Dear Colleague,
The Mediterranean region stands poised at the nexus of significant geopolitical transformations in 2025, with ripple effects extending far beyond its shores. This year’s Eurasia 2025: Expert Outlook on the Mediterranean brings together three incisive analyses that delve into the shifting dynamics of North Africa, the Levant, and the broader Middle East, offering vital insights for policymakers and analysts.
Our first article examines the enduring Western Sahara conflict, a perennial source of tension between Morocco and Algeria, now set against the backdrop of an incoming U.S. administration that may redefine Washington’s role in the Maghreb. The potential recalibration of American policy under President Trump’s administration, coupled with Morocco’s domestic transitions, raises critical questions about stability in North Africa and the risk of renewed conflict.
The second piece explores the evolving landscape of jihadism in the wake of the Assad regime's collapse in Syria. With Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leading an interim government, jihadist factions face both opportunities and internal challenges as they navigate a fragmented Syria. This article provides a nuanced view of how the region's instability may incubate new threats, influence regional politics, and possibly create a new safe haven for jihadist networks.
Lastly, our third article assesses the precarious position of Russia in the Mediterranean following its potential loss of military bases in Syria. The fall of Bashar al-Assad has upended Moscow's long-standing geopolitical ambitions in the region, raising questions about the future of Russian power projection in the Mediterranean and its broader implications for NATO and U.S. security interests. With a weakened Kremlin, this moment presents a tremendous strategic opportunity for the West to counter Russian influence in the region.
These three articles collectively highlight the Mediterranean's critical role as a geopolitical crossroads where power struggles, ideological shifts, and strategic recalibrations will shape the future. As these developments unfold, the region’s trajectory will remain pivotal in reshaping the future of Eurasia.
Enjoy!
Will 2025 Bring an All-Out War in the Maghreb?
The Western Sahara conflict is set to remain one of the most critical geopolitical issues affecting North Africa in 2025. Morocco closed 2024 reaffirming its sovereignty over this territory, in a year in which also France – after Spain – changed course and backed Rabat’s quest for sovereignty.
The dispute over Western Sahara has pitted Morocco, which annexed the former territory controlled by Spain, against the Polisario Front, which seeks independence for the territory with the support of Algeria, since 1975. Since 2021, Algeria and Morocco have been embroiled in a renewed diplomatic crisis.
With a new US administration arriving in late January the Maghreb could emerge as one of its most pressing policy challenges, despite being historically an area not particularly significant in Washington’s calculations. On this issue, the first Trump administration structurally changed the American approach, by bringing Morocco into the framework of the Abraham Accords. In previous decades, all U.S. administrations had maintained a neutral stance, reiterating that the issue should be addressed within the framework of the United Nations. Historically, Republican administrations had shown greater sensitivity to Rabat's desires, but never to the extent of substantively altering the approach as Trump did.
Outgoing US President Joseph Biden has done nothing to reverse this shift officially, despite President Trump’s formal decision to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over these territories only came in December 2020, after his electoral defeat. Many in the Biden administration were not particularly convinced of continuing down that path, but reversing such a significant decision without alienating an ally like Morocco would have been extremely difficult. Biden has thus adopted a stance of rhetorical ambiguity on the issue, as noted by the International Crisis Group.
The Biden administration has carefully dodged the issue by recalibrating the official U.S. position, avoiding direct references to Moroccan sovereignty, not following through on Trump’s controversial promise to open a U.S. consulate in Dakhla. It also has considered the autonomy plan not as “the only basis” for resolving the conflict, as defined by the previous administration, but merely as “a potential approach” toward a solution. Under President Biden the United States has sought to maintain a careful balance in its relationship with Algeria, the balancing role played by the current administration has helped contain tensions and prevent an open war.
With the return of President elect Donald J. Trump, however, this role could change. The newly announced US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, for example, is considered to be extremely pro-Moroccan. Officials in Rabat know how to exploit the rules of the game in Washington D.C., using Morocco’s extensive influence among the think tanks and diplomatic and para-diplomatic circles and knows how to benefit from these relationships. Additionally, Morocco is known to retain a certain affinity with Republican circles, where it also maintains strong ties.
Finally, there is a more immediate but no less important element to consider inside Morocco. In recent months, it has become evident that Morocco's Crown Prince, Moulay El-Hassan, is playing an increasingly public role, as demonstrated by his meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, who was welcomed in Casablanca during his recent November 2024 visit.
King Mohammed VI's health remains problematic, and if it were to deteriorate suddenly, the transition could occur much sooner than expected. In this context, there might be pressure from the Moroccan side to push the incoming Trump administration to resolve the Western Sahara issue in Rabat’s favor in the early months of his presidency, thus altering the balancing role the United States has played under President Biden. Should this happen, the risk of an all-out conflict between Morocco and Algeria would rise dramatically and North Africa could experience a renewed crisis in stability creating what political risk analysts refer to as a ‘Gray Rhino Event’ event as few foreign policy experts may not anticipate a potential conflict erupting in the Western Sahara.
*Please note the opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent the view of his employer.
Jihadists Challenges and Opportunities in 2025: Will Syria Becomes the New Battleground?
by Murad Batal
Jihadists are basking in their first major success: the downfall of al-Assad's strong regime in the Middle East. Jihadism, however, faces many significant challenges and opportunities in 2025, but the collapse of the 50-year-old Assad regime will likely introduce new opportunities as the interim government led by Syrian jihadists of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) try to rebrand itself by adopting a more moderate rhetoric which has made the group popular among ordinary Syrians. But one of the interesting areas to monitor in the coming year is whether differences between the various jihadist factions inside Syria might trigger major internal disagreements, particularly among hardcore jihadists. This could lead to defections and a shift towards mainstream jihadism.
As we glance across the jihadist landscape there are groups that make up the so-called Islamic State jihadist network which harbor a deep enmity towards HTS. These groups have been particularly active in the Sahel and Afghanistan and are likely to attempt to return to the Arab world through Syria. To elevate their image these groups may begin attacking HTS, sparking violence among jihadist factions in Syria at a time when the interim government is in its early stages of development.
Should these groups return to Syria then it could become a possible incubator for Jihadist groups seeking to topple secular Arab regimes, such as Egypt and neighboring Jordan. Western audiences should keep in mind that Syria has a unique geopolitical role in the Middle East acting as a bridge stretching from the Levant to the Euphrates and this could work to the advantage of jihadists. Just as western policymakers feared that a power vacuum left in Afghanistan following the US departure which led to the takeover by the Taliban Syria likewise could follow a similar fate and potentially emerge as a new safe haven for ISIS.
Foreign fighters, including Chechens, Uzbeks, Uyghurs, and other Arab nationalities, who have stayed in Syria, could potentially challenge the new HTS rulers. Therefore, the future of these groups will become a focal point for political negotiations as well as a source of polarization due to various rival groups.
Exploiting the Defeat of Hamas
Another interesting trend to monitor is whether jihadists will seek to exploit Hamas's defeat in Gaza. These militant groups have been closely monitoring the growing popularity of Hamas following the 7 October 2023 attack. Despite their bitter relationship, jihadists will likely use narratives about Gaza to spread their ideology among frustrated Arab youth, and may present themselves as an alternative, citing civilian casualties, the destruction of the Gaza Strip, and Western hypocrisy. This could lead to a rise in lone wolf attacks in various regions until jihadist groups, especially ISIS, can regroup and rebuild the networks they lost since their defeat in Mosul in 2017.
History shows that Arab structured jihadist groups tend to return to Arab world as they did in moving from Chechnya to Iraq, or when the former al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab Suri urged jihadists to use Central Asia as launching pad with aim to return to Arab countries.
A recent editorial in the Islamic State online magazine ِAl-Naba’, IS Weekly, published on December 12, 2024, (11th Jumada al-Akhera 1446H) proclaiming this point noting that: "After the fall of the Assad regime, the so-called "Islamic State” expressed their opinion with an editorial in its main magazine al-Naba, titled "Domestication and Recruitment." The article framed what had occurred as a "deliberate replacement of the Nusayri regime [a term jihadists use to refer to the Assad regime] with a system that combats Sharia through ‘Shara’ (double entendre in Arabic).”
Al-Naba’ also argued that the use of "domesticated jihadists" as a method of counterterrorism reflects their belief that "there is no point in pursuing the path of jihad to achieve the desired change." This statement highlights the rupture between the two sides, rooted in their differing interpretations of the dualities that govern jihadist ideology. It also further underscores the point that Syria is in the forefront of thinking among competing jihadist groups and that the country’s future could play a major role in shaping the future of jihadism.
Will 2025 Mark the End of the Russian Military Presence in the Mediterranean?
by Andrii Ryzhenko
Since the overthrow of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, Russia’s strategic foothold in the Mediterranean has remained in a state of limbo. 2025 may be the year that Moscow completely loses its foothold in Tartus as the naval base has been the pillar upon which the Kremlin has built its geopolitical ambitions in the Mediterranean for over half a century.
At the time of the writing of this article Russia’s naval presence at Tartus is in a heightened state of uncertainty as Russian forces await approval from the interim rebel government in Damascus led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to evacuate Russian military forces from Syria. Several Russian cargo ships have been waiting outside the port along with several Russian warships since January 6.
Until recently Russia maintained two important military bases in Syria: the naval supply point in Tartus and the airbase in Khmeimim. Russia currently has approximately 7500 forces operating in Syria and their future remains uncertain. As a loyal servant of the Kremlin Syrian despot Bashar Assad signed an official intergovernmental agreement with Moscow in 2017 on the expansion and leasing of the two Syrian bases at Tartus and Khmeimem for 49 years with the agreement set to expire in 2067 (the agreement was signed in 2017 but was not ratified by the Russian parliament until January 2018). Maintaining a Russian military influence in the Mediterranean has been an ongoing geopolitical objective for the Kremlin since the Cold War and recently was reiterated in the official Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation in 2022.
Significant uncertainty continues to shroud the future of the Russian presence in Syria. Over a month since seizing power, former Syrian rebels have shown a warming of relations with their former Russian enemy. Russian forces effectively remain in Syria under the protection of the rebel group 'Hayat Tahrir al-Sham' (HTS) which until recently Russian war planes had mercilessly been bombing since Putin intervened in Syria in 2015. As HTS forms a transitional government in Syria, it is attempting to lay the foundations for its future foreign policy but it remains unclear what their position will be toward permitting the Russians to stay in Syria and whether extraditing former Syrian leader Assad from Moscow might also be part of those plans
The new de facto leader of Syria, Ahmad al-Sharaa, recently noted in an interview with al-Arabiya that he hopes for the withdrawal of Russian troops stating: “We do not want Russia to leave Syria in a way that undermines its relations with our country” and emphasized he wants to maintain relations with Russia but insists that “any ties must be based on mutual respect.” Thus, the fate of the Russian leasing agreement for the bases in Tartus and Khmeimim is unclear even though the basing agreement expires in 2067.
Russia’s Dilemma
Several compelling arguments exist as to why Russia might be allowed to stay in Syria. First of all is the fact of Syria's debt write-off of $9.78 billion in 2005. Secondly, the Syrian government is completely dependent on Russian weapons and oil and gas equipment. The interim Syrian government will likely have great difficulty replacing these two important items. Meanwhile, Russian officials, told ITAR-TASS that they continue to insist on the agreement’s implementation and that they have a tentative agreement in place to stay on at Tartus and Khmeimem. One Ukrainian news portal reported that Russia might be allowed to retain as many as 3,000 servicemen at the two Syrian bases. It remains unclear, however, how Moscow might continue to logistically support its forces in Syria since there are reports that Russian military units at these bases were running short of food and water. This could be a major sign that HTS is not cooperating with the Russian forces and could be preventing their resupply, which is a clear form of pressure likely aimed at pressuring the Russians to end their presence in Syria.
As Moscow awaits a decision from the interim Syrian government on whether it can stay there are reports of Russian military forces and their advanced S-400 air defense systems, aircraft, and approximately1,000 personnel being transferred from Syria to eastern Libya. In recent days it beginning to appear that Russian forces might be stranded in Syria. On January 9, the Kyiv Post reported that 4 of the 6 Russian operated S400 batteries in Syria were sitting near the pier in Tartus as Moscow awaits approval for their relocation to Russian cargo ships that have been waiting offshore for the past week.
Two reasons likely explain the delay from Tartus. One is that officials in Moscow appears to be examining the possibility of widening its military presence in the eastern part of Libya and might be planning to redeploy these forces to North Africa. Russian warships may be granted the right to permanent deployment in one of the ports in eastern Libya, such as Benghazi, which is situated several hundred kilometers from the coasts of Greece and Italy. Another reason could be that Moscow wants to ship its prized S400s back to Russia to strengthen its air defenses for its ongoing war in Ukraine but the interim HTS-led government wants some sort of concession from Moscow in return.
Will Putin Pivot to Libya?
The issue of establishing a permanent presence in eastern Libya has been ongoing with Libyan despot Khalifa Haftar since 2008, after Russia wrote off Libya's debt of $4.5 billion, and Moscow reportedly dispatched Wagner mercenaries to assist General Haftar, in his unsuccessful effort to oust from power the pro-western Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. General Haftar actively has been trying to obtain Russian air defense systems to protect against the Turkish-backed GNA forces opposing him in Tripoli. Unlike Haftar, the GNA is recognized by the United Nation’s and supported by the West and more importantly by Turkiye.
After General Haftar's meeting with Putin in Moscow in September 2023 work began on a corresponding military agreement with the Moscow-backed Haftar forces. Haftar’s situation is quite complicated given his fears that excessive sympathy from Russia could cost him the support of his own army and provoke opposition from supporters of the internationally recognized Libyan government. Recently Libyan Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah publicly spoke out against the transfer of Russian military equipment to the country from Syria and this likely reflects the view of the Turkish government in Ankara as well.
Putin’s Geopolitical Setback in the Mediterranean
With the overthrow of the Assad regime and the possible loss of a 53-year-old military presence in Syria Moscow could be on the verge of one of its biggest geopolitical defeats in the Middle East, certainly equal to Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat’s expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt in 1972. Should this occur Moscow could lose access to an entire region – the Mediterranean. Moreover, it would cease being a threat to the United States navy – its biggest naval competitor in the region and would deprive Moscow of the ability to counter NATO forces in the eastern Mediterranean. Earlier this week a Russian Kilo-class submarine the Novorossisk left the Mediterranean leaving the Kremlin with no remaining submarine threat against US naval forces in the region for the first time in decades.
Lastly, while the loss of Tartus is strategically significant, the loss of Khmeimim airbase in Syria is an equally significant blow as well. It would deprive Moscow of a crucial aerial transit point for moving Russian military assets to African countries to support President Putin’s Wagner Afrika Corps and would greatly inhibit Russian power projection not only into Libya - but the rest of the sub-Saharan and African continent as well. Due to the magnitude of the geopolitical setback caused by the downfall of Assad it is extremely likely that Russia will use whatever leverage it can muster to prolong its presence in Syria while also pursuing military options in Libya to establish some sort of permanent basing at the port in Benghazi or the air base at al-Khadim near the Egyptian border.
The United States and its NATO allies should use this moment of Kremlin weakness to deprive Russia of the opportunity to retain any permanent military presence in the Mediterranean. If Russian forces were to remain in the region, they would continue to threaten NATO naval forces, and foster and support terrorist regimes in Africa and the Middle East.
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