Eurasia Outlook: Nationalities at War: Non-Ethnic Russians in Putin's War Against Ukraine
Hi everyone,
Welcome to this special issue of Eurasia Outlook dedicated to the Russian use of non-ethnic Russians in its three-year-old war in Ukraine. Due to the importance of this topic, The Saratoga Foundation thought it would be a good idea to dive deeper into this issue by examining its broader strategic impact on Russia’s regions.
While the common perception in the West is that Moscow is using non-Russian forces simply as cannon fodder, the issue also carries strategic consequences, especially considering that 30 percent of Russia’s population is ethnically non-Russian. By examining how Russian nationalities are being used in the war, we may also uncover another layer of inequality: ethnic Russians from rural areas, rather than those from major urban centers, appear to be bearing a disproportionate share of the casualties. Why does this matter? As Russian military losses continue to rise, the Kremlin may be forced to recruit more heavily from urban populations, such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, which could undermine domestic support for the war.
To explore this issue more in-depth, we present three articles by noted regional experts on this topic: Paul Goble, Mairbek Vatchagaev, and Valeriy Dzutsati. Goble notes that Putin has used non-Russians as a scapegoat for criticism of Russian atrocities against Ukrainian civilians, such as the case of the Bucha massacre being blamed on ethnic Buryats, a Russian ethnic group residing in the Russian Far East. Goble also underscores the point that non-ethnic Russians fighting alongside Russian units serve as an important propaganda tool domestically to demonstrate that Russia is not alone in fighting its war against Ukraine.
Vatchagaev examines the role of Chechen forces in the war, noting that while they have had little impact on the battlefield—largely serving in rear service duties—their participation has significantly expanded the power and influence of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. Kadyrov remains the only regional head in Russia with his own national army. The war has allowed him to grow his forces, amass wealth, and become increasingly autonomous, raising concerns that his forces could eventually turn against Moscow’s control.
Lastly, Dzutsati assesses the role of North Ossetian forces in the Ukraine war. Many Ossetians have flocked to fight in the three-year-old conflict as over 12,000 Ossetians currently serve in the Russian army. The Ukraine war has taken a heavy toll on the mostly Orthodox Ossetian society and is starting to cause many Ossetians to question their support for the war. This, in turn, may have an important impact on a key base of support for Moscow in the predominantly Muslim North Caucasus.
Enjoy!
Putin’s Use and Abuse of Non-Russians in His War in Ukraine
Since Vladimir Putin began his expanded war in Ukraine in February 2022, his regime has disproportionately drafted or otherwise impressed into military service members of non-Russian nations; and a disproportionate number of them have been wounded, killed or taken prisoner That has led to charges that he is using the conflict to carry out a genocide against these nations by pointing out that combat losses among those recruited from equally poor but predominantly ethnic Russian regions are as high or even higher.
In fact, Putin’s use of non-Russians in his military forces fighting against Ukraine serves three purposes that are seldom discussed or even recognized: First, it is part of his effort to play down the overall size of his action in the eyes of Russians and even some in the West by limiting the number of Russians from Moscow and other major cities where there are more journalists and diplomats reporting about what is going on. Second, it is intended to promote the idea that any atrocities committed by Russian forces in Ukraine at Bucha (the so-called Myth of Bucha) or elsewhere are the work of non-Russians, a charge many in the West and even some in the Russian opposition have repeated. (For criticism of an especially egregious case of this last phenomenon, see indigenous-russia.com/archives/43425.) And third, it is designed to encourage Russian soldiers to think that their commanders will sacrifice non-Russians before they put their fellow Russians at risk, thus providing a basis for unit cohesion and loyalty among ethnic Russians who remain the overwhelming majority of soldiers in Putin’s army
In all this, Putin is both continuing and departing from Moscow’s earlier approaches to dealing with the problems arising from the presence of non-Russians in the military . In Soviet times, Moscow accepted and then organized non-Russian units first between 1920 and 1938, banned them in that year, and then restored them during World War II, only to do away with them once again when that conflict was over. (On this complicated history, see in particular the comprehensive studies by Russian military historian Aleksey Bezugolny.
In post-Soviet times, Moscow first ended the draft in the North Caucasus fearful that men from there were disloyal and would use any military training they received against the Russian state and then after a time not only restored the draft but allowed Chechnya and other federal subjects to set up their own military and paramilitary organizations that are intended to work with and in support of the Russian military and later restored that status.
The status and fate of non-Russians in Putin’s war against Ukraine highlights two broader issues that have seldom attracted the attention they deserve. On the one hand, they make clear that the Russian army in Ukraine is hardly the purely ethnic Russian force that Putin likes to suggest and that many in the West accept without question. And on the other, this absence of attention has obscured the very real fact that the share of non-Russians in the Russian military more generally is far higher than the share of non-Russians in the population of the Russian Federation, perhaps approaching parity with the ethnic Russians in some units, judging from data on the relative size of nationalities in the prime draft age cohort. In the case of these people in Ukraine, they may even be becoming a wildcard in the conflict, given that their loyalty is far from certain and some of them have been willing to cross over to join pro-Ukrainian national units fighting against the Putin invasion . And in the case of the Russian Federation as a whole, this means there are potentially far more people with armed training who may not stand by Moscow in the event of a weakening of the Kremlin, something that must certainly give the Kremlin pause and that should be factored into Western analyses.
But pointing to these larger problems should not distract us from what Putin policies in disproportionately using non-Russians in his war in Ukraine is doing in the case of one group of nations that is particularly at risk. Because Russian officials find it especially easy to compel men in the smallest nations in the Russian Federation to serve in the military, the impact of Putin’s war is especially hard on them given how many men from these communities have been impressed into service relative to their size. As activist Dmitry Berezhkov, the editor of the Russia of the Indigenous Peoples portal notes, “if a large nation loses a few hundred men, that is one thing; but if a numerically small one loses even far fewer, that can disrupt the transmission of language and culture on which their survival depends”. That is happening in particular among the more than 40 numerically small peoples of the Russian North and Far East and many of them are already being harmed by Putin’s war in Ukraine even though that conflict is situated hundreds if not thousands of kilometers from their homelands. And some of the smallest of these nations may not manage to survive as a result.
Given Putin’s “Russian world” obsessions, it is unlikely that he cares about their fate or even the fate of larger non-Russian nations within the current borders of the Russian Federation. He wants to use non-Russian soldiers to convince Russians that they are not as involved in his war as in fact they are; he wants to use them to allow Russians and others in the West to conclude that it is the “barbarous” Buryats or some other non-Russians who are guilty of any atrocities his forces have been charged with; and he wants to ensure that ethnic Russians will view him as their defender rather than as their enemy and thus support him even more unquestionably. If all this leads to genocide, the Kremlin leader almost will dismiss that as collateral damage, albeit a kind he won’t be unhappy with. It is morally imperative that no one in the West adopts a similar position.
Chechens Fighting Against Ukraine
The Head of the Chechen government, Magomed Daudov, reported that since the beginning of military operations in Ukraine, five regiments and five battalions have been formed and integrated so far into the structure of the Russian Ministry of Defense. According to his data, over the three years of war, 54,262 Chechen servicemen have been dispatched to the Ukrainian front, including 21,283 volunteers from various regions of Russia who underwent training at a specialized center in Gudermes. Daudov also stated that as of early March, over 11,000 personnel from Chechnya were actively participating in military operations against Ukraine.
Additionally, Chechen authorities claim that more than 35 billion rubles, ($421 million) have been allocated from the republic’s budget—already reliant on federal subsidies—to support military operations in Ukraine.
The role of Chechen military personnel in Ukraine is limited to supporting operations: they engage in mine clearance operations, patrolling, and guarding facilities but do not participate in major combat actions, assaults, or military police duties. Despite claims by Ramzan Kadyrov, the Kremlin-anointed leader in Chechnya, about his units "liberating" Ukrainian settlements, these reports have not been confirmed by independent sources. The Kadyrovites have received the ironic name “tiktok troops”, implying that they film everything far away from the theater of active military operations.
On March 16, 2023, the Head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, called upon residents of the republic to voluntarily join new military formations being created under the instructions of Russian President Vladimir Putin. He emphasized that for Chechens, participating in the "special military operation" is not merely a duty but also a sacred religious obligation, giving the conflict the nature of a jihad.
Attempts to create military units from Sufi circles have failed. Sufism is a mystical sect of Islam that is prevalent in the North Caucasus and historically has been a major foundation for Chechen and North Caucasus resistance to Russian rule for over a century and dates back to the times of Imam Shamyl.
Kadyrov appealed to Sufi communities in Chechnya in November 2022 to form their own battalions for involvement in combat actions against Ukraine because he wanted to demonstrate to the Chechen populace that he was also supported by the followers of Sufism, including the followers of Kadiriyya (a major Sufi order in Chechnya) to which Ramzan Kadyrov's family (the brotherhood of Sheikh Kunta-Khadji Kishiev) belongs. In January 2023, the Chechen leadership organized an intensive military training program for all imams and qadis of the republic. Ultimately, both initiatives proved unfeasible, forcing the leadership to abandon further efforts to involve Sufis in combat operations in Ukraine.
Kadyrov's interests in the conflict zone are evidenced by his associates seizing control over dozens of businesses in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories held by the Russian army since 2022. They gain control by appointing members of Kadyrov's clan to oversee enterprises that promise rapid profitability with minimal production investment.
Makeup of Kadyrov’s Forces
Russian military structure stipulates that regiments typically number around 1,200 personnel, and battalions approximately 300. However, it is important to understand that mentioning a regiment or battalion in the context of military operations does not imply that the entire unit is deployed to the conflict zone. In reality, only about one-third of a regiment or battalion is at the frontline at any one time. The remaining two-thirds are either preparing to replace the first group or carrying out duties at permanent bases as per standard organizational procedures.
What has compounded Kadyrov’s problems through his forces military involvement in Ukraine is that the Chechen leadership is experiencing a pronounced shortage of personnel, evidenced by instances where some of Kadyrov’s appointees for these military positions also continue holding their positions in Chechnya while formally serving in the conflict zone in Ukraine. For instance, Ismail Aguev, head of the Kurchaloy District Police Department, officially retains his post in Chechnya despite having served three years in the combat zone. Therefore, when Kadyrov claims he is ready to send 84,000 Chechens (total population in the republic 1.6 million people) to the war in Ukraine, it is, to put it mildly, far from reality. For perspective, even for the entirety of Russia, with a population of 144 million, this figure exceeds the three-month recruitment quota for the entire Russian army.
Currently, Chechen units that are, in one way or another, linked to Ukraine, with command structures formed from individuals who have undergone rigorous selection and proven their complete loyalty to Ramzan Kadyrov consist of the following.
78th Motorized Rifle Regiment "Sever-Akhmat" named after A. Kadyrov, Russian Ministry of Defense (stationed at the former tank unit in Shali). The regiment is part of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, commanded by Zaindi Zingiev. Its formation was announced by September 2022. The regiment includes fighters experienced in combat operations in Syria and Ukraine. As of February 2025, it was stationed near Chasiv Yar, in the Bakhmut district of the Donetsk region, Ukraine.
Special Police Regiment named after A.A. Kadyrov of the Chechen Interior Ministry, commanded by police colonel Zamid Chalaev, has been participating in the occupation of Ukrainian territories since February 2022. Chalaev claimed his unit fought in battles for Mariupol and has been sanctioned by all EU countries for involvement in the invasion of Ukraine and deportation of Ukrainian children. At the start of the war, Kadyrov designated him responsible for operations in the Luhansk area.
94th Operational Regiment of Rosgvardia (military unit 6779, Urus-Martan), part of the 46th Zhukov Order Independent Operational Brigade—a tactical unit of the Russian National Guard, commanded by Colonel Khasmagomed Magomadov.
96th Operational Regiment of Rosgvardia (military unit 6780, Gudermes), part of the 46th Zhukov Order Independent Operational Brigade—a tactical unit of the Russian National Guard, commanded by Magomed Tushaev.
270th Motorized Rifle Regiment "Akhmat-Kavkaz", Russian Ministry of Defense, commanded by Khusein Mezhidov (previously commander of the 249th Separate Special Battalion "South" within Rosgvardia), is part of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division. The commander was accused by Ukrainian authorities of hostage-taking and participating in battles around Hostomel, Ukraine.
141st Special Motorized Regiment "Sever" named after Hero of Russia Akhmat-Khadzhi Kadyrov, Grozny formation of Rosgvardia (military unit 4156, Grozny), part of the 46th Zhukov Order Independent Operational Brigade, commanded by Colonel Musa Besaev. Members of this regiment include Zaur Dalaev, accused of murdering Russian politician Boris Nemtsov, and Ruslan Geremeev, a witness in the same case. This regiment is also known as "Sever-Akhmat" or simply "Akhmat" under the Russian Ministry of Defense, and includes three battalions:
Battalion "Zapad-Akhmat," commander Ismail Aguev (were stationed in the Belgorod region of Russia).
Battalion "Vostok-Akhmat," commander Vakha Khambulatov (were stationed in the vicinity of the Zaporozhye front).
Battalion "Yug-Akhmat," commander Musa Iblaev (were stationed in the area of the Zaporozhye front).
Regiment "Akhmat-Rossiya," Russian Ministry of Defense, commanded by Zaurbek Elimkhanov.
Regiment "Akhmat-Chechnya," Russian Ministry of Defense, commanded by Aslanbek Saliev.
Special Forces "Akhmat," Russian Ministry of Defense, primarily consists of residents from Russian regions who come to Chechnya for brief training at the Russian Special Forces University in Gudermes. It's believed their equipment provided through this university is superior compared to other Russian units. The unit is mainly stationed in Russia’s Kursk region, near the border with Ukraine. Commander Apti Alaudinov has also served as Deputy Head of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces since April 2024 and is under multiple international sanctions.
10. Battalion "Vakha," part of the Akhmat Special Forces, operates in the Kharkiv and Lysychansk directions.
11. PPSP Battalion "Grozny," commanded separately by the Chechen Interior Ministry, commander Usman Edilgiriyev.
12. Battalion named after Sheikh Mansur, Russian Ministry of Defense, commander Ruslan Geremeev (a witness in the Nemtsov murder case), partially based in Gudermes.
13. Battalion named after Baysangur Benoevsky, Rosgvardia, commander Bekhan Chalaev, sanctioned by the US and several EU countries, partially based in Gudermes.
14. Battalion "Akhmat-1," Rosgvardia, commander Zaurbek Rashaev.
15. OMON "Akhmat-Grozny," Rosgvardia, commander police colonel Anzor Bisaev.
16. OMON "Akhmat-1," Rosgvardia, commander Alikhan Shovkhalov ("Legion").
17. OMON "Akhmat-Krepost," Rosgvardia transportation unit, led by Ramzan Kadyrov’s relative, police major Abdul-Kerim Kadyrov.
18. SOBR "Akhmat," Rosgvardia, commander Abuzayd Vismuradov.
Today, Ramzan Kadyrov commands over two dozen armed structures which, although formally under the Russian Defense Ministry, Interior Ministry, and Rosgvardia, practically operate as combat units independent from central command, and remain loyal exclusively to Kadyrov himself. It is worth recalling that before the war in Ukraine, Kadyrov controlled six Rosgvardia units in Chechnya and a police regiment. This has vast symbolic importance because Kadyrov remains the only regional leader in Russia who controls and operates these formations.
One of the interesting developments resulting from Chechen involvement in the Ukraine conflict is that Kadyrov’s influence has grown significantly due to the war. Kadyrov has seen an expansion of the military and law-enforcement formations under his control that formally belong to the Russian Ministry of Defense, the National Guard, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, while more state resources from the Kremlin have been put at his disposal. Kadyrov also has seen a growth in his business interests in Russian-occupied Donbas due to the war, where Chechen units are active in extortion and confiscating local property and assets seized by his forces. It is precisely thanks to this bolstering of his military and security power that Kadyrov has become the most influential regional leader in Russia, and he is now focused on consolidating his authority at every level, federal and local, building a vertical power structure around himself.
Kadyrov’s resolute stance in supporting everything Vladimir Putin does regarding the war in Ukraine gives him a powerful argument to reinforce his influence at the federal level as well. In Moscow, they understand that tens of thousands of armed supporters stand behind him. The allegiance of these units to Kadyrov rather than to the Russian state ultimately could become a source of complication for Moscow in the long term that the Kremlin may not be able to control. Images of the June 2023 Prigozhin mutiny still haunt the memories of many Russian officials. Therefore, there is a risk that, if any disagreements arise between Moscow and Grozny, these forces might side with Kadyrov, returning Moscow’s position to a 1999-style scenario—namely, the need to reassert Russian control over the North Caucasus republic.
North Ossetians at War in Ukraine
After more than three years of Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has suffered about 900,000 troop casualties, including up to 250,000 killed, according to NATO estimates. Ethnic minorities comprise a disproportionate share of Russian military personnel losses, according to Moscow Times. Along with other minorities, North Ossetians have actively participated in the Russian invasion of Ukraine despite the relatively small population of 680,000. The exact numbers are unknown, however, according to semi-official sources, around 12,000 Ossetians served in the Russian army in Ukraine as of summer 2024. This number may include members of other ethnic groups living in North Ossetia and some South Ossetians.
Russia’s success in recruiting North Ossetians for the war in Ukraine, in part, can be explained by the relative poverty of Ossetians along with other peripheral groups in the Russian Federation. Large signup bonuses and salaries attract many people to volunteer. Another factor is attributed to the leadership of North Ossetia which likely helped recruitment. Republican governor Sergei Menyailo is a retired Vice Admiral who served as deputy commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea. After the peninsula was annexed by Russia in 2014, Menyailo served as the governor of Sevastopol for two years. He is also under U.S. sanctions, according to the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
Three publicly known “Ossetian battalions” are reportedly currently fighting in Ukraine: Alania, Storm-Ossetia, and Sarmat. Although these military units are supposed to be organized on an ethnic identity principle, in fact, to a significant extent, they are “diluted” with other ethnicities, primarily, Russians. The North Ossetian governor Sergei Menyailo has been pushing for the establishment of a regiment based on one of the said battalions since the summer of 2024. As of early April 2025, it remains unclear if the formation of the regiment has been completed or not. According to the official advertisement, the regiment is accepting men of ages 18 to 60 and are offering a signup bonus the equivalent of about $21,000 and a monthly salary of about $2,300, according to the North Ossetian Committee for Print and Mass Communications). Despite these significant bonuses, Ossetian authorities have apparently faced difficulties in forming the new regiment.
The sluggish growth of new recruitment of Ossetians may be explained in part by high casualties. As of March 25, 2025, the joint project implemented by Mediazona and BBC identified by name 100,001 Russian casualties. 742 of the casualties come from North Ossetia, while the number is more than twice as large as casualties from Chechnya – 337 or Kabardino-Balkaria – 255. Dagestanis and Russians in the Stavropol region suffered more casualties than North Ossetians, respectively 1368 and 1539. However, given their much larger population sizes, North Ossetia was still impacted by war losses more on a per capita basis. However, these numbers are evidently incomplete, as the project team suggests, and the final tally could be significantly different.
Under the conditions of de facto censorship and high levels of repression, many citizens of Russia either do not protest or if they do, they quickly find themselves behind bars. Therefore, it came as a big surprise when in the summer of 2024, leaders of 12 North Ossetian civil organizations published an open appeal to the head of the republic, Sergei Menyailo, in which they demanded that the losses among the Ossetians in the war in Ukraine be disclosed, that a week of mourning be declared, and that the president of Russia be asked to ban the conscription of “representatives of the Ossetian people" to “preserve the Ossetian gene pool.” The signatories of the petition also admonished the regional authorities for organizing a carnival during the ongoing war and dismissed the celebrations as “dancing on the bones and blood of the heroes of the SVO [special military operation], innocent civilians killed in the frontline zone” according to Kavkaz.Realii.
To be sure, the authors of the address did not criticize the war in Ukraine itself or President Vladimir Putin for starting it. Moreover, they positioned themselves as Russian patriots who only wanted to protect the small Ossetian people from extinction. Likely due to these circumstances, the authorities did not crack down on the activists but rather allowed the anger to dissipate slowly.
Sources inside North Ossetia claim that people in the republic initially reacted positively to the Russian large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. However, as casualties mounted, the public increasingly questioned the necessity of war and its costs. Although little meaningful discussion happens in the media, the issues related to the war in Ukraine are widely debated in the Ossetian society. Local politicians express their pride in the Ossetian participation in Russia’s war in Ukraine. However, many ordinary people are becoming increasingly concerned about the human losses.
Republican authorities recently organized a large funeral service for the Russian army Major Marat Tibilov. Putin awarded him with the Hero of Russia order in February 2025. Tibilov was an ethnic Ossetian and native to North Ossetia and was born and raised in Chermen and later moved to another town in North Ossetia (Lower Shaniba). Tibilov served in the Russian military prior to the start of the war and therefore was not a volunteer.
Two months later, Tibilov was killed in the Kursk region of Russia. Previously, he had fought in Russia-occupied Ukrainian territories. Thousands of people reportedly turned out for the service as he was put to rest at in the “Alley of Glory” in Vladikavkaz (region15, April 1) , which is a special burial place where authorities bury people as a sign of special recognition for their talent or services to the public. In Tibilov’s case, they likely made this decision based upon Kremlin publicity for his service that included a photo op with President Putin in February 2025. The funeral, however, did not turn into a rallying event for more military recruitment.
Although North Ossetians continue to support Russia’s war in Ukraine or, at least, do not actively oppose it, there are signs that people are growing tired of the conflict. Nationalist sentiment seems to be taking the Russia-loyalist form of opposition to the war. Paradoxically, those Ossetians who portray themselves as Russian patriots may be best positioned to protest the loss of life and avoid prosecution if they begin to question Ossetian continued involvement in the war. The initial success of the recruitment of Ossetians to fight Russia’s war in Ukraine may be waning as the formation of the new “Ossetian regiment” seems to have stalled and if true it could deprive Moscow of a small but loyal contingent of recruits for its three year old war in Ukraine.
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