Dear Colleague,
On behalf of The Saratoga Foundation, we are delighted to present the first in a series on Eurasia as part of our extended network of regional analyses. This series features insights from prominent experts who will explore what may be in store for various parts of Eurasia in 2025 as we enter the new year.
The inaugural analysis focuses on the Caucasus — often described as the crossroads of Europe and Asia. This region remains geopolitically significant, rich in energy resources, and characterized by a remarkable ethnic complexity, sometimes referred to as the Eurasian Balkans.
In 2025, the Caucasus faces a mixture of challenges and opportunities, from shifting power dynamics among neighbors like Azerbaijan and Armenia to internal struggles, including the ongoing turmoil inside Georgia. Glancing northward, Chechnya remains an imperial outpost of Russian power ruled by Putin’s Quisling - Ramzan Kadyrov. This analysis compiles perspectives from leading experts on the Caucasus offering valuable insights into what the region might experience in the year ahead.
The Stalled Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Process: What to Expect in 2025?
Over the past two years, numerous unofficial deadlines for signing an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty have come and gone, each raising hopes among the people of both countries. In the first half of 2024, optimism surged, particularly as the United Nations Climate Conference (COP29) in Baku approached. The summit, held from November 11-24, seemed poised to serve as the stage for a historic breakthrough.
This optimism was not unfounded. Azerbaijan’s COP story began on a positive note with a prisoner exchange agreement with Armenia and Yerevan’s support to Azerbaijan’s bid to host the summit. This was followed by another significant development in April, when the two countries resolved a territorial dispute as Armenia agreed to return four occupied border villages (Baganys Ayrim, Ashagy Askipara, Kheyrimli and Gyzylhajily in the Gazakh district of the Republic of Azerbaijan) to Azerbaijan. The peaceful resolution of this issue was unprecedented in their entire post-Soviet history. This progress culminated in the signing of the first bilateral agreement between the two countries on August 30, which focused on the delimitation of their interstate border. The ratification of this agreement was completed just a couple of weeks before the COP29 summit.
Despite this promising trajectory, the peace process remains gridlocked as 2025 begins, with deep political and constitutional hurdles blocking further progress. Azerbaijan has made it clear that it will not sign a peace treaty unless Armenia amends its constitution to remove references to its 1990 Declaration of Independence, which calls for Karabakh’s unification with Armenia. However, Armenia’s Constitutional Court ruled in September 2024 that this preamble is non-amendable, effectively requiring a national referendum to implement any changes.
The political feasibility of such a referendum remains uncertain. Widespread public dissatisfaction with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s policies toward Azerbaijan, coupled with deep divisions within Armenia’s political landscape, could result in insufficient voter turnout or outright rejection of constitutional amendments. Opposition groups in Armenia and some diaspora groups, which dismiss Pashinyan’s argument that the claims to Karabakh in the preamble lack constitutional relevance, further fuel Azerbaijan’s distrust in Armenia’s political trajectory. The Azerbaijani government warns that any agreement signed under these circumstances risks being nullified by future Armenian governments influenced by revanchist opposition.
Beyond constitutional issues, the peace process is hindered by broader geopolitical disputes. Armenia has resisted Azerbaijan’s demands to terminate the defunct Minsk Group’s mission and end the deployment of the EU monitoring mission on its border with Azerbaijan. Furthermore, disagreements over the Zangezur Corridor and Armenia’s reluctance to commit to barring third-party forces along the border with Azerbaijan continue to exacerbate tensions. Moreover, another irritating factor for Baku is that the military supplies by France and India to Yerevan have added further layers of complexity to the problem by fueling revanchist sentiments in Armenia and thus further deepening the distrust of the Azerbaijani side in Armenia’s intentions.
Thus, the optimism that characterized late 2024 has been replaced with skepticism as entrenched political, constitutional, and geopolitical challenges persist. Without significant shifts in domestic and international dynamics, the prospect for meaningful progress toward a peace treaty in 2025 appears increasingly unlikely. As both countries navigate this impasse, the broader South Caucasus remains shrouded in uncertainty, with the risk of renewed hostilities ever-present. While 2024 demonstrated the potential for unprecedented cooperation, the road to a comprehensive peace agreement remains long and fraught with obstacles.
Will Putin Continue to Support His Loyal Foot Soldier Ramzan Kadyrov in 2025?
The relationship between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ramzan Kadyrov is an unusually trusting one. In his last visit to Chechnya in August 2024, Putin said of Kadyrov at a meeting at Grozny’s Special Forces University - “one such foot soldier is worth a lot.” Twice during his visit to Chechnya Putin referred to Ramzan's father, Akhmat Kadyrov, who was killed in 2004, as his friend.
As the head of Chechnya Ramzan Kadryov is allowed many things that no other leader of a Russian entity can afford. Not to mention having his own army, which has multiplied at least three times since the war in Ukraine began. Kadyrov’s forces have seen increases in paramilitary and law enforcement units as well as additions to units of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Rosgvardia.
Kadyrov's constant policy of supporting the Russian military campaign in Ukraine is exemplary. Some 50,000 Chechens reportedly have been sent from Chechnya over the past three years. Ironically, the number of Chechens still are an absolute minority among the units fighting against Ukraine. The Chechen town of Gudermes, which has been repeatedly attacked by Ukrainian drones in recent months, has been set up for the urgent preparation for war of volunteers. Mercenaries are invited from all over Russia to participate in training there and this factor is deeply appreciated by the Kremlin.
Despite these contributions Kadyrov repeatedly has posed a number of problems for Putin that have to be solved by the central government in Moscow. The first of these was Kadyrov’s attempted assassination on the former deputy chief of staff to the president of Uzbekistan Komil Allamjonov. This caused Kadyrov to threaten a series of reprisals against those in Uzbekistan who condemned the attack. Another instance were reports of extensive looting by Kadyrov ‘s military forces operating in Russian occupied territories of Ukraine which proved to be extremely embarrassing to the Kremlin.
The Chechen leader’s embarrasing escapades does not end here. He also has been repeatedly involved in criticizing and interfering in the affairs of federal officials appointed personally by the Russian president and in Russian foreign policy. He caused major outrage for his use of Ukrainian prisoners of war as human shields against attacks by Ukrainian drones inside Chechnya targeting the Special Forces University in Gudermes (near Grozny). The Russian media also chastised Kadyrov for the formation of his cabinet of ministers from among his own family members. But the last and most important point of outrage leveled against Kadyrov is his responsibility for Grozny air defenses firing on a civilian plane operated by Azerbaijani airlines last month.
During three years of war in Ukraine, Kadyrov has made great strides in ensuring that his team, in any negative scenario, can have a broad base of support, not only in Chechnya but also beyond its borders. Kadyrov’s men hold high positions in Russian federal cabinets, including among the team of presidential aides (Ruslan Edelgeriev, who is the assistant to the Russian president and special representative of the head of state for climate issues), several top-ranking officials in the Ministry of Justice (heads of the FSSN in Russia's regions, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Defense, and the Rosgvardia (assistant director of the Rosgvardia). State Duma deputies and senators are also exclusively trusted people. There has never been such an organization of people loyal to Kadyrov in the vertical of power in Chechnya under any other leader. The placement of his allies, and first of all family members is connected with the attempt to protect the interests of their numerous family (clan). The appointment of children, nephews, sons-in-law and close and distant relatives (in violation of Russian law) is specifically designed to cover important areas of regulation of life in the republic in the area of obtaining finances.
Lastly, 2024 ended with a grandiose scandal for Kadyrov, when ground-based air defenses in Grozny fired upon an Azerbaijani airplane which eventually crashed in the Kazakh city of Aktau. Putin was forced to publicly admit his mistake to the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliev in the downing of the AZAL civilian aircraft which he acknowledge crashed “due to shelling from the ground” and then apologized. Baku, however, is demanding recognition of the air defense fire on the plane and compensation for the victims of the accident.
Since Putin and Aliyev have spoken twice on this topic since the incident, we should expect Moscow to fulfill other demands raised by Baku as the number of Russian concessions climbs. But, here Putin will face political fallout inside Russia because the incident occurred in Kadyrov’s Chechnya, and the repercussions from this tragedy will be quite unpleasant for the Chechen leader. Putin does not apologize for anything. In this case, however, he was forced to publicly apologize, which is another sign of his loss of authority against the backdrop of the ongoing war in Ukraine. Consequently one of the great questions of 2025 is how much longer will Kadyrov continue to serve as the head of Chechnya amidst such controversy?
Kadyrov’s future will greatly depend on the head of Chechnya himself. Numerous reports have surfaced in the past year about a deterioration in Ramzan Kadyrov's health. Accordingly, the question of replacing Kadyrov with a new person will arise. In such a scenario Moscow may decide to replace Kadyrov with a person from his own team to avoid a redistribution of power and money in his clan based network. Should this occur Ramzan Kadyrov might step forward and offer various options for choosing his future successor which could include members of his own family (he has two daughters and three sons all of whom hold positions of responsibility in Chechnya) and could include members of his team, such as the Delimkhanov brothers, Magomed Daudov, Ruslan Edelgeriev, and others.
Whomever Kadyrov proposes, the choice will rest solely with the Kremlin, and according to the traditions of the Kremlin administration, it has already been determined, which means that it will come as no surprise either in Moscow or Grozny.
Georgia 2025: A Nation at a Crossroads
by Giorgi Pagava
As 2025 begins, Georgia remains entrenched in a fierce political battle that pits pro-European civil society, the political opposition, and former President Salome Zurabishvili against the ruling Georgian Dream party, led by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili. The ongoing political struggle in Georgia will decide not only the question of power in the Caucasian country, but also affects its foreign policy vector as well. One of the key questions arising from the tense internal struggle is whether Georgia will continue its integration into the Euro-Atlantic community: led by the European Union (EU), NATO, or will it remain in the orbit of Putin’s Russia?
Meanwhile, peaceful civil society protests continue in the Georgian capital Tbilisi and other Georgian cities. Since November 28, when Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze announced the suspension of Georgia's EU membership talks, rallies and demonstrations in Tbilisi and other Georgian cities have led to violent clashes with police. More than 400 protesters have been arrested while thirty of them are still in prison and many face long-term imprisonment.
Despite all this the protests continue. Every day, thousands of people continue to take part in demonstrations and rallies outside the parliament building demanding the release of political prisoners and new elections in the country as Georgia increasingly faces Russian style repression.
The United States has gone a step further by imposing personal sanctions against the founder and honorary chairman of the Georgian Dream party - Bidzina Ivanishvili - as well as more than a hundred Georgian officials, police officers, judges and civil servants responsible for violating democratic norms.
Georgian Dream officials, however, refuse to soften their position and are not making any concessions to the opposition and refuse to recognize the leader of the opposition movement, President Zurabishvili, as a legitimate partner. Georgian Dream also continues to avoid discussions with any of the leaders of the four pro-Western coalitions which received mandates in parliament as a result of the October 26 elections.
A major confrontation was avoided recently when Salome Zurabishvili decided to leave the presidential palace after the inauguration of the new president Mikheil Kavelashvili. Zurabishvili, however, declared that she will continue to be the main representative of the opposition movement in the West - in the United States as well as the EU.
As we enter 2025, protests in Georgia likely will intensify in parallel with the introduction of Western sanctions and a slowdown in Georgian economic growth. A serious economic crisis is already unfolding in Georgia's main industry - tourism. According to former Georgia prime minister Nika Gilauri (now one of the opposition leaders) the tourism sector in Georgia has declined by as much as 55 percent due to the ongoing political crisis.
Despite this economic setback it seems unlikely to compel the Georgian Dream government to concede to opposition demands for new elections. The outcome of the confrontation in Georgia remains unclear and largely depends on the position of the West. The determination of both Washington and Brussels to introduce even tougher sanctions against Ivanishvili and his team will help the opposition, but what is needed is for the West to provide Georgia with real security guarantees from possible Russian aggression at a level similar to the Baltic states.
Fears of renewed Russian aggression and the feeling of insecurity dominate much of the sentiment of Georgian society and is the “foundation” upon on which Ivanishvili builds his regime and helps him to actually receive hundreds of thousands of votes in the Georgian elections.
Unfortunately, the West failed to demonstrate its readiness not only during the rule of Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream party, but also during the presidency of former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, now imprisoned in Georgia. Even at the height of Western support Saakashvili was never able to obtain such guarantees either after Russia's open aggression in 2008, or after the Russian annexation of Crimea when Putin's strategy of occupying neighboring states became obvious to everyone, or after the Kremlin began its second bloody war of aggression against Ukraine in 2022.
The unresolved confrontation between Georgia’s democratic aspirations and autocratic governance will likely intensify throughout 2025. Whether Georgia moves closer to realizing its Euro-Atlantic ambitions or remains mired in political turmoil will largely depend on the West’s commitment to supporting the opposition movement and preventing Georgia from falling into a Russian sphere of influence. For now, Georgia stands at a crossroads, with its future hanging in the balance.
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