Dear Colleague,
In this special issue, Eurasia 2025: Expert Outlook on Russia & Ukraine at War, we bring together three in-depth analyses that examine key dynamics driving the conflict in the year ahead for both Ukraine and Russia. These articles shed light on Russia’s evolving military objectives in eastern Ukraine, Kyiv’s efforts to close the military technological gap in the war, and the internal dysfunctionality that plagues Russian power structures. Together, they provide a comprehensive outlook on the challenges and opportunities shaping the trajectory of the war.
The first article, Russian Military Objectives in Ukraine in 2025, assesses Moscow’s strategic priorities in the war and the extensive resource challenges it faces in sustaining its military campaign. From tapping Russian paramilitary forces - like Rosvgvardia - for additional manpower, to injecting North Korean labor into Russian defense industries to offset skilled labor deficits caused by the war. These efforts underscore the Kremlin’s resolve to expand territorial gains despite mounting manpower and resource constraints.
The second article, Ukraine to Narrow the Technological Gap in the War Against Russia in 2025, highlights Kyiv’s increasing reliance on Western support and indigenous innovation to counter Russia’s numerical advantage. It outlines how Ukraine’s adoption of advanced weapons systems and pending arrival of a squadron or more of advanced French-made Mirage 2000-5E fighter aircraft that will help narrow the aerial balance on the battlefield.
Our third article, Growing Institutional Dysfunction to Plague Russian Power Institutions in 2025 explores the growing dysfunctionality within Russian power structures symbolized by the 2023 Prigozhin mutiny, the failure to respond to the March 2024 Crocus City Hall attacks, which reflect an ongoing trend in Russia’s weakening political and institutional structures. Combined with a tightening of Western sanctions, and rising inflation, this creates an array of internal problems that exacerbate Russian vulnerabilities.
Finally, this issue aims to provide policymakers, analysts, and scholars with a deeper understanding of what some of the leading issues will be in 2025 that will shape the war in Ukraine.
Enjoy!
Russian Military Objectives in Ukraine in 2025
Key takeaways:
Moscow plans to tap Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) for additional military manpower resources to offset manpower shortages
The Kremlin has a program underway to import North Korean workers to offset labor shortages to shore up Russian defense Industrial production
Russian military is increasing spare tank and mechanized reserves for future 2025 maneuver warfare offensive on the steppes after the capture of Pokrovsk.
The Kremlin’s autumn 2024 campaign plan did not produce the desired results for the Russian army. Russian efforts to capture the Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine were largely thwarted by Ukraine’s successful August 8 offensive in Kursk Oblast, which caused Moscow to redeploy a significant portion of its strike forces from eastern Ukraine to counter the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk. For example, the Russian General Staff redeployed a significant part of their assault formations to this sector of the front.
Two brigades from the Russian 76th and 104th airborne divisions, as well as a number of serious motorized rifle formations were redeployed to Kursk. Failure to fulfill earlier plans forced the Kremlin to adjust the 2025 campaign for the next six months, making the spring campaign critically important to Russian strategy. This is primarily due to the fact that Kremlin military planners failed to resolve their strategic tasks during the 2024 autumn-winter campaign due to the transfer of important units to fight in Kursk.
In light of these developments the objectives of the Russian armed forces for the spring-summer campaign of 2025 will likely be the following: push the Ukrainian forces beyond the left bank of the Oskol River, capture the strategic junction of Kupyansk, as well as push Ukrainian forces embedded in the Kursk region of Sudja and impose battles in Ukraine’s northern Sumy region to tie down Ukrainian forces defending Kyiv. All things considered, the ultimate objective before the Russian Federation armed forces remains the capture of the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk urban agglomeration, often referred to as Ukraine belt of fortress cities that serve as the centerpiece of its defense strategy in eastern Ukraine. This agglomeration stretches from Konstantinovka to Svyatogorsk, which makes it possible to impose long and ongoing battles in urban conditions. Russians expect to attack from the directions - Chasov Yar, Toretsk, Mirnograd, as well as from the side of Liman once the displacement of Ukrainian troops behind Oskol is successful.
To fulfill these ambitious plans the Russian military faces only one significant obstacle - lack of sufficient personnel. The manpower issue has become so critical for the Russian army that it is scouring its rear areas - particularly among the wounded - to locate experts with rare specialities who have not undergone a full course of treatment but instead are being sent to Russian ground assault operations. There are simply not enough contracted volunteers to cover continued Russian losses as Kremlin military strategists are spending their winter months thinking ahead about the spring 2025 mobilization when Moscow can replenish its depleted manpower. In short, the Kremlin is implementing stop-gap measures until the spring draft.
New Sources of Manpower in Rosgvardia
To counter the manpower shortage Russian authorities will have to adopt laws regulating the mobilization process and devise new schemes to offset is personnel shortages. New Russian laws have been adopted on the regulation of those mobilized to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Rosgvardia which likely indicate that new repressive pressure are in store by Moscow to find more precious manpower, as well as scramble to incorporate parts of Russia’s internal troops for the war effort which at the same time will saturate this branch of the Russian armed forces and deplete a group built to maintain internal order inside Russia. The pool of people of a suitable category may reach several million persons from this recruitment effort, which is already tangible. Veterans and former members of Rosgvardiya and the Interior Ministry are in separate registers and are not subject to mobilization into the Russian army, but the amendments correct this and now allow them to be mobilized into the Russian military services.
Separately, it is worth mentioning the elaboration of the mechanism of ‘catching’, or forced detention by arrest, meaning that those who fall under the draft. In the autumn of 2024, in fact, the mechanism of coercion was honed on conscripts, and it was quite successful considering the number of catches with the application of new laws and restrictions as Russian officials applauded their efforts.
Therefore, this means that if a new wave of Russian mobilization is announced by the Kremlin, it will be extremely difficult for conscripts to avoid the Russian dragnet, which will enable Russian military planners to more efficiently utilize the deployment of their human resources being sent to the frontlines to fight Ukraine.
Importing North Korean Labor
Against this background, we should not expect a decline in industrial production in the Russian military-industrial complex, but instead the Russian labor shortage will likely be offset by importing North Korean workers. During the past year Moscow experimented with this concept by recruiting workers from North Korea to work in Russian light industry enterprises which turned out to be extremely positive. The results likely influenced Moscow to approve wider recruitment of North Korean workers into its military industrial complex and we are likely to see the Kremlin rely more on this type of imported labor force to offset deficits in Russian defense industrial production. It also indicated a closer degree of co-operation between Moscow and Pyongyang than is currently known in the West. The Russian government even went so far as to launch an effort in mid-September to crack down and completely scrub the Russian media from using any kind of references to the arrival of DPRK workers and this included the mentioning of the arrival of North Korean construction workers and laborers, as well.
Russia’s Secret Armor Buildup
Russia also requires military manpower to implement the tactic of ‘infiltration’ of its assault groups, which, although costly in terms of personnel, is recognized as effective in forcing Ukrainian units out of their entrenched military positions. Equipment is now often accumulated by the enemy for a more active phase of the campaign. Though Western-based OSINT-analysts frequently discuss Russia’s exhaustion of armored vehicles in its warehouses, experts should note that those vehicles that disappeared from warehouses were delivered to Russian frontline forces, and those that were rejected as unsuitable, based on the experience of the Ukrainian military-industrial complex, can be restored at the expense of large expenditures in time and money.
Therefore, Russia’s extensive accumulation of armored vehicles in reserve and their non-use in the ongoing battles in Donbas may indicate that the Russian General Staff intends to use these vehicles at a later date when it moves beyond the urban agglomerations in eastern Ukraine. Here we should keep in mind that the Donbas landscape evolves from a terrain dominated by dense forests and rivers into the wider tank-friendly steppes should Moscow capture Pokrovsk and then move further to mount operations against Ukraine’s two fortified eastern citadels in Kramatorsk and Slavyansk. This shift in terrain will allow Moscow to introduce maneuver warfare, and also permit Russia to avoid wasting its declining number of armored and mechanized resources in a protracted positional war against Ukrainian forces. It may also result in a decision by Moscow to wage in parallel hybrid actions against the Baltic States.
Finally, in 2025, we will see the upcoming Zapad-2025 exercise in Belarus. Scheduled to take place in the early fall the exercise will attract a major grouping of Russian forces that could become the staging exercise for some sort of Russian strike into the Baltics. In the event of such an exercise, we could see some sort of provocations arising. In light of the fact that new military units are being formed in the Russian Federation, and equipment is being accumulated and stockpiled, and the Armed Forces of Belarus appear to be undergoing changes in the organizational and staff structure of units, then at least we should anticipate potential provocations and grouping under the guise of exercises to divert attention from Ukraine to a new conflict in Europe.
Ukraine to Narrow the Technological Gap in the War Against Russia in 2025
The main problem for Russia in 2025 remains that Putin's regime has become hostage to its own propaganda, which excludes the option of withdrawing Russian troops from the territory of Ukraine without achieving the objectives of the Spetsialnaya Voyennaya Operatsiya (Special Military Operation) or SVO.
The Kremlin increasingly requires some kind of "victorious" scenario for the end of the conflict to justify its heavy military losses and the negative consequences it imposes on the Russian economy not to mention Russia’s continued international isolation. Any compromise that involves preserving the territorial integrity of Ukraine is a threat to the existence of both Putin's regime and Russia in its current form.
In 2025, the Kremlin will do everything possible to force Kyiv to capitulate on its terms. Therefore, the scenario of the continuation of the war of attrition is the most likely, at least in the first half of 2025. Putin, however, will not be able to achieve his goals in Ukraine by military means due to the limitations of his own resources and the growing technological advantage of the Ukrainian military, which will eliminate Russia's advantage in terms of personnel.
Western observers should keep in mind that the Ukrainian military is gradually gaining a technological advantage over the Russian army on the battlefield due to the following factors:
- replacement of old Soviet weapons with modern Western ones (tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs), artillery, communication, and Electronic Warfare)
- simplified access to defense technologies and components of partners
- broad involvement of the Ukrainian private sector in the development of new robotic platforms
Despite all its propaganda rhetoric, Moscow has limited resources to continue the war at the pace it pursued in 2024. This applies to both weapons and personnel. Stocks of legacy conventional heavy weapons (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, artillery) are decreasing. The rate of production of new heavy weapons does not correspond to the scale of losses at the front.
Against the background of the decline in the popularity of the war among the Russian population, the announcement of additional mobilization is already becoming politically dangerous. The number of persons willing to serve in the Russian army under contract is constantly decreasing, Russian regions are also losing their capacity to replenish Russian manpower and are no longer able to fulfill Russian plans for recruitment as they were before. Therefore, the Kremlin is being forced to increase monetary bonuses. These bonuses also have a negative impact on the economy of Russia’s regions. At the same time, the quality of Russian recruits and their motivation also continues to deteriorate, which influences Russia’s embrace of its “meat grinder” warfighting strategy.
Meanwhile, tension and stress on the Russian economy and population under these conditions, will become more obvious as the central Russian government finds it increasingly difficult to manage and control. Externally the situation is also not favorable for Moscow either. The strengthening of international sanctions by the West, Putin’s loss of Syria, and his shameful attempts to attract military aid from North Korea with the goal of continuing the war in Ukraine will continue to have a negative impact on the Russian economy and adversely affect Moscow’s ability to influence international events.
All this will increase the likelihood of a series of unexpected “Black Swan” style events unfolding inside Russia over the course of 2025. Such events in Russia could include:
- another mutiny within Putin's inner circle;
- military riots at the front due to heavy losses;
- actions of disobedience among the population;
- technological disasters due to wear and tear of Russian equipment
At the same time Russia’s continuation of its war of attrition remains a challenge for Ukraine. For Ukraine, though the key guarantors of the country's resilience remain a dynamic and creative civil society, a motivated army, and the staunch support of its key international partners.
The dynamics of hostilities in the war will be determined by the rate of introduction of new technologies in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as the volume and tempo of the supply of modern weapons from its partners. One favorable factor that will help Ukraine in its war efforts that could start to narrow the gap with Russian airpower and help Ukraine achieve air superiority is through the acquisition of new generation combat aircraft from Ukraine’s NATO partners, such as the United States and its delivery of F-16s. Moreover, the arrival of a squadron or more of French-made Mirage 2000-5F fighter aircraft equipped with Storm Shadow missiles, the first European designed combat aircraft to join the Ukrainian Air Force, will significantly improve its combat air to ground capabilities to halt Russian offensives.
Should Ukraine use these aircraft effectively then this development will be of great importance as Ukraine can avoid holding its aging Soviet air force in reserve due to its inability to replace these aircraft. The influx of French and US made fighters could become one more “game changer” that may significantly affect the situation on the battlefield and make a major difference in how the war progresses.
Growing Institutional Dysfunction to Plague Russian Power Institutions in 2025
by Pavel Luzin
Authorities in Russia in 2025 are likely to experience an extended set of challenges caused by deepening institutional dysfunction the likes of which have not been seen inside Russia since the end of the Crimean War in 1856. A major manifestation of this dysfunctionality plaguing Russian society occurred from June to August 2023 during the Prigozhin mutiny that came close to unseating Russian President Vladimir Putin from power. This event in turn was followed by the extrajudicial liquidation of the Wagner Group’s leadership.
Troubling signs of the dysfunctionality in Russian power institutions reappeared in 2024 and will likely be a continuing trend occurring over the course of the next year.
First, the slow reaction of the Russian police and Rosgvardia forces (the national gendarmerie and internal forces of Russia responsible) during the March 22, 2024, Crocus city terrorist attack in the Moscow region and the fallout from these attacks, with incidents of torture of the detained gunmen. The Kremlin made clumsy attempts following the attack to accuse the Ukrainian government of involvement in the attack and then launched a brutal campaign against Central Asian labor migrants later that spring.
Second, after Ukraine’s August 8 offensive operations in Russia’s Kursk region provincial authorities there became paralyzed following these attacks resulting in poor inter-agency coordination at both the regional and federal level of the Russian government. It took several days for the Russian power institutions to restore political control over the situation.
Third, the destruction of an Azerbaijani commercial aircraft on December 24, 2024, during the plane’s flight from Baku to Grozny, led to Moscow’s denial of the incident and Moscow’s inability to accept responsibility for the incident. The Russian leadership created the impression that it was far more prepared to accept damage to its foreign reputation and remaining partnership ties rather than disclose its mistake and rectify its decision-making and institutional errors. These are clear signs that the Russian political system is simply unable to rectify its institutional errors related to the incident while public punishment of those responsible for the tragedy is considered to be more costly and riskier in terms of Russian domestic politics than the damage caused to Russia’s overseas image.
Fourth, it has become increasingly obvious that Russian power institutions are simply unable to conduct efficient policy planning. For instance, the entire range of recently developed industrial strategies, from aircraft and space industries to machine tools, faced major delays and revisions in 2024. Even the updated Russian nuclear doctrine accompanied by public debates on how to transform the nuclear deterrence strategy into efficient nuclear intimidation demonstrated the actual deadlock of Russian policy in this field. In fact, the update to Russian nuclear policy appeared to be more of a rhetorical rather than a substantive modification, especially when one compares the actual version of the document word by word with the June 2020 version.
Even the attempt at using the new conventionally armed Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) “Oreshnik” launched on November 19, 2024, demonstrated that the Kremlin is more interested in intimidation rather than deterrence because its declared high-precision conventional hypersonic warheads failed to make a precision strike, nor did the launching of the IRBM give any desirable outcome other than nuclear saber rattling.
In light of the incidents outlined above the Russian leadership will likely continue to experience an extended period of institutional dysfunctionality into 2025. Two fundamental options exist for Moscow in correcting this trend. One would involve conducting major reforms of Russian state institutions and transition of power on a scale not seen since the 19th century. A similar transition and period of major reforms took place in Russia soon following the Russian defeat in the Crimean War of 1853–1856. However, the probability of this option in 2025 is increasingly small to reverse this trend because the transition of power in today’s Russia is possible only to reverse in the event of a coup d’état which is completely impossible to predict, nor can it be ruled out as the warning signs of the 2023 Prigozhin mutiny still remain.
Another option is for the Kremlin to simply extend its isolationist agenda, develop new repressive legislation and expand its command administrative economic model regardless of the actual military situation as the war in Ukraine enters its fourth year. The actual probability for this option occurring seems to be quite high as Moscow focuses its limited resources on the continued restoration of its military power while pursuing a domestic political course that results in more self-isolation and an even more rigid political regime at home.
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