By Alexander Melikishvili

President Putin chose the press briefing on 9 May, the day Russia celebrates the end of World War II, to deliver a veiled threat to Armenia over its stepped-up efforts to pursue closer ties with the EU. He reminded the press pool that the war in Ukraine started with the latter’s attempt to do the same. He then added, “Therefore, they [Armenia] should not take it to the extreme.” Putin’s comments also included a suggestion to hold a referendum in Armenia, the outcome of which could potentially lay the groundwork for “a gentle, intelligent and mutually beneficial divorce.” Putin proposed discussing this topic at the upcoming Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) summit, which will be held in Astana, Kazakhstan, from May 28 to 29.

Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan was quick to respond. At an impromptu huddle with the media on May 11, in the Erebuni district of Yerevan, he defiantly disagreed with the divorce metaphor and stated that he saw no need to hold a referendum on relations with the EU, while issuing assurances that his government had no intention of harming Russian interests. Pashinyan expressed “great respect” for the EEU but announced that he would be skipping the summit due to being preoccupied with campaigning ahead of Armenia’s crucial parliamentary election on June 7. Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan will be representing Armenia in Astana.

If Putin’s remarks were relatively measured, other representatives of the Russian government were more explicit. Their ire was caused by the presence of Ukrainian President Zelensky at the 8th summit of the European Political Community (EPC), which, for the first time, was held in Yerevan on May 4. Maria Zakharova, the spokeswoman for the Russian foreign ministry known for her vitriolic tirades, declared at a press briefing on May 7 that the Ukrainian leader’s visit “showed the citizens of Armenia what kind of future the EU has prepared for them.” Mikhail Kalugin, the senior Russian diplomat overseeing relations with the CIS states, pointed out that “integration requires systemic work that is hardly compatible with an approach according to which membership in the EEU is viewed as a temporary measure for the period of search or the process of accession to an alternative association. To put it simply, sitting on two chairs won’t work.”

*Image above is a Russian AI-generated image mocking Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan, flanked by Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, and Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan in a Mount Rushmore-like sculpture taken from the YouTube channel (@notowa1) of the Armenian popular movement “No to Western Azerbaijan” that opposes Armenia-Azerbaijan-Türkiye rapprochement.

Russia Launches Disinformation Campaign in Earnest

Ahead of the general elections, Pashinyan is significantly hobbled by his principled position regarding the normalization of relations with both Azerbaijan and Turkey, which is very unpopular among a sizable segment of the Armenian electorate, especially Karabakh refugees. In addition, Pashinyan’s campaign against alleged corruption in the Armenian Apostolic Church, including calls for the resignation of Catholicos Karekin II, has made him the target of criticism from religious conservatives and the pro-Russian opposition. According to the public opinion poll results released in April, although Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party garnered the biggest share of supporters (33.6%), leaving far behind Narek Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia (11.4%) and ex-President Robert Kocharyan’s Armenia Alliance (4.2%), respondents who refused to answer or did not know whom they would vote for accounted for 23.3% and 13.7%, respectively, indicating that many voters are still undecided.

Against this backdrop, Russia unleashed an online disinformation campaign targeting Pashinyan due to his pro-Western policies, which is replete with AI-generated videos and images. According to the Russian investigative outlet The Insider, the Matryoshka bot network commenced its operations in October 2025, or eight months before the elections, which underscores the importance the Kremlin attaches to Armenia. In comparison, Matryoshka’s disinformation campaigns in the United States (presidential elections) and Moldova (parliamentary) began three and a half and five and a half months before the election dates in 2024 and 2025, respectively. In terms of content, it is a toxic mix of familiar Kremlin tropes and outright lies, including accusations that Pashinyan is planning to drag Armenia into conflict with Russia, that he is selling out Armenia’s national interests for the sake of normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, and that his pursuit of closer relations with the EU threatens “traditional values” in Armenia.

Russian election interference is further confirmed by the Swedish investigative organization Blankspot, which alleges that it has obtained a confidential document entitled Programme for Work in the ‘Anti-Pashinyan’ Direction for 2026. Blankspot claims that the document was obtained from “a person operating within the Russian intelligence services” after he or she “was hacked by a third party before March 2026.” It identifies the main objective as the “minimization of electoral results of the ‘Civil Contract’ and political forces allied with it.” This is to be accomplished through a number of means, including framing the elections as a referendum on confidence in Pashinyan personally.

Outlook

Russia does not lack levers of influence over Armenia, economic or otherwise. Suffice it to mention that Russia owns Armenia’s critical infrastructure, including its railway grid and gas distribution network. Armenia is vitally dependent on the gas it receives from Russia via Georgia at a steep discount, which Putin reminded Pashinyan of at their rather uneasy meeting in Moscow on April 1st. However, so far, it appears that the Kremlin’s strategy is limited to “soft” measures, including arbitrary trade restrictions such as the prohibition on selling imported Armenian mineral water in April. Given Pashinyan’s precarious domestic position, it is likely that Putin’s regime calculates that the disinformation campaign will be enough to unseat him.

Furthermore, the presence of the Russian military in Armenia provides Putin with other options as well. The passage by the State Duma of the draft law allowing the use of force to protect Russian citizens abroad on May 13, after it goes through the legislative process (approval by the Federation Council followed by Putin’s signature), will give Moscow a legal pretext for potential military intervention in Armenia, where, as of December 2025, 43,536 Russian citizens held residence permits, according to the Armenian interior ministry. On May 14, Pashinyan responded to the passage of this law by stating that he was not concerned and expressing his confident expectation that the Russian 102nd military base in Gyumri, “irrespective of what laws are in place in the Russian Federation, must function within the framework of Armenian laws and powers.” Nonetheless, under an extreme scenario, the Russian troops deployed in Armenia could be employed to carry out a coup to install a more Russia-friendly regime.

Armenia’s fate hangs in the balance as it is unclear how effective the deployment of the EU’s Hybrid Rapid Response Team to counter foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), in response to the Armenian government’s request, has been in limiting the impact of the Russian disinformation campaign ahead of the elections. Similarly, it is very unlikely that further institutionalization of EU-Armenia relations (through the establishment of the EU Partnership Mission in Armenia with a two-year mandate in April) will stave off potential Russian military intervention should Putin decide to use force to bring Armenia to heel.

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About the Author:

Alex Melikishvili is a senior country risk analyst with more than a decade of experience working in the private sector (S&P Global, IHS Markit) with a focus on Eurasian security. Alex holds a master’s degree in International Affairs from the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

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By Vusal Guliyev

Disruptions to energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz once again reveal the structural vulnerabilities of global oil markets. As the world’s largest crude importer, China is particularly exposed to such shocks. Historically, a significant share of China’s crude oil imports has been sourced from the Middle East, with a substantial portion transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

An estimated 52% of China’s oil imports currently pass through the strategic chokepoint. However, Beijing’s dependence remains lower than that of other major East Asian economies. By comparison, around 95% of Japan’s oil imports and roughly 70% of South Korea’s transit the same route. This demonstrates China’s relatively more diversified supply structure than its Asian neighbors. China’s exposure also extends beyond oil. As the world’s largest importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG), about 30% of its LNG imports are linked to flows via the Strait of Hormuz. A considerable share of these supplies originates from Qatar, followed by the United Arab Emirates and Oman.

Against this backdrop, the Hormuz blockade is not merely a disruption but a catalyst, accelerating China’s shift toward continental energy suppliers and overland transport corridors. Over the past two decades, Beijing has pursued a systematic diversification strategy aimed at reducing its reliance on vulnerable maritime routes. As a result, non-Gulf suppliers—particularly Russia and Central Asia—have gained increasing prominence. The current crisis has accelerated this shift. It has reinforced China’s turn toward geographically resilient, land-based energy networks and a broader portfolio of alternative suppliers.

Russia Becomes Beijing’s Fall-Back Supplier

Amid disruptions to Iranian oil exports, Russia has diplomatically positioned itself as a critical fallback supplier for China’s energy needs. During a meeting with Xi Jinping in Beijing on April 15, 2026, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that Moscow is capable of fully compensating for any energy shortfall China may face due to the restricted supply of Iranian energy. Unlike Middle Eastern oil flows, Russian exports—particularly via pipelines—remain largely insulated from geopolitical chokepoints and naval disruptions.

Russian crude is delivered to China via oil pipelines such as the Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean (ESPO) route, which has become a particularly important component of China’s import portfolio. By early 2026, Russia has emerged as China’s top crude oil supplier, accounting for approximately 19.6% to over 20% of China’s total crude imports in 2024 and 2025. Imports frequently exceed 2 million barrels per day (bpd), driven by discounted prices on grades such as ESPO and Urals. These discounts are largely a consequence of Western sanctions imposed since 2022 in response to the Ukraine crisis, which have constrained Russia’s access to European markets as well as to Western shipping, insurance, and financial services.

This deepening energy interdependence is even more evident in the gas sector. The operational Power of Siberia pipeline—linking eastern Siberian gas fields to northeastern China—has rapidly scaled up deliveries to around 39 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually. Discussions are also underway to increase gas flows up to 44 bcm per year through upgrades and operational optimization.

The bilateral energy relationship is set to deepen further with the proposed Power of Siberia-2, designed to deliver up to 50 bcm of gas annually from western Siberia to China via Mongolia. However, this roughly 2,600-km pipeline remains closely tied to the broader pricing dynamics shaping Russia–China energy relations. Despite years of negotiations, progress has stalled primarily due to disagreements over gas pricing. China seeks to preserve discounted terms, while Moscow aims to secure higher returns to justify the investment. This impasse reflects a wider asymmetry in bargaining power. As Russia continues to offer gas at reduced prices amid limited alternative markets, Beijing faces little urgency to finalize a long-term agreement. Consequently, the future of the pipeline remains uncertain. This underscores the fact that infrastructure expansion is not merely a technical matter but also a function of shifting economic leverage between the two sides.

China’s Energy Bridge to Central Asia

Beyond the Russia–China axis, Central Asia plays a vital role in shaping Beijing’s overland energy architecture. However, similar patterns of constrained capacity and strategic recalibration can be observed across the region’s energy corridors. Region wide pipeline networks linking Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states to western China provide critical overland alternatives that bypass maritime chokepoints altogether. The Kazakhstan–China Oil Pipeline, operational since 2006, has a capacity of around 20 million tons per year (approximately 400,000 bpd) and typically delivers 250,000–400,000 bpd, accounting for roughly 3–5% of China’s total crude oil imports.

At the same time, the Russia–Ukraine war—particularly drone attacks on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) facilities at Russia’s Black Sea port terminal at Novorossysk— has significantly disrupted Kazakhstan’s oil export infrastructure, prompting renewed efforts to diversify routes. During the second Caspian and Central Asia Oil Trading and Logistics Forum held in Baku on April 23, 2026, the Chairman of the Board of PetroCouncil.kz Assylbek Jakiyev highlighted the vulnerability of Kazakhstan’s existing export system, citing disruptions affecting routes linked to the CPC. He noted that Kazakhstan is actively evaluating two principal alternatives, the Trans-Caspian route via Azerbaijan (the Middle Corridor) and the China-bound export route supported by existing infrastructure. Although the China route offers immediate capacity of up to 20 million tons annually, its current utilization remains significantly below potential, at approximately 3 to 5 million tons, primarily due to operational constraints.

In parallel, the Central Asia–China Gas Pipeline—linking Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan to China—supplies around 55 bcm of natural gas annually through its three existing lines (A, B, and C), with long-term agreements (particularly with Turkmenistan) targeting up to 65 bcm per year. This framework is expected to deepen further with the proposed Line D expansion, a fourth branch of the pipeline system designed to add 25–30 bcm per year via a new route through Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Although the project has faced delays since 2014 due to financing constraints and complex transit negotiations, it remains a strategically important priority for Beijing. Once the long-awaited Line D becomes operational, the Central Asia–China Gas Pipeline system will reach an annual capacity of approximately 85 billion cubic meters, making it the largest gas transmission system in Central Asia.

Importantly, this infrastructure expansion is reinforced by recent high-level political engagement between the two countries. During a meeting in Beijing on March 18, 2026, Xi Jinping and Turkmenistan’s National Leader and former president, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow held comprehensive talks aimed at deepening bilateral cooperation across multiple sectors, with energy remaining a central pillar. Both sides emphasized the importance of expanding cooperation in natural gas, with particular attention being paid to the continued development of the Galkynysh field and the strengthening of long-term supply arrangements. The meeting also highlighted efforts to align Turkmenistan’s development strategy with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, further embedding energy cooperation within a broader framework of connectivity and regional integration.

This momentum was further reinforced in subsequent engagements. During high-level talks held in Turkmenistan in mid-April 2026, Chinese Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang and Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow reaffirmed their commitment to deepening bilateral energy cooperation, with natural gas remaining central to the partnership. The discussions— held alongside the launch of new development phases at the Galkynysh gas field—emphasized expanding the scale of gas cooperation and accelerating key joint projects. A central outcome was an agreement to further develop Turkmenistan’s vast gas reserves and strengthen long-term supply arrangements to China through existing and planned pipeline infrastructure.

Shortly thereafter, Türkmengaz signed a $4.6 billion gas field contract with China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) to design and construct production facilities capable of processing up to 10 bcm of gas annually as part of the development of Phase 4 of the Galkynyshgas field. As one of the world’s largest natural gas fields, Galkynysh forms the backbone of Turkmenistan’s export capacity to China via the Central Asia–China pipeline network.

Still, Central Asia provides a relatively modest share of China’s crude oil imports but remains a major source of pipeline gas, at times accounting for around one-third of the country’s natural gas imports. Beyond their quantitative contribution, these overland supply channels are strategically indispensable, enabling stable, long-term deliveries into China’s Xinjiang region under frameworks such as the Belt and Road Initiative. To some extent, they mitigate China’s exposure to vulnerable maritime chokepoints while reinforcing its broader energy diversification strategy.

Beyond its deepening engagement with Central Asia—especially the energy-rich Caspian littoral states of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan—China is well positioned to expand its energy and connectivity footprint across the wider Caspian basin, where Azerbaijan is emerging as a pivotal energy and transit hub. Offshore production from the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli (ACG) complex and the Shah Deniz gas field underpins Azerbaijan’s export capacity, while logistics centered on Baku—supported by the Port of Baku and its integration with the Port of Aktau in Kazakhstan and Turkmenbashi International Seaport in Turkmenistan—could facilitate the trans-Caspian movement of hydrocarbons, including potential eastward flows over the longer term.

China’s involvement in Azerbaijan’s hydrocarbon sector remains limited, particularly in core offshore oil and gas projects dominated by Western and regional consortia. Its presence is more visible in renewables, technical services, and infrastructure cooperation across various regions of Azerbaijan. By contrast, China is far more active along the eastern Caspian littoral, particularly on Kazakhstan’s shores. Through China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Beijing controls about 86% of the Aktobe oil fields and holds roughly 8.4% in the Kashagan oil field. It is also more broadly engaged in pipeline and energy infrastructure, though it does not exercise dominant control over the sector as a whole.

Concurrently, Azerbaijan’s growing alignment with Central Asian producers—reinforced through multilateral frameworks such as the C6 platform and the Organization of Turkic States—is consolidating a more cohesive trans-Caspian corridor. This integration enhances multimodal flexibility and enables the rerouting of flows in response to geopolitical or market disruptions. Rising Asian demand—evidenced by Japan’s recent efforts to secure crude from Azerbaijan’s and Kazakhstan’s offshore oil fields—further underscores the system’s growing multidirectional character. For Beijing, deeper engagement with this Azerbaijan-centered network is unlikely to generate immediate large-scale import volumes, given existing infrastructural and capacity constraints. However, this would reinforce a parallel, non-Russian Eurasian corridor, diversifying supply pathways and reducing concentration risk, while enhancing China’s long-term strategic optionality within an increasingly complex and interdependent energy landscape.

Outlook

Despite significant progress in diversifying supply routes and expanding overland energy corridors, China’s energy security strategy remains fundamentally constrained by structural realities. The country continues to rely heavily on Gulf hydrocarbons—particularly oil—much of which still transits through the Strait of Hormuz. In practice, no combination of pipelines from Russia or Central Asia can fully replicate the scale, flexibility, and liquidity of global seaborne energy markets. Crucially, pipeline-based supply remains limited in scale relative to the vast volumes transported via maritime routes, underscoring the structural limits of overland diversification.

At the same time, China’s pivot toward continental suppliers introduces a new set of risks rather than eliminating existing ones. Deepening dependence on Russia raises the prospect of strategic overexposure to a single supplier operating under sanctions, potentially enhancing Moscow’s leverage over pricing and long-term contractual arrangements. Meanwhile, Central Asian energy corridors remain constrained by limited capacity, complex transit frameworks, and infrastructure vulnerabilities. Key interregional energy initiatives, such as the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline and Central Asia–China Gas Pipeline Line D, continue to face delays, uncertainty, and political friction, underscoring the fragility of China’s long-term diversification strategy.

To this end, the Hormuz disruption reveals a central contradiction in China’s energy strategy. While Beijing has managed to reduce some of its most acute vulnerabilities, it remains deeply reliant on global transport networks, underscoring the persistent limits of its diversification efforts. Over the longer term, China’s push toward renewable energy and electrification may further mitigate its exposure to external shocks. What emerges is not a fully secure system, but a more complex and layered one—where resilience has improved, yet systemic risk remains deeply embedded.

About the Author:

Vusal Guliyev is a frequent contributor to The Saratoga Foundation. He is a Sinologist, TCSOL Specialist, and Policy Analyst specializing in the geopolitical affairs of Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific region. Mr. Guliyev currently works as a Leading Advisor at the Baku-based Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center) and serves as the Head of the Shanghai Office at AZEGLOB Consulting Group.

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On February 3, 2026, senior officials of the Azerbaijan Naval Forces (ANF), led by Commander Rear Admiral Shahin Mammadov, paid a visit to Islamabad to meet their counterpart, Admiral Naveed Ashraf. The visit came amid strengthening ties between the two countries in the most strategically important fields, particularly defense. The defense partnership between the two countries recently entered a new phase when Azerbaijan, along with Türkiye and China, openly supported Pakistan against India during the clashes in May 2025.

Although local media framed Shahin Mammadov’s meeting with Naveed Ashraf as a routine engagement between partners, the visit must be understood against the backdrop of mounting geopolitical volatility in the Caspian basin and the wider Middle East. The joint United States and Israelis military campaign against Iran since February 28, and Israel’s missile attacks targeting Iranian ships in the Caspian Sea on March 18, coupled with the persistent Russian threat in the basin, have accelerated competition over international trade routes and energy resources in the landlocked sea. Within this context, maritime security is steadily emerging as a strategic priority for Azerbaijan. In recent years, Baku has significantly strengthened its naval capabilities by purchasing and modernizing vessels through close partnerships with both Israel and Türkiye.

*Turkish warship design offered to Azerbaijan as part of its naval modernization program.

In 2018, Azerbaijan held negotiations with the Turkish shipyard Dearsan to jointly build four warships, while in 2025, Baku publicly showcased its Turkish-produced “Salvo” unmanned surface vessel (USV) for the first time, marking a significant step in the country’s maritime modernization efforts. Further efforts to increase military capabilities culminated in the demonstration of Baku’s most recent acquisition of Israeli-made anti-ship missiles, namely Sea Breaker, capable of hitting sea and land targets with high accuracy at ranges of 32 to 300 kilometers (km), including the Israeli-made fifth-generation Ice-Breaker anti-ship cruise missile system. For Azerbaijan, its public display effectively confirmed the system’s existence and highlighted the creation of a robust barrier on the maritime flank, significantly enhancing its coastal defense capabilities.

*Image: The Salvo: Azerbaijan’s first-ever Turkish-made Uncrewed Surface Vehicle (USV) naval drone in operation in the Caspian.

Considering that Azerbaijan possesses critically important energy infrastructure in the Caspian Sea, including offshore platforms and main export pipelines, which are vital to the country’s economy and Europe’s energy security, Baku’s ambitions to enhance naval partnerships and maritime security seem rational.

Russia’s frequent use of the Caspian Sea to launch missiles against Ukrainian territory since 2022, along with Iran’s transfer of Shahed drones to Russia via the Caspian route, has triggered concerns in other littoral states. Indeed, burgeoning military trade between Moscow and Tehran has further emboldened Azerbaijan to expand its outreach to Türkiye, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. This engagement, pursued within the framework of the Turkic community, reflects Baku’s effort to consolidate regional partnerships at a time when Moscow and Tehran’s influence is declining.

Caspian Breeze 2025

In 2025, Baku and Astana conducted their first-ever joint large-scale naval exercises, “Caspian Breeze-2025,” in the Caspian Sea to prepare for potential asymmetric threats. Using a similar title as the former NATO-led Sea Breeze exercises in the Black Sea was perhaps no accident in the choice of the term, as other regional countries might one day join the exercise. Undoubtedly, the Caspian basin’s transformation into “a contested strategic zone” facilitated the emergence of multi-country blocs, namely Russia-Iran (with China’s muted support) and Azerbaijan-Turkic states. The latter is aimed at developing plausible means to counter emerging regional threats.

Azerbaijan’s continuous efforts to strengthen its naval capabilities and ongoing threat assessment with strategic partners form a comprehensive system for protecting the country’s energy and logistical interests. Therefore, without robust communication and coordination among the West, Türkiye, Israel, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan, powers such as Russia and Iran could dominate key regional trade routes, leading to both expansion and fragmentation across the Caspian basin.

Nevertheless, the current level of engagement between Azerbaijan and other regional states with the Trump administration, culminating in Vice President JD Vance’s visit to the Caucasus and the signing of a strategic partnership document, may have convinced Baku that it has secured Washington’s vocal support. In addition, Vice-President JD Vance in his speech in Baku, emphasized that the US will supply Azerbaijan with new patrol boats to strengthen Azerbaijan’s maritime security as part of long-standing US-backed counter-terrorism initiatives with Baku. While this decision highlights the US’s core interests in the Caspian basin, it also seems a rational choice amid the eruption of the US-Iran War in March, 2026.

The ongoing confrontation between the United States and Iran has dramatically reshaped the fragile geopolitical landscape of the Gulf, inflicting severe damage on Iranian military infrastructure and unsettling the Gulf monarchies. In the wake of Tehran’s strategic setbacks, most notably the assassination of senior military and political elites and the destruction of key defense assets, Iran appears intent on widening the theater of conflict by targeting Washington’s regional partners in the Gulf. On the other hand, on March 5, reports indicated that an Iranian Arash drone struck the passenger terminal in Azerbaijan’s Nakhichivan exclave, raising alarm over the future security of critical energy infrastructure across the Caspian basin and beyond. Therefore, Azerbaijan will likely double its efforts to diversify its maritime security partnerships in order to mitigate potential risks and challenges.

Pakistan-Azerbaijan Naval Cooperation

One country that stands out for Azerbaijan in the new regional security order is Pakistan. Islamabad has critically important naval capabilities after having successfully established a sustainable manufacturing cycle in shipbuilding and naval systems. In addition, the Pakistani Navy operates COSMOS-class mini-submarines with a displacement of about 110 tons, produced at the Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works under license from the Italian company Costruzioni Sommergibili S.p.A. These small mini-submarines are designed for sabotage and coastal operations and are well-suited for operating in the enclosed waters of the Caspian Sea. Moreover, in 2018, Türkiye announced that it delivered the second of four MILGEM corvettes to Pakistan under a defense contract.

Given Azerbaijan’s established shipbuilding infrastructure and expertise, Baku is likely to pursue joint production of military boats and frigates in partnership with Pakistan and Türkiye. Over the past decade, the Azerbaijan–Pakistan–Türkiye axis has delivered significant results, particularly in the military and defense sectors, laying the groundwork for a more comprehensive and enduring partnership. As such, the visit of Azerbaijani Rear-Admiral Shahin Mammadov to Islamabad amid heightening tensions around Iran and the buildup of American forces in the Middle East can be seen as a vital element of Baku’s extended strategy of diversification of its military-technical capabilities and a strengthening of the naval component of its national security.

Outlook

Azerbaijan steadily acknowledges that the Caspian basin is becoming an intersection of energy, transport, and military interests of regional and global powers, making efforts to boost its naval and deterrence capabilities mark a further evolution of the country’s national security interests as a growing regional power in the South Caucasus.

Moving forward, Azerbaijan’s ability to secure its offshore energy platforms and export pipelines remains a cornerstone of both domestic economic stability and European energy security. By conducting large-scale joint exercises like “Caspian Breeze-2025,” Azerbaijan is positioning itself not just as a littoral state but a country with maritime aspirations and an emerging ability to neutralize asymmetric threats in an increasingly changing security environment in the Caspian.

About the Author:

Fuad Shahbazov is a political scientist and analyst focused on regional security in Eurasia and the Middle East. He holds a master’s degree in Political Science from Vytautas Magnus University, a professional master’s degree in Terrorism and Countering Religious Radicalization from the University of Bergamo, and a master’s degree in Defense and Diplomacy from Durham University.

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*Image above: Russian military satellite taking off from Plesetsk cosmodrome (Source: Roscosmos)

By Pavel Luzin

Russia is urgently attempting to close its strategic communication gap through the Rassvet satellite program after losing access to Starlink. Since Russia’s domestic satellite capabilities following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine proved to be woefully inadequate, Russian military forces were forced to rely on captured or smuggled Starlink terminals. However, after SpaceX deactivated these illicit connections in early 2026, Moscow had to fill the gap by pivoting toward a rapid-deployment solution: a “Starlink-like” constellation developed in apparent cooperation with China’s Shanghai Spacecom Satellite Technology (SSST).

While this partnership enables Russia to bypass the immense costs and risks of domestic manufacturing, it facilitates a creeping “Sinicization” of Russia’s military space sector. By adopting Chinese hardware designs, such as the flat-panel Rassvet Gen1 satellites, Moscow appears to have gained a potential battlefield equivalent to Starlink but risks a precarious, long-term dependency on Beijing in exchange for its access to this technology. Russia is trading its last remnants of strategic autonomy in space for a survival-driven military capability that appears to be strongly influenced by an influx of Chinese technology for its ailing satellite communications program.

Picture above: Russian soldier using satellite comms image: Source ITAR-TASS

Moscow’s Wartime Gap in Tactical Space Communications

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, its space-based inventory for conducting the war was ill-equipped for the demands of modern, high-intensity warfare. Moscow’s primary military communication systems, Blagovest and Meridian, lacked the capacity and satellite density required to support Russian forces deployed across a 1,000-kilometer (630 miles) frontline. While the low-orbit Strela-3M/Rodnik system was partially operational, its low satellite count meant it could only play a limited support role alongside its commercial counterpart, the Gonets-M.

Russia’s Ekspress fleet of commercial satellites also was unavailable to the military as its capacity was entirely booked by its corporate clients. This left the Yamal satellites—belonging to the state-owned energy giant Gazprom—to try and fill the remaining gaps, but they could only partially satisfy the military’s communication requirements. This systemic shortfall, compounded by a shortage of mobile satellite ground terminals, many of which were old and bulky, eventually forced Russian personnel into the precarious position of relying on captured or smuggled Starlink hardware for battlefield connectivity.

The following table details the status of Russia’s orbital assets at the onset of the Russian war with Ukraine:

Due to these shortcomings in its wartime space communications, Russian military personnel were forced to switch to using Starlink on the battlefield as early as the fall of 2022, which began after they started utilizing captured Ukrainian terminals. Given their importance to Russian military operations, Moscow sought to fill its battlefield communication requirements by developing a massive clandestine smuggling supply network overseas. These purchases enabled Moscow to make significant clandestine acquisitions of the Starlink terminals abroad, most of which were acquired in Europe, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and a few other countries. As a result of this effort, Starlink terminals increasingly appeared in the occupied territories of Ukraine. In fact, the number of terminals acquired by Moscow was so successful that Russian forces began mounting Starlink terminals on expendable Shahed-type drones used in strikes against Ukrainian cities and electrical power plants.

By February 2026, SpaceX had finally switched off all the terminals illegally acquired by Russian forces, causing a temporary – but major - collapse of Russian military communication systems in Ukraine. To make matters worse for Moscow, its own military communication services still had not registered any improvement in filling the gap in tactical military communications problem since 2022. Regardless, it continued to search for an acceptable solution to its problem by investing in the development of a system capable of replacing Starlink from 2022 to 2025.

It was during this period that Russia began investing more intensely in the development of small communication satellites for low Earth orbit. This effort initially began as early as the late 2010s when SpaceX and OneWeb started to deploy their satellite constellations. The dominant idea behind Russian thinking for this effort was to develop a satellite system for the Internet of Things and to obtain more money for its space industry from the domestic, as well as the global market. Through these efforts, Russia was attempting to keep its place among the world’s leading space powers.

By 2026, Russian ambitions for the global space market had been mostly abandoned as Moscow turned its efforts to developing wideband satellite communications for combat operations needed to operate different types of drones, particularly long-range Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), as well as those to assist in military command and control. By October 2025 there had been an even higher upsurge in demand for these systems on the battlefield, according to ITAR-TASS. Russian universities and UAV manufacturers experimented with the control of unmanned aerial vehicles via satellites in low-Earth orbit (1,400 kilometers) and in geostationary orbit (approximately 36,000 kilometers).

Moscow’s Pivot to the Rassvet Network

On March 23, 2026, a batch of 16 small wideband communication satellites, Rassvet (Dawn in Russian) were launched into orbit from the Russian military space launch site Plesetsk. By mid-April 2026, these satellites were still in an early phase of deployment because they needed to move from the 300-kilometer (km) orbit of placement to an 800-km operational orbit using onboard electric thrusters. The developer and manufacturer of the satellites is a Russian private space company known as Bureau 1440, which belongs to X-Holding, and is focused on Internet surveillance and lock-up hardware and software, and affiliated with the leadership of the Russian Federal Security Services (FSB). Bureau 1440 itself was established in November 2020.

The entire Rassvet constellation will eventually consist of between 292 to 318 satellites by the end of 2028. The satellite system could cost more than 430 billion rubles ($5 billion), including about 103 billion rubles ($1.2 billion) from the federal budget and 329 billion rubles (about $3.9 billion) of the company’s own investments. This means the average cost of one Rassvet satellite, including the cost of launch services, would cost $15.7 million per each micro-satellite, or be approximately 15 times higher than the production and orbiting cost of one Starlink satellite. Moreover, the planned cost of the fully deployed and operational system is comparable to the originally planned cost of the GLONASS program for 2021–2030, 484 billion rubles or $6.7 billion. Even though the cost of the Rassvet program includes the research and development phase, it still appears extremely high.

Bureau 1440

Besides the outrageous cost of the system, another prominent aspect involved here is the specifications of the Rassvet satellites and the role of Bureau 1440. Bureau 1440 is a Russian private aerospace company that is part of ICS Holding, developing a low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellite constellation to provide high-speed, low-latency broadband internet designed to compete with Starlink.

Bureau 1440 launched its first three test satellites as part of the Rassvet-1 mission in June 2023. These satellites had a mass of 80 kilograms (kg). This was followed by the Rassvet-2 mission, which began in May 2024, and there were three completely new satellites with a mass of 120 kg. The second mission was focusing on testing broadband communication equipment and the laser communication system between satellites. Twenty-two months later, Bureau 1440 orbited another generation of Rassvet satellites: Rassvet Gen1. These satellites have little in common with the Rassvet-1 and Rassvet-2 satellite missions, and although they are newer satellites, they are also significantly heavier, weighing up to 370 kilograms, and feature 6-beam active phased array antennas that provide a communication speed of 1 gigabit per second. Simply speaking, the Rassvet R&D phase spanned five years and included two technology demonstration missions, each deploying as many as three satellites. Consequently, the production-series Rassvet Gen1 satellites differ significantly from the experimental models trialed between 2023 and 2024.

On the one hand, Bureau 1440 publicly declares that it has approximately 3,000 employees, and 80% of these personnel are engineers. However, on the other hand more than half of its employees seem to have never been associated with the space industry before, and possibly could be nothing more than software engineers. Its manufacturing facility is located somewhere in or near Krasnogorsk. Located on the outskirts of the Moscow metropolitan area, this is not a likely place to build satellites. The company also cooperates with Bauman Technical University (including the use of the university’s test laboratory) and the Moscow Aviation Institute, and this cooperation is especially related to satellite onboard electrical propulsion systems.

However, these examples outlined above are the only known cooperative ties between Bureau 1440 and other Russian scientific entities or suppliers of satellite components. Therefore, Bureau 1440 pretends to produce hundreds of small but advanced low-orbit communication satellites from scratch, mostly by itself, using unknown manufacturing facilities, and inevitably faces a shortage of qualified workforce personnel because of labor shortages inside Russia caused by the negative demographic trend, decline of the education system, and the ongoing war against Ukraine, now in its fifth year.

The Sinicization of Rassvet

The only plausible explanation for the unusually rapid high-speed development of the Rassvet Gen1 satellite and the sudden transition from its predecessor, Rassvet-1, is Russian cooperation with China. For example, the Rassvet Gen1’s flat-panel architecture closely mirrors SpaceX’s Starlink (v0.9, v1.0, and v1.5), which was deployed between 2019 and 2023. Similarly, China’s Qianfan low-orbit communication satellites, which began deployment in August 2024—eighteen months before Rassvet Gen1—also share significant design similarities with earlier Starlink generations. Qianfan was developed by Shanghai Spacecom Satellite Technology (SSST) in the early 2020s and is quite similar to the first generations of Starlink satellites, as well as the Rassvet Gen1 satellites. Moreover, the Qianfan satellite constellation became operational one and a half years before the Rassvet Gen1.

Consequently, Rassvet Gen1 is likely the result of close cooperation between Bureau 1440 and SSST. Under this assumption, Bureau 1440 would primarily focus on adapting Chinese satellite hardware to meet Russian specifications, as well as developing proprietary software for the space-based platform.

Through this approach, the Russian company bypasses the immense complexity and cost of building its own domestic manufacturing facilities and supply chains. In addition, Russian officials can avoid incurring most of the development risks because SSST took the risks on its own.

Outlook

Going forward, the only major considerations for the Russian side are money for the purchase of the satellites and developing the necessary hardware and software upgrades to operate the new Russian space-based constellation network using Chinese tech. In short, the Kremlin appears to be leveraging Chinese manufacturing capabilities and risk-taking to bypass its own domestic supply chain needs. However, it is doing so at the expense of its own long-term strategic autonomy in space. Ultimately, if the entire supply chain of Rassvet Gen1 satellites were delivered from China, Russia could lose the last remnants of its strategic autonomy in space affairs.

In the final analysis, Moscow’s strategy to offset the loss of illicit Starlink access just to maintain parity with Ukraine on the battlefield runs the risk of a ‘Sinicization’ of its military space sector. This creates a precarious dependency that not only threatens to compromise the independence of Russia’s military space activities but could ultimately become irreversible.

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By Alexander Melikishvili

Georgia’s State Security Service (SSS) has not captured any foreign intelligence operatives since 2012, so it came as a great surprise when, on April 22, it announced the arrest of Tamaz Goloev (Goloti). According to the SSS First Deputy Head Lasha Magradze, a representative of an unidentified foreign intelligence service recruited Goloev, who was allegedly tasked with collecting information on the SSS, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of Defense, including their forces and assets, which he was to monitor (photo and video surveillance).

Similarly, Goloev was tasked to collect information on Georgia’s critical infrastructure, including bridges, highways, and railroads. Magradze also mentioned that two other Georgian citizens were involved as well, but they were not in Georgia, prompting the SSS to charge them in absentia and request international arrest warrants for both from Interpol. On April 24, the Tbilisi City Court held closed hearings and ordered Goloev to remain in pre-trial detention for two months. If convicted, he faces 8–12 years in jail under Article 314 (Espionage) of Georgia’s Criminal Code.

*Picture of alleged Russian spy Tamaz Goloev taken from his Facebook page

Goloev is a native of the town of Akhalgori, which is located in the Russian-controlled breakaway region of South Ossetia. He is from a mixed (father – Ossetian, mother – Georgian) family. Prominent Georgian human rights defender Tamta Mikeladze (NGO Social Justice Center) claimed that Goloev was known to Georgian civil society because he was keen to maintain connections to Georgian society and visited Tbilisi regularly. Mikeladze questioned the spying allegations, while former Human Rights Ombudsman Ucha Nanuashvili emphasized that the investigation must produce convincing evidence of Goloev’s guilt or risk being seen as scapegoating him. The separatist authorities in Tskhinvali confirmed that Goloev entered Georgia via the Odzisi (Razdakhan) checkpoint on April 21 and was arrested in Tbilisi a day later. They condemned Goloev’s arrest and demanded his release via the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM), which is facilitated by the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) and the OSCE.

Another State Minister Without Staff

These developments are taking place against the backdrop of a major personnel reshuffle in Georgia’s law enforcement and intelligence communities. On April 21, the de facto* Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze outlined the changes, according to which SSS Head Mamuka Mdinaradze would assume the newly created position of State Minister for Coordination of Law Enforcement Bodies and also become Deputy Prime Minister. With no prior experience in security or intelligence, Mdinaradze, who is a lawyer by trade, has been in charge of the SSS only since September 2025, but this did not prevent his meteoric rise through the ranks (from lieutenant to major general) in this time span.

In announcing the personnel changes, Kobakhidze heaped praise on Mdinaradze, whose tenure at the SSS he assessed as “very successful.” Mdinaradze was also not shy about taking credit—in a late-night interview with the pro-government TV channel Imedi on April 22, he noted that, owing to his efforts, the SSS now collects more information than before, including through an increased number of court-approved wiretaps.

The procedural committee of the rubber-stamp parliament, dominated by the ruling party Georgian Dream (GD), formally ended Mdinaradze’s mandate as SSS Head on April 27. He is replaced by Gela Geladze, who has been the Minister of Internal Affairs since May 2025. Geladze, in turn, is replaced by Sulkhan Tamazashvili, who has been the Chairman of the Government of the Autonomous Republic of Adjara since April 2025. It should be noted that in December 2024, the British government placed Tamazashvili under sanctions for his role in the violent dispersal of peaceful protesters in Tbilisi. At the time, Tamazashvili was the Director of the Tbilisi Police Department. It is unclear who will be in charge of the government in Adjara. Georgia’s de facto legislature approved the new appointments of Mdinaradze and Geladze on 28 April without holding any parliamentary debates.

Mdinaradze will be the second member of Kobakhidze’s cabinet with the title of State Minister (after Tea Akhvlediani, who is the State Minister for Reconciliation and Civic Equality). He will have no staff of his own and will work out of the Administration of the Government of Georgia (formerly the State Chancellery). While Mdinaradze’s exact remit will be spelled out in a forthcoming special government decree, he will coordinate the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the SSS, and the Special State Protection Service. He will also cooperate with the State Audit Service, the Prosecutor’s Office, and the Ministry of Justice, as explained by the Parliamentary Secretary of the Government, Vakhtang Bachiashvili, who noted that this will be a temporary position based on current policy priorities.

Outlook

The GD government’s refusal to identify the foreign intelligence service on whose behalf Goloev purportedly worked is consistent with its broader policy of avoiding actions that might irritate Russia. However, Goloev’s arrest does not represent a change in the SSS modus operandi toward more counterintelligence activities. It is more likely that this episode has been staged as part of the GD government’s Public Relations (PR) campaign to burnish Mdinaradze’s credentials and justify his transition to the new role for a domestic audience.

Notwithstanding the vague official explanations about the need to improve the efficiency of security services and law enforcement, Mdinaradze’s new appointment probably has more to do with Kobakhidze’s efforts to find a suitable niche for him in the Georgian government. Before his SSS appointment, Mdinaradze served as the leader of the GD parliamentary majority and was one of the key GD figures known for abrasive media appearances in which he often made provocative statements, accusing the “deep state” in the West of trying to drag Georgia into war with Russia and castigating the “radical opposition” in Georgia.

As for Goloev, once his trial ends this summer and public attention to this case wanes, it is quite likely that he will be quietly exchanged for any number of Georgian citizens who are routinely detained by separatist militia and Russian border guards along the de facto border separating the South Ossetian enclave from Georgian-controlled territory.

*Editorial Note: Because Georgia’s 2024 parliamentary elections were rigged, it is important to emphasize that the Georgian Dream government is not legitimate. Neither is the parliament of Georgia. As such, this lack of legitimacy must be reflected by certain qualifiers preceding the titles. For instance, one can say, “the Georgian Dream Prime Minister Kobakhidze” or “de facto Prime Minister Kobakhidze.”

About the Author:

Alex Melikishvili is a senior country risk analyst with more than a decade of experience working in the private sector (S&P Global, IHS Markit) with focus on Eurasian security. Alex holds a master's degree in International Affairs from the George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs.

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By Fuad Shabazov

On April 17, 2026, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev met with the Syrian interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in Türkiye. The recent meeting between the two leaders has become a tradition in the post-Assad period, paving the way for a stronger partnership between Baku and Damascus. Indeed, diversification of partnership with particular countries like Azerbaijan and Türkiye is of strategic importance for the former war-torn country, especially amid post-war reconstruction efforts, regional volatility, and Israel’s expansion deeper into Syrian territory.

In May 2025, a high-level Azerbaijani delegation arrived in Damascus to explore opportunities for cooperation across key sectors, including the economy, energy, culture, and education. The visit underscored the deepening ties between Baku and Damascus, but it also coincided with escalating security challenges in Syria, marked by an Israeli Defense Forces incursion and subsequent violent tensions involving Syria’s Druze minority.

*Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev & Syrian President al-Sharaa in Baku in July 2025

Shortly after this visit, President al-Sharaa paid a one-day visit to Baku in July 2025, meeting his counterpart Aliyev, reportedly as Azerbaijan simultaneously launched mediation efforts between Syria and Israel in early August 2025. Although official media sources in Baku did not issue any comment or statements on this matter, diplomatic sources reported that the meeting focused on the ‘security situation, particularly in southern Syria’ — where Bedouin and Druze militants had been clashing.

Syria’s decision to turn to Azerbaijan as a reliable interlocutor in the mediation process with Israel can be traced to its longstanding strategic ties with both Israel and Türkiye. At the same time, Syrian officials increasingly view Azerbaijan as a credible actor and potential mediator between Syria and Israel, but also between Syria and Russia in April 2025. Even though the mediation efforts with Israel did not yield significant results and stopped Israeli military advancements in Syria, it opened additional horizons for the Baku and Damascus bilateral partnership.

Energy map of Azerbaijan-Turkiye-Syria natural gas pipeline: Map Source:

Shah Deniz Fuels Syrian Economic Recovery

As such, in 2025, the Azerbaijani State Oil Company (SOCAR) signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Syrian government to supply natural gas to Syria, which stands to reshape the Middle East’s geopolitical and energy landscape. Under the new agreement, Azerbaijan exports 1.2 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas annually to Syria via Türkiye from the BP-operated Shah Deniz gas field in the Caspian Sea. This supply is earmarked for Syria’s gas-fired plants, with Energy Minister Mohammad al-Bashir estimating it will boost the country’s electricity generation by about 750 megawatts, enabling some regions to receive up to 4 additional hours of electricity daily.

Overall, since diplomatic relations were restored between the two countries, Azerbaijan has announced plans to invest between $400-600 million in Syrian energy infrastructure, while a joint venture between SOCAR and Türkiye’s BOTAŞ aims to explore and develop new reserves and invest in petrochemicals. Azerbaijan’s further investment plans are essential for Syria, as the country anticipates that Baku’s investments in local infrastructure would serve as a natural shield against potential Israeli air strikes, given the nature of its relations with Tel Aviv.

Azerbaijan’s efforts to mediate between Syria and Israel have failed so far. The prospect of joint participation in the Abraham Accords, as pursued by other Arab states, also did not materialize. In response, Baku and Damascus appear to be exploring the creation of a new geopolitical axis linking Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Syria. Strategic cooperation in this framework could open the door for Syria’s eventual engagement with the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). This would offer a significant avenue for Syria’s post-war recovery, as well as introduce Damascus to a new network of countries and trading partners in Central Asia, and even participation in the Azerbaijan-led Middle Corridor project.

As such, Syria could benefit from Azerbaijan and Türkiye’s expertise in transport and energy infrastructure development, as well as gain access to additional markets in the wider Eurasia, strengthening Syria’s regional position. On the other hand, Azerbaijan’s willingness to enhance its partnership with Syria is part of its broader strategy to recalibrate its footprint in the Middle East after 2020, enabling it to diversify its energy portfolio through investments in Israel, Syria, Türkiye, and the Gulf. If successful and resilient, gas exports to Syria could enable Azerbaijan to make inroads into Egypt’s energy market using Syria as a transit country.

Outlook

The overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024 and the ongoing war with Iran in the Persian Gulf have led to a decline in Iranian influence in the immediate neighborhood, namely Syria, creating a vacuum that Azerbaijan is eager to fulfill. As such, Azerbaijan and Turkiye’s growing footprint in Syria, complemented by energy-related projects and infrastructure upgrades that bypass Iran, could further unsettle Tehran. Azerbaijan’s long-standing strategic partnership with Israel and recent efforts to mediate a diplomatic thaw between Syria, Israel, and Türkiye are seen as a source of threat by Tehran.

For Tehran, the emergence of such a cooperative format and axis reflects a broader pattern of geopolitical encirclement. This perception of encirclement has become increasingly pronounced amid the ongoing war and Washington’s August 2025 agreement with Azerbaijan and Armenia to establish a 42‑kilometer transit corridor, known as the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP).

Nevertheless, lingering domestic instability in Syria, the ongoing war in Iran, and a regional security gap highlight limitations for Azerbaijan in capitalizing on Iran’s preoccupation at the moment, as eventually larger energy and infrastructure projects could face serious stalemates or even delays, stretching Baku’s diplomatic capacities to build wider relations with Damascus. Regardless, the shadow of the South Caucasus energy giant, Azerbaijan. By assisting Syria in its post-war economic recovery, Azerbaijan is opening a new chapter in the post-war economic recovery of Syria, driven by the shifting energy geopolitics of the Middle East.

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About the Author:

Fuad Shahbazov is a political scientist and analyst focused on regional security in Eurasia and the Middle East. He holds a master’s degree in Political Science from Vytautas Magnus University, a professional master’s degree in Terrorism and Countering Religious Radicalization from the University of Bergamo, and a master’s degree in Defense and Diplomacy from Durham University.

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By Vusal Guliyev

The sharp escalation of the Iran-related crisis in the Strait of Hormuz has once again exposed the fragility of global energy supply chains dependent on maritime chokepoints. Nowhere is this vulnerability more visible than in the Strait of Hormuz, through which a substantial share of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas flows. As the war enters its second month, its impact is immediate and far-reaching. The war is causing higher shipping risks, rising insurance costs, and increased volatility across energy markets. What began as a regional security crisis has quickly emerged as a global economic concern, reminding energy-importing states that maritime disruption in the Gulf is reverberating far beyond the Middle East.

For East Asian economies, the implications are especially serious. Japan, South Korea, and China remain deeply reliant on Middle Eastern crude, making them highly vulnerable to disruptions in Gulf transport routes. Japan is the most reliant, with roughly 95% of its imports coming from the region, followed by South Korea at about 70%, and China at approximately 52%. Japan alone imports about 2.8 million barrels per day, with approximately 70% of these volumes passing through the Strait of Hormuz. This heavy reliance on a single source is intensifying the urgency of diversification efforts, pushing East Asian governments and energy conglomerates to accelerate efforts to secure alternative suppliers and develop more resilient supply routes beyond the Gulf.

Recent reporting by NHK World-Japan suggests that Tokyo is actively intensifying its search for alternative sources of supply, including deeper engagement with producers in the broader Caspian region. In this sense, the Iran crisis is functioning less as a sudden rupture than as a catalyst pushing Tokyo's existing strategic thinking into a more urgent phase of implementation. Japan’s response is particularly notable because it is not new to the race for Caspian oil and has been involved in the region for several decades.

Unlike countries that are only now beginning to diversify, Tokyo is building on a long history of diplomatic engagement with the Caspian region and prior upstream investment experience through firms such as INPEX Corporation, Japan’s largest exploration and production company. This provides Japan with a relative advantage in accessing Eurasian energy resources.

The Caspian Basin, particularly Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, has long been an important component of Japan’s regional strategy. More specifically, INPEX Corporation has held a 7.56% stake in the Kashagan Field in Kazakhstan since 1998. This major offshore project produces roughly 430,000 barrels per day, with ongoing expansion plans aimed at further increasing capacity. On the western shore of the Caspian Sea, INPEX has also strengthened its position in the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli (ACG) oil fields in Azerbaijan, becoming a significant stakeholder through its subsidiary, holding a 9.31% stake since 2003. Producing over 330,000 barrels per day, the ACG stands as the largest oil field in Azerbaijan’s sector of the Caspian Basin. INPEX holds rights under Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) in both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. The PSA for the ACG remains in force until 2049, while the PSA for the Kashagan Field is valid through the end of 2031, with an option to extend it to 2041 under the existing terms

From Tokyo’s perspective, these producers offer more than just additional barrels. They represent a pathway toward greater supply security at a time when dependence on the Strait of Hormuz is highly fraught with geopolitical risk. At a time when energy importers are searching for reliable and politically resilient alternatives, the Caspian stands out as a region that can contribute to diversification away from the most vulnerable maritime routes. Its strategic value lies not only in resource abundance but also in its potential for integration into broader cross-Eurasian trade and transportation networks.

Japan and the Middle Corridor

This is where the Middle Corridor becomes central to Japanese strategy. Often seen mainly as a trade and logistics route linking Asia and Europe, it is increasingly gaining importance as an energy corridor as well. In the current context, its role goes beyond simple connectivity. If further developed and effectively operationalized, it can enable more secure and diversified energy flows from the Caspian to East Asian and global markets. Japan has already demonstrated its interest and commitment by investing significant effort in developing and digitalizing the Middle Corridor through a range of Central Asia–Japan initiatives, particularly under the Tokyo Declaration announced in December 2025 at the inaugural Summit of the Central Asia plus Japan Dialogue. These efforts directly respond to Japan’s growing concerns about transit security and broader supply chain vulnerabilities.

At the same time, Japan’s renewed focus on the Caspian could give rise to a quieter yet more meaningful form of strategic competition with China. Over the years, China has steadily expanded its economic, infrastructural, technological, energy, and security presence across Central Asia through major economic initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative and multilateral platforms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Through sustained investment, the development of transport corridors, and bilateral energy partnerships, Beijing has significantly deepened its footprint in a region at the heart of Eurasian connectivity, as demonstrated by the second China–Central Asia Summit and its decades-old engagement with the region.

Japan’s return to the region, even if framed in commercial and security terms rather than open rivalry, is likely to increasingly intersect with Chinese interests. This is unlikely to take the form of open confrontation, but rather a more layered competition over influence, access, and long-term positioning within Caspian energy and trade networks. This possibility reveals an important transformation in Asian energy geopolitics. The Caspian Basin is no longer just a secondary source of supply on the periphery of the global energy map. It is becoming a strategic arena in its own right, where major Asian powers seek to secure redundancy, resilience, and leverage. Japan’s energy strategy, shaped by the Iran crisis, reflects a broader recognition that supply security now depends as much on geography and diplomacy as on market prices. In this context, Caspian engagement is not merely about replacing one source with another. It is about constructing a more durable architecture of energy security.

Outlook

The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz not only affects Japan. South Korea also remains highly exposed, with roughly 61% of its crude oil imports passing through the strategic chokepoint. Recent agreements between South Korea and Kazakhstan highlight a similar shift toward Eurasian energy diversification. Kazakhstan is set to supply around 18 million barrels of oil, supporting Seoul’s efforts to secure volumes through routes that bypass the Gulf chokepoint. While modest relative to South Korea’s overall import needs, this partnership carries clear strategic weight. It signals a deliberate effort to reduce reliance on Middle Eastern transit routes and to integrate the Caspian Basin into a more diversified and resilient energy supply framework.

In sum, the deeper significance of the current shock lies in its structural effects. It is accelerating East Asia’s shift away from chokepoint-dependent energy supply chains toward more diversified Eurasian corridors. The Strait of Hormuz remains indispensable, but it is now also understood as a vulnerability that cannot be ignored. In response, the Caspian Basin is gaining great strategic importance as a critical node in the emerging geography of energy security. What is unfolding is not just a temporary adjustment to crisis conditions, but a broader reconfiguration of how East Asian states think about risk, resilience, and strategic access in a more uncertain global environment.

About the Author:

Vusal Guliyev is a frequent contributor to The Saratoga Foundation. He is a Sinologist, TCSOL Specialist, and Policy Analyst specializing in the geopolitical affairs of Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific region. Mr. Guliyev currently works as a Leading Advisor at the Baku-based Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center) and serves as the Head of the Shanghai Office at AZEGLOB Consulting Group.

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By Giorgi Lebanidze

Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze has ordered a change in the status of the Circassian Cultural Center (CCC) that will likely lead to its permanent closure. The CCC has been a major window for Georgia on the North Caucasus for the past 14 years promoting cooperation with the Circassians since its creation in 2012. During the past decade it has organized numerous conferences and events, but now is on the verge of being permanently shut down. While the center continues to functionally operate, its main office house in the Georgian Ministry of Culture has been significantly downgraded since the decision was made on January 1^st, 2026.

The Center’s status was changed earlier this year when its status was reclassified by the Prime Minister from a Legal Entity under Public law (LEPL) to that of a Non-Entrepreneurial Non-commercial Legal Entity (NNLE). This was not just a mere name change. The downgrading of its LEPL status allowed the “Center” to be more active, attract donors, and expand into the international arena. Furthermore, the LEPL “Circassian Cultural Center” operated under the “umbrella” of the Georgian Ministry of Culture, which increased its administrative and financial capabilities. Moreover, the change in status to an NNLE will likely result in the CCC being integrated into Tbilisi State University, where the organization will have even fewer resources and limit its operations even further.

This information was confirmed by CCC founder Merab Chukhua who served as director from 2012 to 2023, during an April 7 interview with the author. Chukhua, who is a professor and linguist, noted that Georgian authorities have long wanted to close the Circassian Cultural Center, but the government was unable to achieve that goal while he was director. Chukhua said that: “We had broad international support, primarily from the United States” and “authorities were unable to completely liquidate the Center” so they opted to change its status “hoping there would be no outcry from its supporters in Europe and the United States. Formally, the Circassian Cultural Center is now integrated into Tbilisi University, but this is merely an opportunity to pursue its final closure,” he said.

Chukhua is convinced that the Georgian authorities are acting on Moscow’s orders and essentially seeking to “destroy everything Georgian and especially everything Caucasian in our country.” Chukhua left the center several years ago to begin political activities as the leader of a new Georgian opposition party known as ‘On the Behalf of Georgia Party.’ The CCC is currently led by Nugzar Antelava, who has proven unable to resist the decision made by the Georgian Dream government to alter its status.

CCC’s Soft Power Influence on Abkhazia and the North Caucasus

Georgian-Circassian relations have a long history, both in the Middle Ages and in modern times. On May 11, 2011, upon the initiative and support of then-President Mikheil Saakashvili, the Georgian Parliament recognized the Circassian genocide. The parliamentary resolution established several state institutions, and a Circassian genocide memorial was built on the Black Sea coast in the village of Anaklia.

The LEPL “Circassian Cultural Center” was formally established in 2012 under the Georgian Ministry of Culture, where it has continued to operate until recently. During his recent interview, Chukhua reflected on the CCC’s achievements over the past decade, stating: “We enjoyed great popularity among Circassian diasporas worldwide. We held special conferences on Circassian culture and history.” Chukhua described how the CCC fought for the rights of Circassians living in Russia and the Circassian diaspora living in more than 50 countries around the world, making great progress in elevating global understanding about the historical tragedy that fell on the Circassians and their important role as a long-suffering people in the North Caucasus.

*Image: Merabi Chukhua, noted Georgian ethnographic expert on the North Caucasus

Chukhua and his “On the Behalf of Georgia Party” is part of a broader organized opposition movement inside Georgia whose goal is a peaceful change in the current government controlled by the Georgian Dream (GD) party. Chukhua asserted that “I have always felt the interest of the Russian special services behind this effort to shut down the CCC and I have even been declared persona non grata in Russia.” Not surprisingly, Russian authorities have listed the CCC as among the five most hostile organizations to Russia.

In 2014, at the invitation of Glen E. Howard, a North Caucasus expert living in the US who previously worked for Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Chukhua and other CCC leaders visited the United States to participate in a conference on the impact of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics on the North Caucasus. Merab Chukhua spoke at several Washington, D.C. based thinktanks, including the Carnegie Center.

Chukhua emphasized in his interview with the author that the creation and functioning of the CCC in Tbilisi was welcomed and positively received in Abkhazia and the North Caucasus due to its soft power impact on the region. For example, many Circassians who fought in Abkhazia against Georgia from 1992 to 1993 spoke in favor of Georgian-Abkhaz reconciliation after these efforts began. In fact, one of the leaders of the Circassian movement, Ibrahim Yaganov, who fought in the 1992-1993 Georgian-Abkhaz war on the side of Russian-backed Abkhaz forces, and was awarded the title “Hero of Abkhazia” radically changed his views on Abkhazia, its relations with Russia, and the prospects for resolving the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict.

In particular, Yaganov believes that Abkhazia has failed as an independent state and risks eventually being fully absorbed by Russia. According to Yaganov, the only solution is for Abkhazia to reach out and come to an agreement with Georgia and reconcile their differences with Tbilisi. Yaganov’s changed views about Georgia is emblematic of the lasting effects of Georgian soft power diplomacy toward the Circassians which significantly altered some of the negative stereotypes created by the Kremlin about Georgia in the decades after the Abkhaz war.

*The picture above is of the Circassian Culture Center in Tbilisi

The Circassian Cultural Center, which the Georgian Dream party is moving closer to permanently shutting down, officially opened on February 16, 2012, in the building of the Ministry of Culture and Monument Protection of Georgia in Tbilisi. The opening ceremony was attended by Mirza (Papuna) Davitaia, State Minister of Georgia for Diaspora Issues; Nugzar Tsiklauri, Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Diaspora Issues; David Tskhadadze, Deputy Minister of Culture of Georgia; and several renowned Caucasus scholars and special guests from the Caucasus and abroad. “The Georgian state extended a helping hand to the Circassian people by creating one of the main centers of Caucasian culture in Tbilisi so that they can preserve their language, culture, and identity. This is difficult for them in exile,” Davitaia stated during a recent interview.

According to Davitaia, the CCC’s purpose is to research and popularize the history and culture of the Circassians, as well as other Caucasian peoples. “Protecting the cultural heritage of the Caucasian peoples is one of the priorities of the Georgian state. Restoring Georgia’s functions as a regional leader and political center is also a priority for Georgia. The creation of this center was another step in this direction,” Tsiklauri said during a recent interview. In attendance at the time of the opening of the center was Iyad Youghar, President of the Circassian Cultural Center based in Patterson, New Jersey. Patterson is home to over 7,000 Circassian Americans and remains one of the largest bastions of support for the Circassians in North America.

During that ceremony, Youghar said: “It is gratifying that the Circassian Cultural Center has opened in Georgia. This center will facilitate the study and popularization of the history and culture of the Circassians and the Caucasian peoples in general, which is very important. This will deepen relations between our peoples.” In a recent interview with the author regarding the looming closure of the CCC, Youghar said he was “deeply concerned about the closure of the Center” and noted that “the CCC in Georgia under Chukhua’s leadership had been immensely helpful to many Syrian Circassians fleeing the Syrian Civil War, who had sought refugee status and relocation to Georgia when Russian officials repeatedly blocked their efforts to relocate back to their homeland in the North Caucasus. Circassians will be immensely grateful to Chukhua’s efforts and those of Georgia in helping Circassian refugees from Syria.“

*Picture Above: Circassian monument in Anaklia, Georgia, site of Russian deportations.

Georgia’s Circassian Memorial in Anaklia

A year after becoming the first country to recognize the 19th-century massacre and deportations of Circassians by Tsarist Russia as “genocide,” Georgia opened a monument in 2013 dedicated to the victims of those tragic events almost 150 years ago in Anaklia on the Black Sea coast. The site is near the administrative border of Abkhazia, known as the “Memorial for the Victims of the Circassian Genocide.” Papuna Davitaia. The Georgian minister in charge of diaspora issues attended the ceremony in 2013 to unveil the monument dedicated to the deportation of Circassians.

May 21^st remains a highly symbolic event to Circassians because it is the day when, in 1864, the Russian Empire declared its victory in its decades-long war against the North Caucasus peoples, removing the Circassians, who were the last peoples in the region to resist Russian rule, having defeated the Imam Shamyl and his Chechen and Dagestani followers several years before. May 21st is considered by Circassians to be their day of commemoration as victims of that deportation. Each year from May 21st to 22nd, a number of events are held in Anaklia to mark that day, including a conference to discuss the results of the recognition of the Circassians genocide by Georgia.

“This [monument] is an important step towards the Caucasian solidarity,” Papuna Davitaia, the Georgian state minister for diaspora issues, said, adding that the Georgian state was now capable to carry out its Caucasian policy and engage with the peoples of the North Caucasus. May 21st is also marked in Georgia’s breakaway region of Abkhazia as the Day of Remembrance of the Caucasian War as well. Abkhaz leader, Alexander Ankvab, took part in a wreath-laying ceremony at the monument to the Muhajirs – those Muslim Abkhazians who were forcibly deported to the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century.

Moscow has intensely monitored the Georgian-Circassian dialogue and often tried to interfere in this process, especially after the change of power in Georgia in 2012 and the formation of a new government led by the Georgian billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili and his Georgian Dream (GD) party. In an interview on April 8, Paata Zakareishvili the former State Minister of Georgia for Reconciliation and Civic Equality (2012 to 2016), believes that at various diplomatic levels, Russian officials have demanded that Tbilisi disavow its recognition of the Circassian genocide. However, the Georgian parliament cannot make such a decision because it would create a major backlash of discontent from its neighbors in the North Caucasus.

Zakareishvili pointed out during a recent interview that “as we see now, the Georgian authorities are acting in '“small steps,” and with these ‘small steps,” such as ‘“changing the status of the Circassian Cultural Center, the Georgian government is clearly sending a message of loyalty to Moscow.” He noted further, “Georgia no longer cooperates with the peoples of the North Caucasus. Delegations from Caucasian peoples no longer travel to Tbilisi. The parliamentary committee on relations with the peoples of the North Caucasus has been liquidated, as well as the Mir TV Company, which previously broadcast news and cultural programming to the North Caucasus” Mir (which means peace in Russian), aired programs in the three principal languages of the region: Cherkess (Circassian), Chechen and Avar languages, the former state minister underscored.

When he was in office from 2012 to 2016, Zakareishvili noted that “we financed the studies of students from the North Caucasus at Georgian universities.” Paata Zakareishvili calls relations with the peoples of the North Caucasus “very important.” Even during Soviet times, he pointed out, many Caucasians, including Circassians, came to Tbilisi to study because of the attractiveness of the Georgian capital, which was widely regarded as a center of higher learning and education in the Caucasus. Today, however, the Georgian capital has lost its status as a “center of attraction” for the North Caucasians, and their only opportunities for higher education lie in Moscow, which is often closed to those seeking opportunities to study from outside the Russian capital. Regardless, Zakareishvili remains confident that the peoples of the North Caucasus will remember their identity, and the restoration of relations between Georgia and the Circassians depends on Ukraine’s victory in its war against Russia.

Despite the GD ruling party’s support for Moscow, only Georgia and Ukraine have recognized the Circassian genocide. But more recently, a third country, Lithuania, is joining the ranks of former captive nations (the first in the Baltics) to consider recognition of the Circassian genocide, creating new momentum and support from among the former captive nations of the Soviet Union. No other country, including those with a Circassian population, has made such a decision, fearing it might provoke anger from Moscow. This precedent is crucial because it creates the conditions for Circassians to fight for their rights and historical truth.

Outlook

Georgian society continues to maintain a strong amount of affinity for the Circassians. This, too, is a historical tradition. Perhaps for this reason, despite the CCC’s change in status, its office in the Georgian Ministry of Culture has not yet been fully closed. A plaque with the CCC inscription still hangs on the wall outside the main building, where the Georgian and Circassian flags continue to fly.

While the looming closure of the Circassian Cultural Center could be viewed as a setback to the Circassians, noted Caucasus expert Paul Goble recently emphasized that the Circassian movement has achieved several major milestones in the past decade, notably: “What makes this change so important is that Circassians both in the homeland and in the diaspora have invested great importance in Georgia’s support both in the opening of the Center and recognition of the genocide in 1864. Anything which appears to be backsliding from that is thus not surprisingly viewed as being even more significant than it may ultimately prove to be.”

About the Author:

Giorgi Lebanidze is a Georgian journalist and expert based in Tbilisi, Georgia.

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The Saratoga Foundation is a research and analysis organization focused on Eurasian security and geopolitical developments. Founded in 2023, the Foundation provides analysis on timely security issues shaping U.S. strategic interests related to the Eurasian chessboard.

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By Michael Horton

On February 28, 2026, hours after U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, the Houthis announced they would resume attacks on Red Sea shipping and Israel. Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, the group’s leader, warned that his forces had their fingers on the trigger. Bahrain and the UAE were warned they would be the first to pay if they aided operations against Tehran. Closure of the Bab el-Mandeb, the strait connecting the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, was described as likely if the assault on Iran continued.

In the weeks that followed, the Houthis launched ballistic missiles toward Israel on March 28th, March 30th, April 1st, and April 2nd. As yet, the Houthis have not launched any attacks on maritime targets or on GCC states. The strait remains open. The disparity between the Houthis’ rhetoric and actions is a product of lessons learned from two years of conflict following Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israel, mounting domestic concerns, inter-organizational tensions, and curbs on Iranian-sourced materiel.

Always quick to learn and adjust to changing political and martial realities, the Houthis are pursuing a well-calibrated policy of conditional deterrence.

Lessons Learned

Operation Rough Rider, which ran from March 15th to May 6th, 2025, struck more than a thousand Houthi targets across Houthi-controlled northwest Yemen in roughly seven weeks. Supply depots were hit. Missile launchers were targeted, and some of the infrastructure that supports drone and missile production and assembly was destroyed. Major General Zakaria Abdullah Yahya Hajar, who ran the Houthis’ drone force, was killed in a March strike on a headquarters north of Sana’a, along with Major General Mohammed Khaled Yahya al-Haifi, chief of missile-force operations, and several other senior commanders — deaths the Houthis concealed for nine months before quietly acknowledging them in December. The campaign cost the United States an estimated two billion dollars or more. The Houthis shot down seven MQ-9 Reaper UAVs during the campaign, and one F/A-18E Super Hornet fell overboard when the USS Truman was forced into evasive maneuvers after an incoming Houthi ballistic missile. The Houthis absorbed the attacks, derived operational lessons from them, and largely fought the U.S. to a standstill.

On May 6th, the U.S. and the Houthis agreed to an Omani-brokered ceasefire in which the Houthis agreed not to target American vessels and not to impede shipping through the Bab al-Mandeb. Both sides declared victory. Reporting by the New York Times, based on interviews with over a dozen U.S. officials, confirmed that the Trump Administration ended the campaign because the strikes were not achieving their objectives. The Houthis were explicit that the agreement did not include the cessation of attacks on Israel. After the end of Operation Rough Rider, Israel continued to target infrastructure in Houthi-controlled areas, and the Houthis continued to launch missiles and drones toward Israel.

Each side’s reading of the outcome helped shape what came next. For the Houthis, the March to May hostilities confirmed something they had been testing since late 2023: a mass maritime campaign draws a military response that degrades real capabilities, while a calibrated campaign does not. Consequently, in 2024, they struck commercial shipping roughly 150 times. In 2025, this dropped to seven attacks, even as they continued operations against Israel. This shift shows the Houthis became far more selective and measured in targeting maritime assets. The leadership seemingly realized that the threat of attacks could act as a kind of strategic reserve.

Operation Rough Rider also reinforced lessons the Houthis had absorbed during the Saudi-led coalition air campaign that began in 2015 and lasted, with brief interruptions, until the 2022 ceasefire. Concealment of weapons, materiel, and signals hygiene is paramount. Northwest Yemen’s rugged mountain terrain favors concealment. The Houthis have modernized and deepened Saleh-era underground depots and have dug new ones. They also located drone and missile production and assembly infrastructure in densely populated areas. These facilities are dispersed with multiple backup sites to compensate for any losses.

While the U.S. and Israel were able to successfully target some Houthi commanders and lower-level leadership, the Houthis are quite adept at minimizing their electronic emissions. Following strikes on their leadership, the Houthis launched an internal purge to root out suspected informants and doubled down on organizational security. It is likely that the group uses runners for communication with top-tier leaders, carrier pigeons (a method used by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP), and possesses a hardwired internal communication system in areas around Sana’a.

A Wasting Asset

Another crucial factor behind the Houthis’ strategic restraint is a material challenge. Their missile program still depends on key components sourced from Iran. Although the Houthis have successfully diversified supply chains for their drone programs, they continue to struggle with finding alternatives for critical missile parts. Leadership understands that each missile launched will be harder to replace going forward. Continued war with Iran will almost certainly further constrain these Iran-linked supply chains.

The Houthis’ missile supply gives them considerable leverage over regional powers, namely Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as well as over their domestic foes. The Houthis can easily target command centers and any concentration of forces in areas controlled by the recognized government of Yemen. With the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the East-West pipeline now running at full capacity to export Saudi oil via the Red Sea port of Yanbu, the Houthis’ leverage has increased sharply. Closing the Bab al-Mandeb or striking the pipeline and Yanbu’s port infrastructure would directly threaten Saudi Arabia’s primary remaining oil export route. The Houthis have already demonstrated the capability: a Houthi drone strike temporarily shut down the East-West pipeline in May 2019.

While UAVs can target all of these sites, the Houthis’ more sophisticated missiles pose a greater challenge to Saudi and Emirati air defenses and have a higher chance of inflicting serious damage. The same limited supply of missiles poses a threat to the U.S. base at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti and Emirati installations near Berbera in Somaliland.

Domestic Pressure

The Houthis are also contending with growing domestic pressures stemming from a moribund economy, declining revenue from formal and informal taxes, and the sale of refined petroleum products. These pressures have intensified due to attacks on port infrastructure by Israel in 2025, as well as U.S. sanctions that followed the formal redesignation of the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the State Department on March 4, 2025, pursuant to an executive order Trump signed on January 22nd. As a result, the once-significant revenue the Houthis derived from taxing and selling imported refined petroleum products has eroded. The Houthis depend on this revenue not only to fund their government and military, but also to sustain a vital patronage network.

The Houthis’ power rests on the continued compliance, forced or otherwise, of northwest Yemen’s tribes. While the Houthis have worked to infiltrate and compromise tribal power structures across the northwest, much of the compliance is still bought. Former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh also relied on patronage networks to maintain his grip on power. Corruption, declining oil exports, and his heavy-handed prosecution of six wars against the Houthis between 2004 and 2010 all contributed to the erosion of his authority and his eventual removal during the Arab Spring uprisings. Just as the Houthis have learned lessons from Operation Rough Rider, they are keenly aware of how Saleh lost power. Another extended bombing campaign by the U.S. and or Israel will not displace them, but it will further impede their ability to buy the compliance of key tribal allies.

Inter-Organizational Tensions

Running through all of this is a factional argument about what the Houthis are, and what they owe Iran. On one side, what can be called pragmatists are rooted in the movement’s Yemeni political tradition. The pragmatists have long resisted full subordination to Iran’s Axis of Resistance framework. These figures are by no means pacifists; most fully backed and helped prosecute the Red Sea campaign and missile launches toward Israel. But they understand that further escalation — the kind that invites another sustained bombing campaign, or that depletes inventory the group cannot easily replace — does not serve their goal of maintaining power and slowly expanding their political influence across Yemen. Many of these men also have personal fortunes to protect and are likely more interested in business than in sustaining a war that will slowly erode Houthi control.

On the other side are the maximalists, figures for whom the war with the United States and Israel is an ideological obligation that cannot be so easily weighed against domestic calculations. Many of these men are part of the younger generation that came of age during the last years of the Saleh government. While many are undoubtedly wealthy due to corruption and the war economy, they have not amassed the personal fortunes that many in the older generation have. They have less to lose, and it is largely through war that a Houthi commander can prove himself and advance within the organization.

Tehran’s position complicates any simple reading of this contest. The Iranians want the Houthi threat activated and credible — a second front that disperses American and Israeli attention and keeps Saudi Arabia in particular in check. But Tehran does not want the Houthis to be degraded by a serious escalation. Iran’s preferred outcome, a Houthi posture of maximum menace with minimal commitment, aligns, at least for now, with what the pragmatists are already arguing.

The Bab al-Mandeb

The Bab el-Mandeb carries, in normal times, between 10 and 15 percent of global seaborne trade. With the Strait of Hormuz now largely closed to non-Iranian vessels, its strategic weight has increased further still. The Houthis hold parts of its eastern shore, and they have the weapons — anti-ship ballistic missiles, drones, and naval mines — to make transit through it prohibitively dangerous. They have said, on the record, that closure is likely if the assault on Iran escalates further, especially if there are U.S. boots on the ground in Iran.

The arithmetic of the Houthis’ restraint is clear. Closing the Bab al-Mandeb ends the threat because it produces a response from the United States and Israel that will not displace the Houthis but will degrade them militarily and further stress their ability to fund patronage networks. Escalation by the Houthis could also provoke Saudi Arabia into backing ground operations by forces allied with the Government of Yemen (GOY). While such an operation is unlikely to dislodge the Houthis, GOY-allied forces are better organized and more capable than they have been for years.

The Houthis, and for now Iran, benefit more from holding the threat to close the Bab al-Mandeb and attack oil handling infrastructure in reserve. It is also highly likely that Saudi Arabia, which has maintained backchannel communications with the Houthis since at least 2022, is ensuring that the group receives some economic support. Reports indicate that Saudi salary transfers to Houthi-controlled areas helped shape the timing of the Houthis’ entry into the current conflict. If accurate, this underscores Riyadh’s continued interest in managing — rather than confronting — the Houthis directly.

What Comes Next

The Houthis will continue launching missiles at Israel — enough to maintain the appearance of solidarity with Iran and the Axis of Resistance — but not enough to deplete an inventory they cannot easily rebuild. Maritime threats will continue at a frequency calibrated to sustain elevated insurance rates and keep some U.S. naval assets committed to the region. However, barring U.S. troops on the ground in Iran, the Houthis are unlikely to cross the threshold that would provoke another sustained bombing campaign. The Bab el-Mandeb will remain open and threatened.

The danger in this situation is not that the Houthis will rationally decide to close the strait. It is that they will not have to decide. Miscalculation is not a failure of intent; it is what happens when multiple actors are moving simultaneously up an escalation ladder, none of whom can see to the top. A single exchange — a vessel sunk, a naval asset struck, a threshold crossed by one of the other parties — can produce an escalatory loop that removes the option of restraint before any party has specifically chosen to abandon it.

The Houthis have endured six Saada wars, seven years of Saudi-led military intervention, successive Israeli campaigns to decapitate their leadership, and two American bombing operations. They are not a movement that makes decisions from desperation. They make them from a precise, if sometimes ruthless, accounting of what they possess, what they stand to lose, and what price their adversaries are prepared to pay. That accounting currently argues for continued restraint.

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About the Author:

Michael Horton is the co-founder of Red Sea Analytics International (RSAI) and a contributing author at Eurasia Outlook. He has two decades of experience as an analyst and researcher in Yemen and the Red Sea region. Michael has written policy briefs and conducted briefings and seminars for the US National Security Council, the British Foreign Ministry, the British Ministry of Defense, the US State Department, and senior members of the British Parliament and the US Congress. He has written extensively about the region for The Saratoga Foundation, Jane’s Intelligence Review, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Oxford Analytica, and The Economist,.

About the Saratoga Foundation

The Saratoga Foundation is a research and analysis organization focused on Eurasian security and geopolitical developments. Founded in 2023, the Foundation provides analysis on timely security issues shaping U.S. strategic interests related to the Eurasian chessboard.

Thank you for your support! Please remember that The Saratoga Foundation is a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization. Your donations are fully tax-deductible. If you seek to support The Saratoga Foundation, you can make a one-time donation by clicking on the PayPal link below! You can also subscribe to our website to support our work.

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On March 18, Israeli military planes carried out attacks on Bandar Anzali, headquarters of Iran’s Northern Fleet and its largest port on the Caspian. Reports about the air strikes the following day noted that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) hit the port and other adjoining areas, destroying infrastructure and at least five Iranian naval vessels and merchant ships during the nighttime attack.

Not only did the air strike signal to Tehran and the Iranian people that US-Israeli attacks would no longer be limited to Iran's southern portions of that country—effectively eliminating any safe havens—but it also threatened to spill over into Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Turkmenistan, as well as their trading partners in China and Europe. By suggesting that north-south and east-west trade corridors, which make use of shipping via the Caspian Sea, are now at risk, the incident sparked a foreign ministry protest in Moscow and still silent anger elsewhere.

In the wake of these attacks, some analysts and officials in the region are already suggesting that this could lead to shifts in these trade corridors away from one’s dependent on the use of the Caspian Sea to the use of overland land routes, benefiting a few countries but harming others. But all who have offered commentaries on these attacks agree that the Israeli move has brought the Iranian war to the Caspian and that even if there are no further strikes in the near term, the littoral countries as well as their trading partners must be alert and ready to respond to such attacks in the future, lest those attacks drag in one or more of the countries involved into a broader war around Iran.

In addition, regional commentators are also warning of other, less obvious but potentially equally or even more disastrous consequences from strikes like this, including both the triggering of an ecological disaster for the Caspian or even possibly the revival of the Islamic State movement (ISIS), which operates in the region and would threaten not only the neighboring states but the world as a whole.

*The photo above is a damaged ship after the Israeli air strike on Bandar Anzali on March 18.

The Israeli attack on the Caspian port damaged at least five ships at the headquarters of Iran’s Northern Fleet, and also caused significant damage to the port itself, the surrounding military facilities, and the ships, but it involved no casualties. What it did do was send important messages to the Iranian government and people, to the governments of the littoral states, and to all countries and international corporations involved in both east-west and north-south trade in the Caspian region.

The March 18 air strike on Bandar Anzali clearly demonstrated to the Iranians that the Israel, and potentially the United States, are quite prepared to expand their attacks beyond Iranian nuclear facilities and southern economic infrastructure and that no one in Tehran or Iran as a whole should count on their being any safe havens where people and officials can go about their business with little need to fear a military attack. Clearly, that was the primary reason for the attack, although Israeli officials suggested that what they really wanted to do was degrade trade between Iran and its supporters in Moscow, given that the Caspian has been a major channel for such trade, especially in sanctioned items and weaponry, as it becomes part of a Russia-Iran arms corridor.

Regional Repercussions

All things considered, if the Israeli attack was directed in the first instance at Iran, it also sent shockwaves through the other four Caspian littoral states and the governments and businesses that are seeking to develop both east-west and north-south trade routes via the Caspian, given the existing political difficulties and infrastructure shortages in both Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Moscow has been especially outraged by the Israeli action because it challenges the 2018 accord on the delimitation of the Caspian signed by all five littoral states (but not yet ratified by Iran) that specifies that none of the countries will allow other states any military presence on that body of water. However, what Israeli planes have done is to show how hollow that accord is.

But more than that, this attack has shown that plans to use the Caspian for either north-south trade between Russia and the Indian Ocean via Iran or east-west trade from China and Central Asia to Europe via the South Caucasus are not as well-situated as the Kremlin has insisted. Instead, all countries involved are now waiting to see what happens next, thus casting doubt on both these corridors: the Russian-led route and the one backed by China and the West. The Israeli attack has, at a minimum, put these plans on hold for moving forward and quite possibly may have derailed them permanently.

Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have been seeking to develop land routes for each of these corridors, and now are certain to press the advantage that the caution the Israeli attacks have instilled in the other littoral states and businesses, and their policies may lead outside actors to focus more on railway and pipeline construction through or from them than at any point in the recent past. If Israel pursues any additional attacks, then there certainly could be a fundamental reordering of the geo-economic and geo-political order in Central Asia and the Caucasus, a reordering that will call into question recent assumptions about Russian retreats and American gains in both places.

Threat to TRIPP?

The Israeli move in the Caspian is a significant development—despite the limited attention it has received in the Western media. It may also be a potential turning point for the wider region and might even have repercussions as far east as China and as far west as the United States. It also raises a level of uncertainty concerning the future of the US-backed Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) should there be additional airstrikes on Iranian ports and vessels in the Caspian as the specter of a wider war threatens the Caucasus. After all, TRIPP was one of several reasons that promoted US Vice President J.D. Vance to visit the region only the month before.

Finally, in addition to these changes, two other developments are likely to cast a far larger shadow than anyone is currently prepared for. On the one hand, the Israeli attack has released a variety of poisonous materials into the Caspian, a sea that is closed off to the rest of the world and one that will suffer greatly if these materials are not contained and cleaned up quickly. And on the other hand, what Israel has done might give aid and comfort to those who want to restart the Islamic State (ISIS), a group quite prepared to take its message and its terrorism far beyond where they come from. Such people may see the instability that is now spreading to the north of Iran as a result of the ongoing military campaign by Israel and the United States as a perfect time to come back together and launch new attacks. That one can even think about such a possibility is one more reason why both the campaign and the Israeli attack on northern Iran is likely to have deleterious consequences, however tempting it may have been as a military target.

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*Picture above: Chechens in Grozny commemorating the Day of Memory of Kunta-Khadji Kishiev.

Introduction

In late January during a recent meeting at the Kremlin between United Arab Emirates President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Russian President Vladimir Putin, Ramzan Kadyrov the Russian installed leader of Chechnya, called for Russia to bring the war in Ukraine to a final end. By Kadyrov’s definition of the term, this means ending the war on Moscow’s terms: ‘denazification’, the cession of conquered territories, the designation of Russian as a state language, etc.

As the head of one of Russia’s largest Muslim republics Kadyrov’s statement is important because he seeks a level of legitimacy among Russia’s Muslims and Moscow has endlessly used this as a bridge to the Arab Gulf countries and the rest of the Muslim world building on the notion of Chechens as great fighters. At the same time Kadyrov has militarily backed the Kremlin war against Ukraine to the point of deploying Chechen units to fight against Ukraine since the outbreak of he war. Kadyrov’s calls for an end on such terms is out of the ordinary because Kadyrov is also a murid, or follower, of a famous Sufi sheikh known as Kunta Haji Kishiev. Sufism is the dominant form of Islam in the North Caucasus republic and the fundamental philosophy of Sufism is not predicated on resolving issues through military means. In fact, Sufism prioritizes the internal moral struggle and rejects war as an end in itself; armed conflict is acknowledged as permissible only under specific conditions—namely, for the purpose of defense against an enemy.

Kadyrov’s call for the end to the war on Kremlin terms raises a major question as to how the Chechen strongman attempts to motivate Chechens, who as Sunni Muslims, are being called upon to fight a “holy war” against Ukraine on behalf of Russia. Since the majority of Chechens adhere to Sufi philosophy (referred to in Chechnya as “traditional” Islam), how does this relate to their participation in the war and is this policy succeeding? Furthermore, how does Kadyrov manipulate Islam in a struggle alongside Russia, given the fact that Chechnya militarily resisted Russian rule in the 19th century and fought two wars of independence against Moscow in the 1990s?

Western policy audiences should keep in mind that everything Kadyrov says reflects his personal loyalty to the Kremlin. At the same time, however, he also expresses his support for the war through the use of religious motifs—primarily those associated with so-called “traditional Islam,” which in modern Chechnya draws upon their Sufi heritage. An analysis of public statements, visual symbols, and institutional support from the official clergy suggests that this is less a matter of theology than the use of religion as an instrument of propaganda to support and promote Kremlin narratives about the war in Ukraine. Kadyrov’s exploitation of religion cannot be fully understood without first examining the historical roots and structure of Sufism within Chechen society, which continue to shape both Chechnya’s religious identity and political mobilization today.

*Image of Sheikh Imam Shamyl who led the North Caucasus resistance movement i the 19th century

Sufism in the Chechen Tradition: An Overview

During the last two centuries, Islam in Chechnya has historically developed in the form of the two major Sufi tariqats, or orders, known as the Naqshbandiyya and Qadiriya orders. These groups are the two most predominant Sufi religious orders in the Northeast Caucasus. Experts and observers tend to assume that most residents of Chechnya and Ingushetia are adherents of Sufism, which is an esoteric branch of Islam. However, for those who are unfamiliar with Sufism, a tariqat is an organized spiritual order that provides a structured path in the way of Sufism of discipline, guided by a teacher, to achieve direct knowledge of God, which is conductd through the two dominant orders, the Naqshbandiyya and Qadiriya.

Prominent Muslim leaders and organizers of the national liberation movement, the most prominent of whom was the military commander Imam Shamyl, who opposed the Russian army’s conquest of the North Caucasus for nearly three decades. Imam Shamyl was preceded by others in the first half of the 19th century, such as Sheikh Magomed Yaraginsky, Sheikh Dzhemaludin Kazikumukhsky, Imam Ghazi-Magomed Gimrinsky, Sheikh Tashu-Haji Sayasan, and others. All of whom were notably Sufis. One of the most important propagators of the Qadiri tariqat was the famous Chechen Sheikh Kunta-Haji Kishiev Ilsikhanurtovsky.

One of the distinctive features of Sufism in Islam is that its teachings are passed on from the teacher (ustaz, sheikh) to the student (murid). The teacher gives his murids a virde. By doing so, he relies on a particular spiritual method called tariqa, which translates from Arabic as “path.” Even during periods of armed resistance in the 19th century, the Sufi tradition viewed violence as a necessary defense rather than a universal religious duty. Historical examples exist of Sufis participating in wars, for example, in 1516 in the Ottoman Wars, or the murids of the first and second imams of Dagestan who fought in the late 1820s and early 1830s. Conversely, during the collapse of the Russian Empire, Sufi sheikhs and murids were frequently active in the political processes taking place in the North Caucasus and were also active in the 1990s in Chechnya as well as during the two wars of Chechen independence fought against Russia.

*Note: Chart of major Sufi Sheikhs of Chechnya

State and Islam in Chechnya: Kadyrov’s Embrace of Sheikh Kunta-Haji

As an adherent of Sheikh Kunta-Haji’s Sufi brotherhood, Ramzan Kadyrov constantly seeks to strengthen his personal authority in the republic by cultivating the image of his spiritual teacher (ustaz) Kishiev. In addition to Kunta-Haji Kishiev, there are several dozen other notable sheikhs inside Chechnya, of both the Qadiri and Naqshbandi tariqats. Therefore, Kadyrov’s actions cannot be universally approved because the cult of Kunta-Haji is not entirely acceptable in the republic simply because there are at least six other Sufi brotherhoods of the Qadiriya order and 22 brotherhoods of the Naqshbandi order in Chechnya. For each of them, their own sheikh is far more authoritative than all the others.

                                               Sheikh Kunta Haji Kisheiv

Contemporary politicians in Chechnya today use the cult of Sheikh Kunta-Haji Kishiev to justify and sanctify their reconciliation with Russia. In an effort to suggest that they adhere to the sheikh’s supposed main tenet of “non-resistance to force” they often compare Kishiev to Russian writer Leo Tolstoy or Indian nationalist leader Mahatma Gandhi. However, no such tenet exists in the sheikh’s works; he does not advocate resigning oneself to the fate of the conquered. On the contrary, the sheikh supports the notion of strengthening one’s inner peace for the purpose of fighting foreign oppressors.

Through Kadyrov’s state-sponsored program, Sheikh Kishiev has emerged as a respected figure among much of the republic’s population, while the Chechen strongman has deliberately leveraged the Sheikh’s influence to strengthen his own power base. However, because Islam in the republic is institutionally subordinate to the executive branch—with salaries paid to imams, qadis, and mufti employees —the muftiate’s financial dependence on Chechen authorities effectively undermines its autonomy. This suggests that religious leaders have become part of the vertical structure of the Chechen government.

By placing the official clergy on a par with local officials and within the category of “legitimate” Islam in Russia, the republic has effectively suppressed or repressed all alternative interpretations of Islam. Consequently, independent Sufi brotherhoods and Salafism existing outside the muftiate are considered illegal. In other words, at the government level we have “official (traditional) Islam,” whose main function is to legitimize political decisions rather than provide religious guidance. For example, not a single mosque exists in Chechnya that could even be remotely associated with Salafism. However, there are mosques of this kind in the neighboring North Caucasus republics of Dagestan and Ingushetia.

Moreover, when Kadyrov learned that there were followers of Sufism among the Chechens who were engaged in self-mutilation—similar to that propagated in Iraq among the followers of the teachings of the Kurdish Sheikh Muhammad al-Qasnazi—the head of the republic “exposed” them in front of the cameras live on a local television channel television channel. In doing so, he declared that he would not allow such teachings to be practiced in Chechnya; this was not a mere wish, but an order that no one could discuss or protest.

At the same time, no theological discussions were permitted in the region, and no one has even cited classical Sufi texts or recognized Islamic legal opinions (fatwas) to justify the need for Chechens to fight in the Russian war against Ukraine. Consequently, only the variety of Islam that Kadyrov considers correct and acceptable for all Chechens has the right to exist in the republic. No element of choice exists; rather, it is a matter of necessity to accept this as dogma. Therefore, due to the absence of public debate, it is impossible to have a public discussion about everything that is happening in Ukraine. Fear and forced conformity dominate the political discourse in the republic.

Chechen authorities are more than eager to send any critics to the war in Ukraine, and if such critics are unavailable because they reside in Western European countries, the burden of guilt is then placed on the relatives of those who criticized the actions of Chechen authorities. The rhetoric used stands in direct contradiction to the Sufi tradition, in which the cult of power and ostentatious violence is incompatible with Sufi asceticism—not to mention that the war is not justified by Sharia law and that religious forms are reduced to mere ritual trappings. In fact, today Chechen Sufism is reduced to little more than cultural décor, deprived of its rich inner content.

Sufi Rhetoric in the Context of the Ukraine War

On March 16, 2022, shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a conference was held in Vladikavkaz, the capital of North Ossetia, where the spiritual leaders of Russian Muslims supported Russian President Vladimir Putin by adopting a fatwa supporting his war known as: “On those who died defending the Fatherland and civilians during the Russian military operation in Ukraine to force the aggressor to peace.” The fatwa stated that all those who were killed in the war in Ukraine would be considered martyrs who died in the holy path of Islam.

Inside Chechnya, “jihad”, or “holy war”, has become the main “argument” in the campaign to attract residents to participate in the ongoing Ukraine war. Magomed Daudov, chairman of the republic’s parliament once boasted this in a video posted on Ramzan Kadyrov’s Telegram channel. Chechens participating in the Russian invasion of Ukraine are “defending Islam,” he said.

Under the control of the muftiate and security forces, mass nightly prayers are organized in the republic to support the Russian army in its war against Ukraine, utilizing state administrative resources. Employees of state institutions have reported that under various pretexts they are also frequently forced to participate in collective night prayers at Chechen mosques. According to employees of the Chechen organization “Vayfond,” women were sometimes taken from their homes and transported “by the busload” to the mosque, which usually resulted in prayers lasting three hours, after which the women were taken home. In fact, the degree of government involvement even had reached the point where school-age children were being forced to attend nightly prayers in the republic’s mosques as well. In fact, this initiative was organized by Ramzan Kadyrov’s daughters.

Kadyrov’s “Murids”

The Chechen leader went a step further in the fall of 2022 by announcing that the Sufi brotherhoods in Chechnya could begin organizing their own named units, meaning that they should be named after their ustadz (sheikhs). “All murids (followers) should unite into groups, create and name their battalions, companies, and detachments, naming them after their ustadz“ (teachers, founders of Sufi movements). This decision was related to Russian manpower concerns and the need to search for people to send to the Russian front lines to fight in Ukraine. The results, however, failed to meet Kadyrov’s expectations. By August 2022, the speaker of the republican parliament, Magomed Daudov, who is one of Kadyrov’s closest associates, stated that it was impossible to find people willing to go to war, even with promises of payment. For example, in the Chechen city of Argun, out of 412 low-income families, only three men had agreed to serve in the new regiment, despite the lack of other work. Kadyrov then ordered those who refused to be deprived of their benefits.

Russian Propaganda Portrays Chechen Imams undergoing military training in Chechnya which later proved to be fake news.

Here, too, we see an element of propaganda—a desire to show how the war against Ukraine is supported at all levels in the republic. Kadyrov announced that “it is necessary to create units named after each Chechen ustaz in the republic. We need to study military affairs and prepare for the possibility that the special military operation may be prolonged,” he said at a meeting with representatives of law enforcement agencies in Grozny on November 15, 2022.

Following this announcement, more than 300 imams and qadis (a qadi is a judge in a Muslim community who interprets and renders binding decisions based on Islamic religious law) of the Chechen clergy, led by the Mufti of Chechnya, Salah-Haji Mezhiev, were forced to undergo seven days of military training at the so-called “special forces university” located outside Grozny in the nearby city of Gudermes. According to Kadyrov, the training included the safe handling of weapons, basic tactical and firefighting skills, and first aid.

Once completed, Salah-Haji Mezhiev stated that “theologians are ready, if necessary, to go to the zone of special military operations (as the Russian authorities call the war in Ukraine) in Ukraine to make their contribution to the victory of our state over the servants of Satan,” Ramzan Kadyrov wrote on his Telegram channel. Moreover, in his sermons, Mezhiev referred to the war in Ukraine as “sacred” and “blessed” for Muslims. Russian propaganda channels covered these events and claimed that a battalion of imams would soon be sent to war, led by the Mufti of Chechnya, Salah Mezhidov, which ultimately turned out to be nothing more than a publicity stunt.

Regardless, this did not prevent the mufti from becoming a “hero of Chechnya“ in February 2024 - “for his personal contribution to the achievement of the goals and objectives of the Russian led Special Military Operations (SMO) in Ukraine. According to some Chechen imams, Mezhiev transformed himself from a respected Chechen spiritual leader before his election as mufti into an official backer of the Kadyrov regime. For reasons that are unclear, the Chechen leadership proved to be unable to organize units from among Chechen imams and murids from the Sufi brotherhoods, setting out to actively “rescue” the Ingush murids of Sheikh Batal-Haji Belkhoroev. Russian authorities have been persecuting members of this brotherhood for many years, accusing its “military wing” of organizing the murder of a high-ranking official of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Ingushetia.

*Picture depicts members of Ingush Sufi Batalkhajin unit sent to Ukraine

Kadyrov Intervenes to Protect the Sufi Batalkhajin Brotherhood

Ironically, Kadyrov has also sought use his influential ties to the Kremlin in a positive way to protect regional Sufi groups that the Kremlin is weary of, notably in neighboring Ingushetia. Following reports of the Sufi Batalkhajin Brotherhood being involved in attacking Kremlin-backed Ingush government officials, Kadyrov intervened to help protect one of these groups.

On December 31, 2018, the great-great-grandson of Sheikh Batal-Haji, Ibrahim Belkhoroev, was killed in Ingushetia. The Batalkhajins believe that Ibrahim Eljarkiev—head of the Ingush Center for Countering Extremism and a member of the security forces—may have been behind the assassination. Eljarkiev was subsequently killed in Moscow in November 2019.

From that moment onward, the entire Sufi branch of this brotherhood faced intense pressure from Russian law enforcement. Since much could be forgiven in Russia for those who volunteered to fight in Ukraine, Kadyrov intervened and found a way to resolve the situation by suggesting to Moscow that the Batalkhajins could atone for their ‘sins’ by forming their own military units and depart for the Ukraine front. After this, the Batalkhajin Rapid Response Unit (BOBR) became part of the Akhmat special forces and began participating in Russian military operations, as confirmed by the head of Chechnya on December 13, 2025. The Batalkhajin Rapid Response Unit consists of only 31 persons and underwent training at the Russian Special Forces University in Gudermes (a city in Chechnya, outside Grozny), after which they were then deployed to the front in Ukraine.

In this way, the members of the Batalkhajin brotherhood sought to avoid conflict with the security forces, which began after the murder of the head of the Ingush Center “E.” But this did not help them. Regardless, Russian officials remain convinced that the Brotherhood has a “military wing.” Consequently, some members of the mystical wing Ingush Sufi branch were declared a terrorist organization in Russia, which illustrates how Kadyrov cleverly sought to use his role to save the Sufi group from Kremlin retribution. Neverthless, Kadyrov ultimately failed when it came to preserving at least the mystical wing of the Batalkhajin from the wrath of the Russian security services.

Conclusion

Chechnya’s Sufis remain a resilient force inside Chechnya, and for that matter, throughout the entire Northeast Caucasus and Ramzan Kadyrov has cleverly tried to manipulate Chechnya’s Islamic heritage in his rhetoric to strengthen his rule even though it has no theological basis. What is happening today is not the Islamization of war, but the militarization of Chechnya’s religious identity. For this reason state propaganda in Chechnya continues to depict Kadyrov as “a servant of the Holy Quran, a hero of Islam, and a defender of the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad.” On the contrary, he acts the exact opposite. He often sharply criticizes manifestations of intolerance towards Islam, especially abroad, while he himself systematically ignores violations of Muslims’ rights inside Russia, including those held in Russian detention facilities.

To legitimize his power, Kadyrov uses rituals, fatwas, and symbols instead of resorting to theological discussions. Prayers and public religious justification of the war have served as a useful tool for mobilization. Moscow’s support for the Chechen leader’s actions serves its own self interests. No other Russian regional leader has been able to repeat or even come close to what Kadyrov is doing to mobilize his population to fight in the war against Ukraine.

In the final analysis, Ramzan Kadyrov’s actions are aimed at demonstrating his complete solidarity with the Russian president in Moscow, the republic’s residents, and the Russian political establishment. Regardless of what Kadyrov does or says, all his actions have one goal: to demonstrate his unconditional loyalty to President Vladimir Putin. Kadyrov performs this role by exploiting “traditional Islam” in Chechnya, using it as a tool of control, subjugating it to his will. Islam functions here as an institutional resource, with the Chechen clerical establishment becoming completely dependent on him.

It continues to be a matter of political exploitation of the republic’s religious heritage, which leads to the discrediting of the Sufi tradition, the destruction of the boundary between faith and violence, and ultimately will cause long-term damage to religious consciousness in Chechnya, which will lead to a future departure from Sufi traditions by Chechen society.

Given the long history of Sufi resistance to Russian rule in the North Caucasus, religious developments in Islam in Chechnya have important long-term implications for regional stability. On the one hand, they weaken Chechen nationalism; on the other, they solidify Kadyrov’s hold on power. Hence, controlling the Sufi movement is an important goal in helping Moscow fulfill its imperial agenda. No other region in the North Caucasus—or in Russia more broadly—affects Russian stability more than Chechnya. Developments there, particularly regarding the Sufi movement, can play a dramatic role in igniting the North Caucasus powder keg by spilling over into neighboring Dagestan and Ingushetia. Accordingly, keeping the Sufis in check is a vital element of the agenda of both Kadyrov and the Kremlin and is something that haunts Putin and other Russian policymakers, having fought two wars in Chechnya in the 1990s.

About the Author:

Mairbek Vatchagaev is a Senior Fellow at The Saratoga Foundation and one of the world’s leading experts on Islam in the North and South Caucasus and Russian nationalities issues. He is the author of Chechnya: The Inside Story, From Independence to War, a chronicle of the dramatic events that took place in Chechnya during the 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Chechen war for independence.

Glen E. Howard is the President and Chairman of The Saratoga Foundation.

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👉 ‘The Russian Orthodox Church has evolved from a religious body into a strategic Kremlin asset in Africa, providing help in intelligence operations & facilitating military recruitment.’

By Paul Goble

The Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (ROC-MP) came to Africa about five years ago to expand its influence in the Orthodox world after the Ecumenical Patriarchate extended autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine to weaken the Patriarchate’s claim to primacy even across the former Soviet space. In the last two years, however, the ROC-MP has assumed a vastly more important role as Moscow’s agent on the African sub-continent. It also simultaneously provides a cover for Russian intelligence and covert action operations and even helps Moscow to conduct such operations. More recently, its portfolio has expanded to another new dimension - helping the Kremlin to recruit Africans to fill the depleted ranks of the Russian invasion force in Ukraine, although the church denies doing so.

The Moscow Patriarchate has had some success on the ground and even more in the Kremlin, but by its actions, it has completely compromised itself as a church committed to religious principles. That will not only accelerate the demise of its influence across the former Soviet space but also should alert religious leaders in other countries that when they are dealing with the ROC-MP, they are interacting with an organization that is not so much a religious body but an arm of the Russian state.

*Map of Russian Orthodoxy in Africa: 2022 to 2024: Source Bloomberg

History of ROC Ties to the Russian Intelligence Services

The ROC-MP has a long history of being closely connected with the Soviet and Russian intelligence services, with many of its hierarchs having been and presumably still being officers in those services. But remarkably, it only rarely had much to do with Africa because that continent had long been recognized in the Orthodox world as the canonical territory of the Alexandrian patriarchate, one of the most ancient but smallest and poorest of the Orthodox hierarchies in the world.

The Moscow Patriarchate sought its support and did not want to undermine that chance by poaching Alexandrian churches. However, when the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople granted autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the Alexandrian patriarchate did not oppose it, the Moscow church adopted the position that the old rules were no longer applicable and moved to take over churches in Africa to expand its own network there. It was able to do so because small amounts of aid brought it enormous returns on the ground, opening the path for Moscow to establish its own exarchate to manage its own parishes and bishoprics in Africa, beginning as early as 2022, when the ROC-MP announced it had a presence in 19 countries.

That network quickly fell under the influence of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, the SVR, which viewed the church as a useful cover for its own agents and an even more useful way to penetrate the political elites of African countries who might have been put off by a more direct approach by Russian intelligence. This subtle form of infiltration served as a necessary alternative to the often heavy-handed tactics of Russian “Private Military Companies” (PMCs), like the Prigozhin-founded Wagner Group, which spearheaded the Kremlin’s overt military presence across sub-Saharan Africa.

The actual number of converts, parishes, and priests is a matter of dispute but appears to be in the hundreds, dozens, and a smaller number, respectively. And the activities of the SVR using the ROC-MP as cover and assistant are also a matter of dispute because what the church does in this regard is hidden beyond a veil of secrecy, something that encourages exaggeration. Regardless, it is beyond question that the Kremlin is using the ROC-MP to achieve its goals in Africa.

The ROC Pivots to African Manpower Recruitment

In the past several months, the ROC-MP has devoted greater attention to attracting Africans not only to join Russian PMCs operating there, such as the Wagner Group, but also to serve as a source of recruitment to replenish the depleted ranks of the Russian army fighting in Ukraine. While the actual number of African recruits is a matter of dispute, ranging from 200 to more than 1500, and should be treated with caution, the ROC-MP is now playing another covert role in helping Moscow in new ways. According to Novaya Gazeta, there is strong evidence that the ROC-MP has become “the African Orthodox Military Commissariat,” a role of increasing importance given the growing manpower shortages in the Russian army. The impact of such recruitment is almost certainly greater in the Russian PMCs that are operating in the African countries from which these troops come than in the battlefields of Ukraine to which at least a few have been sent, but probably far fewer than some claim and others fear.

The Kremlin is undoubtedly pleased with the fact that the ROC-MP is helping to boost the number of Africans cooperating with its PMCs in Africa and even providing much-needed manpower for Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine. The ROC-MP is certainly using this to try to bolster its standing with the Kremlin after losing its dominant position in Ukraine and, at risk of similar losses, any influence it retains across the former Soviet space.

Outlook

For both the Kremlin and, especially, the ROC-MP, these gains have come at a high cost. This highlights the way in which the ROC-MP—which was created during World War II when Stalin restored an Orthodox church in Russia—has willingly accepted the role as handmaiden of the Russian security services, while further undermining its influence in the Eastern Orthodox world. Its contempt for the canonical space of the Alexandrian Patriarchate and the influence of the Ecumenical Patriarchate are destroying whatever influence the ROC-MP had in the Orthodox world and the ecumenical movement. In fact, the day may come when the Kremlin and the Patriarchate will recognize that the price they paid for short-term successes will be an ever-larger failure across the former Soviet space and the world.

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👉‘The strategic triangle region of al-Muthalath at the borders of Libya, Egypt, & Sudan is emerging as a critical flashpoint in Egypt’s strategy to halt the flow of arms to RSF forces backed by the UAE.’

By Andrew McGregor

In a brutal war for control of Sudan, Egypt has avoided direct military intervention despite recognizing the Sudan Armed Forces/Transitional Sovereignty Council (SAF/TSC) administration as the legitimate government of Sudan over the rival Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Cairo has, however, observed both the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Khalifa Haftar’s unrecognized government of eastern Libya joining to support the Arab-supremacist RSF in their effort to seize control of Sudan and suppress its non-Arab communities. Crucial to the outcome of Sudan’s civil war is the question of who will dominate the so-called “Triangle” (Al-Muthalath) region, where Libya, Egypt, and Sudan meet.

On January 9, Egypt carried out airstrikes on a UAE-supplied Libyan weapons convoy passing south from Benghazi, through the Kufra Oasis and past Jabal ‘Uwaynat into northern Darfur, where they were to be received by the RSF. Egypt’s previous warnings to Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) to desist from such activity appear to have been ignored. The convoy is reported to have lost dozens of vehicles carrying arms and fuel to the RSF, with significant loss of life. The strike came only two days before an official visit to Cairo by Saddam Hafter, son (and presumed heir) of LNA commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Saddam is in charge of LNA operations in south-eastern Libya and the Triangle region.

The RSF’s reliance on material support from the UAE and its ties with the LNA provide further cause for Egypt to seek an end to refugee flows and the restoration of a true national government in Sudan. While Egypt and the Emirates both support Haftar’s LNA (Haftar has received military aid in the past from both Egypt and the UAE), the refusal of the UAE to acknowledge its long-suspected military support of the RSF has complicated relations between Cairo and Abu Dhabi. Despite its size and power, Egypt has limited leverage over the UAE, a substantial and much-needed investor in Egypt.

Saharan Supply Line: From Kufra to Jabal ‘Uwaynat

Libya’s Kufra Oasis, 640 miles south of Benghazi and 185 miles from Sudan, is the historic launching point for caravans connecting Libya to Chad and Darfur. Its airport is recently renovated and expanded, and now receives regular arrivals of transport aircraft, many of them carrying arms. Shipments of arms from Kufra to Darfur began in May 2025 despite a UN arms embargo on Sudan. Videos and geolocation techniques have confirmed the establishment of an RSF base in Kufra.

A little more than a century ago, Jabal (Mount) ‘Uwaynat, roughly located at the meeting point of the Libyan, Egyptian, and Sudanese borders, was one of the planet’s most remote locations, more legendary than real, and visited only rarely by Tubu herders and raiders. However, in recent years, it has become a heavily militarized nexus of desert trade, artisanal gold mining, drug smuggling, migrant trafficking, and arms-running.

Egypt has sought to establish a long-term presence in the region with the development of the East Uwaynat Desert Reclamation Project, 37 miles from the Sudanese border. Included in the largely agricultural project is a two-runway airport begun in 2018 and finished in 2024. Beginning in mid-2025, Egyptian authorities started delivering Turkish-made drones and other military equipment to the base in East ‘Uwaynat. Some Turkish Air Force cargo flights have arrived directly from Turkey. Satellite images have confirmed that Egypt is deploying advanced Turkish-built Bayraktar Akinci drones at this base.

*Fighters from the Kufra-based Subul al-Salam militia: Source 👉Libya Observer

RSF fighters and Libyan troops (likely members of Kufra’s Islamist Subul al-Salam militia) first arrived in the Triangle region near Jabal Arkenu on June 10, 2025, forcing out units of the SAF and allied militias of the Joint Forces (former Darfur rebels) and looting local markets of anything of value. The Libyans returned north, while the RSF declared it had complete control of the region.  Control of the Triangle helped secure overland supply convoys to the RSF and provided a potential launching point for RSF incursions into lightly defended northern Sudan. Shortly after the occupation, RSF commander Muhammad Hamdan Daglo “Hemetti” offered to transform the Triangle into a regional trade and economic hub for Sudan, Libya, and Egypt. Uninterested in a scheme that would involve recognition of the RSF as a regional authority, Cairo instead promised SAF leader General ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan that it would not permit the RSF to use the Triangle region as a base for the invasion of Sudan’s Northern Province.

Arms and Mercenaries

When the RSF consolidated its authority over the tri-border region last June, it took control of the supply routes running through it while denying access to the Sudanese military. Supplies and mercenaries arriving from Kufra allowed the RSF to recover from its loss of Khartoum to take al-Fashir and consolidate its control of Darfur. However, the move also brought the RSF, a regional source of instability, into contact with the perpetually instability-averse Egyptian state. Cairo has dedicated diplomatic and political resources to finding a solution to the Sudanese conflict, preferably one that provides unity, prosperity, and stability. In its search for a solution, Cairo has maintained an official neutrality, while leaning toward the familiar, Sudan’s army and traditional political class, rather than the unfamiliar and unpredictable future offered by the RSF and its new political manifestation, the Tasis government. Cairo has strongly rejected the creation of what it terms as “parallel entities that threaten Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity,” calling such efforts a “red line” that threatens Egyptian security, a point that has been emphasized in meetings between LNA leaders and Egyptian intelligence and military officials.

Contradictions are the order of the day when trying to sort out who backs whom in the Triangle region. Kufra’s LNA-allied Subul al-Salam militia is undeniably Salafist and Islamist in nature, yet it appears to be strongly involved in the transit of arms and mercenaries to the RSF, which insists one of the main motives for its military campaign is to prevent an Islamist return to power in Sudan. Hemetti recently acknowledged the RSF’s use of Colombian mercenaries who arrive in convoys from Kufra, saying they are used to supervise drone operations, while accusing the SAF of using Ukrainian and Iranian mercenaries. The RSF leader also claimed Sudanese intelligence is trying to bring in Islamist al-Shabaab fighters from Somalia, promising to eliminate them when they arrive.

Conclusion

Egypt’s willingness to attack RSF supply convoys may force the Sudanese paramilitary to switch to a much longer supply route through Libya’s southwestern Fezzan region, through Chad, and into western Darfur, or a return to a previously-used route by air to eastern Chad’s Amdjarass airstrip, followed by a convoy to western Darfur. However, these possibilities have been complicated by diplomatic pressure from Egypt and Saudi Arabia, as well as Chad’s decision to close its border with Sudan following military clashes with RSF personnel carrying out operations against the Zaghawa people in northwestern Darfur.

Cairo prefers a diplomatic solution to the Sudanese conflict, which now threatens to become a regional war capable of creating years of instability along Egypt’s borders. Nonetheless, Egypt remains the region’s most powerful military state and will deploy whatever forces are necessary to preserve the peaceful existence of its 120 million people.

About the Author:

Dr. Andrew McGregor is director of Aberfoyle International Security, a Toronto-based consultancy specializing in the security issues of Africa and the Islamic world.

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By Yuri Lapaiev

The development of unmanned systems technology of all types and purposes is rapidly increasing its intensity in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, as the use of drones for both sides is turning into a high-speed race. The use of drones and their rapid evolution, in all their various modifications, has become a symbol of the extremely rapid development of technologies, which have turned into an endless cycle of competition between offensive and defensive weapons. This means that no new weapons or systems can remain effective on the battlefield for a long time, as countermeasures are also constantly changing.

Despite the rapid pace of change, preliminary conclusions for the future of drone warfare can be drawn today from the war. Ukraine’s experience for the time being will be more accessible due to open sources than Russian forces, but both sides to date face similar successes, challenges, and problems. For example, this applies to the development of Electronic Warfare (EW) systems. The appearance of a large number of drones on the battlefield immediately prompted the development of countermeasures, primarily EW systems. Today’s front lines are impossible to imagine without various EW systems: dome-shaped, directional, “guns,” “backpacks,” mobile versus stationary, proliferating throughout the front lines.

The Impact of Electronic Warfare

The development and creation of such EW systems is extremely complex and expensive. Often, the EW systems required to counter First Person View (FPV) drones are more expensive than the drone itself, which can end up destroying them. Given that FPV drones frequently change frequencies, it sometimes makes countermeasures completely useless. At the same time, the increased use of EW has affected not only drones but also other high-precision weapons that use GPS guidance, such as HIMARS and 155mm M982 Excalibur precision-guided shells, making them less effective.

These developments require a rethinking of the protection of important military equipment/weapons and critical infrastructure, retrofitting them with relatively inexpensive modular EW systems capable of quickly changing the frequency spectrum. The problem is becoming even bigger with the introduction of fiber-optic-controlled drones, which are virtually immune to EW-jamming. At the time of their appearance, they became an extremely effective weapon with no defense. However, there are now several ways to combat this type of drone, demonstrating the speed with which technologies and countermeasures emerge to counter Russian innovations on the battlefield.

UAV Supply Chains: The Risk of External Dependence

Another key lesson from the drone battlefields of Ukraine is the importance of sustaining UAV development and mass production. In modern warfare, drones are expendable and consumed in large quantities, creating constant pressure to ensure an uninterrupted supply and rapidly scale effective designs. This exposes production bottlenecks: if access to critical materials or components is disrupted, development and output can quickly stall. Suppliers of such components gain leverage that can be translated into political influence. Conversely, political decisions by supplier states can restrict access to essential parts, directly affecting battlefield capabilities and operational effectiveness.

This arose when China supplied spare parts for UAVs to Russia, but also somewhat restricted supplies to Ukraine while continuing to sell components to Russia despite official bans. When a country like Ukraine cannot produce all the components for its drones, it must rely on imports, which creates a gap between battlefield lessons and the manufacturer’s ability to adapt. In Ukraine’s case, many key components initially came from China, either directly or through third parties. This distance slowed the feedback loop between frontline experience and technical modification. However, as Ukraine expands domestic production of drone components, that gap is rapidly narrowing.

The irony for Ukraine is that Chinese restrictions actually had a positive impact. It forced Ukraine to seek options for maximum localization of production. Already in 2025, a Ukrainian manufacturer presented the first serial batch of UAVs made entirely from domestic components. One of the benefits of local production is that it allows immediate feedback and permits rapid improvement of the technology, which enhances military effectiveness. In this regard, close cooperation and communication between some mil-tech companies and the military personnel who use them is immensely important.

Building the Right FPV: Drones as ‘Lego Blocks’

Designing effective military drones increasingly resembles assembling Lego bricks from interchangeable parts. Each component has distinct features—especially in electronic frequencies. If one frequency is jammed, it must be quickly replaced with another. This modular approach allows rapid adjustment of the final product, making drones more adaptable and better suited to evolving battlefield conditions.

The issue of dependence on technology stands apart. For example, the use of Starlink gave Ukrainian drones a significant advantage, but it was quickly copied by the Russian military. Blocking Starlink for Russia at Ukraine’s request revealed the strategic vulnerability of the Russian army. However, the Ukrainian armed forces have the same vulnerability and are completely dependent on the political preferences of SpaceX owner Elon Musk or the whims of American authorities.

The Race for Cheaper, Simpler, & Easier Solutions

Measures to ensure sustainability demand the constant search for simpler and cheaper solutions. It is worth noting that the successful Russian strategy of using Geran/Shahed strike UAVs is attributed to their relative cheapness. As of September 2025, for example, one Shahed drone costs approximately $70,000. Simplicity matters. This is especially true when compared to the cost of cruise or ballistic missiles. Each has a price tag estimated to be between $4 to $1 million, and remains the main mass terror weapon used by Russia along Ukraine’s entire strategic depth. However, Moscow has not stopped there and is constantly developing newer versions of this specific kind of drone, while also creating other, even cheaper UAVs.

Particularly noteworthy is the Molniya drone, which, due to its extremely low cost and simplicity, has become widespread and therefore poses a significant threat. Currently, inexpensive Molniya’s have become the primary means for striking Ukraine’s tactical depth instead of the more expensive Russian-made Lancets (one of the main UAV weapons used by Russia back in 2023). This also applies to air defense. After all, shooting down large numbers of cheap drones with expensive and scarce missiles, as happened in Poland in September 2025, for example, is economically unfeasible to use F35s against inexpensive drones, as the Arab Gulf states are now experiencing with the current war with Iran.

The answer to this problem is the use of interceptor drones, with corresponding changes in military doctrines and the deployment of production. Mouad M’Ghari, head of France’s defense company Harmattan AI, notes that Western defense companies are entering an era where the outcome of conflicts is determined not by the technological superiority of individual models, but by the mass production of inexpensive unmanned systems. In today’s world, armies cannot wait years for defense manufacturers to produce an expensive ideal model. Instead, simpler, mass-produced, quick-to-manufacture solutions are urgently needed.

New Weapons, New Rules: The Expanded Radius of FPV Kill Zones

The emergence and use of the first unmanned combat systems at the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 had an immediate and significant impact on the tactics and principles of warfare that existed at the time. Some of these, such as massive mechanized assaults, have become simply impossible in today’s conditions of maximum battlefield transparency and extremely fast cycle chains of “detect-kill.”

Nearly every month, there is a news report from the frontlines about yet another new type of UAV, ground drones, or autonomous combat modules emerging, including reports by sea of Uncrewed Surface Vessels (USVs), underwater drones, interceptor drones, AI drones with machine sight, jet drones, drone carriers. This, in turn, allows commanders to invent new tactics, constantly changing their approaches to unmanned warfare.

Probably, the most prominent example was back in 2025, when, during the Operation Spiderweb, the Ukrainian security services managed to destroy about a third of Russia’s strategic bombers right in their home airfields. The same is true for the constantly increasing radius of the unmanned kill zones. In 2022, the kill zone used to be around 3 kilometers; now, FPVs have a kill zone up to 25 km and growing. In the future, we can expect to see even more options and tactics for using FPV drones; sometimes, they will become quite exotic. This requires changes in the deployment of forces and military training. Some NATO countries are already gradually introducing the use of drones and countermeasures in exercises with their armies. Here, the Ukrainian army can fill the important role of instructors, sharing their advanced and up-to-date experience with allied armies.

The Race for Training Qualified Personnel

The rapid rise in the use of unmanned weapons and the tactics related to their use means that urgent changes are needed in the organizational and staffing structure of military units. The changes currently taking place in the Ukrainian armed forces and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are quite indicative. For example, both armies are actively developing their own Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), turning them into separate branches of their military. In 2026, Russia plans to increase the number of its USF troops by 79,000, bringing the total number of Russian unmanned troops to 165,000.

At the same time, however, they are gradually increasing the number of UAV units in other branches of the military, abandoning less relevant weapons such as anti-tank missile systems in favor of drones. For the Ukrainian army, increasing the number of unmanned units is one way to overcome problems with mobilization and the shortage of recruits. The ability to fight remotely instead of directly on the battlefield has become quite attractive to many prospective recruits and is used by most Ukrainian units to find new personnel. For Western countries, this is an example of the direction in which their armies should develop. Without unmanned systems units (and countermeasures against them), no army stands a chance in modern conflict.

UAVs: Neither a Panacea Nor Wunderwaffe

At the same time, the increased emphasis on the development of unmanned systems and the growing use of drones also creates negative consequences for the capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces. For example, the Ukrainian army has repeatedly faced situations where virtually all the reconnaissance efforts in a certain area of the frontlines are carried out exclusively by drones. In the event of deteriorating weather conditions, this often leaves the command practically blind, while Russian forces frequently take advantage of this to launch their attacks.

In addition, some Ukrainian frontline commanders complain about the deterioration of their soldiers’ skills due to this new phenomenon. Ukrainian officers argue their units are paying less and less attention to fire and tactical training. Despite their increasing effectiveness, drones cannot fully replace human soldiers on the front line; control over territory still requires “boots on the ground.” At the same time, the influx of new recruits into Ukraine’s new USF units is, in a sense, “cannibalizing” or diverting potential recruits needed for slots in other branches of the Ukrainian army, primarily the infantry, thereby indirectly adding to the personnel shortage.

The Nightmare of Frontline FPV Coordination

With the increase in the number of UAV crews and drones of various types, surfaces, and ranges of operation, the issue of coordination of efforts becomes more acute. Unfortunately, there are quite a few cases in the Ukrainian armed forces when several drones from different units are simultaneously engaging the same target on the frontlines. Often, the reason for this is the lack of normal communication between units and the desire to earn points for hits. This, in turn, is creating a coordination nightmare as units frequently compete against units, creating a new type of friction on the frontlines.

Another common problem that emanates from this frontline competition in the Ukrainian Army is the rise in the number of FPV-related incidents of friendly fire. This occurs when the frontline drones cannot perform tasks due to EW-“friendly fire” from other neighboring units. This problem could be partially solved by improving the ‘mission control’ system, which Defense Minister Fedorov recently announced would be corrected.

The growing number of various unmanned systems on the battlefield also poses a growing challenge for modern commanders in terms of complicating the coordination of ongoing combat operations. The solution to this problem may lie in increasing modern situational awareness and command systems that use Artificial Intelligence (AI) to reduce the burden on frontline commanders, which could ease, if not eliminate, the coordination problem.

Rubicon’s Exploitation of Drones at the Operational Level

Another remaining challenge is the division of tasks in terms of depth, from the tactical to the strategic level. According to one prominent military expert, Ryan O’Leary, Ukraine is currently losing the battle for depth by paying too much attention to the tactical level of war. Not all experts and commanders agree that the current focus on destroying as much of the enemy’s manpower as possible is the right approach to conducting the war.

This contrasts with the tactics employed by Russia’s Rubicon UAV unit. Rubicon focuses its efforts almost exclusively on the operational-tactical level of war and achieving operational depth, namely, using its drone units to destroy Ukrainian logistical capabilities. For Ukraine, the solution could be to clearly prioritize targets and scale up the USF (without cannibalizing other units, especially from front-line brigades). It is also necessary to delineate areas of responsibility. Ukrainian USF Commander Robert Brovdi recently noted that the USF plans to devote more attention to its efforts at the operational level, leaving tactical operations to the newly established corps, for example, the 3^rd,7^th, 10^th, and 14^th corps. However, this can only happen after the relevant units have built up their capabilities to a sufficient level.

Outlook

In the final analysis, the Russian-Ukrainian war has demonstrated the high effectiveness of drones in modern armed conflict, and the rapid rise in the development of technology, primarily AI, promises even greater military effectiveness in the near future. In preparation for a possible future conflict with Russia, Western armies should intensify their learning from the Ukrainian experience by accelerating the introduction of drones (as well as means to counter them) into their frontline units.

At the same time, drones alone will not be an advantage; they require trained personnel, new tactics, and more advanced coordination and control systems. Ukraine, as a bearer of the most modern combat experience and sophisticated technologies, will be an important partner for the rest of NATO. The United States and its European allies should review their current economic and production models in order to be self-sufficient in the production of unmanned systems and means of countering them.

Solutions and systems must be sufficiently inexpensive, standard among allies, and easily scalable. Supporting Ukrainian production of unmanned systems (through direct financing or joint companies) presents our allies with a unique opportunity to test the systems in real combat conditions and identify the most effective drone systems for further production.

About the Author:

Yuri Lapaiev is currently the editor-in-chief of Tyzhden (The Ukrainian Week) magazine. He graduated from the Ivan Kozhedub Air Force University in Kharkiv with an MA in computer network engineering. Between 2006 and 2011, he served in the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence, including as an analyst. In 2011-2015, Lapaiev worked as a marketing analyst in the head office of one of Ukraine’s largest mobile operators. From 2015 to 2016, he served in the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces and participated in the Anti-Terrorism Operation (ATO) in eastern Ukraine.

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By Vusal Guliyev

Amid intensifying competition over Eurasian connectivity, Japan is positioning itself as a consequential partner in the digital modernization of the Middle Corridor—formally known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. At a moment when traditional trans-Eurasian logistics are increasingly constrained by geopolitical tensions, sanctions regimes, and structural vulnerabilities from the conflict in Ukraine and the ongoing conflict in the Persian Gulf, the Middle Corridor is emerging as a new corridor for trade and connectivity.

Stretching from East Asia through Kazakhstan, across the Caspian Sea, and onward via Azerbaijan and Georgia to Europe, the Middle Corridor has gained renewed strategic relevance not only as an alternative to geopolitically exposed maritime routes such as the Suez Canal, but also to overland arteries like the Trans-Siberian Railway, whose reliability has been fundamentally undermined since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Its contemporary importance, however, comes not from geography alone, but from its capacity to adapt to a fragmented logistics environment through accelerated digital transformation.

Historically, trade flows between East Asia and Europe have relied predominantly on maritime routes via the Suez Canal or on overland transit across Russia along the Trans-Siberian Railway, commonly referred to as the Northern Corridor. The route’s potential was underscored in 2018, when the first Japanese rail cargo shipment crossed Russian territory with official backing from both Tokyo and Moscow, reflecting early efforts to diversify transport options beyond sea and air freight. The Kremlin’s war in Eastern Europe, however, has fundamentally reshaped this landscape. What once constituted a viable logistical alternative has increasingly become a strategic liability, as sanctions, geopolitical tensions, and heightened uncertainty have rendered reliance on Russian transit routes progressively impractical.

Against this backdrop of heightened complexity and uncertainty, Japan has advanced its own connectivity agenda, seeking to strengthen resilient transport, energy, and digital linkages across Eurasia while reducing exposure to geopolitical risk and supply-chain disruption. Tokyo’s interest in modernizing Eurasian connectivity is closely tied to its broader economic and resource-security objectives, particularly the need to secure reliable access to critical raw materials sourced from regions traversed by the Middle Corridor. As a resource-poor economy with limited domestic reserves, Japan depends heavily on stable external suppliers for energy, critical minerals, and industrial inputs. Central Asia—especially Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan—has therefore assumed growing strategic importance, given its substantial reserves of oil, natural gas, uranium, rare earth elements, and non-ferrous metals that underpin Japan’s energy security, manufacturing base, and high-technology sectors.

Beyond resource availability, Central Asia offers Japan an opportunity to diversify supply chains away from over-reliance on politically sensitive, congested, or vulnerable routes and markets. Uranium imports from Kazakhstan remain integral to Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle, while copper, zinc, and other metals support its electronics, automotive, and green technology industries. In the context of the global energy transition, the region’s prospective role as a supplier of minerals critical to batteries, renewable energy systems, and hydrogen technologies further enhances its long-term strategic relevance.

Ensuring that these strategically important resources can move reliably from Central Asia to global markets, however, depends on the efficiency and resilience of the transport corridors linking the region to East Asia and Europe. As global supply chains become increasingly data-driven and risk-sensitive, the Middle Corridor’s competitiveness hinges less on physical capacity alone than on the deployment of smart customs systems, electronic transit documentation, real-time cargo tracking, and interoperable digital platforms that integrate rail, port, and maritime operations across multiple jurisdictions. Japan’s growing engagement reflects a strategic recognition that, under conditions of disrupted trans-Eurasian logistics, leadership in standards, software, and systems can be as consequential as investment in hard infrastructure.

This emphasis on digital connectivity is most evident in Japan’s push for customs digitalization, where operational bottlenecks undermine the corridor’s credibility as an alternative to disrupted Eurasian routes. Customs modernization is an area where targeted interventions can yield disproportionate strategic returns. In this context, Japan pledged in August 2025 to support the upgrading of customs services at Kazakhstan’s Port of Aktau, a critical maritime hub linking Central Asia’s rail networks with Caspian Sea crossings along the Middle Corridor.

By supporting smart customs systems, automated risk-management tools, and electronic documentation, Japan seeks to reduce clearance times, limit bureaucratic friction, and enhance the predictability of cross-border movements along a corridor whose attractiveness depends fundamentally on reliability amid widespread logistical disruption elsewhere in Eurasia.

Japan’s MUFG Finances the Nakhchivan-Kars Railway

At the same time, Japan’s engagement extends beyond digital governance and technical assistance to encompass substantive financial support for strategic infrastructure that reinforces the corridor’s physical continuity. In this context, Japan’s largest financial institution, Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group (MUFG Bank), has committed to financing the Nakhchivan–Kars railway route—an initiative aimed at enhancing direct rail connectivity between Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave and Türkiye. This commitment forms part of a $2.6 billion external financing package led by MUFG Bank, in partnership with Sweden’s EKN and Austria’s OeKB export credit agencies, as well as the Islamic Development Bank.

The Nakhchivan–Kars rail line is expected to deepen the integration of the South Caucasus segment of the Middle Corridor and further consolidate Türkiye’s role as a gateway to European markets. MUFG’s involvement demonstrates that Japan’s participation in the Middle Corridor is not merely diplomatic or conceptual in nature, but anchored in substantial financial instruments that support the corridor’s long-term structural development and resilience.

Importantly, developments along the South Caucasus segment of the Middle Corridor have also complemented Tokyo’s broader strategic calculus. In April 2023, the Port of Baku concluded a cooperation agreement with Qingdao Port—one of China’s largest maritime hubs—to deploy advanced digital solutions aimed at enhancing operational efficiency, security, and competitiveness. Beyond reciprocal visits and institutional knowledge exchange, the agreement established a logistical channel enabling cargo from Japan and South Korea to transit through Qingdao and onward to Baku via the Middle Corridor. This arrangement effectively embeds East Asian supply chains more directly into the Trans-Caspian network and complements Japan’s parallel push for customs digitalization and interoperable logistics systems across Central Asia.

Even before these institutional consolidations, Japan had tested the corridor’s operational feasibility. In early 2025, Japan successfully conducted a trial shipment via the Middle Corridor, transporting cargo from Japanese ports to Türkiye through a combination of rail and maritime links across Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. The journey was completed in just over 20 days and was coordinated by Danish shipping and logistics company Maersk. The pilot demonstrated that Japanese goods can traverse this land–sea route efficiently and within competitive timeframes despite multiple border crossings and modal shifts. Beyond its symbolic significance, the shipment underscored the operational feasibility of integrating Japanese supply chains into the Trans-Caspian network. It also illustrates how improvements in customs digitalization, electronic documentation, and logistics coordination are mitigating risks that have intensified since disruptions to established Eurasian corridors.

These operational and financial initiatives were further embedded within a broader diplomatic architecture in December 2025. At the inaugural Summit of the Central Asia plus Japan Dialogue (CA+JAD), held in Tokyo, participating leaders adopted the Tokyo Declaration, elevating connectivity and logistics modernization to a shared strategic priority in response to evolving geopolitical risks. Within this framework, advancing the Middle Corridor emerged as a central element of the summit’s connectivity agenda. Moreover, to support business development and interstate trade, Japan set a ¥3 trillion (approximately $19 billion) target for business projects in Central Asia over the next five years under the Tokyo Initiative. The meeting also launched the Japan–Central Asia Partnership for AI Cooperation, signaling Japan’s intention to apply advanced digital tools to the practical challenges of Eurasian transit. Envisaged applications include AI-enabled cargo tracking, predictive logistics planning, and more advanced customs risk-management systems.

Nevertheless, the corridor’s long-term viability depends on addressing the structural complexities inherent in multimodal transport. Reliance on rail networks, maritime crossings over the Caspian Sea, and onward rail connections to Europe requires a level of coordination that paper-based systems cannot provide, particularly amid heightened regulatory scrutiny and geopolitical fragmentation. Each modal transition introduces additional documentation requirements, compliance checks, and scheduling risks. Accordingly, Middle Corridor-involved states have increasingly prioritized digitizing multimodal data exchange, harmonizing electronic documentation, and adopting international standards that enable real-time information sharing across borders.

Outlook

Within this context of heightened strategic volatility, Japan’s connectivity agenda represents a deliberate effort to manage geopolitical risk and reinforce supply-chain resilience. By prioritizing customs modernization, interoperable digital systems, and emerging AI-driven logistics solutions, Japan is addressing the Middle Corridor’s most persistent operational constraints while reinforcing its strategic value as a diversified Eurasian trade route. This approach moves beyond conventional infrastructure assistance toward shaping the standards, governance practices, and technological norms that underpin long-term corridor performance. For the Central Asian states, Japanese involvement complements domestic digital reforms and enhances corridor reliability amid geopolitical uncertainty.

Meanwhile, Tokyo is directly advancing its economic security objectives by embedding resilience, predictability, and diversification into its transcontinental supply chains, thereby reducing exposure to persistent disruptions in trans-Eurasian logistics and strengthening access to alternative East–West transit corridors. As competition over connectivity intensifies, the evolution of the Middle Corridor suggests that the future of Eurasian trade will be defined as much by digital integration and institutional coordination as by the physical routes themselves.

About the Author:

Vusal Guliyev is a Sinologist, TCSOL Specialist, and Policy Analyst specializing in the geopolitical affairs of Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific region. He currently works as a Leading Advisor at the Baku-based Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center) and serves as the Head of the Shanghai Office at AZEGLOB Consulting Group.

Additionally, he holds affiliations as a Geopolitical Analyst and Associate Expert with several policy research institutes, including the Topchubashov Center, the Caspian-Alpine Society, Khazar University China Studies Center, and the European Geopolitical Forum. A graduate of Shanghai International Studies University, he previously held long-term Visiting Research Fellowships at Ankara University, Harvard University, and Boğaziçi University.

He has authored numerous academic and analytical articles in Azerbaijani, Turkish, English, and Chinese, examining the socio-political, socio-economic, and scientific-technological dynamics of Wider Eurasia, with a particular focus on the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Greater China, and the broader East Asia region.

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Following the outbreak of the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war, the Starlink satellite communication system became a critically important element of tactical and operational communications’ tool on the battlefields of Ukraine. Originally transferred to Ukraine by US officials as a means for ensuring stable connectivity, Starlink’s unique technical characteristics soon made it not only a tool of strategic importance but also an object of attempted use by Russia. Authoritative Russian information outlets openly admitted in 2024 that Russian armed forces were, in fact, frequently using Starlink systems in Donetsk Oblast in Russian occupied territories in eastern Ukraine.

By late 2025, individual episodes involving the use of Starlink by Russian forces had become a common trend that could no longer be ignored. According to Ukrainian officials, Russian units were using Starlink terminals to coordinate operations and control UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles), including the so-called “killer drones.” In response, Kyiv introduced a verification mechanism – the so-called “white list” system – under which only verified Ukrainian devices could be activated. By early 2026, Ukrainian authorities announced that they had reached agreements with SpaceX to block the unauthorized use of terminals by the Russian military.

This resulted in the blocking of unverified terminals and prompted investigative reports into the possible involvement of third countries in facilitating the re-export or transit of Starlink equipment to Russia. At the forefront of these countries involved in the clandestine Russian effort was the Central Asian country of Kyrgyzstan. Crucially, the issue appears to be less about mere “physical access” to the hardware than about registration and network authorization. The fact that Russian forces were able to operate Starlink systems suggests that supply channels were intertwined with activation mechanisms and the circumvention of restrictions through third-party jurisdictions.

*Image above: Starlink Shipments with Emaross Cargo stickers

The Air Waybill Trail to Bishkek

Several investigative reports identified a specific shipment recorded under Air Waybill No. 501-16267215, dated May 10, 2024. The documentation lists the cargo as “routers and adapters not subject to restrictions,” ostensibly outside the scope of sanctions. However, the shipment was classified under HS code 87089900—corresponding to automotive parts rather than telecommunications equipment—and transported from Dubai World Central (UAE) to Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan). This discrepancy is analytically significant: misclassification under a non-sensitive customs code can reduce regulatory scrutiny and facilitate the movement of controlled or dual-use goods. According to an investigation by Nordsint, Starlink terminals subsequently appeared in Russian conformity registries, indicating likely downstream redistribution.

According to several investigative reports, three main actors were involved in the operational and logistical mechanism:

· Emaross Group FZE (UAE) – founded in 1994, the firm specializes in sourcing, transporting, and delivering goods, including both new and used vehicles, textiles, auto parts, and other freight categories, with capabilities for ocean, air, and land freight – appeared in customs documentation as the manufacturer; the company, however, stated that it only specializes in logistical and trans-shipment operations. The episode resulted in an internal investigation, discovering that the Starlink equipment that ended up in Russia had been shipped to Kyrgyzstan.

· Archie and Co LLC (Kyrgyzstan) – registered in Ak-Jol village (Chuy region), the company, whose declared business activity is “wholesale non-specialized trade”, was listed as the consignee/recipient of the above-mentioned cargo from the UAE, whose broad commercial classification, rural registration, and the lack of sectoral specialization made it an ideal actor for such transshipment. Importantly, the use of such an opaque actor provides de facto no direct evidence that could directly implicate the Kyrgyz government, whereas the structural characteristics of such entities make them suitable as buffer nodes in re-export operations.

· Polarstar Logistics – the carrier identified on the air waybill was a Uzbekistan-originated company with a Dubai link, under US sanctions at the time of shipment (it was added to the list in February 2024) – which was described by Emaross as “an active logistics agent within the UAE infrastructure”. Emaross explained the discrepancy in HS codes as a “technical administrative error” by Polarstar’s forwarder, who had used an outdated air waybill template for automotive components. The involvement of a sanction-exposed logistics operator raises compliance questions and suggests that high-risk transport intermediaries may play a functional role in Russia-oriented trade corridors.

Why the Middle East – Central Asia Link?

Understanding how Starlink systems ultimately appeared on Russian frontlines in Ukraine requires recognition as to why the “Kyrgyz case” is not an isolated incident, but is part of a broader sanctions-evasion network, involving multiple regional actors in Central Asia – including Uzbekistan - working with Russia-aligned logistical hubs in the Greater Middle East. Since 2022, Central Asia has seen a significant increase in a covert system of re-export flows back to Russia. Although much of this trade is lawful, investigative reporting and trade data patterns indicate that certain categories of high-technology goods have transited the region before reaching Russian end users. In this context, Kyrgyzstan—and Central Asia more broadly—possesses several structural characteristics that make it an effective transit node for smuggling high-tech goods within complex, multi-layered supply chains.

A. Membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and absence in the international sanction lists facilitate Kyrgyzstan`s ability to conduct cross-border trade with Russia.

B. Flexible wholesale trade registration: Kyrgyz law allows companies to choose broad business activity codes (including wholesale non-specialized trade), and this form of business registration is relatively straightforward and flexible.

C. Limited enforcement capacity relative to major Western export hubs. Analysts note that resource constraints, underdeveloped strategic trade control systems, and weak oversight of complex financial crimes have hindered the effective implementation of sanctions and regulatory measures.

D. Kyrgyzstan’s strategic geographic position between Russia and China facilitates multimodal transit routes. At this juncture, it is important to note the role of China, whose growing economic footprint in Central Asia adds complexity to both actual and future sanction evasion mechanisms. In the future, increased regional connectivity through Chinese logistics corridors may further complicate monitoring mechanisms.

The inclusion of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in this configuration further complicates the picture. The UAE’s high cargo throughput, well-developed system of free trade zones, sophisticated re-export ecosystems, and its non-sanctioned status collectively strengthen the Central Asia–Middle East scheme. Together, these factors create a multi-layered buffer system in which global logistics origins are followed by regional transit jurisdictions.

Conclusion

The Kyrgyzstan–UAE episode in the Starlink supply chain underscores a profound transformation in the architecture of international sanctions: it is abundantly clear that existing sanctions regimes are no longer limited to restricting physical flows of goods; they increasingly operate at the intersection of hardware, software, licensing, and network authorization. At the same time, the Starlink case demonstrates that even when advanced technologies physically reach a sanctioned environment through multi-layered transit corridors and buffer jurisdictions, their operational effectiveness ultimately depends on activation mechanisms controlled by origin-state actors. For example, the ability of Ukraine and SpaceX to introduce verification mechanisms and block unauthorized terminals illustrates that, for the time being, the West retains significant control and leverage over critical digital infrastructures and dual-use technologies.

In the long term, the strategic implications of this episode may prove even more consequential. The exposure of transit corridors through jurisdictions such as Kyrgyzstan and the UAE, combined with the demonstrated vulnerability of foreign-supplied systems to remote restriction, is likely to accelerate efforts by Russia, China, and other non- or anti-Western powers to prioritize “sovereign” technological ecosystems. These efforts encompass domestically controlled satellite communications, payment systems, semiconductor production, and digital infrastructures insulated from Western regulatory reach. In other words, while the current system enables Western actors to impose meaningful constraints, it simultaneously incentivizes technological decoupling. The Starlink case, therefore, should not be viewed merely as another episode of sanctions evasion; rather, it signals a broader structural shift toward a fragmented global technological order in which control over activation, standards, and digital governance is becoming as strategically significant as control over physical supply chains.

About the Author

Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at The Saratoga Foundation specializing in Russian military and security affairs, as well as Russo-Chinese relations. He is also an Advisor at Gulf State Analytics (Washington, D.C.) and Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defense and Security Network (Canada).

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Like many other peoples overrun by European imperial powers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Africa’s Somalis found themselves divided into regions governed by rival powers: French Somaliland (Djibouti), British Somaliland (modern Somaliland), and Italian Somaliland (modern Somalia).

A former British protectorate, Somaliland joined the former Italian Trust Territory of Somaliland to form the new nation of Somalia in 1960. However, after General Siad Barre, the Marxist-Leninist commander of the Somali Army, took control of Somalia in a coup d’état in 1969, he mounted a brutal repression of the Isaaq clan, the dominant clan of the Somaliland region. When Barre fled from power in 1991 in a tank loaded with Somalia’s gold reserves, Somaliland broke with the rest of Somalia to declare independence. Since then, it has struggled to find international recognition as a sovereign state in the face of Mogadishu’s claim that it remains part of Somalia.

Map of Somaliland: (Source: Port Management Association of Eastern and Southern Africa (PMAESA)

A territory of 68,000 square miles and over 6 million people, Somaliland has a highly strategic location on the south coast of the Gulf of Aden near the Bab al-Mandab strait that provides access to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Though several states have proved sympathetic to Somaliland, last December Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced Israel would be the first UN-member state to recognize Somaliland’s independence. Somaliland’s intention to accede to the Abraham Accords was confirmed by Netanyahu on January 30. Problems exist, however, with the legitimacy of the PM’s announcement, as Netanyahu apparently failed to ask for the approval of the cabinet or the Knesset, possibly rendering the recognition invalid under Israeli law. At the center of Netanyahu’s recognition of Somaliland is Israeli access to the port of Berbera, used and expanded for naval use by both the Soviets and later the Americans.

Israel Recognizes Somaliland

Israel’s initiative was opposed by 50 countries and groups, including Somalia, Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Ethiopia, Djibouti, the African Union, the European Union, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Riyadh described the new partnership as “an action that entrenches unilateral secessionist measures that violate international law.” Qatar suggested that if Israel wanted to recognize new nations, it could start with the State of Palestine.

Israel needs another port in the region; Eilat, its port at the northernmost point of the Gulf of Aqaba, normally gives Israel access to the Red Sea, but after two years of disruption and a Houthi drone strike in September 2025, revenues at Eilat have dropped to zero as the port barely functions. Aware of its exposure, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) carried out military exercises in Eilat on February 12, simulating attacks from both Iran, Yemen, and various armed groups.

The Houthi conflict with Israel began in October 2023, with missile strikes on Israeli-bound ships and even Israel. In response, Israel mounted long-range bombing strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen. Use of Berbera’s airstrip for Israeli Air Force operations would reduce flying distance to Yemen by more than two-thirds while allowing for regular manned and drone surveillance operations in the sensitive Gulf of Aden region. At the same time, however, Berbera could become an easily reachable target for Houthi missiles; Houthi leader ‘Abd al-Malik al-Houthi warned that an Israeli presence in Berbera would be a threat to Yemen and Somalia, and would therefore be treated as a “military target.”

Believing that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) had attacked its national unity and sovereignty by facilitating Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, Mogadishu cancelled all agreements with the UAE relating to ports, security, and defense, though it has no enforcement power in Puntland or Somaliland. Hersi Ali Haji Hasan, chairman of Somaliland’s ruling Waddani party, defended Somaliland’s agreement with Israel, claiming that “There is no choice before us but to welcome any country that recognises our existential right.” News of the deal brought thousands of residents of the Somaliland capital of Hargeisa into the streets in protest, some waving Palestinian flags. Large protests against the agreement were also observed in most Somali cities.

Despite denials from both Israel and Somaliland, Somalia’s Defence Minister, Ahmed Moalim Fiqi, claimed in January that Somalia had confirmed the existence of an Israeli plan to resettle Gazan Palestinians in the breakaway state, claiming as well that Israel’s recognition of a Somaliland state was part of a regional strategy: “Israel has long had goals and plans to divide countries — maybe for 20 years — and it wants to divide the map of the Middle East and control its countries... it wants to create a military base to destabilise the region.” Both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority condemned Somaliland’s acceptance of Israeli recognition and suggestions that the territory might act as a destination for expelled Gazans.

Israeli sources quoted a leading member of Somaliland’s foreign ministry on January 8 as saying there are active discussions regarding an Israeli military base at Berbera and the establishment of an embassy in Jerusalem. The official added that accepting Gazans was not part of the agreement with Israel.

DP World Berbera and the Emirati Network

The UAE’s DP World, one of the planet’s largest logistics companies, began a major modernization and expansion of the Berbera port in 2016. DP World holds a 51% stake in the $442 million project, the Somaliland Ports Authority 30%, and British International Investment (BII) the remaining 19%. The BII is a development finance institution whose sole shareholder is the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO). The BII works “in partnership with DP World to strengthen economic development across the African continent by investing in improving and expanding ports.”

The project includes the construction of the Berbera Corridor, a highway connecting Berbera to Hargeisa and land-locked Ethiopia. A 2024 agreement laid the groundwork for an Ethiopian lease of facilities at Berbera, leading to eventual recognition of Somaliland as a state by Addis Ababa. Berbera will provide a valuable option for Ethiopia, 95% of whose trade currently goes through Djibouti.

In 2017, Hargeisa agreed to the establishment of an Emirati naval and air base near the Berbera commercial port. The site includes an existing Soviet-built 4-kilometer-long runway, once leased by NASA as an emergency landing strip for the space shuttle. US Africa Command has inspected the airport twice recently, in 2022 and 2025. Berbera is now one of a network of Emirati bases established around the Red Sea region and the Gulf of Aden, including the port of Bosaso in neighboring Somali Puntland, the Yemeni port of Mocha, and various islands, including Mayun, a strategically important rock in the middle of the Bab al-Mandab.

In July 2025, Somaliland offered to host a US military base at Berbera and grant access to critical mineral resources in exchange for diplomatic recognition. The White House, however, demonstrated no interest; when asked for comment on the offer last December, President Trump replied, “Big deal,” adding, “Does anyone know what Somaliland is, really?”

Conclusion

Somaliland’s growing relations with Israel are a bold gambit to attract international recognition at the risk of antagonizing other potential regional partners. Israel is likewise antagonizing important nations already signed on to the Abraham Accords in order to have one small, non-Arab country join the pact. Israel’s motivation is more likely to be found in its perceived need to create alternative access points to the Red Sea and not to be left out of the ongoing militarization of the Red Sea as tensions increase with Iran and its Houthis in Yemen. In the process, Somaliland risks becoming a target for the Islamic State and al-Qaeda (al-Shabaab), both of whom operate in Somalia.

About the Author

Dr. Andrew McGregor is director of Aberfoyle International Security, a Toronto-based consultancy specializing in the security issues of Africa and the Islamic world.

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by Paul Goble

A December 2025 conference in Vilnius is proving to be a turning point in the history of the Circassian national movement, not only because representatives of the Circassian community met with parliamentarians of an EU and NATO-member country. Perhaps even more importantly, the meeting has become a model for Circassian efforts elsewhere to counter Moscow’s information war against their nation and to unify what is the largest and most divided people among the non-Russian nationalities whose homeland is inside the current borders of the Russian Federation.

If the symbolic importance of the Vilnius conference was recognized immediately not only by participants but by observers the practical impact of that meeting was not long in coming, with activists in yet another country – in this case, Azerbaijan -- moving to recognize the actions of the Russian state against the Circassians as an act of genocide and a prominent Circassian expert pointing to how the Vilnius meeting can help to unify the divided Circassian nation and show what needs to be done yet as that nation seeks to recover its rightful place in the world.

*Picture above is from the Azerbaijani website Minval and its discussion of the plight of the Circassians. 

The holding of international conferences about the Circassian genocide has sometimes drawn criticism by a few because the events they focus on took place in the 19^th century, even though the impact of those actions and new genocidal moves by the Russian state have taken place right up to the present. But the Vilnius meeting shows that such criticism is misplaced. Not only have two countries, Georgia and Ukraine, recognized Russian actions against the Circassians as genocides, but those recognitions have helped power the Circassian and other national movements inside the current borders of the Russian Federation.

            Chechen Opposition Leader Akhmed Zakayev in Vilnius

Instead, talking about the genocide in the case of the Circassians is a way of building bridges to other peoples who have been victims of Russian acts of genocide. Azerbaijanis would not have taken part in that meeting or spoken as they did about the Circassian genocide had they not experienced similar tragedies in their own national history. This demonstrates that Circassian activists who focus on the genocide are on the right track, and that their efforts create an opening for the Circassians to unite behind their cause with other nations that have suffered genocide, first and foremost at the hands of the Russian state, but more broadly as well. The implication is clear: this approach offers the Circassian movement a way to break out of the ghetto in which it has sometimes found itself and could prove even more powerful than the highly successful Circassian mobilization surrounding the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, which Moscow insisted on holding on what had once been the killing fields of its genocidal campaign against the Circassians.

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The other lesson of the Vilnius conference was one that was drawn by Adel Bashqawi, a participant in that meeting, a distinguished historian of Circassia and the Circassians, and the irreplaceable editor of the essential website, Justice for the North Caucasus. In his remarks, which he entitled “Silencing the Circassian Exile, Bashqawi spoke about the way in which Moscow, before, during, and after the Soviet period, has worked tirelessly to keep the Circassians from uniting and speaking with a common voice to people of goodwill throughout the world.

Of all the victims of Russian imperialism, the Circassians have been the most divided, with 90 percent of their number expelled from their homeland by the original act of Russian genocide against them, and with the 10 percent who remain in the homeland divided as a result of Soviet ethnic engineering, which seeks to destroy the nation by dividing it into parts. Instead of a common Circassian nation, there are the Adygeys, the Cherkess, and the Kabards, who enjoy statehood of a kind, and other smaller groups who do not. In fact, they are all Circassians, but Moscow knows that if they come to understand that and develop the means to speak with one another, Russia’s oppressive regime in the North Caucasus will end.

Outlook

Russia has had an important advantage in its information war against the Circassians. Of the seven million abroad, many do not know Circassian but instead Arabic, Turkish, or other languages; and of the 700,000 in the homeland, while the three “recognized” nations speak mutually intelligible languages, they have been encouraged to think of themselves as different peoples. Eventually, one hopes that all the Circassians will be able to return to a restored Circassia and that they will develop the rich traditions of the Circassian language. But that is a long-term goal.

In the short term, something else is needed, something that is implied by Bashqawi’s words. What the Circassian movement needs now, as the meeting in Vilnius showed, is a common Circassian portal to which all Circassians can turn and then toggle between the languages they know today, the international languages others can use to learn about them, and the Circassia they will eventually recover.

Creating such a portal will not be easy – the tasks of compiling and editing it are enormous, and the translation tasks are not minor either – but this is the obvious next task for the Circassian national movement, one that if undertaken will drive the final nail into the coffin of Russian imperialism and the history of the genocides it has inflicted wherever it has ruled and will guarantee that the Circassians, their country and their language will flourish. Given what can be gained, as Vilnius has suggested, this is the task to which the Circassians and their supporters should now direct their efforts.

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by Vasif Huseynov

The South Caucasus is entering a new phase of regional energy reconfiguration as Azerbaijan moves forward with plans to transmit electricity to its Nakhchivan exclave through southern Armenia, along the Zangezur corridor.

What was once understood mainly as a transport initiative is now, under the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), evolving into an energy corridor with significant regional and geopolitical consequences. The launch of construction on the Zangezur high-voltage transmission line and parallel political signals from Baku, Yerevan, and Ankara suggest that trans-regional energy connectivity may become the most immediate and transformative dimension of post-conflict normalization.

On January 29, it was reported that Azerbaijan had begun construction of the Zangezur high-voltage power transmission line, a technically complex project designed to integrate the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic into the country’s unified electricity system and to form a critical segment of an emerging Azerbaijan–Türkiye–Europe electricity corridor. Implemented by AzerEnergy, the project centers on a two-circuit 330 kV transmission line with a total capacity of 1,000 megawatts. The first sections include a 74-kilometer line from Jabrayil to Aghbend and a 105-kilometer line from Nakhchivan to the Ordubad border, following the Araz River and crossing mountainous terrain that requires advanced engineering solutions. A subsequent phase envisages the construction of an additional 44-kilometer segment across the Zangezur corridor to connect Aghbend and Ordubad into a continuous internal transmission route, alongside a new 330 kV substation in Nakhchivan city.

Beyond eliminating Nakhchivan’s long-standing status as an energy island, the project enables centralized dispatch, access to reserve capacity, and more stable system operation. In parallel, Azerbaijan plans to build a 230-kilometer, 400 kV transmission line from Nakhchivan to Türkiye, including a 400 kV converter substation, which would align Azerbaijan’s grid more closely with European technical standards and significantly expand cross-border electricity transmission capacity. When completed, this will constitute an electricity line connecting the South Caucasus and Europe, and in the future, Central Asia and Europe via Azerbaijan and Armenia.

This internal integration is unfolding in parallel with a broader diplomatic and economic opening. In January 2026, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan confirmed that the energy systems of Armenia and Azerbaijan would be interconnected, allowing for mutual electricity imports and exports. He framed the initiative as one of the most practical early deliverables of TRIPP, arguing that a high-voltage transmission line could be built faster and at lower cost than rail infrastructure, while generating immediate economic returns.

According to Armenian experts, it would take around one year for Armenia’s electricity grid to be connected with that of Azerbaijan and Türkiye, although full integration of the energy systems would take several years. Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan has confirmed that this had been discussed previously with President Ilham Aliyev and was reflected in the framework documents signed between Armenia and the United States earlier this month.

Reaction to these developments inside Armenia, however, has been mixed. While independent experts find this development critical for Armenia’s energy independence, opposition figures and pro-Russian expert circles portrayed the grid integration efforts as a threat to Armenian sovereignty, warning that Yerevan would be “handing the switch” of its energy system to Baku and Ankara. Such rhetoric reflects deeper anxieties about Armenia’s long-standing dependence on Russia, particularly in the electricity sector. Roughly 40 percent of Armenia’s power generation comes from the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant, whose fuel supply and operation remain closely tied to Moscow. In addition, significant portions of the remaining infrastructure are controlled by Russian companies.

Yet Armenia’s energy dilemma is more paradoxical than these arguments suggest. The country produces roughly as much electricity as it consumes – around seven billion kilowatt-hours annually – and maintains substantial idle capacity that generates costs rather than revenue. Armenian officials have openly acknowledged that without regional interconnections, export potential remains largely theoretical. In this context, linking Armenia’s grid to Azerbaijan’s would provide it with access to synchronized systems in Georgia, Russia, and, via Georgia, Türkiye. For Yerevan, this would enable entry into a regional electricity market that cannot be reached independently, transforming surplus generation from a burden into a potential asset.

From Baku’s perspective, energy interconnection is a continuation of a long-standing strategy rather than a concession. Azerbaijan remains the only energy- exporting country in the South Caucasus, supplying oil, gas, and electricity to its neighbors while expanding its role as a supplier to Europe. President Aliyev recently emphasized that Azerbaijan exports natural gas to 16 countries, ten of them EU members, and ranks first globally in terms of the geographical reach of its pipeline gas exports. Electricity connectivity, particularly through Nakhchivan and the Zangezur corridor, adds a new layer to this profile by positioning Azerbaijan not only as a producer but also as a central transit and balancing hub.

Impact on the Zangezur Corridor

The Turkish dimension reinforces this shift. Ankara has repeatedly signaled that the Zangezur corridor will become a primary route for energy flows into Türkiye. Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar stated that while Azerbaijani electricity currently reaches Türkiye via Georgia, all energy resources (including oil, gas, electricity, and future green energy from Central Asia) are expected to transit through Zangezur in the near future. This would integrate logistical and energy routes, reducing dependence on single corridors and strengthening Türkiye’s role as a gateway between the Caspian region and European markets.

Such statements are not rhetorical flourishes but reflect concrete planning. Alongside hydrocarbons, Azerbaijan is investing heavily in renewable generation in its newly regained former western territories, including hydropower and large-scale wind projects. These projects are designed to feed into expanded transmission infrastructure, supporting export routes toward Türkiye and Europe, as well as the Black Sea Energy Corridor linking Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania, and Hungary. Internal grid integration through Zangezur is thus a prerequisite for sustaining predictable cross-border electricity flows, especially as renewable capacity grows.

The geopolitical implications of these developments extend beyond energy economics. For Armenia, participation in a regional energy network represents a gradual reorientation away from exclusive dependence on Russia and toward a more diversified, market-based model. This helps explain the intensity of opposition from pro-Russian actors, who view interconnection with Azerbaijan as part of a broader erosion of Moscow’s leverage. Similar fears accompanied earlier Azerbaijani fuel supplies to Armenia, which were initially denounced as dangerous but were quickly accepted by consumers when lower prices disrupted existing monopolies.

Outlook

For Azerbaijan and Türkiye, the evolving energy landscape enhances their strategic depth and resilience. By developing multiple, interconnected routes for hydrocarbons and electricity, both countries are reducing their vulnerability to geopolitical disruptions while increasing their importance to European energy security. EU officials have already expressed interest in these new developments, pointing to routes via Nakhchivan and Georgia as strategic links connecting Central Asia to Europe and complementing the Southern Gas Corridor and emerging green energy initiatives.

That said, Azerbaijan’s Zangezur power line, Armenia’s willingness to interconnect grids, and Türkiye’s push to reroute energy flows signal a fundamental change in the region’s energy landscape. The South Caucasus is moving away from fragmented, dependency-driven systems toward a more integrated energy space shaped by market logic and strategic interdependence. Whether this transformation stabilizes the region in the long term will depend on political follow-through and regulatory coordination, but the direction is increasingly clear: energy is becoming the backbone of a new regional order.

About the Author

Dr. Vasif Huseynov is the head of the Western Studies department at the Center for Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center) in Baku, Azerbaijan. He is a faculty member at Khazar University in Baku. Dr. Huseynov had previously worked for the Center for Strategic Studies (SAM) and Public Administration Academy (DIA) in Baku. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in International Relations from the Academy of Public Administration in Azerbaijan, a Master of Arts degree in Global Political Economy from the University of Kassel in Germany, and a PhD in Political Science from the University of Göttingen, also in Germany. His MA and PhD studies were supported by full scholarships of German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). He has authored several op-eds, articles, and academic publications, including a book titled “Geopolitical Rivalries in the ‘Common Neighborhood’: Russia’s Conflict with the West, Soft Power, and Neoclassical Realism”, which was published by Ibidem Press in 2019 and distributed by Columbia University.

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by Yuri Lapaiev

One of the enduring lessons of the Russia–Ukraine war is that battlefield advantage—and in some cases victory—can stem from an adversary’s ability to rapidly copy, adapt, and scale the most effective tactical or technological solutions of its opponent. This dynamic has been especially evident in the race to develop unmanned systems across the battlefields of Ukraine. The relatively low cost of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), the ease and speed of pilot training, and the precision of drone strikes have made these systems highly attractive, driving their rapid proliferation and encouraging the formation of specialized UAV units integrated into core military operations. Nowhere has this competitive adaptation been more visible than in Russia’s evolving approach to drone warfare, which initially mirrored Ukraine’s drone development but has since diverged in important ways.

The most elite and experienced units in the Russian military—special forces and airborne troops—were among the first to employ drones in combat. Similar to their use in Ukrainian formations, Russian units initially employed simple quadcopter First-Person View (FPV) drones equipped with explosive payloads. However, Russian forces reached a significant milestone with the development and widespread use of the Lancet loitering munition, which became one of their key strike systems used during their response to Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive, which initially proved to be highly effective. Lancet drones, in addition to their exclusively military significance, also served a propaganda function: the Russian Federation exaggerated the scale of production through selectively edited strike footage and visual effects, while omitting evidence of unsuccessful attacks.

The situation changed dramatically in February 2024, when the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) announced the creation of its Unmanned Systems Forces (USF). Eleven months later, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov reacted to this development by unveiling plans in December 2024 to establish a Russian analogue to the USF. By January 2025, the first specialized Russian UAV units had been formed, most notably the 7th UAV Regiment within the Central Military District. The regiment was expected to consist of approximately 1,300 personnel. It is organized into 102 reconnaissance and strike drone crews and is equipped with Lancet, Supercam, and Orlan-30 UAVs. The unit was officially presented to the Russian public on May 9, 2025, during Moscow’s annual Victory Day parade.

By November 2025, the Russian military had formally announced the creation of a new branch of the armed forces—the Unmanned Systems Forces—explicitly modeled on the Ukrainian example. Beyond forming combat units, the deputy commander of the new branch, Colonel Sergei Ishtuganov, also announced plans to establish a specialized higher military educational institution to train personnel to man these forces.

The Birth of Rubicon

At the forefront of Moscow’s most effective—and perhaps best-known—newly formed UAV units is the Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies. Established by order of Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov in August 2024, Rubicon was designed as a model elite unit while also serving an experimental role. As a result, it is staffed primarily with the best specialists in their respective fields and receives preferential funding compared to other units of the Russian Armed Forces. The Center also appears to employ modern, business-style project management practices rather than what exists within the traditional Russian military bureaucracy, which tends to hinder development. Just the opposite has occurred within Rubicon. Its units operate much faster in adaptation and are more innovative than other units of the Russian army.

According to investigations by journalists and OSINT specialists, one of the possible locations for the Center is the Patriot Congress and Exhibition Center in the Moscow region. The location was identified thanks to a video by well-known Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov. Hall D and part of Hall C of the Patriot Exhibition Center, located in the southern part of the complex, have been allocated for the Rubicon Center. At the same time, it cannot be ruled out that the location was deliberately shown in order to mislead Western experts about the actual whereabouts of the Center.

A key factor driving Rubicon’s success is its doctrinal emphasis on integrated drone warfare and advanced operator training. Beyond conducting combat missions, Rubicon instructors disseminate advanced UAV tactics across other Russian units, accelerating force-wide adaptation. The Center is also prioritized for access to the latest equipment and emerging technologies—particularly systems incorporating artificial intelligence and machine vision—many of which are experimental platforms used to test concepts and refine tactics before broader scaling.

Rubicon’s advantages include its elite status, direct subordination, operational flexibility and independence, business-style approaches to project management, strong financing, and superior provision of personnel and equipment. In addition, it functions as a showcase state Russian project, and a personal initiative of Defense Minister Belousov, who—following scandals associated with his predecessor, Sergei Shoigu—has sought a clear success story; and the rapid growth of Rubicon has provided him with one.

Rubicon’s activities extend beyond UAV systems. The Center maintains a specialized department dedicated to the development of Uncrewed Surface Vessels (USVs), comparable to Ukraine’s Magura and Sea Baby maritime drones. Russian USVs first appeared publicly during the July 2025 July Storm naval exercises in the Baltic Sea, and in August 2025, a Russian USV was used to strike a Ukrainian vessel on the Danube River, marking their operational debut.

Equally important is Rubicon’s close cooperation with private defense manufacturers, mirroring elements of the Ukrainian innovation model. This partnership enables rapid feedback from the battlefield and the swift incorporation of design improvements. In parallel, Rubicon operates its own research and development division focused on enhancing drone effectiveness, integrating AI into control systems, and advancing robotics integration. The Center also studies the physiological and operational demands placed on drone pilots, to improve long-term performance while mitigating stress and other harmful effects on operators.

*Photograph of current Rubicon commander: Colonel Sergei Budnikov

Leadership

Little public information exists on the leadership of Rubicon. According to Russian media, the current commander of the Rubicon Center is Colonel Sergei Budnikov. His background is in the Russian artillery and naval infantry, and one of his primary responsibilities is integrating drone operations into conventional military forces. In the spring of 2025, there were seven publicly known Rubicon units, each consisting of approximately 130–150 personnel. By the fall of 2025, that number had expanded to 12 units, while overall personnel increased from an estimated 1,000–1,500 to approximately 5,000. Current Russian plans are to establish a Rubicon group within each military formation: North, Center, West, South, East, and Dnepr.

Each detachment within the unit has its own area of specialization, like aerial reconnaissance (Orlan, Zala, Skat, SuperCam), strike UAVs (FPVs, Lancet, Molnia, KVN etc), and anti-drone air defense. Although the structure of the Rubicon Center is fairly typical, its success is attributed to the support of its founder, Minister Belousov, and Evgeny Shmyrin (head of the Department of Prospective Interdisciplinary Research and Special Projects of the Russian Ministry of Defense).

*Photograph: Founder of Rubicon: Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov

In addition, thanks to its subordination to the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Federation (formerly the GRU), the Center receives advanced technologies, increased funding, and up-to-date intelligence on the most important targets, as well as almost complete independence and autonomy in its actions. On the other hand, this model allows the Center to operate not only as a drone strike and reconnaissance force, but also as an intelligence - supported unit capable of rapid sensor - to - shooter cycles.

Rubicon’s high visibility inside Russia is attributed to the extensive attention it receives from the Russian media. The unit is extremely active in the information domain, maintaining its own Telegram channel where it publishes strike results and updates about the Center, while also using the platform for advertising and recruitment. In addition, the Russian information resource Lostarmour—which tracks and analyzes Ukrainian losses in the war. operates a separate section specifically dedicated to Rubicon, publishing data on the Center’s claimed damage and statistics. Rubicon’s media activity serves a dual purpose: supporting recruitment efforts and exerting psychological pressure on the Ukrainian military by cultivating the image of an omnipresent and highly dangerous unit.

Rubicon’s Role as Frontline Fire Brigade

The main difference in Rubicon’s tactics is its focus on several key areas. The first is the destruction of Ukrainian UAVs (primarily strike and heavy bombers such as the Vampire, but also reconnaissance drones). Like the Ukrainians before them, the Russian command understands that clearing the airspace of enemy drones is critical to protecting personnel and equipment and, ultimately, to carrying out combat missions. The second is hunting down the crews of AFU UAVs. Training a truly experienced and effective pilot takes a long time, and unlike the drones themselves, they cannot be quickly replaced. Therefore, the loss of drone pilots is a key factor for both sides.

But the most painful thing for the AFU was Rubicon’s focus on cutting off Ukrainian logistics. The Russian tactic was to flank the AFU units to form a semi-encirclement with one or two accessible logistics routes. Each of these routes was taken under fire control by Rubicon’s UAV crews. This strategy used by Rubicon is similar to the use of artillery for fire control, but it provides more accurate strikes and, with effective reconnaissance, almost immediate conducting of the “detection-attack” cycle. This makes it virtually impossible to deliver supplies and reinforcements to frontline Ukrainian units, as well as to evacuate wounded soldiers or damaged equipment to the safe zones. The first place Rubicon utilized this tactic was during its deployment during the Russian counteroffensive in the Kursk region last year. At that time, Rubicon managed to practically cut off the main Ukrainian transport artery between Yunakivka and Sudzha, which was used to supply and evacuate Ukrainian forces operating in the Kursk region. Rubicon’s successful use of these tactics was one of the main reasons for the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the region.

Following its successes in the Kursk direction, the Russian high command extended this tactic to other critical areas of the Ukrainian frontlines by utilizing Rubicon as a form of rapid response fire brigade. For example, Rubicon is currently attempting to cut off the critically important Izyum-Slovyansk highway, which is one of the main supply routes to Ukrainian forces in Donbas. Rubicon’s units have also begun operating in the Kupiansk and Pokrovsk directions. Since May 2025, Rubicon has been operating mainly in the Donetsk region, supporting the Russian Federation’s offensive in the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka area.

Rubicon’s drone crews have also been spotted in the Kupiansk, Lyman, Sumy, Novopavlivka, and Zaporizhzhia areas as they extend their operational capabilities against the Ukrainian frontlines. The geographical scope of the divisions’ drone warfare activities is likely expanding in line with the growth of the Center itself and the formation of new territorial units, as mentioned earlier. The probable goal is to transform the Center from being a “fire brigade” that is frequently transferred from one frontline area to another on request by Russian commanders, into a full-fledged structure able to simultaneously operate on all areas of the Russian frontlines.

Countering Rubicon

Rubicon’s effectiveness has not gone unnoticed by Ukrainian commanders and experts, many of whom have expressed serious concern about the unit’s operations. Among the recommended responses are a close study of Rubicon’s methods and the development of targeted countermeasures. Maria Berlinska, head of the Victory Drones project, which focuses on strengthening Ukraine’s Security and Defense Forces through technology, has identified three main steps to counter Rubicon's effectiveness. The first step would be to create specific, dedicated Anti-Rubicon units tasked with identifying and neutralizing Rubicon crews; second, the adoption of Rubicon’s most effective operational practices; third, the designation of personnel within each brigade responsible for collecting, refining, and scaling successful technological solutions. Some of this work is likely already underway, as reports have begun to emerge of Rubicon crews and command posts being destroyed by Ukrainian precision strikes.

At the same time, Rubicon appears to be encountering growing challenges related to its expansion, including potential shortages of qualified personnel, particularly in analysis and development roles. Sustaining the growth of an elite, high-technology unit also requires substantial and continuous funding. Moreover, the operational independence of Rubicon units may not be fully acceptable to more conservative Russian army or corps commanders with whom they must coordinate. Finally, Rubicon’s demonstrated effectiveness has made its crews and command posts priority targets for Ukrainian precision strikes.

Outlook

The Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies represents the cutting edge of Russian efforts to catch up to Ukraine in its innovative use of drones in the war following the Kremlin’s 2022 re-invasion. Moscow continues to professionalize, innovate, and institutionalize drone warfare. Russia’s drone arm has evolved from initial experiments with simple quadcopters to the use of sophisticated platforms like the Lancet, Supercam, and Orlan-30. Rubicon has made significant strides by combining elite personnel, cutting-edge AI-enabled systems, and business-style project management to accelerate adaptation and battlefield effectiveness. Its role extends far beyond combat operations to training, doctrinal development, R&D, and integrated use of USVs in its recent drone attacks on the Danube.

Despite operational successes, including disrupting Ukrainian logistics and neutralizing opposing UAVs, Rubicon faces challenges in sustaining rapid expansion, ensuring adequate skilled personnel, and mitigating vulnerabilities to Ukraine’s increased use of precision strikes to neutralize its effectiveness. Looking ahead, Rubicon is poised to evolve from its former role as a frontline fire brigade into a permanent, multi-domain force capable of operating simultaneously across all of Russia’s operational sectors in its ongoing war against Ukraine. Its true test will be whether it can fully integrate into the broader Russian military—initially skeptical but increasingly recognizing Rubicon as a frontline necessity.

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About the Author

Yuri Lapaiev is currently the editor-in-chief of Tyzhden (The Ukrainian Week) magazine. He graduated from the Ivan Kozhedub Air Force University in Kharkiv with an MA in computer network engineering. Between 2006 and 2011, he served in the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence, including as an analyst. In 2011-2015, Lapaiev worked as a marketing analyst in the head office of one of Ukraine’s largest mobile operators. From 2015 to 2016, he served in the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces and participated in the Anti-Terrorism Operation (ATO) in eastern Ukraine.

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