Belarus Between East and West: The Hard Realities for the Belarusian Opposition
by Grigory Ioffe
While it is not always explicitly acknowledged, an analysis of a specific political situation inevitably reflects the analyst’s broader worldview. This evaluation of the current state of the Belarusian opposition is premised on two assumptions: that Belarus is a belated and still incomplete nation-building project, and that politics — especially Belarusian politics — is downstream from culture, not the other way around.
From its inception in the early 20th century, the Belarusian national movement has been shaped by the conflicting pulls of two older and expansionist nationalisms: Russian and Polish. Today, the pull of Russia has not only persisted but solidified and intensified, while the Polish influence has been largely supplanted by that of the European Union at large — a socio-geographic and economic entity associated with higher living standards. Liberal orthodoxy attributes these standards to democracy, which is seen as lacking in other parts of Europe. However, this causal claim remains unproven and may even be reversed. For many Belarusians, Europe’s appeal lies in both democracy and a higher quality of life, though the relative importance of each factor has never been clearly evaluated.
The Geopolitical Tug of War Over Belarus
If we accept that Belarus — like Ukraine — is caught in a geopolitical tug-of-war between Brussels and Moscow, and that it operates under an authoritarian regime, then it follows logically that the opposition would be divided as well. Despite the predominance of Russian as the everyday language for most Belarusians, some politically active citizens advocate for even closer ties with Russia. Ironically, these individuals have consistently faced repression by a regime that is widely seen as Russia’s staunchest ally.
No clearer example of this unique paradox exists when we assess how President Lukashenka has harshly dealt with Belarus’s Russian leaning political activists Andrei Gerashchenko, Elvira Mirsalimova, Artyom Agafonov, Yury Pavlovets, Dmitry Alimkin, Sergei Shiptenko, and others. Unfortunately, the Western media, pro-Belarusian opposition groups and thinktanks in the West frequently overlook this unique paradox about how Minsk balances itself between Moscow and the West. Currently, Grodno-based activist Elena Bondareva is also under pressure. The most likely reason for this attitude is President Alexander Lukashenka’s desire to monopolize relations with the Kremlin and prevent Moscow from replacing him with a more zealous advocate of the “Russian World.”
In contrast, for much of Lukashenka’s tenure from 1994 to 2020, the pro-Western opposition was permitted to establish affiliations and receive financial support from Western sources — support that, for many, became their primary (if not sole) source of livelihood. That the pro-Western opposition enjoyed relatively greater self-organizing freedom than its pro-Russian counterpart may seem counterintuitive, but it is an established fact. This historical leniency contrasts starkly with the current reality: at least 1,000 political prisoners (down from a peak of 1,500), all of whom are aligned with the democratic, pro-Western opposition. The regime’s repression of this group has intensified after each wave of post-election protests — in 2001, 2006, 2010, and 2020. These dates reflect not only a rising curve of protest movements, but also a matching escalation in the intensity of repressions.
Following the brutal crackdown on the August–September 2020 protests, between 200,000 and 500,000 Belarusians emigrated. While destinations varied, Lithuania and Poland became the primary havens. Approximately 1,500 people were sentenced to various prison terms and are now recognized as political prisoners. It remains unclear how many of the emigrants are politically active. According to Nasha Niva, in 2015, Lukashenka estimated the number of active opposition figures in Belarus at around 400, claiming he knew all of them. Even if this number has since grown, the increase is unlikely to be dramatic. Many swept up in the post-2020 repressions were apolitical bystanders drawn into the protests by circumstance rather than conviction.
For those who do not follow these groups closely to recap the main institutional structures representing the Belarusian opposition abroad are:
a) The United Transitional Cabinet, established in 2022 and led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, functioning as a kind of executive branch with 6–7 members; and
b) The Coordination Council, currently composed of 80 members, serving as a de facto legislative branch.
Photo: Opposition Member Angelika Melnikova
Both have experienced major internal challenges, including infighting, forced resignations, and public scandals — the most notable being the February-March 2025 disappearance of Coordination Council Speaker Angelika Melnikova who also withdrew $150,000 from one of the opposition’s accounts and reportedly traveled to the United Kingdom, Sri Lanka, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). While Melnikova’s whereabouts are still unknown; there is a reasonably high probability she is in Belarus, where her husband had reportedly stayed behind after she fled the country.
In July 2024, in an apparent effort to reset relations with the West, Lukashenka began releasing political prisoners. To date, nearly 300 have been freed, including Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s husband, Sergei. Despite Tsikhanouskaya’s frequent meetings with Western leaders, a growing disconnect has emerged between the opposition in exile and the general population in Belarus. Moreover, internal divisions reportedly have deepened over strategy: whether to continue pressuring Western governments to isolate and sanction Lukashenka (as the United Transitional Cabinet has done from the outset), or to seek negotiation and concessions in exchange for the release of more prisoners. The Cabinet’s hardline stance is increasingly seen by critics as self-serving. “Your husband was freed through negotiation,” they argue. “Why should others wait indefinitely for the uncertain fruits of your intransigence?”
Meanwhile, Belarus under Lukashenka appears to have weathered Western sanctions, including the loss of key Baltic export routes such as the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda, and is reportedly experiencing economic growth that outpaces much of the EU. This development underscores the warning delivered in July 2020 by the late Foreign Minister Uladzimir Makei: “Everyone recalls 2010, when they also thought the regime was weak—now, even more so. I assure you, the regime is strong, calm, and confident that the situation will remain under control.” He further warned that if events similar to those of 2010 recur, “there will be no third thaw.” Indeed, after the regime suppressed post-election protests in 2006 and 2010, it took years to normalize relations with the West. Now, it may take even longer. As Makei put it, such a setback “would definitely jeopardize our statehood”
Photo: Former Belarusian Foreign Minister Vladimir Makei
Western leaders largely dismissed Makei’s comments as regime propaganda. They should not have. Makei was, in fact, one of the most committed and effective advocates for Belarus’s engagement with the West, including a desire to normalize relations with the United States. Part of his effectiveness stemmed from a deeper understanding of Belarusian society than that displayed by many in the pro-Western opposition. The regime, while autocratic, enjoys a solid base of support — no less robust than that of its liberal-democratic challengers. This is an uncomfortable reality that many Western democracy promoters refuse to acknowledge, branding anyone who does so as a dictator’s apologist. Their attitude resembles that of a child who, after bumping his head against a table, blames and punishes the table.
As U.S. President Donald Trump declared in his May 13, 2025 speech: “In the end, the so-called nation-builders wrecked far more countries than they built — and the interventionists were intervening in complex societies they did not even understand themselves.” While the American President was referring to the Middle East, the same critique applies to how Western foreign policy has often treated Belarus — with little knowledge and even less curiosity. Had they done their homework, Western policymakers would have recognized Belarus as a culturally divided country, which helps explain the persistence of Lukashenka’s support base. They might even have acknowledged that, in terms of resisting Russian expansionism, Lukashenka has arguably acted more like a Belarusian nationalist than many who claim that title.
This recognition does not make him a democrat, nor does it justify his three-decade hold on power. But it does establish the missing point of departure for any serious and constructive Western political initiative toward Belarus.
Outlook
The future of Belarus's West-leaning opposition hinges on two key points articulated by veteran opposition journalist Alexander Klaskovsky, now based in Czechia. First, a national dialogue is essential to mend the divided nation, though its timing remains uncertain. Second, the current exiled opposition is unlikely to represent the West-leaning side in such talks, as the regime refuses to negotiate with them. Attempts to emulate Poland’s 1989 roundtable are misguided due to differing domestic and international contexts. In the 1980s, for example, Polish society generally perceived Poland's natural alignment to be with the West. While opinions on Wojciech Jaruzelski are varied, some believe his imposition of martial law in 1981 averted a potential Russian invasion.
In contrast, Belarusian society is deeply divided. The future of Belarus will most likely be shaped by new leaders emerging from both sides of the political spectrum within Belarus itself to foster dialogue and navigate these divisions. It is unlikely that today’s political emigrants will affect this process. As a long-time observer on Belarus for more than four decades, I concur with this assessment.
About the Author:
Grigory Ioffe is Professor Emeritus, Radford University. Dr. Ioffe is the author of: Understanding Belarus and How Western Foreign Policy Misses the Mark, published in 2008 and more recently Reassessing Lukashenka: Belarus in a Cultural and Geopoltical Context. He also has published several hundred articles on Belarus.