Escalation Ladders in Russian Nuclear Strategy: What Rung Are We On?
by Timothy Thomas
Introduction
Escalating situations and escalation ladders have been part of international relations for many years. Escalation, of course, refers to increases or adjustments in a situation which, causes it to grow beyond some reasonable or normal set of parameters. Escalation usually results in more serious or tenuous developments. For example, regarding the use of North Korean soldiers fighting alongside Russia, the United Nations Court of Justice noted their appearance “raises serious concerns regarding escalation.”[1]
Analysts have long studied various types of escalation situations. They include conflicts in general (will they escalate, for example, from a local to a regional level); to specific aspects of them (are we moving from small terrorist groups to heavily armed forces); or to their intensity (full or limited scale), among other issues. Motivating factors in escalations usually involve gains or losses by one side in comparison with the other as well as evolving strict differences of opinion.
During the Cold War, escalation was a serious concern in US-Soviet relations. Both sides were heavily armed with missiles and nuclear weapons. There was the potential for serious consequences if the world’s only two superpowers faced off over territory or natural resources. Luckily the two sides never came to that moment, even though several times they came close (Cuban Missile Crisis, etc.).
Today, escalation can occur due to entirely new components, such as when one side is able to covertly launch a cyber-attack against the other or use other technologies to inflict serious damage to an opponent’s critical infrastructure. Such an escalation can be invisible for months or years until it is uncovered. Some can lead to situations requiring serious negotiations while others, unfortunately, can even cause existential crises requiring nuclear considerations.
From the very beginning of Russia’s war with Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has threatened the world with nuclear release. His threats appeared to be designed to force Western nations into acquiescing to his demands or into limiting military supplies to Ukraine, among other reasons. That is, most were simply to generate fear in the West about the spread of the conflict while keeping escalation chances both minimized yet potential.
The Role of Herman Kahn
Herman Kahn, author of the well-known book On Thermonuclear War, was the American strategist behind the creation of a 44-rung nuclear escalation ladder that detailed steps that could lead to a nuclear conflict. The ladder remains a detailed argument about nuclear release that is still studied and referenced by analysts today, offering a template for understanding how the world could accidentally fall into a nuclear Armageddon if cooler heads cannot prevail.
Russian analysis of Kahn’s work has produced a few nuclear escalation ladders of their own, with most developed before Russia’s current war with Ukraine. In 2018 Andrey Kokoshin, a former Russian Security Council official for the former government of Boris Yeltsin, offered a nuclear ladder with 10 rungs. He later followed this by publishing a second ladder in a 2021 book titled Voprosyi Ob Eskalatsii i De-eskalatsii Krizisnykh Situatsiy, Vooruzhennykh Konfliktov, i Voyn (Questions about the Escalation and De-escalation of Crisis Situations, Armed Conflict, and War). Kokoshin and three other prominent Russians (Viktor Yesin, a former Chief of the Strategic Missile Troops, Russia’s nuclear missile force; Aleksandr Shlyakhturov, a former Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU] of the General Staff; and Yury Baluyevsky, a former Chief of the General Staff) discussed a nuclear escalation ladder with 17 rungs.
Then in 2024, in a book titled Ot Sderzhivaniya K Ustrasheniyu: Yadernoe oruzhie, geopolitika, koalitsionnnaya strategiya (From Deterrence to Intimidation: Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, and Coalition Strategy),[2] hereafter cited as: From Deterrence to Intimidation. Three different but important and well-connected authors published a specific book chapter in the book dedicated to describing the various escalation ladders. The chapter, however, did not use the ladder and rung template as did the other two above, instead, it presented lists of important steps for Russia’s leaders to consider. One of the lists, for example, recommended reducing the threshold for nuclear use, that is, allowing for nuclear release sooner.
Since this book was written two years into Russia’s war with Ukraine it is listed first below for its more recent and relevant input. That discussion is followed by a description of the rungs on the 2021 and then 2018 ladders when nuclear conflict was not being as consistently threatened as it is today.
From Deterrence to Intimidation:
Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, and Coalition StrategyThe 2024 Nuclear Ladder
Three different Russian experts:, Sergey Karaganov, Dmitry Trenin, and Sergey Avakyants co-authored the 2024 book: From Deterrence to Intimidation. The authors do not carry the expertise or security classifications of those in the 2021 book, but they are important theorists and analysts. Karaganov heads the Russian Federation’s Foreign and Defense Policy Council and is dean of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs. He is reportedly close to Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (making his input even more important). Trenin previously served in Soviet military intelligence (GRU) and from 2008-2022 was the director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. He also worked for the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations and the Sector for Non-Proliferation and Arms Limitation. Less is known about Avakyants, who is a retired Navy Admiral. But his military advice would continue to be valuable for the work.
Chapter Six of the book was titled “Recommendations for Strengthening Deterrence Strategy in the Conflict in Ukraine. ‘Escalation Ladder.’” This chapter used the word deterrence (sderzhivanie) 15 times, the word intimidation (ustrasheniye) 13 times, and a deterrence-intimidation combination four times. The chapter listed things Russia could or must do and not a specific escalation ladder as did the other two examples. The first list addresses decisive steps to take to break Western strategies and plans so that a nuclear world war will not occur. It recommends reducing the threshold for nuclear use. It is followed by political, military-technical, and military lists in that order. The chapter lists some actions that have already occurred (cut undersea cables).
The list of decisive steps by the three authors, many of which contradict or expand ideas found in Russia’s official nuclear policy documents, included the following:
1. Identify efforts to prevent Russia from achieving its goals in Ukraine, which is the main goal of the intimidation strategy;
2. Lift the taboo on attacks on symbolic targets (command centers, government headquarters, etc.) and important infrastructure structures (bridges, tunnels, supply routes). Create problems for Kyiv’s propaganda apparatus. [apparently, the authors are unaware that Russia has already done most of these];
3. Rethink the peaceful approach to strategic deterrence and break free from reacting to the enemy’s steps;
4. Reduce the doctrinal threshold for the employment of nuclear weapons and expand conditions for employing them when threats to Russia do not reach the level of threats to sovereignty
5. Correct the formula that “there can be no victors in a nuclear wear, and it must not be unleashed,” since this truncated phrasing deprives Russia of its most effective means of deterrence
6. Replace passive nuclear deterrence with nuclear intimidation to play the central role in ending the Ukrainian conflict under conditions favorable for Russia;
7. Regularly consult with Russia’s international partners. Closely confer with Russia’s Chinese partners, from strengthening strategic stability and improving strategic deterrence to improving military-political situations in various regions of Eurasia
8. Strengthen nuclear deterrence under the inevitable Russia intellectual leadership, such as reporting Russian views on employing nuclear weapons in the war around Ukraine;
9. Juxtapose Russia’s escalation strategy to the Western model of escalation of the Ukrainian conflict. Avoid a scenario of a war of attrition, which would be bad for Russia. This escalation strategy could involve political and military steps in a certain sequence (the escalation ladder of nuclear deterrence-intimidation) [words of the three authors];
10. Reliance on nuclear deterrence-intimidation reinserts the “nuclear fuse” (and fear) into the international system.
After this, the authors listed political steps that Moscow has taken or should take under specific circumstances. They include the following:
1. If a NATO contingent is sent to Ukraine, Russia will recognize states sending troops as participants in the conflict;
2. Downgrade Russian diplomatic relations with all countries providing military aid to Ukraine (the Baltics, Poland, Romania);
3. Establish a no-fly zone for foreign UAVs over the Black Sea outside the territorial waters of the Black Sea states;
4. Repel naval blockades of Kaliningrad or St. Petersburg by conducting Russian strikes against those countries participating in such attempts;
5. Convince representatives of the “deep state” in the US of the advisability of withdrawing from the conflict without loss of face;
6. Convince the World's Majority partners of Russia’s legitimate possible use of nuclear weapons as the most extreme measure.[3]
The military-technical steps advanced by the authors included the following:
1. Conduct military exercises whose scenarios envision delivering nuclear strikes against specific NATO countries using non-nuclear rockets in the simulation (first against military and logistical centers and second, possibly, against symbolic structures in Europe);
2. Transfer Russian weapons to forces confronting the U.S. and its allies in various regions of the world as a preemptive response to the West’s support of Kyiv;
3. Conduct underground nuclear tests, test space systems designed to put spacecraft out of commission, and conduct regular patrolling on the coasts of the U.S. and its allies with Aerospace and Navy forces. [4]
Finally, the authors listed military measures to take if the West refuses to de-escalate. They appear to tackle more non-nuclear than nuclear issues:
1. Strike Western contingents that enter Ukrainian territory;
2. Destroy NATO UAVs and aircraft in the Black Sea no-fly zone;
3. Disable U.S. And NATO reconnaissance spacecraft;
4. Strike Ukrainian Air Force aircraft if located on NATO airfields initially with non-nuclear munitions;
5. Conduct cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure and destroy logistic elements of European countries;
6. Conduct non-nuclear strikes on key Western weapon supply points for the Ukrainian Armed Forces on NATO territory;
7. Gradually cut underwater cables, first in the Baltic Sea, then in the Atlantic [already doing this];
8. Send a last warning signal: carry out a land explosion of a super-large nuclear weapon of more than 50 megatons;
9. Use non-nuclear weapons to strike military and logistic targets in countries supporting the war against Russia and then strike political targets such as government buildings, and that an “answer” [if the West reacts?] would be nuclear retaliation;
10. Develop political propaganda with Russia to convince the public of the need for such measures;
11. Threatening to cross the nuclear threshold could bring Washington to withdraw and cease aggression against Russia;
12. Russia must at each step inform the U.S. of its serious intentions and readiness to end the conflict under conditions favorable for Russia;
13. Through unofficial channels inform the U.S. it can withdraw without shame or dishonor from the conflict, with Moscow ready to support it [naïve thinking];
14. Ensure agreement between Russian declarations and its actions, use a clear system of signals for the enemy;
15. Warnings should only be given once. Empty threats (red lines) must not be allowed. Deeds follow words and this is the fundamental principle of intimidation. [5]
The target of the deterrence-intimidation strategy is the military-political elite of the United States and other leading Western countries. The leadership of each nation, the authors state, must be made aware of the fact that they cannot live comfortably and be fully protected. U.S. strategic targets for Russia are the former’s overseas bases where it is worth striking them at a much earlier stage of escalation. [6]
Kokoshin, Yesin, Shlyakhturov, and Baluyevsky’s Proposed Escalation Ladder
A few years earlier, in 2021, Kokoshin and his three other authors discussed nuclear issues and deterrence in the book Voprosyi Ob Eskalatsii i De-eskalatsii Krizisnykh Situatsiy, Vooruzhennykh Konfliktov, i Voyn (Questions about the Escalation and De-escalation of Crisis Situations, Armed Conflict, and War).[7] The numerous nuclear threats of Putin and former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev over the conflict with Ukraine have made it harder to pinpoint where on this escalation ladder of 17 rungs Russia might now stand. So far nuclear threats have escalated only with voices but not weaponry, trying to coerce the other side into offering concessions. However, the recent use of more destructive weapons (Oreshnik, etc.) indicates there is movement and even insecurity on Russia’s part which may mean it is moving closer to a nuclear employment option.
In concert with past estimates, Russia appears near rung 11, since Russia has employed an intermediate-range ballistic missile. Rung 12 is where nuclear conflict begins and, thankfully, that rung has not been stepped on to date. Weapons used thus far are a composite of various types, from information and cyber weapons to cruise and ballistic missiles. The 17 rungs listed below use the original italics and bold lettering, which appeared in the original Russian text and are:
1. Exacerbation of the situation, including intensification of information confrontation, including information operations to destabilize the internal situation of the opposing side, economic sanctions, etc.
2. Exchange of threatening declarations about the possibility of employing military force to, among other things, protect one’s friends and allies.
3. Escalating political crisis with increased intensity in the conduct of information confrontation, demonstration of military force in the “grey zone” (including intensification of the conduct of various levels of military exercises, flights by strike aviation along the borders, “display of the flag” by the sides’ warships, etc.), but without its military employment (on the whole, intensification of confrontation in the “grey zone,” which assumes horizontal escalation).
4. “Hybrid warfare,” an integral part of which is limited combat employment of military force (especially special operations forces, mercenaries [“proxies”], private military companies, etc.), together with large-scale use of political, information-psychological, economic, and other assets characteristic of “hybrid warfare.” In this regard, “hybrid warfare” can also be placed below political crisis on the “escalation scale,” with increased intensity of demonstrating military power (confrontation) and limited (local) “conventional warfare” without the use of means of mass destruction.
5. Intentional or unintentional provocation (incident) in the interaction between great powers, which results in the death of people and serious damage to military equipment.
6. Local “conventional war” with limited political goals of the opposing sides and limited (in time and place) employment of military force, without the use of means of mass destruction and the large-scale employment of combat cyber-operations against civilian targets, with the involvement of only a certain portion of conventional forces and conventional means of destruction. Combat cyber-operations are carried out only against conventional forces being used in the war, against Strategic Nuclear Forces and early warning systems, and civilian targets without action against the state’s administrative system. A special problem is the effects of cyber-operations on nonstrategic nuclear weapons because of the presence of dual-purpose carriers. Many experts think that it is impossible to distinguish between the employment of cyber-operations against nonstrategic nuclear weapons and against nonnuclear assets with similar carriers.
7. Regional war with the conduct of combat operations on land, in the air, and at sea, without the destruction of any spacecraft, with the conduct of combat cyber-operations of a larger scale than in a local war. Under conditions of an increasing level of interdependence in the world economy, in the production of industrial and agricultural products, in energy, etc., such a war is fraught with the radical destruction of supply chains, disruption of trade routes, upheavals in financial markets, and an enormous world economic crisis as a whole. Many experts assume that at this stage of escalation of military confrontation between great powers the threat of further intensification of combat operations is rising, because it will be extremely difficult to keep them within a specific framework. They note that in such a conflict neither of the sides wants to acknowledge itself as victorious and will further escalate right up to the “nuclear threshold.”
8. Limited “conventional war” with destruction (physical or functional) of spacecraft at some scale, without the destruction of satellites that warn of a missile attack.
9. Large-scale “conventional war,” without striking large metropolitan areas or destroying chemical production, atomic energy stations, etc., with the employment of “cyber weapons” only against military targets, both on a theater of military operations and beyond its boundaries.
10. Large-scale “conventional war” with the conduct of military cyber-operations, aimed at the disruption of the other side’s state administration system and at the destruction of important civilian elements of infrastructure.
11. “Conventional war,” striking large metropolitan areas and destroying chemical production and atomic energy stations (the destruction of large chemical production and atomic energy stations, with large-scale chemical and radiation contamination, fraught with the death of multitudes of people, can be equated with the employment of weapons of mass destruction).
12. “Nuclear conflict” – a crisis situation in which one or several possessors of nuclear weapons is involved, and confrontation reaches a level where one or more of the sides begins to use nuclear weapons as an instrument of direct political pressure. Nuclear conflict can arise abruptly, without passing through the above-mentioned stages of local “conventional war,” regional war, etc.
13. Intentional or unintentional destruction by the conventional strategic missile submarine assets (antisubmarine warfare assets) of one of the great powers (including an unidentified “third side”).
14. Demonstration of the employment of nuclear weapons in desert terrain, without hitting people or military and economic targets.
15. War with limited employment of nuclear weapons against actual military targets and the other side’s armed forces.
16. War with the employment of strategic nuclear forces in a “counterforce” variant, with an attempt to avoid hitting the enemy’s civilian population and important economic structures.
17. War with mass employment of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction, against, among other things, large metropolitan areas.[8]
Russia still appears to be a rung below nuclear conflict and has been there for some time, to include after the publication of its new 2024 Basic Principles of the Russian Federation in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence (Osnovy gosudarstvennoy poletiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii v oblasti yadernogo sderzhivaniya).[9] The ladder offers a combination of coercive elements and actual nuclear employment.
Kokoshin’s Proposed Escalation Ladder
This 2018 ladder appeared before the Russian government (Putin) published Russia’s 2020 nuclear policy. Andrey Kokoshin listed 10 rungs. However, it was not until rung six that targets appeared. They included nuclear power and chemical plants, among others:
1. The normal state of the world political system.
2. A political crisis with an increased intensity of demonstrating military power.
3. Hybrid war.
4. Limited (local) conventional war
5. Large-scale conventional war without the destruction of large metropolitan areas, chemical production, or atomic power stations.
6. Conventional war with the destruction of large metropolitan areas, chemical production, and atomic power stations, which can be equated with the employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
7. Nuclear conflict (a crisis in which one or more nuclear states are involved, when at least one begins to use them as an instrument of political-military pressure without directly using them).
8. Demonstrative use of nuclear weapons in desert terrain without killing or hitting people, military structures, or economic structures.
9. War with limited employment of nuclear weapons.
10. Massive use of nuclear weapons.[10]
Thus far, Russia’s conventional forces have destroyed several targets listed at rung 6. There have been numerous uses of the instrument of political-military pressure (nuclear threats have been consistent) but no direct use of a nuclear weapon.
Russian Nuclear Strategist Sergei Karaganov
Back to Karaganov in 2023
Before moving to conclusions, it is important to add a few words about one of the authors of the 2024 book. Karaganov is a typical representative of the modern Russian elite who frequently conducts diatribes against the United States and the West. He and his Kremlin comrades fail to understand just how much those nations who were once part of the Soviet Union or were former members of the Warsaw Pact distrust Russia. Many now hate Russia’s successor administration even more after having watched its actions during the Ukraine conflict, both at home (imprisoning any opponents of the war) and on the battlefield (conduct of war crimes, killing civilians, etc.). These atrocities have confirmed all that these former vassals of the Soviet Union suspected of the Russian elite. The Kremlin is after resources, land, and revenge for its loss of territory. Ukrainians have watched Russia send soldiers from the far reaches of Russia or from prisons to their death in human wave attacks against Ukrainian soldiers. Like other elite members, Karaganov overlooks Russia’s many critical internal problems, starting with the President, whom former Pact or Soviet members deeply resent.
In a June 2023 article in Russia in Global Affairs, a year before the 2024 book appeared, Karaganov stated that Russia had thoughtlessly set too high the threshold for nuclear weapons uses and that it should lower that threshold. Moving up the deterrence-escalation ladder should be done quickly in his opinion. Some steps have been taken already, he noted (deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus and the readiness of the strategic deterrence forces), but Karaganov stated there are two dozen rungs on the nuclear ladder (which he does not list), implying that movement up the ladder is too slow. He went on to warn people of goodwill in other countries that if they are supporting Ukraine then they should leave their places of residence if they are near facilities that may be nuclear targets. He stated
I have said and written many times that if we correctly build a strategy of intimidation and deterrence and even the use of nuclear weapons, the risk of a ‘retaliatory’ nuclear or any other strike on our territory can be reduced to an absolute minimum.[11]
Karaganov noted about NATO that:
"But what if they do not back down? What if they have lost the instinct of self-preservation completely? In this case, we will have to hit a bunch of targets in a number of countries in order to bring those who have lost their mind to reason. We will have to make this choice ourselves. Even friends and sympathizers will not support us at first"[12]
The madman in this scenario is Karaganov. To end the conflict with Ukraine, he supported the liberation of eastern and southern Ukraine and forcing the rest of Ukraine to surrender. This requires breaking the will of the West to support Kyiv and forcing it to retreat strategically. Perhaps it is Karaganov’s hope that the new US administration would do this for them by breaking with Kyiv. The new administration should continue to be informed as to how much disdain the current Russian leadership holds against the United States and avoid unconsciously working on Russia’s behest.
Conclusion
Policymakers in the West must be aware of these ladders and lists for either their potential impact on Russian offers to end the conflict or for their impact on future actions Russia might pursue. The two distinct ladders offer a more traditional approach to nuclear conflict in sync with Herman Kahn. We are but a rung away from nuclear conflict, according to the 2021 ladder. The Karaganov book is more specific and distinct as well as more threatening since specific actions are laid out that take into consideration the progress and subsequent negotiating positions associated with the war with Ukraine. But these threats can be bluffs, a topic, which the other escalation ladders did not mention. To be fair, the other escalation ladders did not have the context of an ongoing conflict with Ukraine for consideration, just a more peaceful Russia and Ukraine in 2021 and 2018. The 2024 options should be scrutinized more closely as a result.
Dmitry Trenin, one of the authors of the 2024 book, wrote in 2023 that nuclear weapons have been “on the table” of Russian politics from the beginning of the conflict as a means of keeping the United States and its allies from getting involved in the conflict. However, it became clear that nuclear deterrence turned out to have much more limited uses since the US believed Russia was bluffing. This is an extremely dangerous misperception, Trenin noted as the conflict is being escalated both horizontally by expanding the theater of operations and vertically by the increase in the power of weapons being sent to Ukraine. If this inertia is not stopped the war will spread to Europe and will almost inevitably go nuclear. The possibility of using nuclear weapons should be spoken about more often.
Trenin added what he felt would be a stumbling block for NATO if Russia hits NATO countries with nuclear weapons. In his opinion, the United States will be “unlikely to respond to these strikes by attacking Russia for fear of its retaliation against the US.” This will dispel the myth, in Trenin’s opinion, of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (an attack on one is an attack on all members) causing the US nuclear umbrella to disappear. He stated that the US will conduct a non-nuclear response against Russia, but this will encourage a retaliatory strike from Russia against the United States. Trenin noted that strategic success is expected by the Russian leadership, whose stakes are much higher than those in the West. He concluded with this thought:
“It must be borne in mind that the adversary assesses Russia’s chances differently from us and can take steps fraught with a direct armed clash between Russia and NATO and the United States. We must be ready for such a turn. To avoid a global catastrophe, fear must be brought back into politics and public consciousness: in the nuclear age this is the only guarantee of humanity’s survival.” [13]
The Russian professionals who have assembled these escalation ladders are all close to the Kremlin in one form or another. Therefore, the expectation is that they are all highly regarded by people around Putin. It is not known if his advisors would offer these insights directly to him or whether they might offer them to other players (Foreign Ministry, etc.) who would value them highly as well.
Finally, by understanding these escalation ladders addressed in Kremlin strategic thinking, perhaps Russian and Western policy experts can possibly find a common agreement to prevent a future “Cuban Missile Crisis 2.0.”
*Timothy Thomas is a Senior Fellow at The Saratoga Foundation.
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FOOTNOTES
[1] Siobhan O’Grady, Karen DeYoung, Michael Birnbaum, and Ellen Francis, “U.S. Pressures Kyiv to Soften Its U.N. Resolution,” The Washington Post, 23 February 2025, p. A15.
[2] Dmitry Trenin, Sergei Abakants, and Sergei Karaganov, Ot Sderzhivaniya K Ustrasheniyu: Yadernoe oruzhie, geopolitika, koalitsionnnaya strategiya (From Deterrence to Intimidation: Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, and Coalition Strategy), Moscow: 2024, pp. 91-94. The author would like to thank Glen Howard for providing this chapter and Dr. Harold Orenstein for his translation of it.
[3] Ibid., pp. 95-96.
[4] Ibid., pp. 96-97.
[5] Ibid., pp. 98-100.
[6] Ibid., p. 101.
[7] Andrey Kokoshin, Viktor Yesin, Aleksandr Shlyakhturov, and Yury Baluyevsky, Questions about the Escalation and De-escalation of Crisis Situations, Armed Conflict, and War (Voprosyi Ob Eskalatsii i De-eskalatsii Krizisnykh Situatsiy, Vooruzhennykh Konfliktov, i Voyn), Moscow: 2021, pp. 60-65. RAND Corporation analyst Mr. Clint Reach provided a digital copy of the book to the author; and Dr. Harold Orenstein translated the rungs on the ladder in the book. The author would like to thank both individuals for their help.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Russia Matters, Belfer Center, Harvard, accessed 1 March 2025, citing the 19 November 2024 Russian Presidential Decree on nuclear policy, at https://ww.russiamatters.org/sites/default/files/media/files/2024%20Basic%20Principles%20of%20State%20Policy%20of%20the%20Russian%20Federation%20on%20Nuclear%20Deterrence.pdf
[10] As noted in V. V. Selivanov and Yu. D. Il’in, “The Concept of a Military-Technical Asymmetric Response with Respect to Deterring a Probable Enemy from Initiating Military Conflicts,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 2 2022, p. 43. The author would like to thank Dr. Harold Orenstein for his translation of this article.
[11] Sergey Karaganov, “A Difficult but Necessary Decision,” Russia in Global Affairs, 13.06.2023 at http:// eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/a-difficult-but-necessary-decision/.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Dmitry Trenin, “A Response to Sergey Karaganov’s ‘A Difficult But Necessary Decision,’ Russia in Global Affairs, 22/6/2023 at https:// eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/ukraine-and-nuclear-weapons/