Dear Colleague,
As we enter 2025, the Baltics and the Black Sea stand at the forefront of Eurasia's evolving security landscape, where the interplay of geography, geopolitics, and hybrid warfare underscores their strategic significance. Situated on NATO’s maritime flanks, these two regions have become flashpoints for Russian ambitions that will continue to shape European security in the coming year.
From the increasing threat of Russian hybrid warfare—exemplified by incidents like the recent Eagle-S undersea cable sabotage in the Baltic —to speculation about Russian designs against the strategically significant Faroe islands in the North Atlantic, these areas are critical arenas where NATO's unity and deterrence strategies will continue to be tested. In the Black Sea, Moscow faces constraints on its naval operations, influenced by the 1936 Montreux Convention and Ukraine’s highly effective asymmetric naval strategies through its Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) program.
This series explores the multifaceted challenges facing both regions, including Russia's maritime ambitions, the implications of Finland's proactive deterrence efforts to combat Russian hybrid warfare in the Baltic, and Russian aims in the Black Sea in its war against Ukraine. Drawing from expert analyses, this segment provides a sweeping outlook on the security, political, and strategic dynamics shaping the Baltic and Black Sea regions in 2025.
Enjoy!
Will Putin Test NATO in 2025 with Moves Against Islands in the Baltic and North Atlantic?
by Paul Goble
In light of Finnish authorities’ recent detention of the Russian-operated oil tanker Eagle S and its purported involvement in yet another instance of undersea cable sabotage in the Baltic, all eyes will be on Russian President Putin and his future retaliatory moves to this action in the new year.
One area where Putin is likely to test NATO in the coming months not by a direct attack on a NATO member state along Russia’s borders but rather may be against islands in the Baltic Sea and North Atlantic belonging to Scandinavian members of the Western alliance. For the Kremlin leader, these are attractive targets: they have small populations and a long history of economic and even political autonomy. That means both that the size of Russian forces necessary to overrun them would be relatively small and the likelihood that some in the alliance would be reluctant to stand up to Moscow in their defense lest that lead to a general war. But the strategic location of these islands is so great that the loss of even one of them would have negative consequences for the West both immediately and in terms of what that would mean for the future of NATO.
Putin’s temptation to move in the North Atlantic also may have had an accidental boost with the recent statements by President-elect Donald Trump to acquire Greenland. His statement in turn likely motivated Greenland’s prime minister, Mute Egede, to renew his calls for independence from Denmark following Trump’s renewed expression of interest in purchasing the Arctic island.
Potential island candidates for Putin might also include Gotland, a Swedish possession, and the Aaland Islands, a Finnish one, in the Baltic Sea and the Faroes and Greenland, Danish possessions both, and Spitzbergen, a Norwegian one, in the North Atlantic. The Faroe Islands and the Spitzbergen archipelago are likely to be especially attractive targets as far as Putin is concerned. The Faroes, which are part of Denmark but enjoy sufficient autonomy not to be part of the European Union (EU) and its sanctions regime and with close ties to Moscow as far as fishing rights are concerned, and the Spitzbergen archipelago, which is governed by a treaty that restricts Norway’s ability to project military power there and gives Russia and China the ability to insert hybrid-style personnel are likely to be the most tempting of these. And because they sit astride both the entrance to the Northern Sea Route and SOSUS monitoring networks, their loss to Russia would give Moscow a major victory.
In a recent article, Moscow security commentator Aleksey Chichkin noted that Russia is interested in continuing its close cooperation with the autonomous Faroes because the region of 1,400 square kilometers and 53,000 people wants to do so as well. Because it is autonomous, the Faroe Islands are not part of the EU and have reluctantly gone along with the EU and Denmark in imposing sanctions on Russia after the Anschluss of Crimea and Putin’s launch of the expanded invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Nevertheless, until 2022 the Faroe Islands enjoyed extensive trade and fishing rights with Russia.
So far, NATO countries have not issued an explicit warning against any Russian moves against these islands, lest such a warning in and of itself add to tensions in the region. But Russian commentaries over the last year suggest that NATO will have to issue a clear statement and insert more forces of its own in this region or face the prospect that Putin, possibly with Chinese support, will steal a march there in 2025.
Putin and the Eagle-S Incident in the Baltic: Will Hybrid Warfare Escalate in 2025?
During the annual plenary session of the Valdai Discussion Club held on November 7, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that a struggle is unfolding for a new world, and it is not just a struggle for power but it is a clash of principles in relations between countries and peoples. Putin also underscored in his Valdai speech that the world has approached a dangerous line, and that a moment of truth is coming, where the old-world order is irretrievably gone and there is a new fundamental clash of principles shaping the future of global relations.
Nothing epitomizes this more than the recent undersea cable incident in the Baltic where the Eagle-S oil tanker was used by Moscow to sever an undersea cable, which was the fifth incident of this kind in the past year. Since the escalation of the Ukraine war in 2022, there has been a significant increase in hybrid attacks with the potential to inflict substantial economic damage and cause substantial loss of life. In light of this recent incident in the Baltic it is important to keep in mind that Russia’s concept of war encompasses both kinetic armed combat and non-kinetic elements. While most non-Baltic Western countries think that on the surface things appear tranquil, the Eagle-S attack on Finland’s undersea cables represent a substantial increase in Russian-led covert attacks that surpass conventional cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns. These hybrid tactics, which include sabotage, assassinations, arson, and infrastructure damage, pose a multifaceted threat to national security and societal stability.
This complexity underscores the urgent need for the West and NATO to adapt their strategies to comprehensively protect its members. In essence, Russia is at war with the West, although it is not a conventional one. It operates in the hybrid realm. Even with the potential for a resolution to the War in Ukraine in 2025, it is anticipated that hybrid attacks, as discussed previously, will likely intensify.
The Eagle-S incident is not just a lone incident in the Baltic but indicates that there is a global dimension of hybrid warfare. This is particularly evident with the pervasive nature of cyberattacks, which are not only perpetrated by Russia but also by China, Iran, and North Korea. Furthermore, incidents such as the sabotage of submarine cables and railway lines, coupled with political interference in elections, underscore the covert operations aimed at destabilizing Western societies. At the same time, hybrid warfare, by its inherent nature, is unconventional and often deniable, rendering it challenging to counter effectively.
One example is the migration crisis orchestrated from Russia and Belarus to Finland, the Baltic States, and Poland to pressure and destabilize neighboring countries. By using migrants from Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan as instrument of Hybrid Warfare, Russia and Belarus exploit humanitarian concerns to strain resources, provoke political divisions, and challenge border security. This tactic aims to weaken NATO and EU cohesion and response, reflecting a broader strategy of hybrid, non-military confrontation. When the countries affected by the hybrid operation asked for help from the European Commission to secure their borders, the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen said it was a long-standing common position of the Commission and Parliament that there will be no joint financing of barbed wire and walls. Later, amid growing pressure, a proposal emerged suggesting that the EU could provide partial funding for “border infrastructure.” However, this support would be contingent on recipient countries allowing the EU’s border agency, Frontex, to assist in border management - an arrangement that Poland and the Baltic States have consistently declined.
Finland’s recent seizure of the Eagle-S tanker marks a major shift in how some NATO-member countries might address emerging hybrid threats. More significantly, it potentially signals a new and more aggressive approach within the Euro-Atlantic community to counter Russian provocations. Whether this action establishes a lasting precedent, however, remains uncertain.
Following the Eagle-S incident NATO member countries should strengthen their collaboration and perhaps hold a lesson’s learned meeting dedicated to these hybrid actions by Russia to display NATO’s resolve and boost intelligence sharing among Western nations. This form of cooperation is essential to form a robust front against these multifaceted threats presented by Russia. Furthermore, enhancing the protection of critical infrastructure and safeguarding democratic processes from disinformation are crucial steps in maintaining societal resilience.
As we enter 2025, the far larger question raised by Russian use of hybrid warfare that is paramount for the West is the question of deterrence in the context of hybrid warfare. NATO-member countries lack a consensus regarding how to react to the severity of the hybrid threat. Such discord can undermine trust in democratic institutions and disrupt societal stability. To address these challenges, the West and NATO must establish a unified and well-defined response framework. One of the most significant strategic challenges for NATO policymakers and the United States will be whether they should define a new threshold for hybrid attacks, thereby enabling a decisive response to prevent the escalation of hostilities. Moreover, one of NATO’s newest members – Finland – is leading the way in the Baltic by enforcing its own form of deterrence in response to Russian hybrid warfare and the rest of NATO should pay attention.
Russia’s Maritime Flanks in 2025 and the Role of the Two Bs – Baltic and Black Seas
By Ihor Kabanenko and Glen Howard
Two maritime flanks, the so-called two Bs – the Black and Baltic Seas – are critically important in Russian imperial ambitions to exert influence over continental Europe. Moscow’s projection of military power and domination of European energy security are two key instruments of this strategy.
At the same time, the current geostrategic situation has created substantial limitations for Russia in the two Bs. Russian access within the Black Sea is severely restricted by the 1936 Montreux Convention as well as Ukraine’s highly successful asymmetric (so-called mosquito) naval operations using its fleet of Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) to curtail Russian naval operations in the northeastern Black Sea and shut down Russian supply lines to its forces operating in Syria via the highly touted ‘Syrian Express’.
Due to the closure of the Turkish Straits to warships in wartime between the two warring states (Russia and Ukraine) Moscow also is unable to reinforce or redeploy its naval forces from other parts of Russia to offset the losses of its Black Sea fleet, such as the sinking of the Moskva heavy cruiser and other naval ships due to Ukrainian USV attacks.
In the Baltic Sea it is about the eastern part of the Baltic where Russia`s geostrategic position with a small coastline is limiting its naval missions as the Russian navy lacks the freedom to maneuver. The above-mentioned developments have greatly affected Russian naval deployment patterns in the two Bs, thereby denying Moscow the opportunity to achieve what naval strategists such as A.T. Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett have referred as a ‘concentration of force’, which in this case are its two maritime flanks – or what Mahan referred to as the Inland Seas.
The Two B’s in Russian Naval Strategy
When assessing the two Bs, it is important to keep in mind that in naval strategy the Baltic and Black Seas represent what are referred to as a "closed naval theater." The idea behind this strategic concept was advocated by German naval strategist Vice Admiral Hermann Kirchhoff (1851-1932) of the Imperial German Navy. Kirchhoff argued that geography greatly influences naval operations and that conditions in a closed naval theater in the Baltic are much different from the open ocean, such as the Atlantic. Kirchhoff identified the possession of and access to a country’s coastline as the main factor shaping naval operation and that based upon these naval strategists should apply the use of naval forces to a theater of military operations. Understanding this distinction is important to clarify how the geography of continental powers like Germany and Russia influence their strategic approaches to naval operations.
In-land Seas and Maritime Flanks
Reliance on the coastline is always crucial for advancement in Russian naval strategy aimed at dominating the Inland Seas of its two maritime flanks in Europe. It is especially important when assessing Russia's long-term war against Ukraine and what shapes Russian military strategy in the northern Black Sea. The experience of the Ukraine war is convincing in this regard as Moscow has consistently pursued military objectives aimed at diminishing the Ukrainian coastline in the Black Sea which has dropped to only 20 percent of its pre-2014 length due to Russian encroachment. At first glance the land-centric nature of Russia's war against Ukraine also has a clear focus on the maritime domain. Often ignored by Western security experts, Russian armed aggression against Ukraine is a war for control over the warm southern seas, which in this case is the northern Black Sea coastline. This can only be achieved by seizing Ukraine’s remaining coastal territories that are of exceptional importance to the Kremlin. Once achieved, Moscow hopes to one-day to resume construction of a large ocean going fleet, including nuclear-powered destroyers and aircraft carriers in Crimean and other key shipyards.
Although, the closure of the Turkish straits to warship navigation of the warring states and Ukraine’s successful asymmetric naval missions have dramatically altered the regional geostrategic situation to Moscow’s disadvantage, it would be a mistake to think that these changes were perceived by the Kremlin as irreversible. No indications exist, however, that Moscow is ready to give up the gains made in 2014 after its annexation of Crimea.
Meanwhile, the Kremlin continues to build up its operational capabilities in and around southern Ukraine, both maritime and coastal, including asymmetric ones, as a major southern strategic offensive against Ukraine seems to be on the horizon for Moscow in its 2025 plans. In the framework of such strategy, Russian actions in the eastern front in Donbas and north of Kharkiv might also be aimed at tying down the bulk of Ukrainian defense forces which are concentrated in these two directions.
Hybrid Warfare in the Baltic
In the Baltic, Moscow is operating in a similar hybrid non-kinetic manner similar to its actions in Ukraine before its large-scale military invasion. Russian use of the Eagle-5 oil tanker in the Baltic and other vessels to sabotage undersea cables exemplifies the Kremlin`s gravitation to hidden kinetic activity. Ukraine`s experience in this regard underscores the fact that Moscow can pivot between non-kinetic and kinetic operations when conditions warrant their use. In light of the events above there is nothing to suggest that Moscow might avoid pursuing an open kinetic operation in the Baltic in 2025, or at least threaten to conduct one to force the West to reduce its support for Ukraine.
All things considered Russia’s maritime strategy is all about improving its geostrategic position on the aforementioned continental seas, this is a key trend to keep in mind when assessing Russian strategy in the two Bs in 2025. It should not be ruled out that at some point Moscow will not only launch a strategic operation to take control of the northern Black Sea coastline, but also pursue kinetic actions in the Baltic region.
As the Russian war in Ukraine enters its fourth year Ukraine and NATO should anticipate such a possibility and develop a new set of scenarios by taking into consideration that Russian ambitions in the Baltic and Black Sea have not diminished. The Kremlin is anxious for revenge in the Black Sea, and the importance of the Baltic theater to Moscow is only growing, not least against the backdrop of Russia’s embarrassing setback in Syria and the loss of a key strategic ally in the Mediterranean, which could fuel its drive to create mischief in the Baltic.
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