Kitaizatsiya: China in Russia, Newsletter, Issue No.4
BRIEFS
Moscow Asks Beijing for Access to Rare Earth Technology
According to the Moscow Times, Russia has asked China for access to rare earth technology as the Kremlin confronts a severe gap between its vast geological reserves and its minimal production capacity. Despite holding an estimated 28.5 million tons of rare earth metals, Russia extracts hardly any of the strategic commodity. Moscow relies heavily on foreign supplies of lithium, tungsten, niobium, and other critical minerals. Seeking partners—including the United States—Putin emphasized the need to develop deposits across Russia and occupied Ukraine. A new federal strategy aims to triple output by 2030, though dependence would still remain high. Earlier this year President Putin offered to sell rare earth minerals to the United States if the US agreed to improve relations even though Russia lacks the technology to process the strategic mineral.
…while Putin Orders Russian Industry to Produce a Roadmap for Rare Earth Development by December 1
Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered the government to produce a roadmap for developing Russia’s rare earth metals (RZM) industry by December 1, with Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin responsible for implementation. Despite vast reserves—28.5 million tons of rare earth metals and over 650 million tons of rare metals—Russia extracts only about 50 tons annually, covering less than 2% of domestic demand. Imports supply more than half of Russia’s tungsten, molybdenum, zirconium, and tantalum needs, and nearly all lithium. Lacking its own extraction technologies, Moscow has sought Chinese assistance, but negotiations have made little progress.
China Initiates Restrictions on Machine Tool Exports to Russia
China has begun restricting exports to Russia of mid-tier precision machine tools needed to manufacture components with sub-10-micron tolerances, limiting Moscow’s ability to produce certain missiles, engines, and guided weapons. Russian firms report that equipment once easily purchased now requires special export licenses, making machines with 3–4-micron accuracy effectively inaccessible. Chinese customs data also show a broader downturn: exports to Russia fell 16.4% year-on-year in August 2025, and total trade dropped nearly 9% in the first eight months of the year.
Local Protests Erupt in Transbaikal Over Moscow’s Assistance for Chinese Backed-Projects
A clash between residents of the Transbaikal, on the one hand, and Russian officials and Chinese workers, on the other, is spreading from Russian courtrooms to villages where in at least one case a Russian has taken the law into his own hands and even used guns against Chinese workers brought in with Moscow’s help to develop industry and transport there. The situation is getting out of hand, prompting one resident of the region near Lake Baikal to exclaim “the Chinese have been saying for a long time, ‘Baikal is ours’ [and] soon they’ll say ‘And Crimea is ours too.’ I keep asking: what are our guys fighting for. So that these Chinese people can strut around here? Why?”
According to the Important Stories portal, eleven years ago, Oleg Deripaska and his En+ group signed an agreement with China’s Shenhua Group to expand the export of coal to China from the Transbaikal, something that requires the expansion of mining and the development of transportation networks. Because of the negative environmental impact of both the expanded mining and the routing of new railways and highways through areas that had been off limits lest they destroy the unique natural environment around one of Russia’s most storied lakes, the project has sparked protests and court cases by residents even though Russian officials welcome it.
In February 2025, a Russian court rejected a government ecological assessment and ordered the companies involved to cease work. The Russian coal company involved has appealed and new documentation is supported to be presented in a few months. But despite this decision, the companies involved have continued to build roads and railways, often harming what had been protected regions. Local people feel powerless to stop this. After all, they say, China is “a world power while we live in poverty.” And Russian officials are now welcoming in Chinese workers to do the job.
Russian officials have helped Chinese companies force Russians out of their homes so that there will be a place for Chinese workers to live. In response, one resident took out his gun and began “shooting out the window” at the Chinese. Others have not gone that far - at least not yet. But tensions are clearly escalating, and the readiness of some residents to compare what is going on in Putin’s war in Ukraine – where local men have died – with the war of Russian officials against their own people in the Transbaikal to help not Russians but the Chinese is telling. And if the courts vacate their original stop order early next year, an explosion in the coming months is likely.
This case highlights something that is all too often forgotten: officials and businessmen in Moscow view Chinese involvement in Siberia and the Russian Far East very differently than do the residents of these enormous and resource-rich regions. The former see the arrival of the Chinese as an opportunity to make money and cement ties between Moscow and Beijing. Indeed, many of the richest Russians in the capital gained their wealth by developing lands east of the Urals with the help of the Chinese. But the latter see the influx of Chinese as a more direct threat to their way of life and the pristine environment in which most of them take such pride, perhaps especially around Lake Baikal. Moscow-appointed officials in the region can generally be counted upon to carry out the Kremlin’s wishes, but the longer they pursue the line that Chinese development of the region is an unqualified good, they are going to alienate the population there which is going to be hostile not just to the Chinese but to the Russians from the center who are helping the Chinese to establish an even larger presence in the region.
Moscow’s promotion of the expansion of a Chinese presence in the region has been infuriating residents of these regions for more than a decade. And as the recent events in the Transbaikal show, the division that matters is not simply between Russia and China, as many are inclined to assume but rather between China with the backing of the distant Russian capital, on the one hand, and the residents, ethnic Russian as well as non-Russian, in the regions east of the Urals into which Moscow is helping the Chinese to move. In fact, in 2019, a group of protesters in Tomsk even staged a demonstration carrying signs stating: “Down with the Imperialism of Moscow and Beijing before the participants were rounded up.
At present, as in the Transbaikal, Moscow appears committed to doing whatever it takes to smooth the way for the Chinese. But that approach is costing it the support of residents in the Transbaikal and beyond. It may ultimately become a threat to the center, especially after Putin’s departure, when the political future not only of Siberia and the Russian Far East but also of the Moscow-centered state will be decided.
Bastion or Buffer? Tuva’s Emerging Role in Russian Strategy Toward China
Long overlooked and rarely discussed beyond specialist circles, the Russian Far Eastern republic of Tuva has reemerged as a strategically significant buffer within Russia’s evolving geopolitical posture toward China. Remote, ethnically distinct, economically stagnant, and historically peripheral to Moscow’s centers of power, Tuva is not an obvious candidate for heightened geopolitical significance. Yet recent developments—including the temporary suspension of operations by the Chinese-owned mining firm LLC Lunsin—have cast new light on Tuva’s role as a contested space where Russian anxieties over deepening dependence on China increasingly intersect with local identity, economic vulnerability, and historical memory.
The episode with the LLC Lunsin, initially framed as an unintended consequence of sanctions compliance, soon revealed a more complex dynamic: Russian law enforcement pressure, the swift intervention of regional authorities, and the political resonance of Chinese investment in a culturally unique borderland. Taken together, these events expose a deeper concern within parts of the Russian elite about Beijing’s expanding economic and cultural presence inside the Russian Federation, even as Moscow continues to portray its strategic partnership with China as stronger than ever.
Tuva’s significance, however, extends far beyond a single mining dispute. Russian scholars and policymakers have begun reinterpreting the republic through the lens of Vadim Tsymbursky’s “Great Limitroph” theory—seeing Tuva not merely as a marginal region, but as a historically fluid buffer zone positioned between Russian, Mongolian, and Chinese civilizational spheres. This framing carries profound implications. It suggests that Tuva may serve simultaneously as a symbolic bastion against perceived Sinicization, a cultural and religious frontier anchored in Buddhism rather than Orthodoxy, and a potential platform for projecting influence into Mongolia and Inner Asia. As Russia recalibrates its foreign policy amid war, sanctions, and increasing reliance on China, Tuva’s strategic position—once peripheral—now offers Moscow both an opportunity and a dilemma: how to leverage the region’s unique attributes without provoking the very geopolitical pressures it seeks to manage.
Courting Tuva: Zijin Mining Group’s Expanding Influence
In May 2025, the Republic of Tuva (Tyva) briefly drew attention in the Russian media after an announcement by LLC Lunsin, a Tuva-based subsidiary (established in 2005) of the Zijin Mining Group (紫金矿业集团有限公司) that it would be suspending its operations in Tuva due to a series of challenges affecting its regional activities. The Chinese mining group is regarded as one of China’s largest mining conglomerates specializing in the exploration, development, and production of gold, copper, and other minerals.
Initially, both Chinese and Russian representatives cited economic sanctions and the resulting inability to conduct financial transactions between Russian and Chinese banks as the principal obstacle. However, subsequent reports from Tuva-based sources suggested a different cause: an increasing number of inspections and interventions by Russian law enforcement agencies, which allegedly disrupted the subsidiary’s normal operations.
Following these developments, a meeting was convened between local Tuvan authorities – who emphasized the strategic importance of LLC Lunsin to the regional economy – and Zijin Mining Group President Zou Laichang. The talks reportedly resulted in an agreement to resume the company’s operations. While seemingly a minor episode, this incident can be interpreted within a broader geopolitical and domestic context. As Russia’s strategic dependence on China has expanded dramatically since 2022, parts of the Russian elite have become increasingly uneasy about Beijing’s growing economic and political footprint within the country. Against this backdrop, Moscow may seek to leverage ethnically non-Russian, Turkic-speaking, and predominantly Buddhist Tuva as a platform to reinforce its influence in the region and symbolically demonstrate control over areas where China’s economic presence is becoming more assertive.
Tuva’s Importance in Russian Strategic Thinking: “The Great Limitrophe”
In 1993, the Russian intellectual Vadim Tsymbursky published an article titled “Island Russia” (Ostrov Rossiya), in which he introduced the concept of the Great Limitrophe theory—a framework explaining how certain borderlands or buffer zones have historically played a critical role in geopolitical struggles among major powers. According to Tsymbursky, such regions are never entirely aligned with one side or the other; rather, they tend to shift allegiances over time and serve as zones of contention where civilizational and cultural boundaries blur, overlap, and interact. While Tsymbursky’s original analysis primarily referred to countries such as Ukraine, Poland, the Caucasus, the Baltic States, and the countries of Central Asia, contemporary Russian authors from Tuva have identified this republic as another example of a “buffer zone” or a territory belonging to the Great Limitrophe.
Experts in Tuva appear to have reached this conclusion based upon their perception of Tuva as “a territory that, on the one hand, lies between [Chinese and Russian] civilizations but has never truly become an integral and complete part of either of them.” It is also particularly noteworthy that Russian scholars specializing on Tuva—view it as part of the Great Limitrophe and have proposed leveraging the republic’s potential to strengthen Russia in two important ways.
First, ethnically non-Russian populations inhabiting Russia’s borderland territories are believed to possess unique advantages in terms of their regional defense potential. This argument rests on their deep knowledge of the local terrain—often harsh and geographically complex—as well as their ability to operate effectively in extreme climatic conditions and sparsely populated environments. Such attributes, according to Russian experts, make the local population a valuable asset in defending Russia’s periphery. Moreover, these experts assert that the people of Tuva would be particularly willing to defend Russia’s territorial integrity with determination. This thesis is rooted in local historical memory: in the early 20th century, for example, when Tuva became an object of interest for both China and Mongolia, it was Russia that helped the region defend its sovereignty—an event that, in the eyes of Russian commentators, should foster enduring gratitude among the local population.
Second, to expand Russian influence across adjacent territories—most notably Mongolia—Moscow might activate another facet of Tuva’s strategic potential. Russian experts suggest that Russia should “liberalize” contacts between the populations of Tuva and Mongolia, thereby turning the Tuvans into informal “envoys of Russian culture.” It is important to note that in earlier Russian publications—particularly before 2014, when Sino-Russian economic and political relations began to deepen—authors emphasized the need to strengthen ties between Tuvans residing in the Russian republic and ethnic Tuvans living in China (estimated to be approximately 2,500). However, the Russian side has long lamented Beijing’s explicit unwillingness to facilitate such contacts, reportedly obstructing the freedom of movement of China-based Tuvans and thereby limiting cross-border cultural exchange.
Insulating Tuva from Sinicization: The New Battleground?
Despite the fact that Tuvan authorities have clearly outlined foreign economic priorities of the republic – Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and China – the Russian federal center has been cautious in attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from these countries. Since the early 1990s, Tuva—alongside other ethnically non-Russian regions of the Russian Federation—has remained deliberately dependent on federal subsidies and financial transfers from Moscow. This system of engineered economic dependence, maintained through centralized control over fiscal resources, has effectively stifled local entrepreneurship and inhibited the emergence of a self-sustaining regional economy. From the Kremlin’s perspective, this policy served a clear strategic purpose: to prevent economic self-sufficiency from translating into political autonomy. Russian federal authorities have long viewed independent economic development and the expansion of foreign trade linkages in such regions as potential precursors to centrifugal dynamics, including social unrest or a weakening of local dependence on Moscow. As a result, policies ostensibly aimed at ensuring “stability” in Tuva and similar republics have, in practice, entrenched structural underdevelopment and reinforced the region’s fiscal and administrative subordination to the center.
This is particularly evident in the proposed Russia–Mongolia–China corridor—a route crossing Siberia via Tuva—which was first officially discussed in the early 2010s, yet still faces significant delays. However, in recent months the Siberian regions of Tuva, Krasnoyarsk Krai, and Khakassia – have intensified their calls for the project’s development and stressed its strategic importance. Meanwhile, Moscow’s response has remained notably reserved. Naturally, this could be based upon economic or environmental considerations, yet the Kremlin`s behavior might also be explained by other factors. For example, in the work of Chimiza K. Lamazhaa – a local scientist who backs the concept of Tuva being a part of Russia`s so-called Limitrophe zone – has pointed out that the local language, religion and identity could become a source of conflict.
Among other things, Lamazhaa argues that while the Chinese civilizational impact on Tuva is “minimal”, signs of proximity of the great nation are still visible in the republic. The author does not claim that Tuva will necessarily become a battleground between China and Russia, but she acknowledges that Tuva`s territorial and cultural specificities create a unique situation of “interregnum” (mezdutsartviye), which in turn could pose a dilemma about Tuva`s relevance to Russian civilization or Eastern (Chinese or Mongolian) cultural tradition.
To avoid the revival of local nationalism and the republic`s (potential) tilt toward China, the Russian side has pursued three policies to insulate Tuva from Sinicization: To prevent the revival of local nationalism and a potential tilt toward China, Russia has pursued three policies aimed at insulating Tuva from Sinicization. The first is the prioritization of Buddhism. It is worth recalling that in 2023 the consecration of Russia’s largest Buddhist monastery, Tubten Shedrub Ling, took place in Kyzyl. Importantly, the construction of this monastery was initiated by Sergei Shoigu—President of the Russian Geographical Society and, at the time, Minister of Defense—while the site itself had been personally consecrated and blessed in 1992 by the 14th Dalai Lama during his visit to Tuva. Notably, the 2023 event did not elicit any public reaction from Chinese officials.
Second, it has promoted a specific type of “neither China nor Mongolia” narrative. After 2022, pro-Kremlin media started posting articles about Tuva that not only highlighted Russia`s undisputed sovereignty over this ethnically non-Russian region, but juxtaposed Russia`s “beneficial” influence on the republic and its historic choice to be with Russia rather than Mongolia or China. Russian sources emphasize Tuva`s voluntary decision to join Russia, which was not done under any sort of coercion by Moscow and reiterates the Russian role as a security provider for the Far Eastern republic at a time of regional Sinicization.
Third, and perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this policy is related to Moscow`s (so far unsuccessful) attempt to utilize Tuva and its natural resources – notably its lithium deposits, which are critical for American automotive firms producing Electric Vehicles (EV`s). This has been one of the major tools Putin has used in trying to reset relations with the United States. Local authorities in 2023 announced the discovery of a massive lithium deposit in the Sangilen Highlands, which reportedly contains 596,000 tons of the strategic commodity as well as other rare earth metals. Putin publicly touted the strategic importance of the lithium deposits declaring that “Tuva ranks first in our country in lithium reserves, which is almost 30%. The production of this metal is, without exaggeration, a strategically important task, the solution of which largely determines the effectiveness of our import substitution programs and ensuring the technological independence of the country.”
Following Donald Trump’s re-election as U.S. President—and given his strong interest in securing access to critical and rare-earth metals, as well as U.S. dependence on China—Putin suggested that instead of seeking opportunities in Ukraine, American firms should participate in developing Tuva’s lithium deposits. The United States, however, did not respond to the Russian proposal.
Conclusion
Tuva is a small, ethnically non-Russian republic, remote, and sparsely populated region of the Russian Federation, with a population of approximately 338,000. However, Russian writings about the Far East indicate that it could become a new battleground between Russia and China due to Sinicization. The republic remains economically stagnant and heavily dependent on Russian federal subsidies, as its foreign economic ties are limited and its private sector remains underdeveloped. Yet despite these structural constraints, Tuva possesses enormous attributes that could elevate its strategic value within Moscow’s broader geopolitical ambitions — including its distinct ethno-religious identity, its geographical proximity to Mongolia and China, and its significant, though underutilized, natural resources.
In this context, the Kremlin may seek to turn Tuva into a geopolitical asset, using the region as a platform to project influence into neighboring Mongolia and, under favorable conditions, parts of Central Asia. Under this scenario — which is not entirely unrealistic — Tuva could shift from serving as a symbolic bridge between Moscow and Beijing, an image that aligns with post-2022 Sino-Russian cooperation, to functioning as a buffer (or even, under certain circumstances, a bastion) against China’s regional encroachment on the Russian Far East.
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