After Qaddafi: Haftar’s Dynastic Ambitions and Türkiye's Expanding Role in Libya
*Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin and Libyan General Khalifa Haftar
October 20 marked the 14th anniversary of the death of Muammar Qadhafi, the Libyan “Brother Leader” who ruled the country for 42 years. Since the collapse of his Jamahiriya and his death in 2011, Libya has steadily descended into deep political fragmentation. Two months ago, on August 21, 2025, the United Nations Special Representative, Hanaa Tetteh, presented a new roadmap to the Security Council aimed at breaking the deadlock in Libya’s protracted transition.
The plan comes at a time when the country is worn down by years of provisional governments, discredited institutions, and a public increasingly lacking in trust. The roadmap, designed to unfold over a 12–18 month period, rests on three pillars: a credible electoral framework, the formation of a unified government, and an inclusive dialogue involving not only elites but also youth, women, and civil society.
The risks, however, are clear. Elections held without a shared political and security agreement could fuel further instability. The recent local vote—despite a 71% turnout—took place in only 26 of the country’s 63 municipalities: enthusiasm remains limited, and the potential for actors opposed to the process to sabotage it remains high. Meanwhile, Libya continues to be divided between two governments: the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli, and the eastern authority aligned with the House of Representatives, which relies on the armed forces of Khalifa Haftar. Unsurprisingly, Tetteh warned that attempts to derail the process are inevitable, and that only strong unity among external actors can ensure the plan’s success.
*Khalifa Haftar and his son Saddam Haftar
Haftar’s Succession Strategy
Against this backdrop, just days earlier in Benghazi, Haftar promoted his son Saddam to Deputy General Commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA) and appointed other family members to prominent positions. It was a “dynastic” move, and its timing was anything but coincidental: it came on the eve of the UN initiative and in parallel with a renewed rapprochement between Haftar and Türkiye. Saddam’s rise consolidates a family-based chain of command—intended to reassure the general’s inner circle on the question of succession and to project an image of continuity to the outside world. Notably, in recent months, the younger Haftar has pursued an active international agenda, including contacts with the Americans, Italians, Egyptians, and, most significantly, the Turks.
The evolution of the relationship between Haftar and Türkiye is the most notable development of recent months. Ankara has gradually broadened its strategy: since 2023, it has begun engaging with Haftar as well, shifting from being Tripoli’s exclusive partner to positioning itself as a mediator between the two sides. This shift was symbolized by the visit to Benghazi—without a stop in Tripoli—by İbrahim Kalın, President Erdoğan’s trusted intelligence chief. After his failed attempt to take Tripoli—largely due to Turkish military intervention—Haftar now appears to recognize that the conflict cannot be won militarily, and that Türkiye has become a key regional player. His approach is therefore pragmatic: better to integrate Ankara than to continue opposing it.
For Tripoli, however, the picture has become more complicated. Prime Minister Abdelhamid Dbeibah governs under Turkish protection and with the backing of local militias and Misrata factions that have been absorbed into state institutions—but he does not truly control them. Now that Türkiye is opening channels of dialogue with the East, Dbeibah’s room for maneuver is becoming increasingly limited.
Today, Türkiye is indispensable on all Libyan fronts: it mediates tensions in Tripoli and now supervises the fragile truce reached between local militias after the clashes of the past few months; acts as a broader political broker; and leverages Libya to safeguard its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. A key objective is to preserve the validity of the 2019 maritime memorandum—ideally through parliamentary ratification in the East. This strategic interest is the main reason Türkiye has chosen to engage with Haftar.
*Map is based upon the Türkiye–Libya memorandum on the delimitation of the EEZ.
The issue remains particularly sensitive. Greece continues to view the Türkiye–Libya memorandum on the delimitation of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) as contrary to international law. In early September, Athens submitted a formal letter of protest to the UN against Libya’s maritime claims. For Greece, the worst-case scenario would be a consolidation of the Ankara–Haftar agreement, extending the memorandum at a national level and locking it in through parliamentary approval. In such a case, the agreement would become an integral part of Libya’s legal framework, making any future challenges from Athens or the EU much more difficult.
Outlook
Libya now finds itself at yet another crossroads. The success of the UN roadmap hinges on the ability of both internal and external actors to move beyond zero-sum logic. Diplomatically, Türkiye has emerged as the central systemic player.
In this context, Haftar—through the dynastic consolidation of his power—has made his future intentions quite clear: that his family remains a central pillar of any future Libyan power structure. Here, the ultimate paradox becomes strikingly clear: the general whose military advance on Tripoli was halted by Turkish intervention may soon enter the capital through a new UN-backed unity government—under Turkish diplomatic supervision—without firing a single shot.
About the Author:
Dario Cristiani is a Fellow at The Saratoga Foundation and is currently a Visiting Senior Researcher at the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies at King’s College London and a Research Associate with the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome. He is an expert on North African militant groups and Italian geopolitics. He also operates a newsletter in English on Italia politics Politica Estera.
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