Kitaizatsiya: China in Russia, Newsletter, Issue No.2
BRIEFS
Beijing Remains Silent on Power of Siberia 2 Agreement
Despite Moscow’s claims, Beijing has not confirmed any agreement on the long-discussed Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline. During Vladimir Putin’s September visit to China, Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller announced that a “legally binding memorandum” had been signed, pledging to raise gas exports to China to over 100 billion cubic meters annually. This statement led to a flurry of Kremlin-echoed remarks, characterizing the Miller announcement as a breakthrough in Russo-Chinese energy cooperation.
China, however, has remained silent about the agreement to date. Xi Jinping, for example, made no public reference to the pipeline, nor has China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) issued any statement, while the Chinese state media has completely avoided making any mention of the deal. To add insult to injury, there was no photo opportunity of Putin and Xi signing the Power of Siberia 2 agreement, which would have made front-page news around the world. It seems, however, that only the Financial Times reported that the agreement was finalized although the newspaper noted that no gas pricing agreement was announced, which has been a key holdup to any go-ahead with the project. Upon closer scrutiny, some Western energy analysts are noting that Moscow’s announcements are premature (see Paul Goble’s article below exploring this announcement), noting the communique from the talks merely spoke of “cross-border infrastructure.” Experts stress that without agreed pricing or timelines, the project remains aspirational.
Russo-Chinese Trade Plummets by Nearly 20 Percent
Russian-Chinese trade is experiencing a sharp downturn in 2025, marking the first sustained decline since Russia’s war against Ukraine began three years ago. In August, Chinese imports from Russia fell 17.8% year-on-year, while its exports to Russia dropped 16.4%, nearly double July’s decline. Over the first eight months of 2025, bilateral trade fell nearly 9% to $145 billion, with Russian exports down 8.8% and Chinese exports down 8.2%. Customs data show steep reductions in Chinese purchases of Russian oil (-11%), petroleum products (-28%), LNG (-13%), coal and timber (-10%). The Chinese slowdown has alarmed the Kremlin, with insiders criticizing Beijing for exploiting Moscow rather than acting as an ally. During President Putin’s September visit to China, efforts to secure major new deals yielded little: modest increases in gas and oil contracts represent only fractions of Russian output, while the much-touted Power of Siberia 2 pipeline remains unconfirmed by China.
Chinese Companies Ignore Vladivostok Economic Summit
In the wake of President Putin’s successful trip to China and high-level meetings with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, one would have expected that China would have reciprocated the ‘partnership with no limits’ relationship by sending dozens – or at least one - ranking Chinese company to participate in Russia’s premier Far Eastern economic investment conference - the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF). While the gathering of the EEF in Vladivostok – which opened on September 3 - is widely touted by the Kremlin as an “authoritative business platform” for Asia-Pacific cooperation and a cornerstone of Moscow’s pivot-to-Asia strategy, none of China’s top political and business leaders showed up.
Not a single senior representative from China’s Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Finance, Foreign Ministry, or Central Bank attended. In fact, the highest-ranking delegate who participated in the EEF was Li Hongzhong, Vice Chairman of China’s National People’s Congress, who was accompanied by some of his deputies and aides. By contrast, past forums have featured Chinese President Xi Jinping, Japan’s Shinzo Abe, and India’s Narendra Modi. This year, only Mongolia and Laos sent prime ministers, while India’s representation dropped to a deputy ambassador. No executives from China’s major corporations appeared on the guest list; instead, discussions were led by local officials such as the mayor of Fuyuan, a small Chinese border city. The muted turnout in Vladivostok suggests Beijing is in no rush to elevate the partnership, leaving Moscow increasingly reliant on China for its economic future.
China Eases Visa Controls for Russian Tourists, But Will Moscow Reciprocate?
During the Putin-Xi summit, China announced that it has plans to introduce a one-year visa-free regime for Russian citizens, while it remains unclear if Russia will reciprocate. Visa-free travel for Chinese visiting Russia began in 2020. The move is expected to significantly boost travel between the two countries. According to Meduza, in 2024 alone, over 1.6 million Russians visited China, while 1.2 million Chinese visited Russia. More than 50 percent of Chinese tourists travel to the Russian Far East, particularly to Primorsky Krai and Khabarovsk Krai, where Russian hotels are reportedly experiencing a major shortage of hotel space due to the influx of Chinese tourists.
Both Russia and China have a mutual visa-free travel program for large organized travel groups, but the duration for these visits is limited to 30 days. The new policy, effective from September 15, 2025, through September 14, 2026, will allow Russians to enter China visa-free for as long as 30 days for tourism, business, family visits, or cultural exchanges. China already ranks as Russia’s third most popular destination, with 1.04 million visits in the first half of 2025, up 31% year-on-year.
One key question raised by the Chinese announcement is whether Beijing’s easing of visa restrictions for Russians will prompt Moscow to reciprocate. On August 9, Moscow and Beijing agreed to expand the visa-free regime for Chinese tourist groups, and are in discussions about reducing the minimum group size from five to two people for stays of up to 30 days. Should this change occur, it would make it easier for more Chinese tourists to visit Russia. By lowering the threshold to just two travelers, Moscow appears to be yielding to Chinese pressure, as monitoring such small groups will be far more difficult for Russian officials to monitor, particularly in the vastness of the Russian Far East.
Why Demographics Matter More Than Finance in Russia-China Relations
A week ago, after meeting with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin celebrated agreements between the two to build a second gas pipeline between Russia and China and to allow Russians to visit China without having to obtain a visa. But it has now become obvious that the much-ballyhooed pipeline accord was only a declaration of intent because China refused to provide the upfront funding necessary to move the project forward, which the Russian side had demanded. Moreover, Beijing’s unilateral decision to lift visa requirements for Russian visitors was not followed, as many had expected, by a similar Russian gesture regarding Chinese visitors to the Russian Federation.
These twin outcomes are a clear sign that the problems the two sides face on both questions have to do with demography, not just financing, and that these demographic factors are likely to become even more important as bilateral trade between the two countries appears set to decline further after declining by nearly 20 percent just in the past year.
In recent times, China has sought to link any investment in the Russian Far East to having Chinese firms and workers involved, given that the Russian population there is already below 2.5 million and continuing to fall, according to one Russian observer. In fact, the problems are so severe that Kremlin officials are having great difficulty in coming up with the workers needed to carry out a long list of infrastructure-related projects, including a rail line to Sakha, bridges, and intermodal stations along the border. Moscow is repeatedly failing to complete promised sections of rail and highways in the Russian Federation after China had finished its portion of the work. Indeed, in some cases, the Russian government has organized the arrival there of workers from Central Asia to fill the gap.
At the same time and despite its desire to expand trade with China, Moscow is increasingly reluctant to agree to an influx of even more Chinese workers, given that their numbers have already grown to the point that the Chinese, when combined with the Central Asians who have come to the region, now form the majority of the population in some Russian cities. Moscow itself could be exacerbating this problem not only by allowing more Chinese in but also by shifting investments away from the Chinese border since Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine began, something that Beijing may hope to exploit but only on its own terms.
Exactly how large the Chinese community in the Russian Federation is not publicly known. While Moscow earlier played up the threat this group might play to the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation to keep the population of the Russian Far East in line, the central government has now played down their presence lest it spark anti-Chinese attitudes at a time of heightened Russian hostility to migrant workers and when the Kremlin is trying to cut deals with Beijing as Putin tried last week. The Chinese population in the Russian Far East is certainly far larger than the estimated 10,000 who lived there in 1991. Some observers claim that it could be as high as three million, down from the five million before Putin launched his expanded war in Ukraine.
That figure, however, is almost certainly exaggerated in an upward direction just as much as Moscow’s official numbers have been exaggerated in a downward one; but there are certainly several hundred thousand Chinese living in the Russian Federation east of the Urals. In some cases, they dominate Russian cities and even whole regions in the Russian northeast, where they are more likely to threaten local non-Russian nationalities than ethnic Russians, particularly because many of these smaller nationalities have suffered extensively due to the Ukraine war. In some places, they have been given special, almost extraterritorial rights, something that the Chinese have demanded but that has alarmed many Russians.
Both Russian leaders and their Chinese counterparts are aware of all this, although they are seldom prepared to speak about the existence of such fears in public. Some of their subordinates, however, have and indicate that in both Russia and China, there are growing worries about the impact of the influx of more people from the other on their indigenous populations. But because China is so much larger than Russia and because Chinese regions near the border of the Russian Far East are even more disproportionately large, Beijing does not have nearly as much reason to be concerned and so is more ready to make concessions on visas but also to demand that its workers be allowed to go into Russia to complete key infrastructure projects.
Moscow certainly welcomes Beijing’s concessions on visas, but has compelling reasons not to respond quickly, and Beijing certainly has equally compelling reasons not to agree to send money to Russia for infrastructure projects that may never be used as intended and thus will demand that its workers do the job. That reality lies behind the outcome of the Putin-Xi talks, one far more significant than financial issues, not only now but in the years ahead.
Territorially Russia – Economically Chinese: How China is Reshaping the Jewish Autonomous Oblast
On August 20, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the acting head of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast (JAO), Maria Kostyuk. During their Kremlin meeting, Putin unexpectedly praised the economic performance of one of Russia’s smallest and most economically depressed regions. Frequently referred to as the “kingdom of permanent crisis” and “Russia’s bear corner,” the JAO’s economy achieved 4.4 percent growth in 2024. The JAO`s growing economy has virtually nothing to do with Moscow’s actions. Recent positive developments reversing the decades-long streak of stagnation in the remote Siberian outpost are attributed exclusively to the oblast’s growing economic integration with China’s bordering province of Heilongjiang, which has become particularly evident after Russia’s renewed war with Ukraine in February 2022.
China’s Creeping Encroachment on the JAO
China stepped up its economic and demographic expansion in the JAO in the mid-2000s. By 2006, local sources reported that no fewer than 5,000 Chinese nationals were economically active in the oblast. Often described in the Russian media as workaholics, the newly transplanted Chinese demonstrated an ability to effectively engage in hard labor – particularly in areas where Moscow experienced acute labor deficits. Chinese workers filled key areas such as agriculture and construction, which were industries that Russian locals were either unwilling or unable to engage in. By 2012, Chinese economic expansion had reached the point that the governor of the JAO, Alexander Vinnikov, de facto admitted that economically the JAO was much more connected with China than with Russia.
Citing the increase in bilateral trade between the JAO and Heilongjiang province, Vinnikov noted that it had increased twofold over the previous two years, with China’s share in the JAO’s economy reaching a staggering 95 percent. The governor specifically mentioned the presence of more than 150 Chinese Small and Medium Size Enterprises (SMEs) working in the JAO in agriculture, timber/lumber production, construction, natural resources extraction, and the production of consumer goods. By 2018, the level of Chinese trade with the JAO reached “over 95 percent” as its local economy became almost exclusively dependent on cross-border trade with China. This also signified continued growth of the Chinese presence in the local economy. After 2022, China`s share in the local economy reached a disproportionately new high of 98.6 percent, which reflects an almost unconditional domination of the local economy by neighboring China.
In interviews with the Russian media, key regional officials, such as former JAO governor Alexander Levintal, pointed out when asked about the sources of economic development and revitalization, the oblast’s proximity to China was a major factor contributing to local economic growth and the welfare of the JAO’s inhabitants.
Analysis of Russian sources identifies the following areas of the JAO`s economy, where the level of involvement of Chinese businesses is exceptionally high, and broken down into the following industries:
Agriculture (Arable Land)
Reason: The JAO has an excellent quality of soil and a vast area of arable land — 2,000 square kilometers, compared to its total territory of 36,271. Despite being twenty times smaller than Khabarovsk Krai, the JAO has more farmland. Russian officials stopped publishing information about Chinese nationals’ ownership or use of land in the region before 2022. However, earlier investigations and statements by JAO officials suggested that Chinese nationals were cultivating or controlling more than half of the arable land.
Notable Results: Russian official sources stopped publishing information related to Chinese nationals’ ownership (use) of arable lands in the JAO prior to 2022. As stated earlier, pre-2022 investigations and statements by the JAO`s highest officials suggested that Chinese nationals were owning or tilling more than half of the local arable land in the JAO.
Industrial land
Reason: Control over infrastructure plays a major role in industrial land use.
Notable Results: To date, there have been no notable results. Russian sources, however, report that Chinese investors show selective interest in Moscow-designated Territories for the Advancement of Development (TOR). For instance, parts of the Amur-Khangin TOR are located near key infrastructure, such as bridges, which have drawn Chinese attention. For example, Chinese investors are interested in becoming residents in parts of the Amur-Khangin TOR that are located near critical infrastructure, particularly bridges.
Infrastructure
Reason: The JAO’s strategic location, with 570 kilometers of Sino-Russian border, makes it a focal point for transport links between the two countries.
Notable Results: The most recent episode occurred during the 34th Kharbin Industrial-Trade Fair (May 17-21, 2025), where the Chinese delegation expressed its readiness to invest 22 billion rubles ($273 million) in the construction of a major transportation hub in Nizhneleninskoye that connects China with the JAO. More importantly, the Chinese side not only voiced its readiness to finance the project, but also expressed a strong level of interest in doing all the construction work there (it is unclear whether the Chinese side is interested in cooperating with Russia or conducting all activities singlehandedly).
Natural Resources
Reason: The JAO contains more than 20 types of natural resources, including ores, graphite, talc, zeolites, coal, and peat. Geological studies also suggest the possible presence of gold, hydrocarbons, phosphates, diamonds, and platinum. In 2023, China declared its readiness to fully fund the production and mining of taconite, a vital ingredient in steelmaking, at the Sutarskoye iron ore deposit.
Notable Results: In 2023, the Chinese government declared its readiness to fully fund the production and mining of taconite (a key ingredient in steel production) at the Sutarskoye iron ore deposit in the JAO.
According to a 2024 study produced by the Russian-Chinese investment index, the JAO was listed as one of the top three destinations for Chinese business investment in Russia, with Moscow and Amur Oblast in Siberia as the other two highest attractions. Increasingly, China`s economic expansion in the JAO appears more and more like a takeover of Moscow’s Far Eastern outpost rather than an example of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI); there are several reasons for this.”
First, the case of the Amur-Khangin TOR clearly shows that Chinese investors are not interested in financially committing to the development of large joint projects with Russia. Rather, the simple import of raw materials and commodities, as well as the prospects of obtaining access to strategically important areas that are placed near critical infrastructure, such as bridges (primostovije territorii) on the territory of the JAO, are key themes that interest China.
Secondly, the case of the Nizhneleninskoye transportation hub is particularly revealing. Russian officials, pointing to Chinese financing for the project, hailed it as a vital initiative to “effectively handle transportation and cargo trafficking… with a particular focus on coal transportation”. Yet this narrative stands in stark contradiction to the broader reality of Russian-Chinese coal trade, which has not only collapsed[1] but, to Moscow’s embarrassment, has been further undermined by Beijing when it imposed an import duty on Russian-produced coal, restricting its export to China. This unexpected move baffled both federal officials and the leadership of Russia’s coal-producing regions, exposing the fragility of Moscow’s assumptions about Beijing’s reliability as a trade partner. Upon closer examination, Chinese investment in the Nizhneleninskoye transport hub appears to be less about facilitating coal exports and more about consolidating China’s foothold in the JAO, using the project as a form of leverage, or, for better words, blackmail, to extract broader concessions from Moscow on other critical infrastructure projects.
Culture, Education, and Public Opinion
In terms of cultural Sinicization, the results are, for obvious reasons, less visible than when it comes to the economics of trade. For example, a survey of Birobidzhan-based private language schools indicates that the study of English still appears to be the most sought-after language among Russian students. However, given Russia`s determination to reduce the exposure of young Russians to European languages (traditionally, the English language has been the most popular among Russian students), it would be interesting to see if this would have a direct spillover effect on Russian interest in learning Mandarin.
In light of the progressive restrictions imposed by the Kremlin on preventing any expression of anti-Chinese sentiment inside Russia, signs persist that local officials in the JAO remain uneasy about the presence of foreigners living in the country, particularly Chinese nationals. In a striking 2019 interview, the former governor of the JAO shockingly revealed that “the Chinese control 56 percent of our [JAO] arable land,” warning that once a Chinese farmer begins operations, he employs “his own people [Chinese]” rather than Russian locals. Since the publication of this interview, no member of the JAO leadership has spoken again in such direct terms, a strange silence that could be an indication of Kremlin retaliation against these officials for publicly speaking out given Beijing’s importance to Moscow, rather than the absence of public statement being a reflection of any substantive change in opinion. Similarly, two recent sociological studies conducted in the JAO examining local attitudes toward foreigners revealed noteworthy findings.
According to one 2019 study based upon surveys, interviews and secondary research, foreign nationals from three countries – China, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan – were viewed to be among the least desirable foreign workers in the oblast. Another study published in 2022 reflected the tremendous degree of uneasiness among the Russian locals regarding their stances on marriage to a foreign national, particularly the Chinese. One unnamed respondent cited in the study blatantly stated: “You see, there is growing more and more of them [Chinese]. It is clearly visible. In such a family the kids are not Russians, they are Chinese. We have calculated that it would be enough for 10,000 Chinese to acquire Russian citizenship in the JAO, so that in the next 10 – 12 years the Chinese would form the majority here. Do not get me wrong, this is not an urban legend. These are simple calculations,” he noted.
While the validity of such calculations is a separate issue, these opinions highlight an important trend: many Russian citizens living in the JAO continue to perceive the Chinese presence there as an implicit demographic threat. Although economic and trade partnerships are generally welcomed, a significant portion of the local population remain wary of the Chinese and their increased presence in the region. At the same time, Chinese efforts—through promotional events, educational initiatives, and investment projects—could potentially reshape this image. A glaring manifestation of this trend occurred in late May 2025 when a joint Russian-Chinese educational center was opened in Birobidzhan - the capital of the JAO. The extent to which such initiatives will either foster stronger pro-Chinese or anti-Moscow sentiments, however, remains a question for further study and research.
Conclusion
The territory that is known today as the JAO became a part of the Russian Empire in the 19th century following the Russia-enforced Treaty of Aigun (1858) – which was widely hailed in Russia, but remains negatively viewed in China as an unjust treaty imposed by Tsarist Russia. Interestingly, in September 2024, the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan), Lai Ching-te, claimed that if Chinese claims on Taiwan are about territorial integrity, then the PRC should also take back land from Russia signed over by the last Chinese dynasty in the 19th century, mentioning the Treaty of Aigun.
Russia`s deepening economic and political dependency on China since the onset of the February 2022 re-invasion of Ukraine has had a major impact on the JAO. China`s share in the economy of the far-flung Russian region is likely to have reached approximately 100 percent due to its dependence on cross-border trade with China and the expansion of Chinese businesses there. From an economic perspective, it is safe to say that the JAO is now much more dependent on China than any other subject of the Russian Federation. However, from a demographic standpoint, while there is no clear data on the exact number of Chinese nationals permanently living there, many Chinese take employment on a rolling basis, not permanently residing there, but leaving after several months of stay due to Russian visa restrictions limiting their stay.
Luckily for Moscow, Chinese cultural intrusion into the JAO remains limited. From a cultural point of view, the JAO still seems to be far more oriented toward Russia than China, but the recent establishment of a Chinese cultural center in the JAO’s capital of Birobidzhan could mark a new stage of Chinese cultural encroachment in Moscow’s remote Siberian outpost. It is, however, hard to forecast how this dynamic will evolve if the Russian Far East’s dependency on China continues to deepen and the local Russian population continues to diminish.
[1] For the first seven months of 2025, Chinese imports of Russian coal fell by 17 percent (year-on-year compared with 2024). Although China cut back on Russian coal imports, it did not adopt the same approach toward other suppliers; for example, imports from Australia have increased.
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