The Transformation of Salafist-Jihadism in the New Syria: The Importance of the Jihadist Manifesto “Al Faridah al-Gha’yba” and its Impact on Syrian Leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani
By Murad Batal Shishani
As a former journalist for BBC World - I had a deep interest in jihadist militant thought as a part of my work in the Middle East and often had the opportunity to interview leading jihadist thinkers. One episode from nearly a decade ago still stands out in my mind when we examine the rise of Hayat Tahrir al-Shams (HTS) and its enigmatic leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani and his journey from being a former member of al-Qaeda and follower of former ISIS leader Abu Mohammad Bakr al-Baghdadi to one of the leading figures in post-Assad Syria.
It was a cold day in November 2017 when I entered a modest mosque in the al-Shati refugee camp in Gaza. I was there to meet one of the jihadist ideologues who fled from Egypt to Gaza after the ouster of President Mohamed Morsi in 2013. My research focused on the state of jihadists between Sinai and Gaza. I had been instructed to come alone, without cameras or recording devices. I waited until he had finished conducting his prayer and gave a brief lesson to the congregation, and then we walked to his modest home.
As was common in Gaza at the time, there was no electricity. We sat under the dim, bluish glow of a mosquito-killing lamp powered by a battery. Using the pseudonym Abu Ahmed, the jihadist ideologue had a captivating storytelling style. Despite his considerable influence among Gaza jihadists, he focused on an era he knew well—the late 1970s in Egypt when he witnessed the rise of the Islamic Group and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. This period culminated in the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981.
Abu Ahmed shared an intriguing piece of information with me during my interview—one that I recalled when the Assad regime fell on December 8, 2024. He revealed that he was among a group of Sheikhs who had endorsed a booklet by a "good young lad," as he described him in his mixed Gazan-Egyptian dialect. That booklet - which is entitled Al Faridah al-Gha’yba (The Neglected Duty) and written in the late 1970s by Abd al-Salam Farag, has since become a Jihadist manifesto and emerged as one of the foundational texts of jihadist movements and a practical guide to jihadist ideology.
*The cover of the booklet Al Faridah al-Gha’yba (The Neglected Duty) and a short description of the book at the link above are offered by Princeton Readings in Religion and Violence.
Farag identifies jihad in the booklet as the "neglected duty" and argues that fighting the "near enemy"—the ruling regimes in Muslim-majority countries—takes precedence over fighting the "far enemy." The booklet’s core idea revolves around the belief in the apostasy of Muslim rulers. Farag contends that liberating Muslim lands, including Jerusalem, while a legitimate duty, would ultimately strengthen the "apostate regime" and reinforce a state that is not governed by Sharia. Farag writes, "The foundation of colonialism in Muslim lands is these rulers. Beginning with eliminating colonialism is pointless and futile; it is merely a waste of time."
Farag’s dual-principle approach, since the manifesto’s publication has become a hallmark of jihadist groups, which oscillate between prioritizing “the near” and “far enemies” based on political circumstances. Abu Ahmed, who was close to the emerging jihadist leadership at the time, explained that the assassination of Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat in 1981 was intended as a practical application of Farag’s ideas.
From the "Far Enemy" to the "Near Enemy"
Following the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981, intense security crackdowns began to push jihadists from fighting the near enemy to the far enemy. This shift coincided with the era of "Afghan jihad" in the 1980s when Afghanistan became a refuge for jihadists fleeing Egypt and a testing ground for apolitical Salafists—particularly from Saudi Arabia—to embrace jihadist thought. This collaboration produced the Salafist-jihadist movement, with al-Qaeda emerging as its most prominent manifestation of that thinking.
After the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, Salafist jihadism alternated between targeting the near enemy—when some jihadists returned to their home countries and engaged in conflicts, such as in Jordan, Egypt, and Algeria during its bloody civil war—and targeting the far enemy, exemplified by campaigns in Tajikistan, Chechnya, and Bosnia in the mid of 1990s. Al-Qaeda's attacks in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi Kenya in 1998 further cemented the focus on the far enemy, culminating in the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. These events triggered a global security crackdown, prompting another pivot toward the near enemy in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and other Arab countries.
The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 produced a new generation of more extreme jihadists, who once again prioritized the far enemy and sought to control geographical spaces. This approach was exemplified by al-Qaeda allies in Yemen, Somalia, Algeria, and Iraq, who established local "bases" depending on their geographic contexts.
The constant wavering between the near and far enemy has become a structural element of Salafist-jihadist ideology, which remains governed by dichotomies such as localism vs. globalism, individual vs. collective jihad, Sharia vs. resources, and operational strikes vs. territorial control.
The Arab Spring in 2011 once again renewed the focus of jihadists as they returned once again to debate the internal legitimacy of regional regimes or “the near enemy”. The scene of Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra), entering the Umayyad Mosque on December 8, 2024, shortly after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime may mark the Salafist-jihadists’ first major victory against a near enemy on such a major scale. It also raises questions about whether al-Jolani—now known by his real name, Ahmad al-Shara, dressed in a modern suit with a neatly trimmed beard and advocating for a modern governance model as seen in Idlib under the "Salvation Government"—has been truly transformed or whether is he merely employing political deception to gain legitimacy in the West.
Is al-Jolani a True Jihadist or Not?
One of the central questions about the emergence of al-Jolani as the leader of the interim Syrian government that has sparked significant debate in the West is whether he remains a true jihadist or is evolving into a national leader. Without understanding the transformations within Salafist-jihadism and its ideological structure, posing such a question would oversimplify the issue. Al-Jolani remains a Salafist-jihadist, but he also represents a shift from within this ideology. Given his experiences in Iraq, his eventual break with ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (while still maintaining allegiance to al-Qaeda), and the subsequent rebranding of his organization reflect internal conflicts between localism and globalism, legitimacy and resources, dominance by force (taghallub), and winning over the populace.
Al-Jolani later severed ties with al-Qaeda in 2016, rebranding his group as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. This move, including his 2020 crack down on the al-Qaeda wing inside his group, while seen by some as a departure from jihadist ideology, it’s not. The leader of al-Qaeda Osama bin Laden, a figure al-Jolani once admired, after the Arab Spring, suggested renaming al-Qaeda to something more appealing to the Muslim Ummah. Ironically, one of the names proposed in the treasure trove of Bin Laden documents seized by the United States in the 2011 Abbottabad compound raid was "Jama’at Tahrir al-Aqsa” (The Liberation of Al-Aqsa Group) which resonates with the name Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham.
Enemy Jihadists
The conflict, or rather the armed confrontation, between ISIS and al-Qaeda (and its arm al-Nusra) was a manifestation of the peak escalation of jihadist dualities, reaching its zenith in violent conflict. Al-Jolani’s (or his leadership’s) new policies—preserving regime-associated governance structures, sending reassurances to regional actors, adopting the slogan "Victory, not Vengeance," and the rhetoric of statehood rather than revolution—along with reassurances to Syria’s minorities, do not signify a departure from Salafist-jihadist ideology. Instead, they reflect a transformation within it. Western audiences should keep in mind that the traditionalist wing of the movement began addressing such questions as early as the 2011 Arab Spring.
This shift can be observed, for example, in their stance towards Christians. The Syrian opposition’s handling of Aleppo’s Christian population after its capture—respecting their religious celebrations—reflected this evolution. Salafist-jihadists, since the Arab Spring, have developed two distinct perspectives: one theological and one political. Theologically, they consider Christians "infidels" as a religious jurisprudence. This raises the question of whether targeting these groups is permissible. Here, the political perspective becomes clearer: attacks against Christians are conditioned upon their being "aggressors," a relative determination depending on context and timing.
This stands in stark contrast to the actions of ISIS, particularly against minorities in Iraq. ISIS marked Christian homes with the letter N in Arabic (for Nasara, meaning Christians) and subjected Yazidis to sexual slavery while declaring all Shiites apostates—a position rejected by the traditional Salafi-jihadist ideologues.
These differences underscore the ideological and operational divides between the jihadist factions, with ISIS embracing extreme absolutism while other factions attempt to navigate more pragmatic, albeit still rigid, approaches to their ideological and political challenges.
Jolani’s Conundrum
The challenge facing al-Jolani (and his project) lies not only in confronting "enemy jihadists" but also in weaving alliances and managing the political realities of post-Assad Syria while staying within the bounds of his Salafist-jihadist ideological background without altogether abandoning it. Critical tests face al-Jolani in managing Syria's diverse religious landscape, navigating political actors, and addressing the regional dimension of structural questions in the movement’s ideology. This is particularly relevant regarding relationships with specific actors, including Turkiye, the Gulf states, and—most challenging of all to Salafist-jihadist ideology—Israel.
While these questions might be deferred amidst the ongoing movement's structural shifts, they are not merely ideological challenges but also pertain to the centers of power within the organization itself. A telling example can be found in what Muhammad Abd al-Salam Farag wrote in his booklet about the liberation of Jerusalem:
"There is an argument that the battlefield of jihad today is the liberation of Jerusalem as sacred land. The truth is that liberating sacred lands is a legitimate duty upon every Muslim, but the Prophet (peace be upon him) described the believer as shrewd and cautious, meaning he knows what is beneficial and harmful and prioritizes decisive, current solutions."
Perhaps in this jihadist manifesto, Abu Ahmad found something useful for the jihadist movement and agreed with it. Reflecting on my meeting in Gaza in 2017, I still remember the slight jolt caused by the death of a mosquito on Abu Ahmad’s lamp as I prepared to bid him farewell. I haven’t heard from or about him since. Whatever future may be in store for al-Jolani as he navigates Syria’s post-Assad politics, monitoring his speeches and political behavior will be important to gain insight into his thinking and determine how Syria’s jihadist movement may evolve after fifty years of Assad rule. How al-Jolani may deviate from the jihadist manifesto al Faridah al-Gha’yba (The Neglected Duty) will be critically important in determining Syria’s post-Assad future.
About the Author
Murad Batal is an expert on militant jihadist ideology at The Saratoga Foundation. He is also a Senior Resident Fellow at the New Lines Institute- Middle East Center, and the founder of “Remarks on Political Violence” research group- London.