demands, the commitment signals Brussels&#8217; determination to claim a seat at a table it did not build.</span></p><p><span>German engagement follows the same pattern, and came just weeks after the EU visits. President Aliyev traveled to Berlin on </span><a href="https://president.az/en/articles/view/73034"><span>July 20-21</span></a><span>, producing the most institutionalized bilateral step in the relationship to date which included a </span><a href="https://president.az/en/articles/view/73034"><span>Joint Declaration</span></a><span> on a Strategic Partnership Agenda and the creation of a new German-Azerbaijani </span><a href="https://en.apa.az/foreign-policy/agreement-reached-on-establishment-of-germany-azerbaijan-economic-council-517108"><span>Economic Council</span></a><span>. Moreover, Chancellor Friedrich Merz described the South Caucasus as an increasingly vital </span><a href="https://president.az/en/articles/view/73034"><span>connective hub</span></a><span> between Europe and Asia, framing emerging transport and trade corridors as a shared source of economic potential. This wording positioned Berlin less as a patron granting Baku access to European markets and more as an equal partner seeking to integrate German capital, engineering, and manufacturing expertise into a corridor strategy Azerbaijan has already set in motion. It also comes at a crucial time for Germany, whose export-dependent economy&#8212;accounting for roughly </span><a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/germany/exports-of-goods-services-in-percent-of-gdp-eurostat-data.html"><span>41 percent</span></a><span> of GDP&#8212;requires precisely the type of supply-chain diversification promised by the Middle Corridor.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span>The same capital gap runs through Azerbaijan&#8217;s energy relationship with the EU, where the need for investment has grown considerably more urgent. Under a 2022 memorandum with the European Commission, Azerbaijan committed to doubling gas exports to the bloc to 20 billion cubic meters a year by 2027. Azerbaijan&#8217;s total exports reached </span><a href="https://caucasusbusinessjournal.com/news/azerbaijan-gas-16-countries-europe-exports-southern-corridor-2026"><span>25.2 billion cubic meters</span></a><span> in 2025, with more than half flowing into the EU and gas now reaching </span><a href="https://caucasusbusinessjournal.com/news/azerbaijan-gas-16-countries-europe-exports-southern-corridor-2026"><span>sixteen countries</span></a><span>, up from twelve the year before. Meeting the 2027 target, however, depends on projects still working their way through construction and financing &#8212; the second stage of the BP-operated </span><a href="https://caucasusbusinessjournal.com/news/azerbaijan-gas-16-countries-europe-exports-southern-corridor-2026"><span>Shah Deniz</span></a><span> field, full-scale development of Absheron, the Umid Phase 2 and Babek gas projects targeted for the end of the decade, and an expansion of Trans-Adriatic Pipeline capacity beyond its current </span><a href="https://www.tap-ag.com/news/news-stories/tap-strengthens-natural-gas-deliveries-to-europe"><span>11.2 bcm/year.</span></a></p><h4 style="text-align: justify;"><span>Aliyev Calls for Europe to Back Words with Action</span></h4><p style="text-align: justify;"><span>President Aliyev has grown increasingly blunt about where the constraint lies. At the </span><a href="https://renewables.az/en/news/president-we-do-not-see-significant-investments-from-europe-in-either-fossil-fuels-or-renewable-energy"><span>World Economic Forum in Davos</span></a><span> in January, he told business representatives that Europe is showing little investment interest in either of Azerbaijan&#8217;s energy sectors, noting that the country&#8217;s main partners in fossil fuels and renewables alike are American, British, Gulf and Chinese firms rather than European ones. In Berlin six months later, he was even more specific: with TANAP and TAP already running at </span><a href="https://president.az/en/articles/view/73034"><span>full capacity</span></a><span>, any increase in gas deliveries to Germany and the rest of Europe depends on new interconnectors &#8212; and financing for them that European banks, chief among them the </span><a href="https://president.az/en/articles/view/73034"><span>European Investment Bank</span></a><span>, have largely withdrawn from oil and gas projects under their green-transition mandates.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span>Azerbaijan brings real assets to that conversation. It is the only post-Soviet nation in the South Caucasus with no Russian military presence on its soil. Moscow completed the withdrawal of its peacekeeping contingent from the Karabakh region in </span><a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/06/12/russian-peacekeepers-complete-withdrawal-from-nagorno-karabakh-a85385"><span>June 2024</span></a><span>, some seventeen months ahead of the original November 2025 mandate. Azerbaijani gas began flowing directly into Germany and Austria via the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline for the first time </span><a href="https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-starts-gas-exports-to-austria-and-germany"><span>this past January</span></a><span>, and its transit relevance has only grown as both the Red Sea and the northern route through Russia have become less reliable. It is also spreading its bets well beyond Europe by extending its activities to Central Asia. </span><a href="https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/112855/"><span>SOCAR recently signed an exploration agreement</span></a><span> with Uzbekistan&#8217;s state energy company and an offshore cooperation deal with Israel&#8217;s </span><a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-and-azerbaijans-state-oil-firm-set-to-seal-plan-for-offshore-gas-exploration/"><span>NewMed Energy</span></a><span> near the Leviathan field in March 2025.</span></p><h4 style="text-align: justify;"><span>Outlook</span></h4><p style="text-align: justify;"><span>Taken together, these developments suggest that Azerbaijan is increasingly positioning itself not simply as a transit country or energy supplier, but as a strategic platform linking Europe with the wider Eurasian space. If the EU wants the Middle Corridor and Azerbaijani energy to deliver their full potential, Baku&#8217;s message is clear: political recognition must now be matched by more tangible European investment, financing and long-term commercial engagement in the region.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><em><span>Dr. Vasif Huseynov is the head of the Western Studies department at the Center for Analysis of International Relations and Multiculturalism (AIR Center) in Baku, Azerbaijan.</span></em></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/bridging-the-middle-corridor-how?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/bridging-the-middle-corridor-how?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p><p>Thank you for your support! 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url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Hunf!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8c5247fc-9e61-4db7-9cda-33a3026dbfd3_1264x843.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Hunf!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8c5247fc-9e61-4db7-9cda-33a3026dbfd3_1264x843.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Hunf!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8c5247fc-9e61-4db7-9cda-33a3026dbfd3_1264x843.jpeg 424w, 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data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/8c5247fc-9e61-4db7-9cda-33a3026dbfd3_1264x843.jpeg&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:843,&quot;width&quot;:1264,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:990593,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/jpeg&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/212873077?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8c5247fc-9e61-4db7-9cda-33a3026dbfd3_1264x843.jpeg&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Hunf!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8c5247fc-9e61-4db7-9cda-33a3026dbfd3_1264x843.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Hunf!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8c5247fc-9e61-4db7-9cda-33a3026dbfd3_1264x843.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Hunf!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8c5247fc-9e61-4db7-9cda-33a3026dbfd3_1264x843.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Hunf!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8c5247fc-9e61-4db7-9cda-33a3026dbfd3_1264x843.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><strong><span>By Alexander Melikishvili</span></strong></p><p><span>Following Ukraine&#8217;s</span><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-08/us-says-ukraine-to-avoid-targeting-tankers-black-sea-oil-site?srnd=homepage-europe"><span> pledge</span></a><span> not to target the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) infrastructure, which is vital for Kazakhstan&#8217;s oil exports (see:</span><a href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/kazakhstans-novorossiysk-crisis"><span> Kazakhstan&#8217;s Novorossiysk Crisis</span></a><span>), or non-Russian oil tankers in the Black Sea, the Ukrainian military has demonstrated precise target differentiation in its recent attacks. On August 17, the Greek-owned, Liberian-flagged Suezmax-class tanker Skiros (capable of carrying up to one million tons of oil) </span><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-17/greek-run-oil-tanker-comes-under-attack-in-russian-black-sea"><span>came under attack</span></a><span> after loading Russian crude at the CPC terminal in Novorossiysk. Although the CPC terminal primarily handles Kazakh oil, Russian crude still accounts for 5&#8211;10% of its total export volume.</span></p><p><span>The attack caused no oil leakage, and the tanker continued on its journey, but the selective targeting of the vessel indicated that the Ukrainian military possessed key intelligence that allowed it to identify vessels carrying specifically Russian oil. This is likely attributed to the creation of new communication channels set up by Ukrainian authorities to interact with commercial shippers and selectively ensure safe passage. It should be noted that the attack on the Skiros took place only a day after the Ukrainian Foreign Minister, Andrii Sybiha, held a</span><a href="https://mfa.gov.ua/en/news/andrij-sibiga-proviv-telefonni-peregovori-z-ministrom-zakordonnih-sprav-greciyi-georgosom-gerapetritisom3"><span> phone call</span></a><span> with his Greek counterpart. The official readout suggests that most of the call was devoted to discussing Black Sea security.</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!gtSn!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F43977341-7fa4-4c60-9dbf-ddebdc5e010c_500x302.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!gtSn!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F43977341-7fa4-4c60-9dbf-ddebdc5e010c_500x302.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!gtSn!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F43977341-7fa4-4c60-9dbf-ddebdc5e010c_500x302.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!gtSn!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F43977341-7fa4-4c60-9dbf-ddebdc5e010c_500x302.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!gtSn!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F43977341-7fa4-4c60-9dbf-ddebdc5e010c_500x302.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!gtSn!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F43977341-7fa4-4c60-9dbf-ddebdc5e010c_500x302.png" width="500" height="302" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/43977341-7fa4-4c60-9dbf-ddebdc5e010c_500x302.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:302,&quot;width&quot;:500,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:303042,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/212873077?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0392a1ff-6bbd-4277-92b4-b22084e5dd2a_500x400.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!gtSn!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F43977341-7fa4-4c60-9dbf-ddebdc5e010c_500x302.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!gtSn!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F43977341-7fa4-4c60-9dbf-ddebdc5e010c_500x302.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!gtSn!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F43977341-7fa4-4c60-9dbf-ddebdc5e010c_500x302.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!gtSn!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F43977341-7fa4-4c60-9dbf-ddebdc5e010c_500x302.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>*Image above: The Sheskharis Oil Terminal near Novorossiysk</p><p><span>On the same day, another Greek-owned vessel, the dry bulk carrier ANNA S (sailing under the Liberian flag), </span><a href="https://www.protothema.gr/world/article/1866303/mauri-thalassa-htupithike-ellinoktito-bulk-carrier-anoikta-tou-novorosisk-diasothikan-oi-21-nautikoi/"><span>was hit five times</span></a><span> by UAVs that almost destroyed it, forcing the evacuation of the crew, including a Romanian captain and 20 Filipino sailors. The vessel was attacked when it was 20 nautical miles off the coast of Novorossiysk, where it was supposed to load barley. It is noteworthy that the crew of ANNA S was rescued by another Greek-owned ship, Elina B (sailing under the Maltese flag), which itself came under attack but continued its journey toward the Bosporus with 56,000 tons of wheat it had received while at the port of Novorossiysk.</span></p><p><span>On August 18, </span><a href="https://dataportuaria.com/en/internacional/current-affairs/bulk-carriers-targeted-in-attacks-near-russian-black-sea-por"><span>three additional dry bulk carriers were attacked</span></a><span> while carrying or en route to load Russian grain: the Russian-flagged Victoria V, struck while docked at Novorossiysk before loading; the Marshall Islands-flagged Fehu, hit while departing Novorossiysk with wheat but able to continue sailing; and the San Marino-flagged Necibe, attacked at the port of Tuapse after loading 20,000 tons of wheat.</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!q09A!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ecad7b5-85ed-4bbb-82a3-52f25067abc2_500x333.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!q09A!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ecad7b5-85ed-4bbb-82a3-52f25067abc2_500x333.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!q09A!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ecad7b5-85ed-4bbb-82a3-52f25067abc2_500x333.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!q09A!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ecad7b5-85ed-4bbb-82a3-52f25067abc2_500x333.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!q09A!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ecad7b5-85ed-4bbb-82a3-52f25067abc2_500x333.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!q09A!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ecad7b5-85ed-4bbb-82a3-52f25067abc2_500x333.png" width="500" height="333" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/4ecad7b5-85ed-4bbb-82a3-52f25067abc2_500x333.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:333,&quot;width&quot;:500,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:373641,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/212873077?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbd1c0096-3d63-4eca-820a-3bd52e0c228c_500x400.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!q09A!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ecad7b5-85ed-4bbb-82a3-52f25067abc2_500x333.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!q09A!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ecad7b5-85ed-4bbb-82a3-52f25067abc2_500x333.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!q09A!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ecad7b5-85ed-4bbb-82a3-52f25067abc2_500x333.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!q09A!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ecad7b5-85ed-4bbb-82a3-52f25067abc2_500x333.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Image above: The Strategic Sheskharis Tunnel (Source <a href="https://pro-transneft.livejournal.com/119416.html">Transneft)</a></p><h4><strong><span>Sheskharis in the Crosshairs</span></strong></h4><p><span>On August 12, Ukraine launched its largest combined attack against Novorossiysk since the war began. According to President Zelensky, the strike </span><a href="https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2087450109210464760"><span>involved </span></a><span>Palianytsia jet-powered attack UAVs, Neptune missiles, and seaborne USVs. As a result, Russia&#8217;s Transneft-owned Sheskharis terminal in Novorossiysk temporarily</span><a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-black-seas-sheskharis-terminal-halts-loadings-after-drone-attack-sources-2026-08-14/"><span> suspended operations</span></a><span> on August 14. It remains unclear what specific damage Sheskharis sustained, but the attack damaged the highly strategic tunnel (see above) connecting the terminal to the Grushovaya oil depot, which is located inland, 6 kilometers from the port. Sheskharis is a strategically important facility, as it accounts for roughly 15-20% of Russia&#8217;s total oil exports. It is also</span><a href="https://kz.kursiv.media/2025-11-14/zhdk-rf-neftebaza-drony-neft/?utm_campaign=endless_feed"><span> important for Kazakhstan</span></a><span>, as about 6 million tons of Kazakh oil (KEBCO blend) pass through the terminal for export annually. However, Sheskharis is far less significant for Kazakhstan than CPC, which transported 63 million tons of Kazakh oil (CPC blend) in 2025.</span></p><p><span>Although Sheskharis</span><a href="https://neftegaz.ru/news/transport-and-storage/933095-port-novorossiysk-vozobnovil-pogruzku-nefti-posle-ataki-bpla-/"><span> resumed operations</span></a><span> on August 16, the relentless pace of Ukrainian attacks targeting tankers carrying Russian crude has forced </span>T&#252;rkiye<span> </span><a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/turkey-cuts-russian-oil-imports-black-sea-export-disruptions-curb-supplies-data-2026-08-14/"><span>to reduce its imports of Russian oil</span></a><span> via the Black Sea, which was previously the primary conduit for Russian oil exports. </span>T&#252;rkiye <span>remains heavily dependent on Russian oil &#8212; in 2025, for example, Russia accounted for almost half (15 million tons) of </span><a href="https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/116144/">T&#252;rkiye&#8217;s <span>total oil imports</span></a><span> (32 million tons). With the northern part of the Black Sea under a de facto Ukrainian blockade, </span>T&#252;rkiye<span> can only hope to receive Kazakh oil from both CPC and Sheskharis, since tankers carrying it will not be targeted, but the volumes will be insignificant, as most of the Kazakh oil is already committed to European markets (Italy in particular).</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QxgI!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2b4c2fda-1712-4a9b-bb5f-43a3b3b23bd0_775x533.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QxgI!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2b4c2fda-1712-4a9b-bb5f-43a3b3b23bd0_775x533.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QxgI!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2b4c2fda-1712-4a9b-bb5f-43a3b3b23bd0_775x533.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QxgI!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2b4c2fda-1712-4a9b-bb5f-43a3b3b23bd0_775x533.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QxgI!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2b4c2fda-1712-4a9b-bb5f-43a3b3b23bd0_775x533.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QxgI!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2b4c2fda-1712-4a9b-bb5f-43a3b3b23bd0_775x533.png" width="775" height="533" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/2b4c2fda-1712-4a9b-bb5f-43a3b3b23bd0_775x533.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:533,&quot;width&quot;:775,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:564785,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/i/212873077?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2b4c2fda-1712-4a9b-bb5f-43a3b3b23bd0_775x533.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QxgI!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2b4c2fda-1712-4a9b-bb5f-43a3b3b23bd0_775x533.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QxgI!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2b4c2fda-1712-4a9b-bb5f-43a3b3b23bd0_775x533.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QxgI!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2b4c2fda-1712-4a9b-bb5f-43a3b3b23bd0_775x533.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QxgI!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2b4c2fda-1712-4a9b-bb5f-43a3b3b23bd0_775x533.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>*Image above: World Bank Map of Novorossiysk</p><p><span>This leaves </span>T&#252;rkiye<span> in a difficult position, which explains why, on 8 August, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan,</span><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/aug/09/ukraine-war-briefing-turkey-calls-for-moratorium-on-black-sea-attacks-by-russia-and-ukraine"><span> proposed</span></a><span> to Russia and Ukraine that they introduce a moratorium on attacks against commercial navigation in the Black Sea. On August 14, the Russian foreign ministry spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova,</span><a href="https://meduza.io/en/news/2026/08/14/russia-s-foreign-ministry-rejects-truce-with-ukraine-in-black-sea"><span> rejected</span></a><span> the Turkish proposal, stating that there were &#8220;no grounds&#8221; for a mutual truce. Ukraine, on the other hand, itself</span><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-offers-russia-truce-black-sea-food-supply-fears-mount-source-says-2026-08-13/"><span> offered</span></a><span> Russia a similar proposal, and its ambassador in Turkiye, Nariman Dzhelyal,</span><a href="https://mezha.net/eng/bukvy/2aa4ff6b_ukraine_backs_turkey-s/"><span> voiced support</span></a><span> for the Turkish initiative on August 24.</span></p><h4><strong><span>Outlook</span></strong></h4><p><span>The tit-for-tat attacks in the Black Sea are hurting both Russia and Ukraine economically, but to different degrees, given the disparity between the two respective economies. For Ukraine, agricultural exports</span><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraines-farmers-despair-russias-black-sea-blockade-traps-their-harvest-2026-08-13/"><span> make up 60% of its export revenues</span></a><span>, 90% of which are usually transported via the Black Sea. Ukraine&#8217;s central bank</span><a href="https://english.nv.ua/nation/un-envoy-claims-draft-in-russia-is-not-planned-50634568.html"><span> projects</span></a><span> that disruption of seaborne export routes could cost the Ukrainian economy $2.5 billion in losses in 2026.</span></p><p><span>For Russia, the situation is much different, as the share of agricultural products in Russia&#8217;s total exports</span><a href="https://russiaspivottoasia.com/russian-2025-agricultural-export-revenues-to-the-eurasian-economic-union-up-23/"><span> reached 12%</span></a><span> in 2025. Russia is also heavily dependent on Black Sea ports to export its farm products, especially grain. As of August 17, because of the Ukrainian attacks,</span><a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/08/17/ukrainian-strikes-halt-most-russian-grain-exports-in-the-black-sea-a93517"><span> 90% of Russia&#8217;s grain export capacity</span></a><span> in the Black Sea was taken offline.</span></p><p><span>The double blockade of the Black Sea threatens this year&#8217;s harvest in both countries, as silos are either filled or nearing capacity, while alternative routes to transport grain simply cannot accommodate such large additional volumes. Against this backdrop, the Russian agriculture minister, Oksana Lut, even</span><a href="https://ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/08/24/ministr-selskogo-hozyaistva-predlozhila-skromit-lishnee-zerno-skotu-iz-za-nevozmozhnosti-eksporta-a204179"><span> suggested</span></a><span> using excess grain as animal feed to mitigate the crisis.</span></p><p><span>Concerning oil exports, the Black Sea&#8217;s importance for Russia is somewhat limited. According to</span><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-02/russia-gushes-crude-exports-as-drone-strikes-hobble-refineries"><span> Bloomberg</span></a><span>, as of early June, Russia&#8217;s daily oil exports averaged 3.46 million barrels per day (bpd), which is a record level since the war started in 2022. In June, Reuters</span><a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/oil-exports-russias-western-ports-drop-15-below-plan-traders-say-2026-08-19/"><span> reported</span></a><span> that Russian oil exports from Novorossiysk, including KEBCO blend but excluding CPC, were on the order of 800,000 bpd, or roughly 23% of Russia&#8217;s total oil exports. As for Ukraine, since 2022, it has imported oil by land and not by sea.</span></p><p><span>Under these circumstances, Russia and Ukraine can potentially continue their standoff in the Black Sea despite mounting economic costs. Ukraine will probably offset them by tapping into the &#8364;90 billion ($105 billion) support loan from the EU. The Ukrainian Ministry of Agrarian Policy estimates the initial package of compensation to farmers suffering from the Russian naval blockade to be &#8364;220 million ($256 million), as this was the estimated figure with which it</span><a href="https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/news/2026/08/20/7243857/"><span> approached the EU for a grant</span></a><span>, which was denied because it is already included in the aforementioned support loan.</span></p><p><span>Russia, too, can absorb the costs, as it is considering</span><a href="https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/118833/"><span> a slew of measures</span></a><span> to mitigate the crisis, including state purchases of excess grain, preferential loans, and subsidies. Despite significantly </span><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-20/russian-sales-bring-gold-reserves-to-their-lowest-since-2020"><span>drawing down</span></a><span> its gold reserves in January-July to their lowest level since 2020, the Russian government&#8217;s financial position remains robust, with the central bank reporting that, as of August 14, Russia&#8217;s aggregate sovereign reserves stood at</span><a href="https://www.cbr.ru/eng/hd_base/mrrf/mrrf_7d/"><span> $755.6 billion</span></a><span>. This allows Russia to continue its brinkmanship in the Black Sea, even as doing so will exacerbate food insecurity for poor countries that rely on grain imports. The World Food Programme </span><a href="https://www.wfp.org/news/world-food-programme-ramps-preparedness-and-response-plans-el-nino-threatens-push-tens"><span>has warned</span></a><span> that at least 45 countries will be in particularly dire straits this year due to the harmful impact of the cyclical El Ni&#241;o climatic anomaly.</span></p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/black-sea-stalemate-implications?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/p/black-sea-stalemate-implications?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p><p></p><p><strong>About the Author:</strong></p><p>Alex Melikishvili is a senior country risk analyst with more than a decade of experience working in the private sector (S&amp;P Global, IHS Markit) with a focus on Eurasian security. Alex holds a master&#8217;s degree in International Affairs from the George Washington University&#8217;s Elliott School of International Affairs.</p><div><hr></div><p>Thank you for your support! Please remember that The Saratoga Foundation is a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization. Your donations are fully tax-deductible. If you seek to support The Saratoga Foundation, you can make a one-time donation by clicking on the PayPal link below! You can also subscribe to our <a href="https://www.saratoga-foundation.org/">website</a> to support our work.</p><p><a href="https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA">https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=XFCZDX6YVTVKA</a></p><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item></channel></rss>